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ABSTRACT
The thesis discusses the role of the mujtahids of 
Tehran in the Constitutional Revolution, considering their 
contribution both in ideas and organisation. The thesis is 
divided into eight chapters, the first of which deals with 
the relationship between the Lulama and the state, and the 
problem of accommodation with a ruler who was illegitimate 
according to Twelver Shi'ite law. The second chapter 
discusses the economic and social position of the Lulama, 
concentrating on their financial resources, their legal 
duties, and their relationships with other groups, and 
attempting to show the ways in which they were subject to 
pressure. In the third chapter, the role of the ^ulama, 
and particularly the mujtahids, in the coming of the 
Revolution is examined, especially their response to the 
centralisation of government, and the financial crisis at 
the turn of the century. The ideological contribution of 
the leading pro-constitutional mujtahid is discussed in the 
fourth chapter and an attempt made to identify the influences 
upon his ideas. Chapters five and seven deal with the role 
of the pro-constitutional mujtahids as the Revolution 
developed, considering their relationship with their 
following, the part they played in political organisation, 
and in the legitimising of the new Majlis, as well as 
their reactions to financial and legal reform. Chapters 
six and eight concentrate upon the arguments of the leading 
anti-constitutional mujtahid, and examine his relationship 
with the supporters of absolutism. The main themes of the 
conclusion are the contribution of both pro- and anti- 
constitutional mujtahids, ideologically and in organisation; 
their relations with their following; their attitude in 
general to reform; and the effect upon the Uulama of the long 
term trends, of which the Revolution may be said to form a 
part. The conclusion also draws in the work of other 
scholars on the subject, especially Hairi, Algar, Lambton 
and Arjomand.
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has published a work in English their name has been 
rendered in the form they have chosen.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the events of the Iranian 
Constitutional Revolution from 1905-9, and the part played 
in those events by a particular group of the tulama. Strictly 
speaking the lulama are those possessed of uilm (knowledge 
of the sacred texts), and in the narrowest definition should 
include only those who have completed many years of 
theological study. In Qajar Iran, however, the term tended 
to be used of those who made their living from religious 
offices or connections, such as rhapsodists (rau£a khvans), 
certain descendents of the Prophet (sayyids) and students 
(tullab). In this thesis the term lulama is used in the same 
sense, that is to denote what might be called the religious 
estate. In the delimitation of the thesis attention has been 
focussed on the highest ranking of the 1u1ama, the mujtahids y 
but it is on occasion artificial or distorting to mention 
only the muj tahids, in which case the Lulama as a whole are 
referred to.
The Constitutional Revolution formed p^rt of a process 
of change which began in the early 19th century. This process 
comprised new institutional developments and ideological 
influences, trends which affected, amongst others, the lulama. 
These changes arose primarily as a result of the influence that 
Europe exerted upon Iran, politically, economically and 
ideologically. The Shah and his governments were aware of 
the weakness of Iran as compared to Europe and inaugurated 
reforms in the fiscal system, the administration and the army, 
which, however, made little progress. As McDaniel has pointed 
out, such attempts to centralize the government amounted in a 
traditional Islamic society to a policy that might be called 
unconstitutional.  ^ It brought the government into conflict
1. R.A. McDaniel, The Shuster Mission and the Persian 
Constitutional Revolution (Biblioteca Islamica, 
Minneapolis 1974); p.20.
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with powerful interest groups, notably the landowners, the 
provincial authorities, the tribal leaders and the ^ulama.
The movement towards reform had tentative beginnings in
the reign of Fath '•Ali Shah (1797-1834) when the Crown Prince,
LAbbas Mirza, began a reform of the army. Other efforts at
reform followed throughout the century, but as McDaniel has
remarked, without the support of a modern centralizing
bureaucracy, the army succumbed to inefficiency and the
2
peculation of bureaucrats. Amir Kabir, the chief minister 
between 1851 and 1853 tried to reform the legal system by 
establishing loose control of the sharila courts, an attempt 
which brought him into conflict with the lulama. In the 1870's, 
Mirza Muhsin Khan, Sipah Salar, imposed similar measures with 
equal lack of success. In 1872, in an attempt to develop the 
country's resources, the Sipah Salar advised Nasir al-Din Shah 
(1848-1896) to grant a concession to construct railways to a 
British subject, Baron de Reuter, but he was defeated by a 
combination of his personal enemies, and the 1ulama, fearful 
of foreign penetration. A few years later the Shah attempted 
further administrative reforms along the lines of the Ottoman 
Tanzimat, but the measures were thwarted by the provincial
- 3
authorities, including the *-ulama.
The lulama perceived all these proposals as a threat to 
Islam, but they made little or no distinction between the 
interests of Islam and those of the lulama. The movement 
towards centralization threatened the independent power base 
of the religious estate. Attempts at law reform questioned 
by implication the functions of the mujtahid, the highest 
ranking of the ^ulama, and suggested government control of an 
important source of revenue. In the late 1880's, the Shah, 
partly to replenish the treasury and partly to assist the
2. Ibid. p.22 .
3. For an example see Abbott to Rosebery, No.6, 6th April 
1875, Incl.2, FO 60/374.
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development of the country, adopted a policy of selling
concessions to foreigners. As Lambton has pointed out, this
seemed to the lulama to encourage foreign intervention,
4
threatening the Islamic basis of the state. Thus the 
centralizing policy taken up by the government in response to 
pressures from Europe exacerbated relations between the lulama 
and the state, whilst an increased foreign presence from the 
1880's led them to believe the Shah was failing in his duty 
to protect Iran, the land of Shiism.
The West was a source of tension in another sense.
During the latter part of the century Iran was increasingly
penetrated by Western political thought. In the writings of
Malkum Khan, in particular, the practice of sole responsibility
by the Shah was questioned, and tentative moves made towards
5
the sharing of power. From the 1860's various reformers 
including Malkum Khan and Mirza Yusif Khan, Majd al-Mulk, 
placed emphasis on the need to form a code of laws to which 
government officials would be answerable. Such ideas were 
propogated with renewed force in the magazine Qanun published 
in London in the early 1890's by Mirza Malkum Khan. Another 
influential reformer was Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who 
advocated Islamic unity in the face of European expansion, and 
the regeneration of Islam. He is said to have acquired a 
number of disciples on a visit to Iran in 1890. Ideas such as 
those of Malkum Khan changed the traditional perception of the 
nature and duties of government, and influenced a few of the 
lulama amongst others. Certain of the '•ulama also responded 
to Jamal al-Din al-Afghani's pan-Islamic message attempting
4. A.K.S. Lambton, 'The Persian lUlama and the 
Constitutional Revolution', in Le Shlisme Imamite 
Colloque de Strasbourg, 1968 (Paris 1970), pp. 245-269.
5. H. Algar, Mirza Malkum Khan (California 1973). The 
book is a biographical study of his life and ideas.
6. For_a discussion of Afghani, see N.R. Keddie, Sayyid 
Jamal al-Din "al-Afghani" (University of California 
Press 1972).
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to unite all Muslims with its call of Islam in danger. But
the secularizing tendency of Western thought, and the radical
institutional changes it would engender were not necessarily
apparent to those of the lulama who gave it their attention.
Virtually none of them had any experience of Western style
government. Furthermore,the reformers couched their proposals
in strictly orthodox terms in the hope, as Lambton and Keddie
have pointed out, of not offending the lulama and involving
7
them in the protest movement. The penetration of Western 
ideas was still slight, which probably explains why the body 
of the ^ulama made little effort to support or refute them 
before the revolution. It is also doubtful whether those 
few who responded understood fully the practical implications 
of the reformers' ideas. In any case the number who responded 
were small. In 1902 a member of the lesser 'ulama assessed 
that not 80 out of 2000 in the madrasas of Tehran were attunedg
to the country's problems.
Towards the end of the century economic factors were 
forcing the government towards change. As figures are scant, 
and usually no more than rough estimates, it is difficult to 
assess with any certainty the economic position of Iran in the 
latter part of the 19th century and the early years of the 20th. 
It seems inflation was a problem throughout the century but 
particularly felt during the last decade. The chief evidence 
of the government's financial difficulties was a budget
9
deficit which grew in the 1890's from £80,000 to £300,000, 
leading the government to try and impose increases in taxation.
7. A.K.S. Lambton, 'Secret Societies and the Persian 
Revolution of 1905-6', St. Antony's Papers, No.11,
(London 195G}, p.55; N.R. Keddie, 'The Origins of the 
Religious Radical Alliance', Past and Present XXXIV 
1966, p.77.
8. De Graz to Lansdowne, No.107, 21st July 1902, FO 60/651.
9. Lascelles to Russell, No. 106, 20th June 1893,
FO 60/543, Spring Rice to Salisbury, No.7, 9th Jan.
1901, FO 60/636.
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All these forces, institutional adjustments, the impact
of new Western ideas and values, and economic difficulties
were at work in the period just before the Revolution and
during the Revolution itself. The response of the *-ulama to
these factors and their part in politics during the Qajar
period has been studied from different aspects and in varying
depth. The main body of interest has so far fallen on the
role of the lulama in the coming of the Revolution in, for
example, the studies of Lambton,^ K e ddie,and Algar.^
Little, however, has been written about their role during
the events of the Revolution. S.A. Arjomand's article on
the iulama1s traditionalist opposition being the only work so
13far to consider the matter in any detail. One of the 
purposes of this study is therefore to examine the role of 
the lulama during the course of the revolution. Of course, 
some attempt has also been made to consider their part in 
the period before the Revolution and to weigh the conclusions 
in the light of the work of the above mentioned scholars.
The period of study ends in the summer of 1909 as after 
that point the vulama became much less significant. With the 
arrival of the revolutionaries from the North and the 
Bakhtiyarl chiefs in the capital, new and more national forces 
came to dominate the political arena in Tehran. After the 
fall of the Shah the anti-constitutionalist Lulama were 
silenced, whilst the pro-constitutionalists increasingly 
withdrew from politics.
10. A.K.S. Lambton 'Persian tUlama', op. cit.
11. N.R. Keddie 'Religious Radical Alliance', op. cit.; 
Religion and Rebellion in Iran (London 1966); 
'Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian 
Nationalism', Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, IV Part 3 (April 1962), pp. 268-295.
12. H. Algar, Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906, 
(Berkeley 1969).
13. S.A. Arjomand 'The tUlama's Traditionalist Opposition 
to Parliamentarianism: 1907-1909', Middle Eastern 
Studies, XVII No.2 1981, pp. 174-190.
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The lulama made a significant contribution to the
Revolution in ideological terms, and from this point of view
two centres were important, Najaf and Tehran. The arguments
advanced by the lulama of Najaf have already been
14comprehensively covered by A.H. Hairi. The theories of the 
pro- and anti-constitutional lulama of Tehran and their 
significance have not, however, so far been examined. The 
campaign against constitutionalism was led from Tehran by 
Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri, and one of the prime purposes of this 
study is to examine the bases and validity of his arguments, 
and the manner in which the constitutionalists, both lay and 
clerical, attempted to refute them at the time.
It was decided to confine the study to Tehran itself 
because of the diverse and decentralized nature of the body 
politic in Iran at this period. The government was minimal 
so each province was ruled as a separate entity in a manner 
which had seemingly changed little over time. As a result, 
conditions varied from region to region, the Russian influence, 
for example, predominating in the North and the British in the 
South. The bazaar had greater influence in Tabriz, whilst 
the Shrine of Imam Riza was significant in the politics of 
Mashhad. Transport was rudimentary, there being by 1900 
only a few miles of railway and hardly any passable roads.
The most significant change in communications was the building 
of the telegraph lines in the 1860's. Then each region was 
largely autonomous both politically and economically.
Therefore to understand the role played by the *ulama in any 
one region, it would be necessary to examine closely the 
conditions prevailing in that region, necessitating a breadth 
of study outside the scope of this thesis.
The studies already mentioned of the role of the lulama 
up to the Revolution have dealt with them in a mainly general 
way. The time has perhaps come to distinguish between the
14. A.H. Hairi, Shitism and Constitutionalism in Iran 
(Leiden 1977/!
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different types of lulama, most particularly between the
orthodox and the heterodox. The latter were active during
the Revolution, but they were not committed to the same
theoretical and material goals as the orthodox lulama. To
the Azali Babis, for example, it was of little consequence
whether the interests of the shari ^a were considered in the
drafting of the Fundamental Law. This study really concerns
the orthodox Jjolama, but partly because it is not always
possible to say for certain whether or not an ^alim is
orthodox, particularly amongst a numerous class, and partly
because information on individuals is rare, it was decided
to focus upon the mujtahids, though the interests of the
religious estate as a whole are also kept in view. Only three
mujtahids emerge from the sources as being of outstanding
significance - Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri, Sayyid lAbdallah
Bihbihani and Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba'i. Most of the other
• • •
orthodox Uulamarincluding the lesser muj tahids formed part of 
constellations centred around these three leaders, whom, on 
the whole, they allowed to speak for them. Thus information 
as to the particular viewpoint of other individuals is sparse. 
Another reason for focussing on the mujtahids is that, with 
their training in jurisprudence, their eminent stature and 
the privileges accorded to them, their role in the judiciary 
and in the administration of the religious endowments, they 
had the largest investment in the protection of the interests 
of the religious estate.
This thesis seeks to answer a number of questions. One
of these concerns the basic relationship between the mujtahids .
as leaders of the "-ulama^ and the state both in theory and in
practice. It has been argued, chiefly by Algar, that the
lulama regarded the state as fundamentally illegitimate, that
they saw themselves as the only legitimate authority in the
land as the General Agents of the Imam, and that they were
therefore in conflict with the state throughout the 19th 
15century. Yet the question has remained, especially in the
15. H. Algar, Religion and State, o p . cit.
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light of recent events, as to why they did not call upon 
the authority they derived from the doctrine of the General 
Agency, or indeed why they did not make significant mention 
of the Imam in the Revolution of 1905-9. An attempt has been 
made to explore this problem and offer a possible explanation.
Another point under consideration is that the lulama 
as a group and particularly the mujtahids had a great deal 
in common as members of the religious estate as identified 
by Arjomand, yet they did not unite during the Revolution 
to defend their common interests. The sources of their often 
bitter divisions have been examined in this study.
Connected with this question is that of what links the 
^ulama, especially the mujtahids, had with other members of
the community. This point has been touched upon by
16 17G. Gilbar and W.M. Floor. No attempt has, however, been
made so far to consider in detail the relations of the *-ulama
with other groups and how these affected the policies of the
*ulama. The tendency in works so far has been to see the
lulama as a self-motivated and largely self-sufficient group,
the prime movers in the various opposition movements of
which they formed part. In this study an effort has been
made to show that the religious estate was not autonomous,
that although the lulama, above all the muj tahids, possessed
considerable financial resources, these resources were not
under their sole control. Indeed like most other groups in
Qajar Iran their position was insecure and vulnerable to
pressure.
16. G. Gilbar, 'The Big Merchants and the Iranian 
Constitutional Revolution of 1906', Asian and 
African Studies, II No.3 1977,pp.275-303.
17. W.M. Floor, The Guilds in Qajar Persia, unpublished 
Ph.D., University of Leiden 1971; 'The Guilds in Iran 
- an Overview from the Earliest Beginnings to 1972', 
ZOm , CXXV 1975, pp. 99-166.
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The mujtahids played a significant part in what became 
a movement for reform, yet it may be asked whether they had 
a serious interest in reform or understood its implications. 
This study attempts to examine the attitude of the mujtahids 
to the reforms of the Majlis as they were introduced, and in 
the light of their interests as an elite group in the Qajar
state and to consider how far Floor's conclusion that the
— 18 lulama were not reformist is correct. It also looks at
the response of the mujtahids to the movement towards
centralization of government, accountability and institutional
change, and to consider how they were affected by it.
The study concentrates upon the role of the mujtahids 
in the events of the Revolution itself. It is noteworthy 
that they divided ostensibly into two groups, pro- and anti- 
constitutional. It is necessary to examine why they adopted 
these positions, what they understood by them and how far they 
adhered to them, and further to consider whether this was a 
profound, or as Arjomand suggests, a superficial difference.
The mujtahids1 role in the organisation on both sides 
has also been studied, including the part played in the early 
opposition movement in 1905-6, in the establishment of the 
Assembly. The mujtahids have also been considered in relation 
to the formation of political factions in the first Majlis.
The contribution of the anti-constitutionalist mujtahids to 
the organisation of the absolutist campaign against the 
Assembly is discussed as well.
As mentioned above, detailed study has been given in the 
thesis to the ideological standpoint of the mujtahids at the 
time of the Revolution. This subject really falls into two
18. W.M. Floor, 'The Revolutionary Character of the 
Iranian lUlama: Wishful Thinking or Reality?',
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. XII 
1980, pp. 501-524.
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parts, the reformist policies advocated by Tabataba-1 i and
the anti-constitutional theories propounded by Shaikh
Fazlallah. With regard to Tabataba*1 i an effort has been
made to ascertain the sources of his ideas to divine what
he understood by terms drawn from Western thought and to
define his exact goals in the period 1905-6. The vexed
question of what was intended by the *-adalatkhana and its
relation to Tabataba-1 i' s aims has also been taken up.
• •
Shaikh Fazlallah has attracted much attention in recent 
years, particularly in Tehran itself. His arguments against 
constitutionalism have been touched on by Hairi but no 
detailed study has so far been made. This study attempts to 
identify the basis of his objections, as well as the themes 
of his arguments and their strength as against the 
constitutionalist refutations. The arguments are also 
discussed in their particular political context together with 
the problem of Shaikh Fazlallah's relationship with the 
absolutist cause. The same considerations are given to 
Shaikh Fazlallah's advocacy of mashruta-yi mashru^a and 
the implications of this phrase.
For the study, a variety of Persian sources have been
used. Of the primary sources, the richest in material is
still probably Nazim al-Islam Kirmani's Tarikh-i Bidari-yi 
- - 19Iraniyan. This work appears to have been begun as the minutes 
of the Secret Society which Nazim al-Islam formed in 1905, 
was subsequently extended into a diary, and was finally turned 
into a book in 1911 with an introductory section on 19th 
century reformers and leading participants in the Revolution. 
During 1907-1908 Na^im al-Islam was engaged on the newspaper
19. Na^im al-Islam Kirmani, Mirza Muhammad, Tarikh-i 
Bidari-yi Iraniyan(History of the Awakening of 
the Iranian People), Tehran 1357/1978-9 edition.
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Kaukab Dari which published some sections of his writings,
so unfortunately there is a break in the Bidari for that
period. The book chronicles with remarkable detail the
political events of the period, reproducing where possible
both the rescripts issued by the Shah and the propoganda
leaflets (shabnama) distributed by the opposition. The
author had a variety of contacts among '•ulama, bazaaris and
bureaucrats, and, of the Persian accounts, his work has
usually proved the most accurate since, on the whole, he
resists the temptation of embellishment. Though Nazim
al-Islam was a client of TabatabaJi, and the work is biased
• •
in favour of the constitutional cause, it has the immense 
advantage for the historian of not carefully selecting the 
events described and of not being moulded by hindsight.
-20Another contemporary account is the gayat-i Yafrya '
the autobiography of Mirza Yahya Daulatabadi. The author
claims to have begun writing his memoirs as early as
1310/1892-3 and at least part of his work was known to
Nazim al-Islam in 1911. The work is slightly marred by
Daulatabadi's desire to inflate his own role in events, a
feat which is sometimes achieved at the expense of accuracy.
Nevertheless it is a useful source because Daulatabadi had a
closer acquaintance with some of the Qajar notables, in
particular, Ih£isham al-Saltana, a Qajar prince and second 
• •
president of the Majlis, than did Nazim al-Islam, and his 
work provides greater insight into the factional struggles 
within both the government and the Majlis.
Two more contemporary accounts are the diaries of 
Mirza ‘•Ali Khan, gahir al-Daula,^ and of Haji Mirza Sayyid
20. Y. Daulatabadi, Tarikh-i MuccLgir ya Hayat-i Yahya 
(A Contemporary History or the Life of Yahy5),
Tehran 1337/1958-9.
21. Zahir al-Daula^ Mirza '■All Khan Qajar, Khatirat 
va Asnad-i Zahir al-Daula (The Memoirs and Papers 
of Zahir al-Dawla), ed. by I. Afshar, Tehran 
1348/1969-70.
16 -
_  _  -  22Ahmad Tafrishi Husaini, both edited by I. Afshar.
Zahir al-Daula, a Qajar prince of enlightened views, was,
during the period under study, governor first of Hamadan,
and then of Gilan and of Mazandaran. However, from the
point of view of the historian of events in Tehran his diary
and papers are useful because of his many well placed
correspondents in the capital. The Ruznama of Husaini
" •
is a spare account of events with little comment, but 
nevertheless containing some interesting details.
For the period just before the Revolution Mirza 'Ali
- 23Khan, Amin al-Daula's memoirs reveal the factional struggles
within the government and the impediments placed in the path
of reform, particularly by the '►ulama. Some of the leading
- - 24constitutionalists such as Sayyid Hasan Taqizada and
- - - *25Mirza Sadiq Khan, Mustashar al-Daula have written their
own versions of events at various times. These works are
valuable on such points as the role of the Tabriz deputies,
the working of the Majlis committees of which they were
members, and the struggles over the word mashruta in 1907.
They are perhaps more fruitful for a study of the militant
constitutionalists, especially those from Tabriz, than for
one on the 'ulama . One unusual autobiography is Aqa Najafi
Quchani's sharp and vivid account of the hardships of his 
2 6youth. It gives much information of value on the life of 
a minor member of the 'ulama during this period.
22. Tafrishi Husaini, Haji Mirza Sayyid Atymad, Ruznama-yi 
Akhbar-i Mcishrutiyycit va Inqilab -i Iran 1321-1328
(A Dairy of the Constitutional Movement and the 
Iranian Revolution 1321-1328) ed. I. Afshar,
Tehran 1351/1972-3.
23. Amin al-Daula, Mirza cAli Khan, Khatirat-i Siyasi, 
(Political Memoirs), ed. I Afshar, Tehran 1341/1962-3.
24. Taqizada, Sayyid Hasan, Khitaba, Tarikh-i AvaJi;Ui 
Ingilab-i MashrTita dar Iran (The History of the 
Beginning of Revolution and_Constitutionalism in Iran, 
from the Lectures of Taqizada), Tehran 1338/1959-60, p.46
25. Mustashar al-Daula Mirza Sadiq Khan, Yaddashtha-yi
Tarikhi-yiMustashar al-Daula (The Historical Notes of Mustash 
al-Daula)/ ed. I. Afshar, Tehran 1361/1982-3.
26. Najafi Quchani, Aqa yasan, Sjyahatna<na-yi Sharq 
(Journey to the East: An Autobiography of Aqa Najafi 
Quchani), Mashhad 1351/1972-3.
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A further major source on the Revolution, particularly 
for the period 1907-1908 is the Persian newspapers. For the 
years prior to the Revolution there are such papers as the 
Uabl al-Matin of Calcutta and the Akhtar of Cairo, published 
abroad. These latter would perhaps be most useful for a 
student of the development of reformist and westernising 
opinion, since their content is largely discursive. Their 
lists of contributors to various projects are interesting, 
especially as many of these were merchants. As chronicles of 
events in Tehran they are not to be compared in reliability 
with the accounts, especially in the British archives, of 
those on the spot. The vast body of the newspapers published 
in the capital during the Revolution were pro-constitutional. 
Fortunately E.G. Browne made a large and fairly comprehensive 
collection of these papers, which is now in Cambridge University 
Library. There is also a much smaller collection in the 
British Library. As with the newspapers published abroad, the 
contents are largely discursive, dealing with the progress of 
the Majlis and of proposed reforms. From the point of view of 
this study the most useful have been Majlis, with its accounts, 
published on average three or four times a week, of the 
debates of the Assembly. These accounts are undoubtedly 
flawed. To begin with, as contemporary observers commented, 
the debates themselves were often rambling and disorderly. 
Discussion would either go in circles round a point or else 
a subject scheduled for debate might suddenly be dropped in 
favour of an extraneous issue raised by one of the speakers.
In addition, the account of the debates is precised, and 
whoever made the precis had particular interests and 
prejudices of his own. The result can often make very 
frustrating reading. There is a further difficulty in that 
Majlis was owned and run by relatives of the leading culama 
so that material detrimental to the prestige of the *»ulama 
is edited out. Thus for the period of the crucial debate over 
the Supplementary Fundamental Law in 1907, during which the 
lulama vehemently opposed certain articles, the debate contents 
appear in the briefest precis, and indeed only a few issues of
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the paper were published, because, or so the editor 
explained, there was a shortage of the right size of paper 
in Tehran. Nevertheless the debates are important in giving 
an understanding of the preoccupations of the Majlis, of the 
views of particular deputies, and their role and as a source 
of information on current events. They may be supplemented 
by the shorter but sometimes more coherent accounts in the 
British archives. It should be remembered, however, that 
much of the work of the Majlis was carried out in committees, 
and it was the members of these committees, who sometimes 
contributed little of note to the debates, who were the most 
powerful deputies.
Not all the constitutionalist press was either well
informed or responsible. Certain papers were recognized by 
27Browne as having a higher standard than others, including 
Babl al-Matin of Tehran, Majlis and Sur-i .Israfil* These 
newspapers primarily have been used for this study as the 
source for contemporary constitutionalist refutations of the 
arguments of Shaikh Fazlallah. Certain other papers are of 
value for particular purposes. Mufrakimat, for example, 
published the records of the trials of the Shah's roughs.
They are valuable in giving an insight into the anti­
constitutionalist demonstrations, and indeed into how a mob 
might be raised and organized.
It is not entirely clear why the absolutists did not 
set up their own press since they cannot have lacked the 
money. Perhaps it was because in 1907 support for the Majlis 
was overwhelming so they felt it fruitless. The difficulties 
encountered by Shaikh Fazlallah (see below) in persuading any 
printer to publish his leaflets, suggest a kind of unofficial 
censorship was operating, anti-constitutionalists being 
intimidated from coming into the open. Such open protests 
as they were able to organize took a religious form, which 
afforded them some protection.
27. E.G. Browne, The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia 
(Cambridge 1914), p.23.
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Whatever the reason, the only anti-constitutionalist
press set up at this time, undoubtedly with money provided
by the Shah and the conservatives, was that of Shaikh
Fazlallah in the Shrine of Shah LAbd al-Azim. Its
productions can hardly be termed newspapers being more
accurately called propoganda leaflets. They are mostly only
two or three sheets, and do not have the usual attributes
of a newspaper such as an editorial, information or comment
on current events, or letters. Their purpose is simply to
convey, usually in a single article, the anti-constitutional
message. Their leaflets have been collected and published
—  —  28with an introduction by M.I. Ri2vani.
In addition to his newspaper, Shaikh Fazlallah also 
published a treatise entitled Tadhkirat al-Ghafil ua Irshad 
al-Jahil (A Reminder to the Negligent and a Guide to 
the Ignorant). In it he sets out in some detail his 
arguments against constitutionalism. A treatise in 
refutation of Shaikh Fazlallah's arguments was published 
anonymously by Ma j1i s press. These two treatises together 
with copies of other documents and correspondence have been 
obtained from Iran with the kind assistance of 
Dr. H. Modarressi.
In recent years a number of invaluable collections of 
documents and memoirs including many from the period under 
study have been edited and published, most notably through
28. M.I. Rizvani, 'Ruznama-yi Shaikh Fazlallah' (Shaikh 
Fazlallah's Newspaper), Tarikh, (Appendix to the 
Journal of the Faculty of Humanities , Tehran 
University), II _ Part I, pp. 159-209,
2536 Shahanshahi/1977.
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-29 - -30the efforts of I. Afshar and I. Safari . These papers
include correspondence sent to Amin al-Sultan, Sadr-i A zam
• •
during his period of exile# by his adherents in Tehran. Though
comparatively scant some of these letters provide an insight
into the views of those who were sceptical of or opposed the
constitutional movement. Another important source of
published documents is the various Persian journals
particularly Barrisiha-yi Tarikhi# Rahnama-yi Kitab# Yaghma
and Vahid. Material from these journals has included letters
from various members of the *-ulama, the memoirs of Haj Shaikh 
- - 31Mahdi Sharif, and the reports of the government spies which
have also been published by Yaghma'i in his book on Sayyid
- - 32 Jamal al-Din Isfahani.
I. Afshar, Maqalat-i Taqizada (The Articles of 
Taqizada), ed. I. Afshar, Tehran 1359/1970-1;
Aurag-i Tazah Yab-i MashrTitiyyat MarbTit bi. Salhia-yi 
1325-1330 Qamari (Newly Discovered Documents on the 
Constitutional Revolution), ed. I Afshar, Tehran 
1359/1980-1?
Mubariza ba Muhammad ^Ali Shah (The Campaign Against 
Muhammad ^Ali Shah)^ Tehran 1359/1980-l£ _
Yad-dashtha~yi Qazvlni (The Notes of Qazvini) f e(j#
I. Afshar, Tehran 1333-45/1954-66•
I. §afa^i, Asnad-i Siyasi-yi Daura-yi Qajariyya 
(Political documents of the Qajar Period), Tehran 
1346/1967-8; Asnad-i Mashruta (Documents of the 
Constitutional Period), Tehran 1348/1969-70;
Asnad-i Nau Yafta (Newly Discovered Documents),
Tehran 1349/1970-7l£ Asnad-i Barguzida az Sipah 
Salar, 7-ill al-Sultan, Dabir al-Mulk (A Collection 
of Documents from the Qajar Period) , Tehran 1350/1971-2.
Sharif Kashani^Haj Shaikh Mahdi, 'Tarikh-i Mashrutiyyat-i 
Iran' (A Histofy of the Constitutional Movement in 
Iran), Vahid Nos. 206-9, 215-16, 218-20 1356/1977-8.
I. Yaghma^i, Shahid-i Rah- i Azadi, Sayyid Jamal 
al-Din Isfahani (Sayyid Jamal al-Din Isfahani, a 
Martyr on the Road to Freedom), Tehran^ 253^/19?^.
29.
30.
31.
32.
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Most of the published Persian sources that exist 
consist of the dairies, letters and memoirs of those who 
were in su.pport of the constitution. As a result the sources 
convey overwhelmingly one point of view. Unfortunately such 
persons as lAin al-Daula and Amir Bahadur do not appear to 
have attempted any memoirs. Perhaps, however, there may 
be papers in the possession of their descendents which 
await publication, and which may throw more light on the 
views of the absolutists.
It has been extremely disappointing that during the 
period of research for this study it has not been possible 
because of the political situation there to go to Tehran 
itself. There is almost certainly a good deal of unpublished 
material there, some of it in libraries such as the Majlis 
and Milll Libraries and some of it in private archives, 
such as that of the Mahdavi family, the descendents of Amin al- 
2arb. It was originally hoped in particular to find more 
material for Chapter I, especially of examples of treatises 
lending justification to the rule of the Shah.
In default of an opportunity to research into the 
Tehran libraries, close reference has been made to Persian 
books and manuscripts in the British Library, the India 
Office Library, the Bodleian and Cambridge University Library. 
Through the kind assistance of Dr. J. Gurney the library of 
Wadham College, Oxford, has also been used. A search was 
made particularly for works pertaining to the relationship 
between the lulama and the state but although these libraries 
possess innumerable works of figh little came to light that 
was relevant to this study. The one notable exception was a 
hitherto unknown tract by Shaikh Fazlallah entitled Su'al va 
Javab, a copy of which is in the British Library.
Perhaps the best known secondary source in Persian on 
the Constitutional Revolution is A. Kasravl's Tarikh-i
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33Mashruta-yi Iran. The work is a comprehensive study of 
"  ■ ~ -
the events of the Revolution in Tehran and Tabriz with 
particular emphasis on the latter. Like virtually all 
Persian historians writing on the subject Kasravi is 
dedicated to the constitutionalist cause. His work is 
based on a variety of sources both oral and written, but 
the account of the early years of the Revolution is derived 
largely from the Bidari of Nazim al-Islam Kirmani. Kasravi 
does publish in full some of the documents he used which 
include papers from the family of Shaikh Fazlallah.
Kasravi scrutinized the role of the Uulama in particular and 
was at pains to show they understood little of the term 
'constitutionalism'. It has been said of Kasravi's work 
that he was the first to stress the role of the poor and 
unknown in the Revolution. However, this effect is achieved 
largely by employing the most unhelpful word 'the people' 
(mardum). On closer examination Kasravi's mardum 
usually indicates merchants or guildsmen who were not 
specially poor or unknown. Of the viewpoint of the mass of 
the very poor, constituting over half the population little 
is recorded. Probably the most illuminating comment so 
far has been made by E. Abrahamian in his article on the 
crowds in the Revolution
A further weighty work in Persian is the seven volumes 
of M. Malikzada's Tarikh-i Ingilab-i Mashrutiyyat-i Iran.^
33. A Kasravi, Tarikh-i Mashruta-yi Iran (A History 
of the Constitutional Movement in Iran), Tehran 
1319/1940-1.
34. E. Abrahamian, 'The Crowd in the Persian 
Revolution', Iranian Studies, II 1969, pp.128-150.
35. M._Malikzada, Tarikh-i Inqilab-i Mashrutiyyat-i 
Iran (A History of the Iranian Constitutional 
Revolution), Tehran ed* 2536/1977-8*
- 23 -
The study suffers primarily from the author's desire to give
prominence to the part played in the Revolution by his father,
Malik al-Mutakallimin. The major source for the early part
of the book, largely unacknowledged, is Daulatabadi's Hayat-i
Yahya, which at times Malikzada repeats word for word, and at
others distorts in accordance with his aim of glorifying his 
3 6 —father. Malikzada has, however, probably been most
gravely misleading on the subject of the secret society or
anjuman, which he claims his father belonged to before the
Revolution. Close examination of this anjuman suggests strongly
37that it did not exist in the form he describes it. In spite 
of these considerable flaws Malikzada's account is still a 
source that cannot be ignored. Most important he has published 
in full original documents which are so far not otherwise 
available. These include the long fatva issued by Shaikh 
Fazlallah some time after the fall of the Majlis. Some of his 
material, though not always reliable or verifiable, is based 
on oral accounts of participants in, or eye witnesses to,
36. Compare for example his account of the events of 
the bast in Shah uAbd al-^A^im 1905-6 Vol.II,
pp. 47-90 with that of Daulatabadi, Vol.II, pp. 10-33.
37. The reasons for this contention_are that although 
Daulatabadi and Haj Shaikh Mahdi Sharif Kashani are 
listed as belonging to the secret society neither 
mentions such an organisation in his memoirs, and 
it is highly unlikely they would have omitted it
if it had existed. Even though security appears 
to have been_more lax_under Muzaffar al-Din Shah 
than under Na$ir al-Din Shah (see Nazim al-Islam, 
op. cit, Vol.I, p.252-3) it is scarcely credible 
that there could have been a secret gathering with 
53 members, without considerable risk of detection. 
Nazim al-Islam's secret society, the best documented 
so*far, had only about seven members, and that of 
Haj Shaikh Mahdi Sharif five members. Amongst the 
projects of the secret society that of uniting _
Tabataba*i and Bihbihani is given, but Nazim al-Islam's 
account shows this suggestion in fact comes from his 
society, . Finally it may be noted that 1904 would 
have to be the date when the society was founded as 
in 1905 Malik al-Mutakal.limin was in Kurdestan in the 
service of Salar al-Daula.
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events. Further, he himself though a child at the time of 
the Revolution could look back with a certain understanding 
on the social and political conditions of the period. Thus 
some of his comments, as for example on the nature of the 
link between the ^ulama and the merchants, are illuminating.
More recent works in Persian on the Revolution include 
• — — 38M.I. Rizvani' , a clear succinct account which makes use of
original material, notably from the memoirs of the Mukhbir
al-Saltana. Other recent works,though perused^have not been
included in the bibliography as they do not appear to use any
new sources or present a fresh or original point of view.
- 39The outstanding exceptions are the works of F. Adamiyyat.
These include Afkar-i Ijtima;i va Siyasi va Igtisadi, a 
compendium of treatises and other documents edited in 
collaboration with H. Natiq and providing much valuable 
original material; Andisha-yi Taraggi va Hukumat-i Qanun, on 
the reforms of Sipah Salar, showing the influence of the 
Ottoman reforms of the Tanzimat and tracing the development 
of new ideas on government and administration; Idi^uluzhi-yi 
Nanzat-i Mashrutiyyat-i Iran on the influence of western 
ideology and concepts on the constitutional movement up to 
and including the Revolution; and Fikr-i Dimukrasi-yi Ijtima1! 
dar Nahzat-i Mashrutiyyat-i Iran which deals with social 
democratic thought during the constitutional movement.
38. M.I. Rizvani, Inqilab-i Mashrutiyyat-i Iran (The 
Iranian Constitutional Revolution), Tehran,
1344/1965-6, p.145.
39. F. Adamiyyat, Afkar-i Ijtima^i va Siyasi va Igtisadi 
dar Asar-i Muntashir Nashuda-yi Daura-yi Qajar 
(Social, Political and Economic Thought in Unpublished 
Documents of the Oajar Period) ed._F. Adamiyyat and
H. Natiq, Tehran_1356/1977-8; Andisha-yr . Taraggi 
va Hukumat-i Qanun cAgr-i Sipah Salar (The Idea of 
Progress and the Rule of Law during_the_Period of 
Sipah Salar), Tehran 1352/1973-4; Idi 1 uluzhi-yi 
Nahzat-i Mashrutiyyat-i Iran (The Ideological Background 
to the Constitutional Movement), Tehran 2535/1976;
Fikr-i Dimukrasi-yi Ijtima1-! dar Nah£at-i Mashrutiyyat 
(Social Democratic Thought in the Background to the 
Constitutional Movement), Tehran 2535/1976.
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Of the non-Persian primary sources, the British diplomatic 
Archives at the Public Records Office are the most extensive. 
These fall into several groups. The FO 60 series contains 
the diplomatic correspondence from the Legation up till 19 06 
arranged by date order. From 1906 onwards it is superceded by 
the FO 371 series in which correspondence is arranged partly 
by subject and partly by date in a somewhat confusing manner, 
and the index to it is not complete. In addition there are 
FO 539 and FO 416 confidential print series. In this study 
reference has been made to the original papers in the FO 60 
and FO 371 series, but sometimes the originals listed in the 
Legation ledgers are missing, in which case reference has been 
made to the confidential print. The diplomatic correspondence 
provides a continuous detailed and often perspicacious comment 
on contemporary problems. Unlike the Persian sources which 
tend to see the ills of the country in terms of those who 
desired reform from below, the British sources show the 
difficulties confronting the government as it struggled to 
effect reform from above. On the other hand, the British 
officials necessarily viewed events primarily with the 
furtherance and protection of British interests in mind. Where 
government attempts at change impinged on these interests, they 
could be as subjectively critical as any other group whose 
interests were affected. During the Constitutional Revolution 
a number of the Legation staff became devotees of the 
constitutional cause without always considering its full 
implications for Iran,and even giving it precedence over the 
foreign policy of their own government. Many of their contacts 
were with the Iranian constitutionalists, such as Taqizada and 
Daulatabadi so that one point of view may be represented 
overwhelmingly and others become submerged. These prejudices 
and preferences must be taken into account in using the 
British diplomatic archives.
In addition to the diplomatic correspondence there is the 
FO 248 series containing consular papers, correspondence to 
and from Iranians, and miscellaneous correspondence. The
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consular papers contain despatches often not sent on to 
London with a great deal of information provided by consuls 
who were sometimes long-resident in their area. The 
correspondence to and from Iranians consists largely of 
papers connected with the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
but has yielded some useful letters from members of the lulama 
and others. The miscellaneous correspondence contains the 
despatches from the British representatives in Turkish Arabia, 
and provides comments on the Lulama of Najaf, with whom the 
British had a certain amount of contact over the management 
of foundations endowed from India, such as the Oudh bequest. 
Although they cannot provide the same insight into the inter­
relations of the lulama of the lA^abat as some Persian sources, 
they possess a degree of objectivity not always found in the 
uncritical and often life-long devotion of a member of the 
*ulama to his particular maitre. One other useful series is 
the FO 800, Private Collections of Ministers and Officials.
Since the involvement of a number of the lulama in the 
reform movement began with the campaign against Joseph Naus, 
the Belgian Minister of Customs, the Belgian archival material 
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brussels has also been 
examined. This highlights more clearly than the British sources 
the reform programme begun in 1897 of which the customs reforms 
formed a part. Further, although the campaign against Naus 
was led by the wulama, the Belgians significantly identified 
the merchants and certain of the notables as their real 
opponents. The Belgian material provides an independent point 
of view that would be valuable in a study of Anglo-Russian 
activity in Iran, and also much that would be of use in 
research on the economy.
With the aim of obtaining fresh evidence a limited 
knowledge of Russian was laboriously acquired by the present 
writer. The telegrammes and despatches from Hartwig to 
Izvolsky published by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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4 0in 1911 as a collection in a book constitute an important 
primary source, particularly on the events of the Maidan 
Tupkhana in 1907 and the coup of 1908. Of course one of the 
problems with this correspondence is that Hartwig's policy 
differed from Izvolsky's and his presentation of events 
cannot always be relied on.
A special effort was made to find fresh material in
personal archives in this country but unfortunately the
effort did not prove very fruitful. Some years ago
Dr. R.M. Burrell made a thorough research of material
available in private and public archives which yielded most
particularly the discovery of Churchill's Biographical Notes
of 1905 in the papers of the 4th Earl of Minto in the National
41Library of Scotland. On the advice of Dr. Burrell the
National Register of Archives, Historical Manuscripts
Commission was consulted for this study, as new private
collections become available from time to time. Of the
public servants posted to Tehran at the turn of the century
A. Hardinge and C. Marling were listed. However, nineteen
letters of Hardinge in the Library of Hastings Town Hall
proved to be little more than brief notes, none of them
relevant to the period under study. The Marling family when
contacted, made a search for correspondence relating to Iran,
but without success. Spring Rice's letters were collected and
42published by Gwynn, and Hardinge wrote his memoirs in his 
43old age.
40. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sbornik 
diplomaticheskikh dokumentov kasaiushchiksia 
sobytii v. Persii s kontsa 1906 g» ,po iiul, 1909 g. 
(Collection of Diplomatic Documents Relative to the 
events in Persia from the End of 1906 to July 1909),
St. Petersburg 1911-1913.
41. R.M. Burrell, Aspects of the Reign of Mugaffar al-Din 
Shah of Persia 1896-1907, Ph.D.- ( London University 
1979).
42. S. Gwynn, The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil 
Spring Rice: A Record (London 1929).
43. A. Hardinge, A Diplomatist in the East (London 1928).
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The two main collections of private papers at present 
available are both in the Cambridge University Library. One 
is the correspondence of Sir Charles Hardinge which contains 
a number of letters from diplomats at the Tehran Legation 
during the period under study. The other is the large 
collection of papers of E.G. Browne recently donated to the 
library by his family. Although still quite unsorted the 
collection has been made accessible to research students 
through the most helpful efforts of Mr. K. Dalby, Assistant 
Under Librarian. It contains letters in both Persian and 
English including some material which Browne gathered for 
his book on the Constitutional Revolution but did not use.
There is also some interesting material still unpublished 
for the years 1910-11, chiefly letters from members of the 
Legation.
Of secondary sources on the Revolution the earliest is
44E.G. Browne's The Persian Constitutional Revolution 1905-9. 
Although written with a strong liberal bias the book contains 
useful primary material and some enlightening observations 
by the author. In more recent years the Constitutional 
Revolution and the Qajar period in Iran have attracted a good 
deal of attention and a number of studies have come out. The 
works of Algar, Keddie, Lambton, Hairi and Arjomand have 
already been mentioned. In his work on monarchy, bureaucracy 
and reform S. Bakhash examines attempts at reform from above 
and analyses why they failed, noting particularly the influence
of rival political factions in undermining each others>
45 46endeavours. McDaniel in his study of the Shuster Mission
introduces the new and important argument that much of the
dissatisfaction at the time of the Revolution arose from the
government's centralizing policy, and not, as had previously
44. E.G. Browne, The Persian Constitutional Revolution 
1905-9, first published 1910 (London 1966 edition).
45. S. Bakhash, Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform under 
the Qajars: 1858-1896 (London 1978) .
46.- R.A. McDaniel, Shuster Mission, op. cit.
- 29 -
been argued, from decline and growing oppression. In his
history of Iran in recent times E. Abrahamian sees the
Revolution as a result of the growth of a new bourgeoisie
but does not really illustrate that there had been the growth
in trade, industry and enterprise to produce such a class,
though there is evidence of an interest in reform amongst 
47the bazaaris. In a recent book on 19th century heterodoxy
and dissent M. Bayat has provided an excellent concise and
lucid summary of 19th century Iranian heterodoxies involving
48the study of material often complicated and obstruse.
Her theory, however, of a continuity between these heterodoxies 
and the Constitutional Revolution must be questioned. For 
one thing., as she herself points out, the heterodoxies are the 
product of a medieval world view. For another they are 
essentially religious offering few ideas on a new political 
structure or a new theory of political authority. 
Constitutionalism may be described as irreligious but this 
is not the same as heterodox. On the subject of foreign 
relations Kazemzadeh's work gives a broad outline of Russian 
and British policy towards Iran from the mid-19th century
to the early twentieth century, touching on the constitutional
• j  49 period.
A number of articles have also proved useful in the 
study. With regard to the relationship between the culama
and the state, A.K.S. Lambton has commented on the arguments
-  -  -50 -
of Mirza Qummi and touched on Shaikh Jalfar Najafi's
- 51limited proposals in her study of his view of lihad.
47. E. Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions 
(Princeton 1982).
48. M. Bayat, Mysticism and Dissent (New York 1982).
49. F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914 
(New Haven 1968).
50. A.K.S. Lambton, 'Some New Trends in Islamic Political 
Thought in Late 18th Century and Early 19th Century 
Persia', Studia Islamica, XXXIX 1974, pp.95-128
51. A.K.S. Lambton, 'A Nineteenth Century View of Jihad', 
Studia Islamica, XXXII 1970, pp. 180-192.
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S.A. Arjomand has highlighted the attempts to find a
52concordence between religion and state. The sources of
authority of the Iranian Lulama have been identified by
53Binder and compared with those of the Sunnis. N. Keddie
has shown the influence of the heterodox and radicals on
54Iranian reformism and nationalism. She has also pointed
out the way the reformers made westernising ideas acceptable
55to the culama by presenting them in Islamic guise.
A.H. Hairi has given an introductory translation of the
•" — C f.
fatva issued by Shaikh Fazlallah after June 1908. The part
played by the lulama of Najaf and the manner in which their
opposition was utilized by the British is discussed by 
57R.L. Greaves.
The involvement of other groups has also been brought 
out recently. G. Gilbar has drawn attention to the role of
the major merchants in organizing and funding the bast in
5 8 T 1
1906. The organisation and the social and economic links
of the guilds, including the fact that the lulama acted as
brokers for them with the state has been discussed by
W.M. Floor.59
52. S. A Arjomand, ' The Shi'ite Kierocracy and the State in
Pre-modern Iran: 1785-1890', European Journal of
Sociology, XXII 1981, pp. 40-78.
53. L. Binder 'The Proofs of Islam: Religion and Politics
in Iran', Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honour of
H.A.R. Gibb. (Leiden 1965 ) •
54. Keddie, 'Roots', o p . cit.
55. Keddie, 'Religious Radical Alliance', o p . cit.
56. A.H. Hairi, 'Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri's Refutation of the 
Idea of Constitutionalism', Middle Eastern Studies 
XXIII No.3 1977, pp. 227-239.
57. R.L. Greaves 'British Policy in Persia 1892-1903' 
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 
XXVIII (1965) I, pp. 34-60, II, pp. 284-307.
58. Gilbar, 'Merchants', op. cit.
59. Floor, 'Guilds', o p . cit.
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A number of theses have proved illuminating, notably
fi 0N. Calder's work on authority in Shi'ite jurisprudence
which traces the development of the fundamental doctrine of
the delegation of authority from the Sixth Imam to the
julama, and their assumption of the executive powers of the
absent Imam. M. Ettehadieh Nezam Mafi's thesis based on much
fresh material discusses the development of political
61organisations during the period. H. Modarressi's work on 
kharaj in Shiite law concentrates on the lawfulness or 
otherwise of the ^ulama's accepting the proceeds of the 
kharaj tax, touching on the relationship between religion and 
state.^
60. N. Calder, The Structures of Authority in Imami Shi'i 
Jurisprudence, unpublished Ph.D. ^London University 
1980}
61. M. Ettehadieh Nezam Mafi, Origin and Development of 
Political Parties in Persia 1906-1911, unpublished 
Ph.D. (Edinburgh University 1980}
62. H. Modarressi, Kharaj in Shi1! Law from the Beginnings 
to the 10th/16th Century, unpublished D.Phil.
(Oxford University 1982}
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CHAPTER I
THE BASIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MJLAMA AND THE 
STATE
The basis of the relationship between the tulama and 
the state is profoundly affected by Shiite juristic theory, 
which developed along lines different to the Sunni. The 
essentials of Shi‘ite doctrine evolved largely under Sunni 
rulers and accorded them no legitimate status in Shi'ite law. 
The advent of the Safavid Shahs, who were Shica, posed the 
problem of what authority the ^ulama could grant to a 
Shiite ruler. This problem was accentuated under the Qajars 
who had no claim to the throne other than the seizure of 
power.
The ShiLa, like the Sunnis, accepted the message and 
authority of the Prophet, but not the authority of the 
Companions. They believed that men could not avoid sin 
unless they had an infallible leader to stand in the place 
of the Prophet and carry out all his functions except 
revelation. None of the Prophet's Companions were infallible 
except his son-in-law, uAli, whose place as the rightful 
successor to the Prophet was usurped. ‘■Ali was the first 
Imam, or infallible leader, and his descendents, who are 
likewise infallible, are the only legitimate leaders of the 
Shi'ite community. There are twelve Imams in all including 
^Ali, but the twelfth has gone into occultation, a conclusion 
reached by the Shlva in the 10th century. The reasons given 
for his occultation have been several, but the foremost is 
perhaps his fear of his enemies among men. At first the 
Imam was represented by a series of four deputies, each a 
naJib-i khass or Specific Agent. After their passing, 
interpretation of the law remained with its custodians, the 
tulama. They derive their authority from a delegation 
from the Sixth Imam, Ja^far al-Sadiq, and it is conferred on 
them because of their knowledge of the Imami hadith. The 
theory of the delegation, which evolved first in the 10th-
1. D.M. Donaldson, The Shi'ite Religion (London 1933), p.310
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11th centuries, appears to have referred only to judicial 
2
authority. The executive functions of the Imam were 
considered lapsed, (sagif). As Calder has shown, in the 
period between the 11th and the 16th centuries the lulama 
assumed most of the executive duties of the Imam. These
included gaza, control of the canonical taxes, khums and
- - 3zakat, and defensive jihad. As a result of the delegation,
as Binder has pointed out, the Shl^a lulama are in a stronger 
theoretical position that the Sunnis.
The guidance of the community by the wulama is provided
not only in answers to questions, but in the example of the
highest ranking and most learned of their number, the
mujtahids. They may act according to their own judgement,
ijtihad. Other believers must imitate their example, and
are called mugallid. The theory of ijtihad was first
explicitly expressed in the work of Hasan ibn Yusif ibn
Mutahhar al-Hilli al-'Allama (d. 1325 A.D.). He stated that
it was both permissible and incumbent for the mugallid
4
to act on the basis of the opinions of the mujtahid.
The mujtahids owe their eminence to their knowledge of 
the roots of law, and it is this which entitles them to 
exercise ijtihad, that is:
'The searching for a correct opinion (raJy-yi gavab) 
particularly in the deducing of the specific_provisions 
of religious law (furu>) from principles (usul) and 
ordinances (ahkam)T^
I
This provides the believer with the logical proof without 
which he may not act. The obligation of the Imamis to 
follow the direction of a mujtahid is also based on the duty 
of loyalty and obedience to the Hidden Imam, which is
2. N. Calder, op. cit., p.72, p.77,
3. Ibid., p.77, p.78/ pp.121-130.
4. Ibid., p.240.
5. Algar, Religion and State, op. cit., p.6.
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transferred to his representatives, the muj tahids. Apart 
from his learning, the mujtahid is an ordinary believer.
The mujtahid is known as a marjai-i taqlid, an example to be 
imitated, and it is to him that the mugallid personally pays 
his contributions of khums and zakat. From the nineteenth 
century there has on occasion been one marja^-i taqlid of 
all the Twelver Shi'•a, but on the whole the ShiLa system 
resists such hierarchical structure.
Fundamentally, the chain of authority in Shiite
jurisprudence leads from the Divine word to the Prophet and
the Imams, and thence to the lulama. According to this chain
the only legitimate ruler is the absent Imam, and there is
no place within it for the temporal ruler. In practice,
however, the executive powers of the wulama, as defined in
their theory of jurisprudence, do not cover all aspects of
government, and in particular do not deal with the keeping
of good order or the means of defending the country. Like
the Sunnis the Imami ^ulama had to contend with powers who
established themselves without the benefit of religious
sanctions. Their response was largely one of passivism,
following a dictate of the Sixth Imam not to engage in
7
revolutionary activity. The major works of figh up to the
16th century studied by Calder discussed the principles of
government service twice, once under a just and rightful
sultan, and once under a sultan al-jaur. The just sultan
can, almost certainly, only be the Imam. However, a treatise
by Sharif al-Murtada (d. 1044) studied by Madelung, appears
• • ^  
to conclude that a ruler who recognises the Imams and applies
their commands, that is the sharila, could be recognised as
6. J.E. Eliash, 'The Ithna ' ashara-shi Juristic Theory 
of Political and Legal Authority',
Studia Islamica XXIX 1969, 26^
7. W. Madelung, 'A treatise of the Sharif al-Murtada 
on the legality of working for the government',*
BSOAS XLIII Part 1 1980, p.18.
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just. Such a ruler, in Madelung's view, acquired a 
'derivative, functional legitimacy' and was entitled to the
o
support of the community. It may perhaps be understood 
that such a ruler would also be a Shi'ite. Up till the 16th 
century, the Shi^a lived largely under Sunni government, and 
jurists on the whole took the view that it was permissible to 
take office as long as it was possible to implement Shi'■a 
law and to protect the Shila community. They considered
they were applying the law not on behalf of the ruler but on
• - 9behalf of the Imam.
Before the establishment of the Safavid empire in 
1500 A.D. there had been no extensive long lasting Twelver 
Shiite state. The Safavids claimed descent from the Imam 
Musa, as well as employing the title Zill Allah, Shadow of 
God, like Sunni rulers before them. They thus asserted 
their right to rule on two counts, the first on behalf of 
the Imams by descent, and the second by direct appointment 
from God, a claim which required no further validation and 
disposed of all intermediaries. The fundamental Imami 
theory remained unaffected by these aspirations and the 
religious claims of the Safavid Shahs were hardly even 
mentioned and certainly not condoned by Safavid works of 
jurisprudence.^^ Nevertheless the elevation of Shi'ism to 
the religion of the state brought major changes in its 
relationship with the temporal power. The security of the 
state was regarded as bound up with the right religion so 
that unorthodoxy was severely dealt with. The culama 
participated in the organisation of the state as they had not 
previously done, and many of them gave tacit support to the
8. Ibid., p.30.
9. Binder, 'Proofs of Islam', op. cit.
10. Calder, op. cit., p.90.
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temporal power. Modarressi has shown that under the Sunnis 
the Shi1*! lulama were rarely given government grants, most 
of which came from the kharaj. Under the Safavids, however, 
the ShiLa received large sums as pensions and grants, so that 
kharaj became a main source of livelihood. This led Shaikh 
cAli al Karaki, one of the leading mujtahids, to argue in 
1510 A .D. that the imposition of kharaj and its disbursement 
among believers was lawful. His attitude to the ruler, 
however, remained ambivalent. He did not regard the government 
as legitimate, yet frankly acknowledged that the lulama owed
much of their power and prestige to the support of Shiite
. . 12 kings.
The mutual cooperation of religious estate and government
was most clearly expressed in the royal appointment of the
Sadr or leading Lalim. He was charged with the disbursement
of clerical revenues from which he gained great power.
Another leading *»alim was the Shaikh al-Islam, who adjudicated
13in all civil matters. From such offices, and those of 
qazi, as well as many lesser positions bestowed by government 
patronage, a wealthy and influential religious class grew up.
During the Safavid period there were a variety of 
opinions on the relationship of religion and state. Chardin 
reports that on the one hand there was the commonly held 
view that the Shah drew his authority from God:
'That the King is God's representative and the 
Prophet's in guiding the people; and that the 
Sadr and all other clerics must not interfere in 
the government or politics.'14
11. Modarressi, op. cit., p.144.
12. Ibid., p.157.
13. J. Chardin, Voyages en Perse et autres Lieux de 
1'Orient (Paris 1811), VI, p.48.
14. Ibid., VI, p.48.
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On the other hand he states that the lulama and the pious
believed the royal power to have been usurped. Officials
of the *-urf courts were correspondingly held to be ministers
15of a tyrannical power founded only on force. Chardin also
reports an opinion that accords to the Uulama a greater
authority than the execution of their shari ua duties. It
was that during the ccultation-true authority belongs only
to a mujtahid - a man who possesses sanctity and knowledge
16beyond all others. Since the muj tahid would be a holy and 
peaceful man, there must be a king who carries the sword for 
the exercise of justice, but he would be like a minister to 
the mujtahid.
The first of the qreat Safavid mujtahids, Muhammad Baqhir 
Majlisi (d. 1699), recognised the necessity of cooperation 
with the temporal power and admitted the interdependence of 
religion and de facto government: he wrote:
'Know that justice cadl of kings and amirs is one of the 
greatest things conducive to the well-oeing of man.
The justice and righteousness of kings and amirs is the 
cause of the righteousness of all the people....It is 
related by a reliable source that the Prophet said,
"There are two classes (sinf) in my community such 
that if they are righteous and worthy my community
will also be righteous, and if they are corrupt, my
community will also be corrupt".'
These two classes were the fugaha and the umaraJ. Majlisi was 
not concerned with the right by which kings arrive at their 
position, but he saw their authority as being validated by 
the performance of certain functions connected to the 
religion. Majlisi saw subjects and rulers as having mutual 
rights and duties. The subjects were to show the king respect, 
pray for his welfare and not oppose his authority. Kings had 
corresponding duties:
15. Ibid., VI, p.47.
16. Ibid., VI, p. 216.
17. Quoted in A.K.S. Lambton, State and Government in 
Medieval Islam (OUP 1981), p.283.
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'Know that kings who follow the true religion 
have many claims upon their subjects, whom they 
protect and whose enemies they repel, and whose 
religion, lives, wealth and honour are safe 
through the protection of kings.'
From the phrase 'kings who follow the true religion' it 
would seem that this theory applied to Shi'ite rulers. It 
would seem also that the foremost obligation of the ruler 
was protection.
By the late Safavid period it would seem,therefore,that 
there were a number of different theories on the relation 
between the religion and state. There was the fundamental, 
jurisprudential theory that the Imam is the only legitimate 
ruler and all others are unjust; there was the view that a 
king who exercised the sword in the service of Shi’ism had 
a qualified authority as long as he recognised the superiority 
of the mujtahid as reflected in Chardin; and there was 
Majlisi1s view that fugaha and umaraJ must combine in 
enforcing righteousness, and that the first duty of the 
ruler was to defend the Imami faith. These last two views 
may have derived from strands of thought that always existed 
alongside the fundamental theory, or they may represent the 
response to the arrival of a powerful Shi'ite state.
An examination of the 19th century, with which this 
study is most closely concerned, reveals a diversity of 
opinion among the ^ulama on the nature of their relations with 
the state, and among ordinary Shi'ites on the authority of the 
mujtahids themselves.
The position of the vulama vis-a-vis the Qajars was 
stronger than it had been under the Safavids. Shi'ism, of 
which they regarded themselves as the legitimate custodians, 
had become the predominant religion of the land. Also many 
of their number, following the instability in Iran in the 
18th century, resided in the Shrine cities in Ottoman Iraq
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18outside the control of the Iranian government. The 
Qajars, like the Safavids, appointed the official 
representatives of the culama in the main towns, the Shaikh 
al-Islam and the Imam JumLa, but as Lambton has remarked 
they never had the institutional control over the lulama
19exercised by the Safavids in such appointments as the Sadr.
•
In addition, as Algar has shown, the mujtahids were
strengthened by a reformulation of their role wThich had
20taken place in the 18th century. This emerged as a result
of a dispute between the Usuli and Akhbari branches of Imami
Shi‘ism over the functions of the muj tahid. The Akhbari school
was founded by Muhammad Amin Astarabadi (d.1626/7), and came
to dominate Shi’ite jurisprudence by the beginning of the
18th century to the point where there is no mention of
important muj tahids in the history of Shivi law during the
middle of the 18th century. The Akhbaris rejected the
paramount role of the mujtahid as incompatible with the
authority of the Imam, and considered the use of ijtihad
reprehensible. They rejected the division of the community
into mugallid and mujtahid, in favour of the idea of all
believers being mugallid to the Imam. They preferred to rely
only on guidance through the interpretations of traditions
reporting the judgement of the infallible Imams. Bayat has
pointed out that Akhbari doctrine represented a reaction to
21the power acquired by the rnuitahids. De Gobineau mentions
18. A.K.S. Lambton, 'Quis Custodiet Custodes? Some 
Reflections on the Persian Theory of Government',
Studia Islamica VI 1956, p.143.
19. Ibid., pp. 142-4.
20. Algar, Religion and State, op. cit., pp. 33-36.
21. M. Bayat, op. cit., pp. 21-2.
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that Akhbari theory enabled the adoption under the title of
the opinion of the Imams, ideas that were not strictly
orthodox, and that the theory had a following amongst lesser
22officials and the bourgeoisie.
The Akhbari theory was refuted by the Usulis, particularly
Muhammad Baqir Bihbihani (1705-1803 A.D.). The Usulis derived • •
their name from the four principles or ugul used by the
23muitahids in deducing the law, to which they gave preference 
over the traditions and thus a more significant role to the 
interpretations of the mujtahids. The doctrine produced a
24concept of orthodoxy centred on and expounded by the muitahids.
The principles of fiqh laid down by Bihbihani and modified by
Shaikh Murtaza Ansari (1801-1864 A.D.) applied throughout the • • •
Oajar period. The position of the muj tahids was strengthened
not only against the temporal power, but in the elimination 
of dissent.
The authority of the mujtahid was not accepted by all
ordinary Twelver Shi’ites. The end of the 18th century and the
beginning of the 19th saw a resurgence of Sufi*ism The 
Ni'-matallahi order in particular gained a large following in 
Kerman. Since a Sufi looks to the head of his order as the 
example to be emulated, and possessed of the esoteric knowledge 
of the Imams, this represented a challenge to the authority of 
the muj tahids. According to Malsum *-Ali Shah, one of the Pirs 
of the Nitmatallahl, the sharl *>a represented only the outward 
path of the Imams, whilst the inner divine truths were found
—  —  i 2  S  —  —  —in Sufiism. Macsum cAli Shah also questioned the validity
22. De Gobineau, Les Religions et les Philosophies dans 
l'Asie Centrale (Paris 1866), p.30.
23. M. Bayat, op. cit., pp. 21-2.
24. Algar, Religion and State, op. cit., pp. 33-6.
25. Ibid., p. 37 .
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of the fatvas of the mujtahids because of their frequent 
contradictions, and claimed that Islam, being perfect, 
stood in no need of the culama. Another Pir, Nur *-Ali Shah,
considered that the power of the Qutb of order was greater
26 *   _
than that of any ruler. The influence of the NiLmatallahis
seems to have reached the highest in the land. The culama 
of Gilan complained to the Shah that the Governor there and
his chief official had adopted the Nitmatallahi cause, and
-  27 -  -
that the shan va was being undermined. Fath lAli Shah was
not personally antipathetic to Sufiism, but the lulama
• 1 r —
nevertheless persuaded him to suppress the movement, as 
Malcolm explained:
'They have always succeeded in convincing his judgement 
that the established religion was necessary to the support 
of the state, and that nothing could be more dangerous 
than the progress of a spirit of infidelity, which, by 
unsettling men's minds, was calculated to throw them 
into a state of doubt and f e r m e n t . '^ 8
The persecution of the Nilmatallahis provides an interesting 
example of the collaboration of *-ulama and state and the 
manner in which they understood their interests to be 
intertwined. It also has implications for the position of the 
lulama on the legitimacy of the Shah to be discussed below.
A few of the NiLmatallahis found refuge in the court of 
of the ValiLahd lAbbas Mirza, and one of their disciples,
Haji Mirza Aqasi won ascendancy over the mind of Muhammad Shah 
(1834-1848 A.D.). Indeed the Shah seems to have looked upon him
26. Nur iAli Shah, Hidayat Nama, an unpublished letter 
quoted in N. Pourjavady and P. Lamborn Wilson,
Kings of Love: The Poetry and History of the
Ni^matuliahi Sufi Order (Tehran 1978), p.117.
27. Mirza Muhammad Taqi Sipihr, Lisan al-Mulk, Nasikh 
al-Tavarikh, ed. J. QaJim Maqami, I, p. 44
28. J.A. Malcolm, A History of Persia (London 1815),
2 Vols., II, p.414.
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as his Qutb, considering him 'the pole of the firmament of
shari cat and tarigat1 and 'the source of revelation and 
29excellence.' This would be consonant with the view that
the authority of the ruler is second to that of the qutb, but
Haji Mirza Aqasi does not seem to have pressed the point.
In a letter to the Shah he refers to him as 'Padishah- i
islam- panah ki vali-yi amr allah .ast.1 • (Padishah Protector
30of Islam who is the Guardian of the Command of God) which 
although not very clearJseems to be close to the idea of the 
Shah as the Shadow of God, and does not seem to denote any 
particular Sufi idea of kingship. Algar has maintained that 
the Shah's open profession of Sufi'ism endangered the standing 
of the vulama, but as he afterwards admits, the Shah's
31beliefs were probably no more than a mild irritant to them.
This was probably because Sufi'ism as a popular force had
ceased to be a serious threat to their own authority. Moreover
Muhammad Shah was a pious ruler who ordered his court to
attend the mosque every Friday."*2 Haji Mirza Aqasi himself
encouraged the lulama of the provinces to come to Tehran so that
33it might develop into a centre of learning. His chief 
enemies were the umara*1 , other politicians like himself, and 
it was they who brought about his downfall.
In the early part of the 19th century a further challenge
to the authority of the mujtahids emerged from Shaikhism. The
founder of this sect, Shaikh Ahmad AhsaJi (1753-1826 A.D.)
• •
29. Lisa.n al-Mulk, op. cit., II, p.40.
30. H. Sa*“adat Nuri, 'Haj Mirza Aqasi, Pt.4, Yaghma^No. 184 
1342/1963-4, pp. 357-8.
31. Algar, op. cit., p.107.
32. Lisan al-Mulk, op. cit., II, p.211.
33. Sa^adat Nuri, op. cit., Pt.9,Yaghma.No. 190 
1343/1964-5 ? pp. 65-7.
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insisted that the source of all his knowledge was the Imams 
34themselves. He believed knowledge was acquired through a
visionary perception of the Divine, which he held much superior
to the mujtahid1s use of discursive reasoning. He also
rejected the mujtahid1s judgement as humanly fallible and
denounced taqlid. AhsaJi propounded the doctrine of the
Perfect Shila, rare beings, specially guided by the Imam to
act as authoritative examples for the faithful. Any necessary
change in the Holy Law comes from the Imam through the perfect
Shi*-a. Indeed the Shaikhis accorded more authority to the
35Imams that the orthodox, using direct inspiration from them 
to form a chain of authority that by-passed the mujtahids.
Three leading Lulama passed the takfir (excommunication) 
against Shaikh Ahsa^i, and the Shaikhis were forced to moderate 
their opinions, at least outwardly, particularly after the 
rise of Babism (see below). However they remained active and
Muzaffar al-Din Shah (1896-1907) was said to have Shaikhi
• 3 6
proclivities as a young man. It is possible that some of
those active in the cause of reform in 1905 in Tehran were
Shaikhis. One of the members of Nazim al-Islam's secret
society cited Shaikh Ahsa'i and other Shaikhi writers as
authorities in a speech at one of the meetings, which was
37accepted without comment by the others present.
34. M. Bayat, op. cit., p.38.
35. A.L.M. Nicholas, 'Le Cheikhisme', Revue du Monde 
Musulman X 1910, p.513.
36. H. Satadat Nuri, 'Muzaffar al-Din Mirza va Shaikhigari\
Vahid v No.3, 1346/1967-8, p.290.« /
37. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p.296.
The most dangerous heterodoxy to emerge in the 19th
century was Babism, which arose from the claim of Sayyid
<*Ali Muhammad in 1843 to be the Bab, or Gateway to the Hidden 
— 3 8 * _Imam. The Bab issued laws and regulations like a prophet
in a book called the Bayan, the decrees of which purported
to explain the essence of the Divine Word. The Bab
was regarded as the head of the faith and the temporal
sovereign of the world. Certain Muslim tenets were no
longer held obligatory, such as formal prayer, fasting at
Ramazan, and the avoidance of certain foods. Babism appealed
to all classes and seems to have meant different things in
different regions. In Mazandaran in 1850 the downfall of
the Qajar dynasty was decreed, and was linked to the number
of Qajar princes and the money needed to support them.
'•Ulama and government combined to suppress Babism in a
vigorous campaign. The followers of the Bab divided into
two, Azalis and BahaJis of which the former were to be very
active in the agitation leading to the Constitutional 
39Revolution. One prominent preacher, and member of the
Qajar family, Shaikh al-Ra'is, was reportedly a Baha'i, but
- - 40otherwise the Bahaiis followed a quietist policy.
The persecution of the Sufis and the Babis highlights 
the interdependence of religion and state, for if right 
religion helped guarantee political stability, it also needed
38. For a discussion of Babism see Sheil to Palmerston,
No. 20, 12th Feb. 1850, FO 60/150^ and No.72,
21st June 1850; M. Momen, The Babi and Baha'i 
Religions 1844-1944 (Oxford 1981); W. McElwee 
Miller, The Baha'i Faith (California 1974).
It is not entirely clear whether the Bab was 
claiming to be the Gate to the Imam, or the Imam 
himself, in other words a major manifestation of 
the Diety; see W.M. Miller, op. cit., pp. 15-16.
39. Keddie, 'Religion and Irreligion', op. cit., pp. 267- 
74.
40. Momen, op. cit., p. 3 64.
- 45 -
the coercive power of the state to enforce it. A persistent 
complaint of the ‘-ulama against the state in the latter part 
of the 19th century was that the government was not 
sufficiently diligent in suppressing heterodoxy, particularly 
Babism, The Lulama also did not have the means to protect 
the country and Shi'ism against foreign invasion, nor at 
this stage the inclination to assume such a responsibility.
The practical alternatives to a Shi’ite ruler were possibly 
Sunni rule, more likely anarchy, or even worse, infidel 
domination.
In the 19th century the Lulama were not only stronger
vis-a-vis the temporal power because of the reformulation of
the role of the mujtahid but also because, unlike the Safavids,
the Qajar dynasty, which established itself in 1785 A.D. did
not claim legitimacy by right of descent from the Imams. The
true basis of Qajar rule was power, as is illustrated in the
coronation ceremonies of the Qajar Shahs, in which the ’•ulama
played little part. Acja Muhammad Qajar (1785-1797 A.D.) was
considered eligible to assume the title of Shah when he had
conquered most of the lands ruled by previous Shahs. At the
ceremony, 'he put on the royal regalia at the request of his
well-wishers, being the assembled princes (umaraJ) and learned 
- 41men (fuzala)', According to another account he put on the
sword of the conqueror and mounted the jewelled throne, and
promised to rule 'in the manner of former kings and customs
42of past sultans'. Malcolm explains that the sword had a 
particular significance as it was:
'Consecrated at the tomb of the holy founder of the 
Suffavean family; and he became, by that act, pledged 
to employ the sacred weapon in defense and support of 
the Shi'ah faith.'^ 3
41. Ri2a Quli Khan Hidayat, Rau&at al-Safa-yi Nasirl 
(Tehran 1270-4q./l953-607"j I, p• 291. *
42. Lisan al-Mulk, op. cit., I, p.44.
43. Malcolm, op. cit., II, pp. 287-8.
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The Shah's rule was thus based on power, but at the same time
the coronation emphasized the Shi'■a character of the new
dynasty, and the function of the Shah as defender of the
faith. The coronation of subsequent Qajar Shahs followed
a similar pattern. Fath LAli Shah also donned the royal
44regalia, and in addition promised to rule justly.
Muhammad Shah (1834-1848 A.D.) and Nasir al-Din Shah (1848- 
• •
1896 A.D.) were similarly confirmed in office by the
45 - -recognition of the powerful, Muzaffar al-Din Shah mounted
on the throne in the presence of all the dignitaries of the 
state. The role of the Lulama had grown a little more 
prominent as the Kayani Crown, now recognised as the rightful
crown of Iran, was placed upon the Shah's head by the Imam
4 6 - -Jumla. At Muhammad VAli Shah's coronation the mujtahids
sat whilst everyone else stood. When the Shah ascended the
throne they rose and in the name of God hailed him as Shah.
47He, however, placed the crown on his head himself. The 
Qajar coronation ceremonies were therefore based on the crown 
as the symbol of power, and the recognition of the powerful, 
including the Lulama as notables. In 1908 Muhammad LAli Shah
stated quite plainly that his ancestors had conquered Iran by
48the sword and he intended to keep it by the sword. The 
ceremonial at court was also deliberately intended to enhance 
the power of the Shah. As Malcolm commented:
'The nature of absolute power requires that it should
be supported by a continued revival of the impression 
of its high and almost sacred character. Many of the 
usages of Persia are calculated to produce this object: 
Everything connected with the royal name or authority 
is treated with respect that is increased by the form 
which attends it.'4^
44. Lisan al-Mulk, o d, cit.. I. d. 52.
45. Lisan al-Mulk, op. cit., II, p.14. p. 29: 
o d. cit.. X. d . 457. d. 461. Hidayat,
46. Zahir al-Daula, op. cit., p. 41.
47. Spring Rice to Grey, No.22, 30th Jan. 1907 
No. 5274.
, FO 371/303
•00 Marling to Grey, No. 146, 17th June 1908, FO 416/37, No.53.
49. Malcolm, op. cit., II, p.564.
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The later Shahs also used descent to stress their right to
rule in such titles as al-sultan bin al-sultan.  8 ?--
Nevertheless the Qajars recognised the need for a 
legitimising doctrine for their authority, and like the. 
Safavids before them they claimed to be the Shadow of God 
upon earth, zill allah. In so doing they were asserting 
that they derived their authority directly from God, by­
passing any intermediaries including the Imams. As Fath cAli 
Shah (1797-1834) expressed it, God:
'Gave glory and adornment to our princely person of 
blessed attributes through the sultanate, and the 
caliphate and the rulership of the w o r l d . 50
and Nasir al-Din Shah claimed:
'We consider the rayahs to be a trust given on the 
part of the Almighty and the means by which we hold 
our sovereignty.51
Such a claim had no validity according to the fundamental 
Imami doctrine whereby all authority must derive from the 
Imams. The idea of an all-powerful Shah, with his authority 
bestowed by God, was not acceptable to most of the Uulama. 
Probably for this reason the Qajars did not insist on the 
title Zill Allah, as will be discussed later.
Algar has argued that the ^ulama viewed the Shah from 
the fundamental de jure position that he was a usurper, and 
that the state was not legitimate, and no doubt some of them 
did. As Calder has pointed out, however, the potential 
opposition in the idea of naJib-icamm was rarely stressed.
He has shown how, within the works of jurisprudence themselves, 
some kind of modus vivendi with the temporal power was
50. A. Lambton, 'Quis Custodiet', op. cit., p. 143.
51. Thomson to Derby, No.56, 20th April 1875, FO 60/371.
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52recommended. Thus, for example, it was considered 
permissible to work for a usurper if he be relatively just, 
or to accept the proceeds of taxes collected by the 
officials of the 'unjust' ruler. Such notions continue to 
assume, however, that the ruler is fundamentally unjust.
For the nineteenth century certain treatises have come 
to light which suggest that many, if not most, of the lulama 
did not carry the fundamental juristic theory into practice. 
Realising the advantages of being ruled by a Shi'ite power, 
they sought, in different ways, accommodation with the state. 
But the de facto power of the Shah, and the de facto 
recognition of it by the Uulama, was not enough. A need 
was evident for some theoretical recognition of the Shah's 
authority and the Milama's cooperation with him. The problem 
was how to give the Shah such authority without weakening 
the fundamental juristic theory. There developed a number 
of what might be termed accommodatory theories which helped 
gain acceptance for the rule of the Shah. Most of these 
attempted to take the problem out of the restraints imposed 
by the traditional context of figh, and study it within new 
parameters.
One such theory is propounded in the Irshadnama addressed
to Fath lAli Shah by Mirza AbuJ1 Qasim Qummi (d. 1815-16 A.D.),
one of the leading lulama of his day. Mirza Qummi addresses
the Shah as Shadow of God but gives careful qualification to 
53the term. He avoids any implication of divine power and 
attributes, and discusses it instead in the sense of exemplary 
emulation. Thus the Shah had a duty to be just and to set a 
high moral example recalling the attributes of the Creator.
52. N. Calder, 'Accommodation and Revolution in Imami Shi'i 
Jurisprudence: Khumayni and the Classical Tradition',
Middle Eastern Studies,XVIII No.l 1982, p.5.
53. Lambton, 'Some New Trends', op. cit., pp. 114-118.
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In enjoining the Shah to protect his subjects and care for 
the needs of the weak,Mirza Qummi says it is incumbent on 
him because God has placed this duty upon him. He adds that 
God has created all men equal but made one his deputy 
(janishin) with special responsibilities. Thus according 
to Mirza Qummi the Shah's authority derives from God:
'The principle (asl) of kingship is derived from the
decree (taqdir) of God.'
But it does not follow that every action committed by a king 
was made necessary by divine decree. Kings would be rewarded 
and punished in the next world for the manner in which they 
carried out their responsibilities.
Mirza Qummi's theory is interesting in that he sees 
rulers as having, duties in the performance of which they also 
have God-given authority. They do not act as agents or 
intermediaries, even of the Prophet or the Imams. The 
argument seems to be that the possession of power itself 
confers certain God-given responsibilities. One of the ing's 
primary purposes is to protect the world of men, whilst the 
purpose of the culama according to Mirza Qummi is to guard 
the religion from all forces that might weaken it. Qummi 
seems to see a division of authority between the ruler and 
the *-ulama. Likewise, the carrying out of duties, particularly 
the function of protection, is an important part of kingship.
If Mirza Qummi found validity for the Shah's rule
outside the sharica chain of authority, Shaikh Ja’-far Najafi
(d. 1821) found a place for him within it, albeit with a
54strictly limited and probably temporary role. When the 
Russians threatened Iran in the early 19th century, **Abbas 
Mirza approached the culama for fatvas sanctioning a jihad.
54. Lambton, 'Jihad' op. cit.; _E. Kohlberg, 'The
Development of the Imami ShiCI Doctrine of Jihad',
ZDMG CXXVI 1976, pp. 64-86.
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The mujtahids responded by making explicit their claim to
be collectively the Deputy of the Imam, naJib-i uamm-i
imam and declared Fath '•Ali Shah their Special Agent, na'ib
khass. The argument as stated by Shaikh Ja'far was that
offensive jihad could only be instigated by the Imam, but
defensive jihad was the responsibility of the mujtahids in
the absence of the Imam. If they were not present they
could appoint another to lead the j ihad and whoever disobeyed
him, disobeyed them, and therefore the Imam, the Prophet
55and God himself. As a mu~]tahid Shaikh Ja^far gave permission 
to Fath **Ali Shah to take such measures as were necessary, 
including the collection of land tax, and the canonical tax, 
zakat, to repel the infidel.
The fatvas issued by the Lulama were collected in a
volume entitled Risala-yi Jihadiyya. A treatise on the Risala
by AbuJ1 Qasim, the second Qa*im Maqam, son of the famous
minister of that title who served the ValiLahd, '•Abbas Mirza,
explains that it was put together by order of Fath cAli Shah
so that at a time of infidel threat the opinions on the subject
5 6might be easily available for reference. It acknowledges 
that the approval of the culama for jihad is essential.
'A sign has been revealed to the most learned Lulama 
that the blessed_person of his majesty should in this 
time that the Imam is absent act as the Special Agent 
of the General Agency, and in order that the commands 
of the government should carry the utmost weight, he 
should take over the sword of jihad of the Imams.' 57
QaJim Maqam emphasises that the Shah's functions in the 
service of Islam are to act as the keeper of good order and 
the keeper of the religion in addition to his being the pillar 
of the kingdom and the shahanshah of the world.
55. Lambton, 'Jihad', op. cit., p. 189.
56. AbuJ 1 Qasim QaJ im Maqam, Munsha^ afe-i QaJ im Maqam 
(The Correspondence of QaJim Maq5m), Tehran 1337/
1958-9, p. 294.
57. Ibid., p. 294.
The concept of the Shah as naJ ib- i khass-i naJ ib-i lamm
• •
does not appear to have been pursued by either side. As Lambton 
has commented the muj tahids gave the Shah only temporary 
validity to act as leader in a particular j ihad. To the Shah 
there was little advantage in seeking permanent recognition of 
such a subordinate role.
Arjomand has recently drawn attention to an important 
treatise on the relations between religion and the state by 
Sayyid Jacfar ibn Abi Ishaq Kashfi (d. 1850) and entitled 
Tufrfat al-Muluk. In it Kashfi seems to argue more clearly 
than anyone else so far known for a division in the spheres 
of authority of the culama and the Shah. During the occultation 
of the Imam the two main functions of the Imamate, religious 
leadership and the wielding of power, pass to two groups who 
act as his deputies, the Uulama and the rulers:
'The muj tahids and the rulers both hold the same office 
which office is that of the Imamate, transferred to 
them from the Imam through the Viceregency (niyabat) 
and consisting of two pillars (rukn) 'knowledge of 
Prophetic matters which is called religion; and the 
implementation of the same in the course of imposing 
order on the world, called kingship or s o v e r e i g n t y . ' 58
Both these are found in the Imam, and should co-exist in his
Deputy, but the vulama, because of the opposition of rulers,
have abandoned sovereignty and the power of the sword, and
rulers have yielded to the ^ulama understanding and
interpretation in matters of religion. It is in the interests
of both to maintain this consensus, for when it breaks down
the culama suffer from the stagnation caused by disorder, and
the ruler is left with mere power. Then both groups fail to
discharge their office. Using a tradition derived from the
Imam cAli, Kashfi asserts that the lulama and the rulers were
each a 'Special Deputy' (naJib-i khass) of the Imam, the one
• •
in the matters of knowledge (cilm) and the other in the matter 
of the sword. One of the conditions of kingly rule and for 
the 'Special Deputyship' is justice.
58. Arjomand, 'Shi'ite Hierocracy* , op. cit. , pp. 53-56
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As Arjomand has commented this theory provides 
religious legitimisation for the ruler only in the sphere 
of his own functions, and was not intended to confer any 
religious authority upon him. Certain elements in the theory, 
including the division in functions and the duty of the ruler 
to impose order, have been noted in earlier writers, Majlisi 
and Qummi. They also stressed justice although they did not 
make it a precondition of office. In the earlier theories, 
however, the Shah's authority to carry out his duties came 
from God, whereas Kashfi introduced the idea that it derived 
from the Imam. The Shahs do not, however, seem to have taken 
up the idea that they were Special Deputies of the Imam 
claiming, as mentioned above, that they derived their 
authority from God. Enough is not yet known about the views 
of the culama in Qajar times to say how far this theory found 
acceptance among them.
The idea of a separation of powers was put forward by 
Mulla cAli Kani in a letter to Nasir al-Din Shah in 1873. In
it he denies an accusation by the Shah that the uu1ama are
59 -overstepping their authority. He asserts the Imam's function
of power (salfanat) and knowledge (cilm) have become divided in
Occultation. During that time God had appointed a naJib for
each of the Imam's functions - the *»u 1 ama are to fulfil the
duties relating to knowledge, and the Shah those relating to
law and order and protection of the subjects. Kani differs
from Kashfi in saying that the ruler derived his authority
from God and not from the Imam, a more nebulous and therefore
less dangerous, justification of the royal power.
The mutual dependence of religion and state, and their 
close relationship were stressed by Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri 
(c. 1840-1909 A.D.). In SuJal va Javab first published
59. Ibid., p.56.
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sometime before 1892 and purporting to repeat the views of 
Mirza Kasan Shirazi, who led the opposition to the Tobacco 
Concession in 1891 he takes up the topic of seditious ideas:
'During the periods when the government (daulat) and 
(the leadership of) the community (mi 1lat) was fixed 
in one person, it was his responsibility to carry 
them out. Now, through the exigencies of the divine 
ordinances, each of these duties is in separate hands, 
so it is the responsibility of each, with the 
assistance of the other, to guard and preserve the_ 
religion and the world of worshippers (din va dunya- 
yi cuhhad) so that the roots of Islam may be 
protected in the absence of the Imam.'^ O
He goes on to say that if one of the responsible entities, the 
government, is slow to act, the other, the community (mi 1lat), 
must encourage, intimidate and threaten it until it does so.
By the community it is probable that he meant their leaders, 
the culama. The theory in effect propounds an active role for 
the culama in the political sphere, when necessary, whilst 
recognising the authority of the Shah. -The main point of 
friction was likely to be whether the Shah considered matters 
had reached the point where they might interfere, or not.
In a fatva issued in 1908 in support of Muhammad cAli 
Shah, Shaikh Fazlallah again took up and elucidated further 
the question of the division of the authority of the Prophet:
j
I 'Prophecy (nubuvvat) and power (saltanat) differed
; in the earlier prophets. Sometimes they were united
and sometimes separate. But the truth of the matter 
was otherwise in the blessed existence of the most 
great messenqer and Seal of the Prophets and his 
successors.'
Then, due to a series of accidents, these two principles, that 
is the application of the religious precepts and the wielding 
of power became separate:
60. Shaikh Fazlallah, SuJal va Javab, op. cit., pp. 61-2
61. Malikzada, op. cit., IV, p.217
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'In truth these two are supplementary and 
complementary to each other, and the foundation 
of Islam depends on them. Without these two 
Islamic precepts (afrkam-i islamiyya) that is 
deputyship in the affairs of prophecy (nlyabat 
dar umur-i nabav/iyya) and power (salfanat) the 
religion would collapse.'
Shaikh Fazlallah then defines the nature of worldly power:
'Worldly power (salfanat) is the authority to 
execute the commands of Islam, on which justice 
depends. And in Islam promises and threats such 
as applying the prescribed penalties (igamat-i 
frudud) are both the work of the executive, although 
warning is more its concern.'
He goes on to say that anyone desiring justice must support 
the two groups which sustain the religion, that is the Lulama 
and the sultans.
Shaikh Fazlallah does not seem to have followed Kashfi 
in claiming the Shah was a Special Deputy, nor does he state 
that the Shah derived his authority from God. Indeed he does 
not seem to concern himself with the justification or lack of 
it whereby the ruler arrives at his position. The sultanate 
conferred a responsibility on its holder, to execute the 
commands of Islam, for which the ruler was presumably 
answerable to God. And because of this responsibility the 
people are bound to obey him. Like Majlisi he recognised the 
need for coercive power to sustain the religion, and believed 
that the justice and righteousness of the community depended 
not only on the uulama, but also on the powerful, the sultan 
and the umara. He follows Majlisi, Qummi and Kashfi in 
seeing a division in functions as between the ruler and the 
Lulama, the primary duty of the former being to keep order.
Another ualim who upheld the authority of the actual
government and one who did not agree that all rulers were
usurpers was Muhammad Rafiui Tabataba^i, Nizam al-Islam
• • • •
Tabrizi. In his treatise Huguq-i Duyal va Milal (The 
Rights of Governments and Peoples) written in 1887, he
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discussed the question of not helping a ruler who is a 
usurper, and a pretender to the imamate. He said that 
governors who are rightful (ahl al-fcagq) and whose 
intentions are good, are not included in the precepts on 
the governors being usurpers, and it was therefore obligatory 
to obey them. But he also concluded that the Sultan must in 
any case be obeyed:
'The Prophet himself said, "Obedience to the Sultan 
is obligatory, and whoever disobeys the Sultan,
disobeys God For power is necessary to protect
the country and its people. This cannot be done 
except by a government. For this reason they must 
not delay in paying their taxes and other dues for 
the well-being of the country, and the order, peace 
and progress of society depend upon the payment of 
taxes (maliyat). And their payment is an act of 
devotion (tauat) . ' 62
So a member of the Shiite lulama reaches the same conclusion 
as the Sunnis on the necessity for coercive power and 
unquestioning obedience to it, though unlike the Sunnis he 
does not accord it legitimacy.
Sayyid Muhammad TabatabaJi (1841-1918) believed that 
• • •
the traditional system of government was not adequate either
for defending Shi'ism or for ensuring just government. The
—  63one true Shah was the Imam of the Age, but since he was
absent and no one knew when he would return, Tabataba^i,
like others before him, was forced to consider what form of
government was best for the temporal polity in default of
the ideal. He was one of the first mujtahids to turn to
Western political thought for a solution. He said that in
order to understand the true meaning of saltanat it was
62. Ni?am al-LUlama Tabrizi, 'Huquq-i Duval. \/a_lYlilal1
(The Rights of Governments And Peoples) in Adamiyyat 
and Natiq, Afkar-i Ijtima^i, op. cit., pp. 68-7 0.
63. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 453.
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necessary to study the new science lulum-i jadid.
Influenced by ideas on constitutional government he gave 
to saltanat a meaning closer to sovereignty than to temporal 
power. The Shah, in his view, was appointed by the people 
on condition he keep good order and protect the country.
If he failed the people would remove him and appoint
i i 64someone else m  his place.
Similar ideas were put forward by Muhammad Husain
• •
NaJini (1860-1936 A.D.) who also stated that the ideal 
government was that of the Imam. Of the alternatives he 
argued in favour of constitutional government. He defined 
tyrannical rule as consisting of three kinds of injustices: 
injustice to God; injustice to the Imam? and injustice to 
the people. Constitutional rule consisted of only one kind 
of injustice, that which applied to the Imam. Thus if 
all government was illegitimate in the absence of the Imam, 
constitutionalism provided the least reprehensible 
alternative.
None of the theories mentioned above were accepted by 
all the lulama, or had the complete agreement of the state. 
But, by the end of the nineteenth century, before Western 
ideas made a major impact, there appears to have been an 
approximate concensus on the practical relations between 
religion and state. This consensus is reflected in the 
correspondence, rescripts and other documents of the time. 
The well being of the general community (tamma-vi millat), 
government (daulat), monarchy (saltanat)and country 
(mamlikat) were seen as interconnected. The role of the 
Shah in ensuring this well being is reflected in the title 
most frequently used for him, Protector of Islam. Thuis
64. See Chapter IV for further discussion.
65. Hairi, Shi'ism and Constitutionalism, op. cit., 
p. 103.
Mirza Hasan Ashtiyani addressed the Shah in a letter in
1891 as 'shahanshah-i .islamiyan panah1, Shahanshah
6 6 —  —Protector of Muslims. His contemporary in Najaf, Mirza
Hasan Shirazi, referred to the Shah as 'shahanshah-^ i
* — — 6 7 ~ _is lain panah1 . In a letter from various cu 1 ama to the Shah
in 1906 he is called ' Pasban-i millat va frami-yi shari'•at'
the Guardian of the Community and the Protector of the
— 6 ft — — —Sharica. Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri, writing to a colleague in
the '-Atabat calls him 'shahanshah- i din panah1 . The Shah
- 69was occasionally also referred to as 'Sultan-i Islam'.
Correspondingly Iran is called 'mamalik-i mafrrusa-yi Iran*,
70 - -the protected lands of Iran. Ashtiyani defined the 
functions of the Shah in his letter as:
'Protector of the true religion and guardian of 
the law of the Prophet, the foundation of the
government The establishment of his government
and the strength of his authority perpetuates the 
safety and security which are the greatest benefit 
from God.'71
Nasir al-Din Shah put the point more bluntly:
'Without the state (daulat) your wives and children 
would be seized by Russian cossacks, Ottoman ^
soldiery, the British army, or Afghans and wolves.'
Elsewhere the Shah is referred to as the executor of the
sharILa, the protector of the religion and the preventor of
73 - -sedition. Muzaffar al-Din Shah likewise regarded his
66. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 24.
67. Ibid., I, P- 36.
68. Ibid., I, P- 364.
69. Ibid., I, p. 40.
70. Ibid., I, P. 36.
71. Ibid., I, P- 24.
•
CMr* Ibid., I, P- 23.
73. Malikzada, op. cit., IV, p.229, P- 235.
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function as primarily one of protection:
'God has entrusted the protection of the Kingdom 
of Persia to us - it is also necessary for us, 
whilst making it our duty to look after the Kingdom 
and protecting the subjects, to be constantly 
careful.''^
The Shah referred to the culama as the 'well-wishers
75of the government and the leaders of the community'.
Ashtiyani called them 'the leaders of the religion and the
— — 7 6community' ruJasa-yi din va millat. They also acted as
intermediaries with the 'mardum-i lavam', the ordinary
people. The view of the division of function between the
lulama and the Shah already noted in Kilama theories found
an echo in the opinion of the state. Zill al-Sultan,
• •
Nasir al-Din Shah's eldest son wrote:
'There are two sorts of influence, one of which is 
moral such as the Prophet enjoys, and the other 
consists in the possession of material f o r c e . 77
It was recommended that the Shah and the Lulama must cooperate 
for the good of Islam. Thus some of the lulama wrote in 
1908 to Muhammad cAli Shah:
'By the firm order of the creator of the world, the 
protection of the foundations of Islam throughout 
the centuries is in the trust of the Sultan of the 
age and the exalted culama'.
Ashtiyani explained to Nasir al-Din Shah that when he saw a 
matter was contrary to the good of the government and the 
community, and would weaken the country and the sultanate,
74. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 119, 7th Aug. 1903,
FO 60/666.
75. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit.. I, p. 366.
76. Ibid., I, p. 24.
77. Lascelles to Rosebery, No. 12, 18th Jan. 1893,
FO 60/542.
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he would contest it. What destroyed the independence of 
the sultanate would also demolish the foundations of the 
religion. The problem was that Shah and uulama did not 
always agree on what was good for the community and when the 
religion was in danger. Thus the cu1ama sometimes interfered 
in affairs where the Shah felt they had no right.
On the whole, however, the rulers and most of the t,ulama
seem to have agreed on certain points. One of these was that
they had separate functions, the Uulama being responsible for
matters of religion and interpretation of the sharica, the
Shah for the protection of the community and the keeping of
good order. The Shah was also expected to uphold the Imami
shari La and, in so far as he did so, was not treated as
illegitimate or unjust. The vexed questions of whether or
not he held a legitimate position according to Shiite
jurisprudence, whether he was a 'just sultan', and whether
7 8he was appointed by God, were allowed to lapse. A similar
sort of accommodation was arrived at in Oudh in India, where
the rulers and mujtahids cooperated to establish and organise 
7 9a Shi'ite state.
78. The term sulfan-i Ladil was used on rare_occasions 
of the actual ruler; see for example Shirazi to 
Na?ir al-Din Shah in Nagim al-Islam, op. cit., I, 
p. 37. Na^ir al-Din Shah on the sample of coins I 
have examined, seems most frequently to have 
employed the title 'al-sulfan bin al-sultan*;
see H.L. Rabino 'Album of Coins, Medals and Seals of 
the Shahs of Iran 1500-1941* (Hertford 1945)and R.S. Poole 
Catalogue of Coins of the Shahs of Persia in the 
British Museum (London 1887).
79. S.A. Ahmad, Two Kinds of Awadh (Aligarh 1971), p. 129. 
There is some evidence that the_ruler of Oudh regarded 
himself as the Deputy of the Imam, but it is not clear 
whether this was acceptable to the culama there; see 
J.N. Hollister, The ShiLa of India (London 1953),
p. 97 and p. 130.
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CONCLUSION
The evidence on the theoretical basis of the relationship 
between the culama and the state in 19th century Iran is still 
incomplete, but it would seem there was no one standard theory. 
From the point of view of the Shah it was recognised that the 
basis of Qajar rule was power, but since some form of 
legitimisation was necessary the Shah claimed to have authority 
from God. There is a view that the culama were hostile to the 
Shah, basing their opposition on the theory that his 
government was illegitimate, being a usurpation of the powers 
of the Imam. This view has been greatly exaggerated. The 
evidence does not suggest that this theory, evolved in the 
sphere of jurisprudence, was applied in the world of practical 
politics by the Uulama as a body. Whilst some, no doubt, 
adhered to it literally, as Algar has mentioned, others, 
recognising that in this imperfect world there must be a 
distinction between ideal theory and practice, sought 
accommodation with the ruler. And in consequence they 
developed accommodatory theories to lend acceptance to his 
rule and their support of it. Although the Shah was, on 
occasions, referred to as 'sultan-i Ladil' the question of 
justice and its connection with the ruler's legitimacy was 
on the whole avoided. The Shah's right to unquestioned 
authority and to consequent obedience rested on the 
satisfactory performance of two main functions, the keeping 
of order and the protection of the Imami shari ca and its 
adherents.
There are strong indications that in the 19th century 
a partnership developed between the Uulama and the state 
based on the cooperation in the upholding of Imami Shi'ism.
The Shah fulfilled the functions of protection, whilst the 
Lulama were guardians of the shari ca and guides of the 
community, with a consequent division in authority. Their 
mutual enemies were the seditious within and the infidel or 
Sunni aggressors without. This partnership came under stress,
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not because the Lulama regarded the Shah as illegitimate, 
but because they considered he was failing to perform his 
necessary functions to their satisfaction. The existence 
of an approximate agreement on the division of authority and 
the mutual recognition of each otherls position as valid, 
may explain why,at the time of the Constitutional 
Revolution^ the culama did not raise the question of the 
Shah's legitimacy.
The majority of the population does not seem to have
questioned that the Shah was legitimate. As Weber has
argued, legitimacy may be bestowed in different ways depending
on the type of normative system. In a modern order it is
bestowed by positive enactments of recognised legality. In
a traditional order such as Qajar Iran, authority rests upon
an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions
and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising
80authority over them . In such orders there is a connection 
between authority and the use of certain kinds of regulatory 
utterances, gestures and symbolic acts. In Qajar Iran the 
performance of acts such as those exemplified in the 
coronation ceremony, and the keeping to the traditions in 
such matters as religious observance, and the performance of 
such functions as defense legitimised the authority of the 
Shah within the state.
80. M. Weber, Lay. Economy and Society, ed. M. Rheinstein 
(Harvard 1954;. !
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CHAPTER II
THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POSITION OF THE HJLAMA
In 19th century Iran members of the cu1ama held 
positions of varying importance. At their head were the 
mujtahids, followed by ordinary mullahs, vuLaz or preachers, 
rauza khvans, religious rhapsodists, and at the lower end 
sayyids, descendents of the prophet, and tullab, students.
In the Safavid period this order had to some extent been 
institutionalised under the Sadr, but in the Qajar period the 
organisation of the religious classes was more informal. 
Normally there was no one acknowledged head of the Twelver 
ShiLa. Only Shaikh Murtaza Ansari (d. 1864), and Mirza Hasan
Shirazi^ from the time of the protest against the Tobacco 
Concession in 1891 till his death in 1895, seem to have held 
the position of marja^-i taglid of all the Twelver Shiua.
Of the mujtahids, those in the Shrine cities in Ottoman
Iraq held preeminence, whilst within Iran the mujtahids
of Tehran looked upon themselves as taking precedence over
their colleagues in the provinces.^" As mentioned in the
previous chapter, each mujtahid had a following of ordinary
Shi'ites or mugallids, who were required to emulate him and
to whom he was thus a marjau-i taglid. The mujtahids1 duties
included giving judgement in legal matters, executing wills,
supervising endowments, giving advice on ritual observance,
distributing khums and zakat, and teaching tullab. Accordinq
to Malcolm they were meant to be protectors of the weak
against the strong, exemplary in their conduct, and free of
2
all connections with the Shah or government officials. In
1. Hardinge to Salisbury, No.58, 7th May 1897, FO 539/76 
No. 74.
2. Malcolm, op. cit., p. 443.
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Malcolm's time there were only about five mujtahids in the 
whole country, but by 1890 Curzon reported that numbers were 
much less restricted,^ and £qa Najafi Quchani, speaking of 
the turn of the century in his autobiography, complained of 
the ease with which certificates or ijazas were awarded so 
that people might become mujtahids.4 In Tehran, at the 
beginning of the century, there were about twelve persons 
claiming the title of mujtahid, of whom three or four tended 
to be more prominent at any one time. In theory a mujtahid 
was expected to combine exemplary character with great 
learning. In practice many muj tahids inherited their positions 
thus in Tehran, in the period under study, the influential
mujtahids Bihbihani, Tabataba'i, Murtaza Ashtiyani and Sadr
• 5
al-HJlama, all succeeded their fathers in office.
Nevertheless they had all undergone a course of study, for
6which most muntahids in Iran went to the Shrine cities.
The life of Aqa Najafi Quchani reveals the immense difficulties 
of attaining the rank of mujtahid without pecuniary assistance 
or family connections.
In practice a mujtahid tended to specialise in some 
duties and not in others. This depended in some measure upon 
his place of residence. Isfahan and Mashhad were known as 
teaching centres, although the Shrine cities were the real 
centres of learning. All the great mujtahids there held 
classes, and Aqa Najafi Quchani found the teaching of Akhuna 
Mulla Khurasan! in Najaf of a much higher standard than the
3. G.N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question (London 
1892), p. 452.
4. Najafi Quchani, op. cit., pp. 212-3.
5. I. SafaJi, Rahbaran-i Mashruta (Leaders of the 
Constitutional Movement^, Tehran 1344/1965-6^
p. 173, 207; M. Bamdad, Sharfr-i Bal-i Rijal-i 
Iran dar Qarn 12, 13, 14 Hijrl (A Dictionary of 
National Biography of Iran from 1700-1960), Tehran 
1347/1968-9, I, p.241.
6. Curzon, op. cit., I, p.452. The leading mujtahids 
of Tehran at the period_under study had all spent 
some years in the uAtabat.
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_ 7
level he had experienced at Mashhad and Isfahan. Of 
the muj tahids of Tehran only Shaikh Fazlallah is reported
o
as giving regular classes, whilst the others appear to 
have concentrated on legal and administrative duties, as 
well as a role of leadership in the community.
Ideally a muj tahid might attain religious leadership of 
his particular city by exhibiting the necessary qualifications 
of learning and qualities of character. In practice pre­
eminence depended on a variety of factors. One of the most 
important was wealth as shown by the example of Aqa Najafi,
the foremost muj tahid of Isfahan, noted neither for his
9learning nor his character, but immensely rich. Another 
factor was a devoted following. Thus when the leading 
muj tahid of Mashhad died in 1896, the battle for his position 
depended upon the number and character of the adherents of 
each protagonist, as well as on their influence. In Tehran 
rivalry amongst the culama became entangled with political 
rivalries, and much was to be gained from good contacts in 
the higher bureaucracy. The rise to prominence of both 
Bihbihani and Shaikh Fa£lallah was much assisted by their 
respective connections with Amin al-Sultan and ‘’Ain al-Daula.
In addition to following a local mujtahid most Twelver
Shiites appear also to have been mugallid to a muj tahid in
the Shrine cities. Thus Haj Mirza Husain Haj Mirza Khalil
7. Najafi Quchani, op. cit., p. 294.
8 . See I4timad al-Saltana, Mirza Muhammad Hasan Khan, 
Ruznamaryi Khatirat'(The Diary of*Iltimad al-Saltana), 
ed. I._AfshSr, Tehran 1345/1966-7, p. 1046; Nazim 
al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 321.
9. Biographical Notes 1906, p. 61.
10. Elias to Durand, Mashhad Diary for 31st July and 4th
Sept. 1896, in FO 248/632.
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was the marjai-i taglid of Tehran and its districts. ^
Pilgrims to the Shrine cities brought alms to the mujtahid
12they regarded as their marjaLi taglid. This emergence of
influential maraja1-! taglid in the cAtahat, such as Shirazi,
was particularly due to improvements in communications which
enabled khums, formerly expended locally, to be paid direct
- 13to the mu j tahids of the •'Atabat. Money could be sent
straight to them by telegramme from members of the Lulama,
14merchants or notables. Although there was usually no
overall leader of the Twelver Shiites, precedence was given
to the most aged of the learned mujtahids, for which reason
Haj Mirza Husain who was around ninety years of age, was
sometimes referred to as the most eminent muj tahid at the
time of the Revolution. Hindsight has created a list of 
—  —  16marajali taglid but again at the beginning of the century 
the lists drawn up by the British in reference to the Oudh
bequest, and based on specific questioning of the muj tahids
- 17of the uAtabat, do not reveal any one person as leader.
After the death of Haj Mirza Husain, Akhund Mulla Khurasani
and Muhammad Kazim Tabataba** i Yazdi were both considered the
, • . , 18 most respected.
11. Najafi Quchani, op. cit., p. 366.
12 . Ibid., p. 434 .
13. A.K.S. Lambton, 'A Reconsideration of the Position
of the Marjau al-Taglid and the Religious Institution', 
Studia Islamica XX 1964, p. 132.
14. Yaghma1! op. cit., p. 240.
15. M. Malikzada, op. cit., II, p. 47.
16. M. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution 
(Harvard 1980), p. 252.
17. Newmarch to Hardinge, No. 63^ -4th Feb* 1903, FO 
248/801 No. 31.
18. Ramsay to the Government of India Foreign Dept., No.153, 
13th Feb. 1909, quoted in J. MacPherson, 'Summary of 
Events in Turkish Arabia', 5th. Dec. 1910, No. 1084,
p. 10, L/P & S/10/77, India Office Records.
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One muj tahid in each city who occupied a unique position 
was the Imam Jumla, the official link between the government 
and the lulama. He was powerful as long as the government 
was strong, but in times of instability, his prestige sank 
considerably and he could remain isolated and discredited.
In addition to being in Tehran pishnamaz, or prayer leader, 
of the main mosque, the Masjid-i Shah, he received from the 
Shah rich vaqf endowments, such as the wealthy Madrasa-yi 
Khan Marvi. Like many other offices the title of Imam Jumfca 
was usually held by one family, the son of each incumbent 
being confirmed in his position on his father's demise.
Zain al—lAbidin was still a child when his father died, but
his uncle took over his duties until he came of age, and was
— 19 —appointed Imam Jumca by the Shah. The Imam Jumna's were
similar to the al-Bakri family in Egypt in holding an office 
confirmed by the state for several generations. Their 
relationship with the state was, however, less systemised than 
that of the Al-Bakri. Both had administrative control of rich 
government augaf, but in the case of the Imam JumLa this appears 
to have been limited to the supervision of funds from specific 
endowments under his jurisdiction, whilst registration of the
Diwan al-Auqaf in Cairo depended on the recommendation of the
—  2 0 —Al-Bakri. No evidence has yet emerged that the Imam Jum^a
had such close links with the Divan-i Auqaf in Tehran. One
of the Imam's main roles was to act as a channel of
communication, and important government announcements on
matters relating to the religion were made in the Masjid-i
Shah.^
19.
20 .
21.
Dust '■All Khan, Mua'-yyir al-Mamalik, x Zain al-&>idin 
Imam Jum^a1,Yaqhma, Year 12 No.12 1338/1959-6, 
pp. 565-576.
F. die Jong, Turug and Turug Linked Institutions in 
Nineteenth Century Egypt (Leiden 1978), p. 32.
G.W. Brasswell, A Mosaic of Mullahs and Mosgues; 
Religion and Politics in Iranian Shi'ah Islam,
Ph.D. Thesis, University of North Carolina 1975, 
p. 209.
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The two main functions of an ordinary mullah were to
give classes, and to act as pishnamaz, or prayer leader, of a
local mosque. As a teacher ustad in a madrasa his function
was purely educational. As a pishnamaz he had more general
duties, including administration, distribution of alms,
occasionally giving sermons, counselling in shari ca matters,
and giving classes. In the villages classes were taught by
the mullah and included the alphabet, arithmetic, and
22recitation of the Quran in Arabic. Sermons in the mosque
were often preached not by the pishnamaz, but by a va^ig or
preacher. These latter formed an important group as their
function was not only to expound upon religious themes, but
to spread propoganda, often of a political nature. During
the Revolution, Haj Shaikh Mahdi, Sultan al-Mutakallimin,
acted as propogandist for the pro-constitutional muj tahids
Bihbihani and TabatabaJi, and Sayyid Akbar Shah, having served 
• •
the same cause, switched to the anti-constitutionalists. In
Isfahan, Shaikh Murtaza was known as the mouthpiece of Aqa 
- 23Najafi. A popular preacher would draw crowds to a mosque 
adding to the prestige of the pishnamaz. For this reason the
Imam Jumfca of Shiraz asked Haj Mirza Nasrallah Bihishti, known
- * * 24as Malik al-Mutakallimin, to preach in his mosque, and
Sayyid Jamal al-Din Isfahani was for the same reason invited
to preach in the Masjid-i Shah in Tehran. The oratorical
skills of the vatiz were also enlisted in personal rivalries
amongst the powerful. Sayyid Jamal al-Din Isfahani was
25invited to speak in favour of Shu*-a al-Daula in Shiraz,
22. Curzon, op. cit., II, p. 493; see also Quchani, 
op. cit., p. 26.
23. Aganoor to Durand, No. 5, 1st March 1898, FO 248/676.
24. M. Malikzada, Zindigani-yi Malik al-Mutakallimin (The 
Life of Malik al-Mutakallimin) , Tehran 13 25 /1946-7, 
p. 58.
25. I.Yaghma'i, op. cit., pp. 14-15.
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and was given a title by both Zill al-Sultan aud Muhammad
• • •
wAli Mirza, rivals for succession to the throne, for
extolling their virtues, the one whilst in Isfahan, the
2 6 _  • 
other in Tabriz. Malik al-Mutakallimin acted as
- - 27propogandist and agent for Prince Salar al-Daula.
During the 19th century in Iran virtually the only form
of education was religious, and many who completed their
course of study, entitling them to the name of mullah, did
not perform religious duties. Malcolm noted that they
followed various occupations and did not class themselves
2 8with the 'priesthood'. These occupations included study
and literary pursuits. A number of the reformist culama
in the constitutional period belonged to this group, including
Na^im al-Islam Kirmani, who edited a newspaper before the
Revolution, and Majd al-Islam who was for a while in the employ
— — 2 9of the notable, Sa^d al-Daula and the merchant, Mu1in al-Tujjar.
Another group who made a living from religious affairs 
were the rauza .khv/ans or religious rhapsodists, who performed 
at ceremonies on holy days, particularly over cAshura. These
ceremonies were often used for political purposes, both as a
pretext for gathering an audience and as an opportunity for
incitement. Shaikh Fazlallah used the pretext of a rauza Kfrvan 
on the anniversary of the death of the Prophet's daughter,
Fatima, to draw together the opponents of the abolition of
— 3 0 —tuyul. Sayyid Akbar Shah employed the same tactic in his
26. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
27. Majd al-Islam Kirmani, '§afhaJi az Tarikh-i Mashruta'
(A Page from the History of the Constitutional 
Movement), Yaghma ^ Year 4 No.6 1330/1951-2, pp. 257-62.
28. Malcolm, op. cit., p. 575.
29. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., II, p. 328.
30. Kasravi, op. cit., p. 374.
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31campaign of opposition to the constitution. On another
occasion a rauza khvan was held to celebrate an alliance
3 2between two groups of roughs in Tehran.
The lowest ranks of the Lu1ama were the sayyids,
descendents of the Prophet, and tullab, students. Muj tahids
who were sayyids had slightly greater prestige than those
who were not. There were, however, many poor sayyids who
lived on alms. Some of them had occasional duties such as
giving readings from the Quran. They were supervised by an
official known as the Naqib al-Sadat, whose duties were to
divide up khums contributions collected from the various
mosques and to punish offenders on the part of the 
33government.
The tullab formed the major part of the -ulama numbering
34in Tehran between one to two thousand. After beginning at
the local maktab they passed to a madrasa where they studied
the various branches of figh, the text and commentaries on
the Quran, some philosophy and the discourses of the learned.
Different teachers taught different subjects. According
to Aqa Najafi Quchani the quality of teaching varied greatly
and classes were often disorderly. He considered the lessons
of the famous Aqa Najafi of Isfahan to be 'noisier than a
35women's bath-house'. He was able to join classes wherever
31. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., II, p. 89.
32. Muhakamat, 15th Muharram 1326.
• ^  _
33. A.’ Amin, 'Iran dar Sal 1311 Hijrl Qamari' (Iran
in the_Year 1311 A.H.), Majalla-yi Barrasiha-yi 
Tarikhi, Year 9 No. 4 1353/1974-5, pp. 75-100.
34. Daulatabadi calculated that these were about 2000
^ulama in the madrasas of Tehran; see Des Graz to
Lansdowne No. 107, 21st July 1902, FO 60/651.
35. Najafi Quchani, op. cit., p. 162.
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he chose with little or no formality. On the other hand
supervision was at a minimum, and he spent two years as
the student of Khurasani in Najaf before he submitted any
3 6work for inspection. Places in a class were easily found
but there was fierce competition for the cells of the
37madrasa, frequently leading to quarrels. Both tuition and
residence were free. Aqa Najafi Quchani was critical of his
fellow students, saying they were often ignorant and even
contemptuous of knowledge, that they studied where it was
financially fruitful and that they preyed upon pilgrims at 
3 8the shrines. According to the British Consul in Mashhad
they were not necessarily young men, and many would remain
students all their lives, living on the endowments of the
39college to which they were attached.
Family connections and intermarriage were strong, at
least amongst the higher Hi 1ama, and may have influenced
their political position. Generally the lead was given by
the senior mujtahid, lesser and junior persons falling in
behind him. Marital links are more noticeable amongst those
who supported the government. Thus Bihbihani took bast in
the Shrine of Shah lAbd al-LAzim accompanied by his son-in-
law .Muhsin,and the latter's brother, the mujtahid Sadr al-tUlama. 
• •
Another son-in-law, Itimad al-Islam was active in the movement.
TabatabaJi brought with him his brother, Sayyid Ahmad, with 
• • •
his family as well as his own three sons. He was also
accompanied by the mujtahid Murtaza Ashtiyani, and the latter's
brother, Mustafa. Generally TabatabaJi and Bihbihani acted as * 1 • •
the spokesmen for their following so it is difficult to 
ascertain if individual members had a different standpoint.
36. Ibid., pp. 372-3
37. Ibid., p. 309.
38. Ibid., p. 213, p. 160, pp. 367-8.
39. Ringler Thomson to Durand, Mashhad Diary, 
FO 248/612.
- 71 -
The Lulama enjoyed a privileged position, particularly 
the muj tahids, whom it was difficult for the government to 
curb. As Shaikh Fazlallah told the followers of Bihbihani 
when they came to enlist his support for the opposition to
the government in November 1905, the Sadr-iAtzam could not
- - * 40 *touch Bihbihani but he could destroy them. Likewise
members of the secret society to which Nazim al-Islam belonged 
complained that it was all very well for him to conspire
against the government as he was under the protection of
- - 41TabatabaJi but they were entirely vulnerable. A powerful 
• •
mujtahid was in a position to give sanctuary to opponents of
government policy in his house as Tabataba^i did for both
• •
Malik al-Mutakallimin and Aqa Sayyid Jamal al-Din. The tulama
as a whole, however, had a certain immunity from punishment,
even when engaged in quarrels that disturbed the peace and
embarrassed the government. In 1903, after a disturbance
between the students of two rival schools, the SadriA'zam and
• •
the Governor of Tehran had them punished in a manner they
considered a slight to their dignity and despatched to prison
in Ardebil. The culama at once united in indignation as/ until
that time such an incident had never been punished with such
42severity, particularly where sayyids were involved. The
lulama guarded their privileged position jealously, as when
in 19 04 students beat the nephew of the Sadr-iAlzam for what
43 - -they considered maltreatment of one of their number. Aqa
Najafi Quchani also reports rigorous objection by sayyids and
students against frialtreatment1 or punishment by the state 
44authorities. One privilege which was determinedly defended
40. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 272.
•i—1 Ibid., I, p. 280.
42. Ibid., I, p. 213.
43. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 
FO 60/682.
150, 16th Aug.
44. Najafi Quchani, op. cit., p. 61.
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against all attempts by the state to abolish it was the
right of sanctuary, particularly in the house of a mujtahid.
A typical dispute arose in 187 6 when some servants of the
Imam Jumca of Tehran, who had taken sanctuary in his house,
were bastinadoed in his presence, so that he suspended public
45prayers and withdrew from the city.
The Lulama were most privileged, however, with regard
to their financial position. They had resources, derived
from the religious foundations, their sharL offices, and the
canonical taxes, which rendered them completely independent
of the state. The most lucrative source of income came from
the vaqf or religious foundations, reckoned at the turn of
the century to be 4,000,000 tomans, that is approximately half
46of the total state revenue. This was, of course, a rough
estimate, as in the absence of government control, little was
known of the real value of vaqf properties, and the system of
accounting was obscure. There was no government control or
registration as for example existed in Egypt. The foundations
consisted of landed property and its income, left for the
building and maintenance of religious schools, mosques, shrines
and tombs. The land could also be used for commercial
enterprises such as shops and caravanserais. Vaqf property
was, however, not equally distributed throughout the country,
and the Shrine at Mashhad, for example, received about
470235,000 per year, which was proportionately greater than 
the income from vaqf elsewhere.
45. Thomson to Derby, No.113, 5th Aug. 187 6, FO 60/380.
46. M. Durand, 'Memorandum on the Situation in Persia',
27th Sept. 1895, Part I Section 6, FO 60/566 
(Henceforward 'Durand Memorandum').
47. Donaldson, op. cit., p. 183.
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The management of vaqf revenue rested primarily with
the legal trustee mutavalli who might be a mullah or an
ordinary layman, and who was theoretically responsible for
the trust; in practice misappropriation of funds was not
unknown, and indeed happened at one of the madrasas attended
by Aqa Najafi Quchani, where the mutavalli was subsequently 
48removed. All foundations had to have a mutavalli but he
might be appointed in a variety of ways. The bequeather might
designate himself as mutavalli and the office pass to his heirs.
He might on the other hand appoint another person in whose
family the office would then become hereditary, though possibly
to be confirmed in each generation by the heirs of the 
49bequeathers. The mutavalli might have carried out his
duties with the cooperation of a mujtahid, who was sometimes
referred to as the nagir, supervisor. Occasionally the
bequeather designated the nagir in the vaqfnama or deed of 
50endowment. Of the two the mutavalli appears to have had
the firmer authority. The deed of endowment also usually
specified how the money was to be spent, the most frequent
items listed being upkeep and fuel, with a certain proportion,
usually a tenth, going to the trustee, and sometimes a further
tenth to the nagir. The remainder might be spent amongst the
poor if the property was a mosque, and the teachers and students
51if it was a madrasa. The students of a school did not always
receive a stipend from the endowment, though they might be
52provided with fuel. The muitahid was allowed discretion in 
disbursing the income he received from a vaqf, which might be 
disbursed among the poor, his students, or even his family.
48. Najafi Quchani, op. cit., p. 77.
49. A.K.S. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant, (O.U.P. 1953), 
p. 231.
50. M. Sutuda, Az Astara ta Istarbad (From Astara to
to Istarbad), Tehran 1353/1974-5, VII, pp. 513-6,
552-56.
51. Ibid., pp. 506-12, 552-6.
52. Ibid., pp. 513-6.
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According to two leading mujtahids of the cAtabat, the 
income they derived from the Oudh bequest was intended for 
charitable purposes, for the maintaining and aiding in the 
creation of mujtahids, and for maintaining those family
53members and adherents of the mujtahid who were without support.
v'agf lands might be sold if greater profits accrued to the
54 -religious body thereby. Shaikh Fazlallah, for instance,
negotiated a sale on commercial terms of the vaqf lands of
- 55QaJim Maqam to the Russian Road Company.
Certain important foundations were under the control of
the Shah who appointed the mutavalll of a shrine or school or
the pishnamaz of a mosque. This was true of the Shrines of
5 6Mashhad and Qum and of certain important foundations in
Tehran such as the Mosque of Sipah Salar, which was
57particularly well endowed. Usually in the case of such 
grants it was understood that the recipient's heir would be 
confirmed in the same office. If, however, the recipient 
incurred the royal displeasure, the Shah could remove him 
from his office. Such an instance occurred when certain of
the fculama took bast in the Shrine of Shah ‘'Abd al-^Azim in
__ _ _ _ _  " •
December 1905. The Shah dispossessed Mirza MurtazaAshtiyani
of the lucrative Madrasa-yi Khan Marvi and bestowed it on the
— 58Imam JumLa who had remained loyal to the government.
Evidently the SadriA'zam also had a say in the disposal of • •
vaqf property, for this same school had previously been held 
by the father of the Imam Jum4a, who lost it when he incurred 
the enmity of Amin al-Sultan.
53. Ramsay to the Secretary of the Government of India 
Foreign Dept., No. 153, 12th Feb. 1909, L/P & S/10/77 
India Office Records.
54. Lambton, Landlord, op. cit., p. 234.
55. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 637.
•
56. Ringler Thomson to Durand, Mashhad Diary, 25th Jan.
1895, FO 248/611? Lascelles to Salisbury, No. 117,
15th July 1892, FO 60/532.
57. Lambton, Landlord, op. cit., p. 234.
58. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, pp. 15-16.
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There were fierce struggles amongst the culama for
control of vaqf property where the office of mutavalli had
fallen vacant, because of the income and influence to be gained
from making the appointment. Usually a mujtahid held
particular influence in the quarter where he lived and would
thus have the best chance of attaining control of any vacant
religious office in that area. The numerous students dependant
on the muj tahid formed the front line in such battles. Towards
the end of 1903 a quarrel broke out between the students of
the Madrasa-yi Sadr and the Madrasa-yi Muhammadiyya over the
59Madrasa-yi Afsarryya. Behind the students were two mujtahids, 
Sayyid '’Ali Akbar Tafrishi and the Imam JumLa, who were in 
competition for control of the Afsariyye. In Mashhad where 
there was a considerable amount of vaqf property, battles 
between rival muj tahids and their students were even more 
frequent.
A certain amount of vaqf income was sent to the tulama
of the Shrine cities. For example Khurasani received 2000
tomans yearly from the vaqf lands of QaJim Maqam, which were
— 60under the supervision of Shaikh Fazlallah in Tehran. It is
not clear why he in particular received this payment, as he
is not specially mentioned as a close connection of Shaikh
Fazlallah. Connections between the mujtahids of the cAtabat
and those of Tehran over vaqf are clearer in the matter of the
Oudh bequest. This money was left by the King of Oudh for
distribution amongst the pious of Najaf and Karbala by the
King of Oudh, who had nominated the British Government as
trustee. The money was given to a particular mujtahid for
distribution, but in 1902 Newmarch, the Political Agent in
Baghdad, was ordered to reorganise the distribution on more 
61regular lines. This produced fierce competition amongst the
59. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, pp. 211-2.
60. Ibid., I, p. 637.
61. Newmarch to Hardinge, No. 63, 4th Feb. 1903,
FO 248/801 No. 31.
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Hi 1ama there. The news travelled quickly to Tehran, and 
Hardinge, the British Representative, was beseiged by 
requests from members of the culami with friends and
relatives in the *Atabat to have them put on the list of
. . .  62recipients.
A further means of financing the religious estate was
by the contributions of the faithful. The most significant
of these were the canonical payments of khums, the share of
the Imam, amounting to one fifth of the donor's yearly income,
and zakat, alms. Khums and zakat were originally supposed
to have been paid to the Imam, but in his absence, there being
no other legitimate authority, they were paid to the muj tahids.
Indeed, the muj tahid had the right to demand zakat and it was
6 3incumbent upon the faithful to pay him. Distribution of
zakat, other than through a muj tahid, or his agent, did not
carry the same spiritual credit. Khums and zakat were thus
important not only as a source of income but also in that
their method of payment was a recognition of the role of the
mujtahid. Distribution of the religious payments also gave
the mujtahid great influence. On the other hand payments were
made not only for religious reasons, but because of the
mujtahid1s ability to represent the grievances of the less
powerful classes. If he failed in this function, religious
payments might be withdrawn, or given elsewhere, so the
64muitahid was to some extent directed by his followers. It 
is noticeable that at the time of the Constitutional 
Revolution the culama formed constellations around a leading 
mujtahid, each of whom had his own following of mullahs, 
students, sayyids and preachers. He also tended to dominate 
religious affairs in his own quarter. This may reflect the 
movement of funds in collection and disbursement by the mujtahid.
62. A. Hardinge, op. cit. , p.. 373.
63. Calder, Jurisprudence, op. cit., p. 121.
64. See Fischer, op. cit., p. 95, for illustration of 
the influence of the mugallid on the mujtahid in 
present day Iran.
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The culama also received a much less considerable
income from government stipends and pensions. In 1895 it
was reckoned that about 500,000 tomans were disbursed by the
government to members of the *ulama, tullab and sayyids. No
demands were made upon the recipients of pensions,who carried
out their studies or duties independent of government control.^
The basis for awarding a pension was usually either personal
contact or hereditary right. At the death of a pensioner a
third of his pension passed to his heir, but usually the
payment of a sum to the Shah ensured that the pension continued
for another life. Several attempts were made to reform this
state of affairs, as in 1903 when Amin al-Sultan tried to
suppress hereditary pensions descending through daughters as
well as sons, but such measures had little effect. Many
Lulama were also tu yuldar, or fiefholders, that is to say
they were in receipt of a grant from the government. Such
grants varied, being sometimes a grant on the revenue attached
to a certain office; sometimes a grant of khaliga or crown
lands in lieu of salary; or a grant to collect taxes in a
given area which might be crown property, or the property of
a third person, or that of the person to whom the tu yul was 
6 6granted. In the last case it amounted to an immunity from
taxation. Aqa Najafi Qiichani obtained such an immunity for
his father for several years on condition the money remitted
6 7went to subsidize the son's religious studies. In another
case a member of the culama was permitted 264 tomans per year
from taxes due on his land for his own account, any revenue in
6 8excess being due to the local treasury.
65. 'Durand Memorandum', Part I Section 6.
66. Lambton, Landlord, op. cit., p. 139.
67. Najafi Quchani, op. cit., p. 199.
68. M.A. Karimzada-Tabrizi, ‘ Chand Sanad-i Tarikhi'
(Some Historical Documents), Barraslh§ .-yj Tarikhi,
Year 8 No. 4 1352/1973, p. 8 .
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Titles as well as offices carried a stipend, the title 
sometimes belonging with the office and sometimes not. In 
1896/7 a mullah named Sayyid Fakhr al-Din, who undertook 
religious duties amongst the royal bodyguard (the exact 
nature of the duties is obscure), was awarded the title Fakhr
-  _  _  69
al-Ashraf by Muzaffar al-Din Shah. He was also given a 
grant of 7 tomans cash plus a certain amount in kind annually 
to be paid in addition to his salary. This sum had previously 
been paid to someone else, recently deceased, but it is not 
clear whether he had held the title as well. His duties, 
however, had not been the same. In this case the money came 
from the taxes of Khurasan, but it was to be collected from 
the Royal Treasury in Tehran. The nomination was made by 
Amir Bahadur Jang, the Commander of the Royal Bodyguard, but 
nominations were most commonly made by the Sadr-i Alzam.
The money the tulama derived from fees from legal
documents and contracts was one of their most significant
sources of income. As a proportion of their total income it
would have varied according to the individual muj tahid or
mullah, and so far no estimates for this period have come to
light. One area that was particularly lucrative was the
administration of government shar*- business, which in Tehran
70was usually passed to one particular muitahid.
The ^ulama paid little to the state in the way of taxes. 
Khums and zakat were not taxed, salaries and pensions had a 
duty imposed on them only just before the Revolution. As 
owners of land, they were, however, liable to payment of the
69. I am grateful to Dr. Mehrdad Shokuhi for giving me 
a photograph of this farman, which is in his 
possession.
70. See Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 210, for the 
example of Shaikh Fazlallah and 4Ain al-Daula.
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land tax. But as the Governor General of Mashhad told the 
British Consul there:
'None of the muj tahids who were among the chief 
landowners in the country paid a twentieth of the 
revenue that could be justly demanded of them.'^l
The tulama were also exempt from the arbitrary levies of
72money exacted by high officials.
The mujtahids were often very wealthy, and a mullah who 
had a secure position was relatively well-off. Students, 
however, frequently found life hard and precarious, unless 
they were supported by their families. Aqa Najafi Quchani 
was often without money for food, or had to sell his books
to eat, or took up labouring work to earn his bread (which
- 73was regarded as demeaning for a member of the lulama).
His account of the hardship to be endured is similar to that
- 74of the seventeenth century divine, Sayyid Ni^atallah.
Funds came from different sources. He received small amounts
from his father, but otherwise existed from the general
distributions from the muj tahids, and from special gifts made
75to the poorer students. At one point he received money
from two mujtahids, one his teacher, and the other the
supervisor of the school wThere he lived. Khurasani, who
evidently wished to encourage serious students only gave
donations to those who had attended classes for two or three
7 6years, and thus proved a serious intent.
71. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 26, 3rd March 1903, FO 
60/665, Incl. I, quoting the son of the Governor 
General of Mashhad.
72. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 254.
73. Najafi Quchani, op. cit., p. 320, p. 169, pp. 75-6.
74. E.G. Browne, A History of Persian Literature (C.U.P.
1969 ed.), IV, pp. 361-6.
75. Najafi Quchani, op. cit., pp. 371-2, 325.
76. Ibid., p. 324.
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The culama had strong links with other groups, notably 
the merchants and trades guilds. These links were forged by 
the religious and legal services which they performed, and, 
where the culama were also landowners, by economic links they 
had in common. Amongst the muj tahids the connection does not
seem to have extended to marriage, but it did amongst the
~77  “lesser *ulama. The culama were looked upon as mediators
between the ordinary people and the government. In conformity
with the theory discussed in Chapter I that the culama and the
Shah were partners in the good ordering of the community of
Islam, the ^ulama were expected to cooperate with the
government by acting as guides, helping quell disturbances,
and passing on and explaining government policy to the
78 “populace. On the other hand the culama were also one of the
main channels whereby popular grievances could be brought to
the attention of the higher state authorities, and discontent
be conveyed to the government. People who were victims of
extortion and arbitrary acts of state officials looked for
protection to the culama, and especially the mujtahids. Thus
when the Vazir Makhsus tried to build a qanat (water channel)
• •
on his land without agreeing the water rights with the local
villagers, some of them took bast with Bihbihani, who
79succeeded in putting their point of view. In 1896 when a 
drought caused a water shortage in Chala Maidan, Tehran, and 
soldiers and water officials (mirab) took advantage of the 
situation, the local people made representations to Shaikh 
Fazlallah, who brought the problem to the attention of the 
Governor of Tehran.^
77. W.M. Floor, 'The Merchants (tujjar) in Qajar Iran',
ZDMG CXXVI 1976, p. 104.
78. See Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 28; Hardinge 
to LanSdowne., No. 69, 24th March 1905, FO 60/698;
Barclay to Grey, No. 202, 25th Nov. 1908, FO 371/507, 
for examples of the Shah assigning this role to the
1u1ama.
79. Sharif Kashani, op. cit., Vahid No. 206 1356/1977-8, 
p. 59.
80. A^A^ Jalilvand, 'Chigunagi-yi Ab-i Paytakht dar Dauran-i 
Qajariya' (Potable Water in the Capital during the Qajar 
Period), Vahid 219-20 1356/1977-8, pp. 28-40.
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Often the best means whereby other classes, especially
the mercantile groups, could press for a particular policy,
or change in policy, was by linking themselves to an
81influential mullah. It is likely the connection took 
concrete form in the payment of khums and zakat to the 
muj tahid or to one of the mosques from which he collected 
these dues. To be sure not to lose these contributions to 
a rival, the mujtahid had to be to some extend amenable to 
the wishes of his following. An ambitious mujtahid needed 
the financial resources for patronage, without which he 
could not attain prestige. Thus a mujtahid seeking influence 
needed to be attuned to current opinion and discontent.
There are many instances where the *-ulama appeared to 
be leading an agitation, but where in reality the pressure 
was coming from their following. What appeared to be a 
religious campaign led by the *ulama against the Jews in 
Tehran in 1899 really originated in a competition between
8 2Muslim and Jewish shopkeepers over the piece goods trade.
The foreign firm of Ralli and Son in 1865 came under attack
by the chief mujtahid of Tabriz at the instigation of a
8 3combination of local merchants. Soon after the establishment
of the Imperial Bank in Isfahan a dispute with a local money
* — 84
changer led to an attack by the *ulama on the Chief Clerk.
In a similar protest in Yazd the Bank was accused of 'not 
respecting Islam'.The best example is perhaps the protest 
over the Tobacco Concession in 1891 where the earliest signs
81. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat.op,cit., II, p. 27.
82. Durand to Salisbury, No. 74, 26th July 1899,
FO 60/609.
83. Alison to Russell, Mo. 71, 30th June 1865,
FO 60/290.
84. Conyngham Greehe to Kimberley, No. 170, 14th Aug.
1894, " FO 60/559.
85. Conyngham Greene to Kimberley, No. 142, 21st June
1894, FO 60/558.
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of opposition came from the tobacco merchants in Tabriz and 
8 6Shiraz, and the leading muj tahid of Tabriz initially
refused to preach against the Concession, much to the
8 7discontent of local merchants. In Tabriz placards appeared
_ o o
threatening the lives of the tulama if they did not protest.
It is interesting to note that in Tabriz with its powerful 
bazaar, the tulama joined the agitation, whereas in Mashhad, 
where they were largely dependant on the Shrine for a living, 
they remained loyal to the Shah and did their best to quell 
disturbance.^
The culama could also use their influence to arouse a
mob for a particular cause. They tended to provide the
leadership and others the money, whereas the organisation
could be undertaken by either. In Tabriz at the time of the
Tobacco protest the agitation was organised by a few
influential citizens among the teashop keepers and small
tradesmen. A petition was circulated through the bazaars by
one of the lesser culama, his method being to give it to the
head of each guild and instruct him to secure the signatures
90of those engaged in his trade. In the campaign leading up 
to the bast of July 19 06 in Tehran, the money came from major 
merchants and high officials but the organisation was carried
* -  9i
out by the culama and bazaaris. One of the mob leaders, 
Mahdl Gavkush, known as the 'centurion' (vuzbashi) for his
86. Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 123, 
No. 89 Tel., 27th April 1891,
6th May 1891, and 
FO 60/553.
•C"00 Kennedy to Salisbury, 
FO 60/553.
No. 128, 20th May 1891,
00 00 • Kennedy to Salisbury, 
FO 60/553.
No. 180, 27th July 1891,
89. Kennedy to Salisbury, 
FO 60/553.
No. 203, 6th Oct. 1891,
90. Kennedy to Salisbury, 
FO 60/553.
No. 202, 3rd Sept. 1891,
91. See Chapter V.
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ability to raise a crowd, worked for the mujtahids
_ _ _ _ _ 92 —
Bihbihani and Tabataba^i. When Sayyid Akbar Shah took • •
bast in the Shrine of Shah cAbd al-*Azim in February 1907,
he was accompanied by students and roughs (not always
distinguishable) paid for by the Governor of Tehran. The
mob who followed Shaikh Fazlallah at the time of the attack on
the Majlis in 1907 was both subsidised and organised by the
leading roughs of Tehran under the guidance of the Shah's
93chamberlain, Mujallal al-Sultan. The attack on the Russian
Discount Loan Bank in Tehran in November 1905, however, was
set up by a mullah, the brother of the muj tahid Mirza Murtaza
Ashtiyani, using the residents of his locality and his 
94students. The leaders of the roughs of the different
quarters of Tehran, such as Sani^ Hazrat from Chala Maidan,
• •
Muqtadir Nizam in Sanglaj, and Haj Malsum in Sar Pulak, sold • • •
their services to whoever required them. Sani£ Hazrat, who
• •
led the mob attack on the Majlis in 1908 at the instigation
- - 9 5
of the Shah, had only recently been working for Bihbihani.
Haj Ma£sum, one of the Shah's myrmidons in 1908, was resident • •
in Bihbihani's quarter and had also been linked to the
mujtahid. For this reason Bihbihani helped him to evade
punishment by the Majlis, thereby gaining prestige with
96certain of the residents of his own quarter. Protests were
also joined by strangers from the countryside, who came into
town in the expectation of pillage, usually in the guise of 
- 97tullab. There may well have been a connection between 
these gangs of the roughs of Tehran also known as lutis, and 
the zurkhanas, but so far no direct evidence has emerged.
92. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 442.
93. Muhakamat, No. 38, 15th Safar 1326.
94. Kasravi, op. cit., p. 56.
95. Ibid., p. 506.
96. Daulatabadl, op. cit., II, p. 189.
97. Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 207, 
FO 60/553.
12th Sept.
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Whatever the real motives, the protest was usually
justified in religious terms, and found legitimacy in taking
on a religious form. Bihbihani warranted his attack on Naus,
the Belgian Minister of Customs, in February 1905 by saying
Naus had denigrated Islam, and that this act rendered him
liable to sentence of death. In the Tobacco Protest one of
the cries was that the Shah was permitting kafirs to interfere
98in the tobacco business. In the final stages of insurgence,
in July 1906, after the killinq of a sayyid, TabatabaJi and his
• •
followers came to the mosque in winding sheets, saying they
were ready to emulate the martyrdom of Husain to fight 
99 *oppression.
One of the government's responses to ^ulama-led agitation 
was to buy off the muj tahids. As the state weakened during 
the 1890's the government was increasingly forced to use this 
method, pursued particularly by Amin al-Sultan. Amin al-Daula 
resisted it, though for example he bought off Mirza Hasan 
Ashtiyani during agitation in 1897."^^ His refusal on the 
whole to give in, however, was contributory to his fall from 
power. Amin al-Sultan managed to stave off opposition to the 
Russian loans of 1900 and 1902 by offering financial 
inducements to the muj tahids of Tehran.
It is unclear quite what services the mujtahids could 
perform for government officials in return for the frequent 
requests they made on the part of their following. One of 
their main services seems to have been the negative one of 
simply resisting popular pressure, or assisting to quell
98. Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 225, 5th Oct. 1891,
FO 60/553.
99. Grant Duff to Grey, No. 182, 15th July 1906,
FO 371/112.
100. Hardinge to Salisbury, No. 5, 7th May 1897,
FO 539/76 No. 74.
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incipient disturbances. Also by judicious administration of
government patronage in the form of gifts, pensions, shar4
business, and the supervision of endowment funds, they could
help to build up support for a particular minister, as
Bihbihani did for Amin al-Sultan. Occasionally they might
perform a special favour for a high official, as Shaikh
Fazlallah did when he issued a fatva supporting Hishmat
—  101al-Mulk's claim to his father's possessions in QaJin, or 
when he sold vaqf land to the Russian Bank at the special
* . t _T . ^  . 10 2request of lAin al-Daula.
The most important function fulfilled by the *ulama was
in the delivering of shar1 judgements. The administration
of the law in Iran was carried out in two types of courts,
shar c and curf. In common with practice in most Muslim
countries civil law was mainly dealt with by the shar4 courts,
and criminal cases by the state authorities in the curf or
customary law courts. Sharc cases could be tried by a mullah,
and if they were important they were referred to a mujtahid.
Such trials were often informal in character and usually took
place in the house of the mullah concerned. Likewise there
were no properly constituted secular courts of law. The 4urf
law was administered by any official of rank who might have
power to enforce the execution of his judgement, competence
103depending on that factor alone. In the villages cases were
usually referred to a gathering of elders, and then tried
104before the head-man or local mullah. In a town they went
before a local magistrate or dargah and serious criminal cases 
were put to the governor of a town or province. Authority in 
curf legal matters was delegated from the Shah, who was the 
ultimate court of appeal.
101. Marling to Grey, No. 
No. 35492.
224 , 9th Oct. 1907,
102. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, pp. 324-8
103. 'Durand Memorandum', Part I, Section 7.
104. Curzon, op. cit., I, 454.
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The civil lav; dealt with by the share courts mainly 
covered personal law, such as marriage, divorce, wills and 
transfer of property. It was also concerned with religious 
rights and duties, and crimes against religion, such as 
heresy and sacrilege. In addition the courts dealt with 
judicial procedure. A decision was written out with a 
citation from the holy texts or commentators on which it 
was based. In giving judgement the Hi lama were independent 
of, and in no way responsible to, the state authorities.
The *urf law varied in different parts of the country,
and it was unwritten since no law except the shariLa could 
105be written. Little attempt was made to refer to
precedent and decisions were promptly given and executed.
The principal checks on government officials were dread of 
their superiors, and the fact that trials were held publicly.
Although criminal law was usually tried in the secular
courts criminal cases of difficulty were referred to the
mujtahids, who pronounced sentence according to the shari ca.
In cases where execution was decided upon, proof of guilt
was taken according to the shari£a, and sent to the Shah to
obtain his mandate. With murder, however, the law of
retaliation often applied, and cases were settled by
compensation. After the governor had sentenced the criminal,
his family requested the intercession of a mujtahid in
106inducing the victim's family to accept blood money.
Payments in such cases were also made to the mujtahid and the 
governor general.
105. Malcolm, op. cit., II, p. 439.
106. P.M. Sykes, A History of Persia (London 1921),
II, p. 385.
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In civil law, especially in such matters as deeds and 
contracts, there was a certain amount of overlap between the 
sharc and cur£ systems. There was no special ruling to 
determine which courts had the power to deal with matters of 
this kind, and the plaintiff might present his case wherever 
he felt it was most in his interest to do so. A dispute over 
vaqf property as between the Shrine of Shahzada Husain and 
some of its tenants in Qazvin, which was referred to Shaikh 
Fazlallah, reveals the confusion in authority as between 
conflicting judgements of different mullahs, and between them
and the Ministry of Justice, all of which could cause delays
107 _in the judiciary system. At that time Shaikh Fazlallah's
108judgements supposedly carried the greatest weight. The confusior 
led to rivalry between the shar* and curf courts, the former 
arguing that the latter were not legitimate. Curzon reported 
that during the reign of Nasir al-Din Shah the influence of 
of the shar1 courts d e c l i n e d . W i t h  the weakening of 
government authority in the 1890's there appears to have been 
a slight growth in the influence of the sharc courts, there 
being more frequent cases of their overturning the judgements 
in *urf courts. The fact, however, that the *ulama could
not execute their own decisions, whereas the state could, gave 
an advantage to the secular authorities. The actual execution 
of the law in all cases was carried out by state officials 
called far.ashes.
Commercial cases and civil cases concerning such matters 
as titles to property were frequently referred neither to the 
shar* or *urf authorities, but decided by private arbitration.
107. I am grateful to Dr. H. Modarressi for providing me
with a photograph of this document.
108. H.A. Burhan, *Shaikh Fazlallah va Dar Kishidan-i U 1
i976-7h pa287615h and HiS Execution)» Vahid No. 203 1335/
109. Curzon, op. cit., I, p. 453.
110. 'Durand Memorandum', Part I, Section 7.
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A gathering of merchants heard both sides of the case, and
after inspecting the documents, gave a decision in the nature
of a compromise. The verdict might be ratified by the
seal of a mujtahid. The commercial law, like commercial
organisation, was rudimentary compared to that which backed
European capitalists. There was no insurance, or guarantee,
and little hope of reclaiming lost property, with a consequent
112lack of confidence. Merchants were also subject to the
113arbitrary actions of powerful officials.
The government made repeated attempts at judicial reform.
In the 1850's courts of justice were set up to try civil cases
but soon disappeared without a trace. In 1858 and 1862 decrees
were passed establishing a Ministry of Justice with provincial
branches, thus introducing a new authority into the existing
judicial system. Further attempts at improving the judicial
system through the Ministry of Justice were made under the
Si-pah Salar in the 1870's (see Chapter IV). The duties of the
Ministry included the hearing of cases in the Tehran region,
and the execution of judgements delivered by the *ulama.
It also had agents in every town to take note of the local
administration of the law, but since they were nearly always
114subservient to the local governor, they were ineffective.
The Ministry also dealt with matters of commercial law, for
which reason it was initially combined with the Ministry of
Commerce. In the 1890's the two were separated and commercial
law cases were referred to the latter. After the Shah's
return from Europe in 1889, he ordered that the law be codified,
and translations of the Code Napoleon, and the Indian Muslim
115Code were commenced but never completed. One of the main
111. Curzon, op. cit., I, p. 455.,
112. Wood to Hardinge, Incl.I in Hardinge to Salisbury,
No. 82, 23rd June 1897, FO 539/77.
113. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit.. I, p. 254.
114. 'Durand Memorandum', Part I, Section 7.
115. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1902, Persia.
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problems with these reforms was finding the personnel to 
carry them through. The chief obstacle, however, was the 
opposition of the powerful interest groups, especially the 
*ulama and the provincial authorities. As a result, beyond the 
formation of the Ministry of Justice, judicial reform made 
little progress.
Curzon noted a number of deficiencies in the Iranian 
116judicial system. They included the confusion of judicial
and executive functions, which might be carried out by the 
same official; overlapping jurisdiction of religious and 
secular courts, and the lack of distinction between their 
prerogatives and functions; the absence of competent tribunals 
to administer the law; of proper guidance for magistrates; 
and of a systemised legal code. It may be added that this 
latter point was to the advantage of the ^ulama and that the 
secular authority was weakened by the fact that the curf law 
was unwritten, and that the sharira did not exist in a form 
that was accessible to laymen.
The Iranian failure in legal reform may be contrasted with 
the work of the Ottomans over the same period, which, though 
imperfect, was much more advanced. The reforms included the 
Commercial Code of 1850, translated from the French, the 
Penal code of 1858 again based on the French and abolishing 
most of the defined punishments of the sharica (hadd), the
Code of Commercial Procedure of 1861, and the Maritime Code
of 1868. Between 1869-79 most shar* precepts relating to
civil matters were codified in the Mejelle, enabling secular 
courts to ascertain that law. As a result all civil
116. Curzon, op. cit., I, p. 459.
117. See Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh
1964) , p. 151; B. Lev/is, The Emergence of Modern 
Turkey (O.U.P. 1961), pp. 107-8, 116-121.
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jurisdiction, excepting that of personal status, came 
within the competence of the secular authorities. During 
the 1870's the Nizamiyya, a new system of secular courts, 
was established to apply these codes. Provision was also 
made for new municipal councils and a municipal code.
The lack of a regular system of law, and the constant
interference of mullahs and governors in commercial affairs
led in 1884 to a new and unusual attempt at the reform of the
commercial law. The proposal was to set up an assembly of
the representatives of the merchants of Iran as a means of
carrying out a programme of economic development and the
118encouragement of foreign trade. Its responsibilities
were to include the establishing of commercial law courts.
mm *
The leading merchant who proposed it, Amin al-£arb, believed 
that the mercantile classes should have a say in the affairs 
of the country, since they were its chief source of prosperity. 
In addition, the representatives of the merchants would 
cooperate with the guilds for the protection of their rights, 
for which it was evident, in their opinion, that one single 
law was necessary. The proposed assembly was to examine many 
projects later taken up by the Majlis. These included the 
development of the country's resources, the setting up of 
factories, the opening of mines, restrictions on foreign 
goods, and the establishing of a national bank.
Amin al-£arb was especially critical of government 
officials, who in his view lacked knowledge and experience, 
and were not sufficiently accountable. For this reason he 
wished the proposed assembly to take judicial precedence over 
the provincial governors in commercial affairs. It was to
118. Adamiyyat and Natiq, op. cit., p. 299.
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give the merchants protection against arbitrary action, such
as the seizure of property. Amin al-2arb was also critical
of the ^ulama for taking bribes, and for their habit of
over-ruling each others' decisions. Abroad, he commented,
119people did not have to pay taxes to mullahs. Some of
Amin al-2arb's comments, particularly on government administration
and legal failings, reflect the ideas of Malkum Khan, and are
similar to criticism put forward by the mujtahid Tabataba*i
• •
in 1905-6.
A rescript for the formation of the Council of Merchants
was issued by Nasir al-Din Shah in August 1884. Elections to
the Councils took place in September 1884. Their existence
was immediately threatened by provincial governors, led by
the Shah's eldest son, Zill al-Sultan, who claimed the
• •
existing system was quite adequate. Opposition from the
*ulama was also not long in emerging, and, in Tabriz, Haj~ •
Mirza Javad Mujtahid claimed that the Council's activities
were contrary to the sharica, and his tullab began harrassing
120its representatives. In Qazvin the Councils were labelled
'a new sedition'. The combined opposition of governors and 
*ulama finally forced the Shah to give up the councils, which 
were allowed to lapse.
The lack of any written law outside the sharlca or even
administrative regulations, meant that government in Iran was
arbitrary and unsystematic. Many of the complaints of the
merchants, amongst others, related to arbitrary taxation and
to maladministration of the revenues. As Malcolm noted, the
whole question of collecting the revenue was so closely
connected with the administration of justice that the two
121subjects cannot be separated. One of the themes of the
119. Ibid., p. 302.
120. Ibid., p. 356.
121. Malcolm, op. cit., p. 470.
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Constitutional Revolution, that government be regulated by 
law, derives from the connection between these two issues.
It is also noteworthy that the cry for justice and law, so 
persistent among Iranian reformers, hardly occurs in the 
writings of their Ottoman counterparts, illustrating once 
again how much less developed the Iranian system was.
CONCLUSION
Under the traditional system of the Qajar state the 
cu 1ama enjoyed a position of power and privilege which could 
hardly be possible under modern centralised government. This 
was particularly true with regard to taxation and the law.
They paid little or no taxes on the substantial income from 
vaqf foundations. The canonical taxes were paid to them directly 
so the government had no say in the distribution of money from 
such a source. Their fiefholdings,salaries and pensions were 
likewise untaxed, though comparatively small, and the 
government made no exactions on their income from legal 
business. In addition, members of the religious classes had 
a greater immunity from punishment than others, this being 
particularly true of the mujtahids. The latter were also 
especially privileged in their right to give sanctuary to 
their followers in their own house, which they frequently used 
to add to their own prestige and undermine that of the 
government.
On the other hand, the position of the culama was also 
vulnerable, and to some extent insecure. This was partly 
because competition amongst them for a share in their 
allotted sources of income was fierce. At the lower end there 
were many sayyids claiming alms, and many more students than 
there were cells and stipends. Salaries and pensions, though 
small and irregularly paid, were eagerly sought after.
Mujtahids had to battle for a share of lucrative government 
shar* business, and control of vaqf foundations. Only a
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a sizeable income would bring a muj tahid the patronage he 
needed. Without patronage he might be respected for his 
learning, but he could not attain the goals of influence 
and prestige which many sought.
The culama were also vulnerable because their sources 
of income, apart from those they inherited, were not under 
their own control. Endowments, for example, could be subject 
to stipulations by the bequeather and his heirs. Certain 
wealthy bequests were the responsibility of the Shah, 
especially in Tehran itself. The goodwill of the Shah or of 
a powerful notable had often to be won to obtain a trusteeship, 
fief, salary or pension. The interests and policies of the 
mercantile classes had to be served if their religious 
contributions were to be retained.
The authority of the ^ulama in the administration of the 
law made them, together with the provincial governors, the 
chief impediments to judicial reform. Their insistence that 
the sharl^a be the only written law prevented the codification 
so necessary to change, and without which it was impossible to 
set up properly regulated tribunals. Resistance by the shar4 
courts hampered efforts to make the judicial system more 
efficient through the institution of the Ministry of Justice. 
These deficiencies were most apparent to reformers from the 
higher bureaucracy, such as Mirza Malkum Khan and those whom 
he influenced, but the attempt to establish the Council of 
Merchants suggests a growing awareness amongst the merchants 
that the existing system did not give them the security to 
assist trade and development, and the protection, especially 
against arbitrary taxation^which they might otherwise hope for.
Overall the advantages enjoyed by the religious classes 
as a whole under the traditional Qajar state meant that it 
was in their interests to conserve what already existed, rather 
than champion the cause of strong modernised government.
CHAPTER III
THE HJLAMA AND THE COMING OF THE REVOLUTION
In 1890, in an atterp.pt to increase the profits of the
tobacco industry, and direct some part of them into the
Treasury, a concession for the monopoly of collection,
manufacture and export of tobacco was sold to a British
subject. This provoked combined opposition from what Keddie
describes as a coalition of culama, nationalists, discontented
merchants and city populations. The first petitions against
the Concession, however, came from the merchants in Tehran
in February 1891, and later in the year from Tabriz, Mashhad
and Isfahan. The pattern of protest has led Gilbar to
argue that the merchants played the central role in the
agitation which eventually led to the cancellation of the
Concession at the cost of £500,000 in compensation to the 
2
Company. He concluded the merchants desired to resist 
measures such as the Concession which would lead to increasing 
activity in the commercial field where they largely had a 
free hand. Indeed the Concession may also have seemed an 
agreement between the government and a foreign country to 
the detriment of Iranian merchants.
During the 1890's the government found itself increasingly 
in financial difficulties, the chief evidence of which was a 
deficit which grew from £50,000 not including the debt caused 
by the cancellation of the Tobacco Concession of 1890 
to £300, 000 by 1900.^ Nasir al-Din Shah had to some
1. Keddie, Religion and Rebellion, op. cit., p. 131.
2. Gilbar, op. cit., p. 290.
3. Lascelles to Russell, No. 106, 20th June 1893,
FO 60/543.
4. Hardinge to Lansdowne, 16th April 1902,- F0 60/650,
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extent made up the shortfall by auctioning off governorships 
more frequently, making about £100,000 in this way, and by 
vigorous demands for pishkish. His milder successor tried 
to give up the sale of governorships as pernicious, but in 
addition found the provincial governors frequently neglected 
to send even that portion of maliyat or land tax they were 
supposed to remit to the central government, so that by 1905
f.
hardly any money was coming in at all. The only other 
revenue of any significance was the customs dues^ which until
7
1898 were farmed out and made about £200,000 a year. Other 
dues bringing in sums of a few thousand pounds each were 
posts, telegrammes and passports, and the Caspian Sea
o
royalties, worth about £20,000. The sale of concessions was 
supposed to bring in about £100,000, but most of this source 
of revenue had been forestalled as payments had been 
commuted for lump suras.
At the time the economic difficulties were blamed on the 
extravagance of the court, corruption, and a growth in the 
pension list. It is true that Muzaffar al-Din Shah's (1896- 
1907) three costly trips abroad, the growth in the bureaucracy 
and, according to Bakhash, the greater tendancy of officials
9
to siphon off the revenues, must have contributed . The 
major problem, however, appears to have been inflation, the 
rate of which accelerated towards the end of the century 
rising from 23 krans in 1861, to 29 krans in 1883, 36 krans 
in 1889, 50 krans in 1897, and 58 krans in 1905. ^  From the
5. 'Durand Memorandum', Sub Section 14.
6 . Safari, Asnad-i Mashruta, op. cit., pp. 11-16.
7. 'Durand Memorandum', Sub Section 14.
8 . Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 69, 14th May 1903,
FO 416/13 Mo. 366.
9. Bakhash, op. cit., p. 270.
10. Allison to Russell, No. 36, 2nd April 1861, FO 60/256; 
Thomson to Granville, No. 9 Comm., 18th Sept. 1883,
FO 60/450; Drummund Wolff to Salisbury, No. 234, 10th
July 1890, FO 60/512; C. Hardinge to Salisbury, No. 25, 
15th March 1897, FO 60/584 (£5000 was estimated to be
worth 30,000 tomans): Grant Duff to Lansdowne, No. 203,
12th September 1905, FO 416/ 24 No. 12.
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later 1890's especially there were frequent reports of high
prices and dearth of foodstuffs.11 Bread riots took place in 
121900 and indeed the high cost of living was to be a cause
TO
of hardship throughout the constitutional period.
Inflation produced a sharp decline in the value of the maliyat 
to the point where by 1900 prices were double those in 1876, 
but the value of the maliyat had not increased at all, and 
the government felt too weak to enforce a reassessment.1^
The abolition of the Tobacco Concession revealed the
weakness of the government. Not only were there financial
difficulties, but the Qajars, now remote from their tribal
levies, and unable to develop or afford a modern army^had not
the means to suppress protest. Amongst those who took
advantage of the government's weakness in the 1890's were the
provincial authorities. They not only increasingly failed to
remit their taxes, but by 1900 the Russian, British and
French representatives were agreed that their open disobedience
to orders from Tehran was a major factor in the breakdown of
15the machinery of government. Another group who grew in 
power were the fculama, especially some of the mujtahids. By 
playing upon popular discontent they were able to augment 
their own prestige whilst undermining the authority of state 
institutions, notably the Ministry of Justice,1** and the
11. Durand to Salisbury, No. 76, 25th July 1899,
FO 60/609. The exact period of years is not given.
12. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 297.
13. See for example Majlis, No. 201, 2nd Nov. 1907.
14. Encylcopaedia Britannica, 1902, Persia.
15. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No. 91, 19th Sept. 1900,
FO 60/618.
16. Amin al-Daula, op. cit., pp. 225-6.
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17police. They were further able to defend their interests
18more rigorously both in Tehran and in the provinces.
Certain of them were increasingly caught up in political
intrigue, most particularly in the power struggle between
the Chief Ministers, Amin al-Daula and Amin al-Sultan. They
tended to support Amin al-Sultan, who was willing both to
heed their protests and to buy them off, whereas Amin al-Daula
19resisted their interference in government.
Amin al-Daula, S'adr-i A*-zam from 1897-8, held strong
reformist views and determined to begin by tackling the
country's financial problems. Assisted by a council of like-
minded persons he embarked on the first major reform programme
20for more than twenty years. The Minister of Finance, Abui1
Qasim Khan, Nasir al-Mulk, put forward a plan of reform
inspired by his study of the financial organisation of
21European states. Its first item was the abolition of the 
farming of the customs. Instead Europeans were to be placed 
in all the main ports to control receipts and supervise 
individual employees. A European official was to reorganise 
the central administration of the finances, and control of 
the collection of taxes was to be removed from the provincial 
to the central government. The officials chosen were Belgian, 
and they arrived in.March 1898. Their representative, Gerard, 
was however not optimistic about their prospects:
17. Ibid. , p . 156
i—•
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• Beyens to Favereau, 
Folio 2981 I to III,
22nd Sept. 
BMFA.
1897, No. 152/46,
19. Amin al-Daula, op. cit., pp. 225-6.
20. Ibid., p . 218.
•
i—1CM Beyens to Favereau, 
Folio 2981 I to III,
13th Feb. 
BMFA.
1897, No. 64/17,
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'The customs are vital to increasing government 
income. Unfortunately their fruits, far from 
being consecrated to works of development.,are 
being squandered by the Court.'22
He felt the new style of administration would be at odds 
with the traditional one:
'How is it possible to suppress abuse by the 
present officials without condemning the principle 
of the method of government itself.'
He also foresaw opposition, firstly because the existing 
tariff was not levied, a present to the official in charge 
usually ensuring exemption; secondly because vested interests 
from the Valicahd (Crown Prince) downwards considered they 
had a right to make deductions from the customs revenues.
Most especially he feared:
'Problems because of the retrogressive rather than 
progressive tendency of the population and religious 
fanaticism. ...In such difficult circumstances what 
possible effect can the efforts of foreigners have 
on the Persian administration unless it be to 
bedevil the present system of government.'
The Ministry of Amin al-Daula did not long survive the
introduction of the reforms as financial difficulties brought
it down. When he tried to secure a loan from Europe in 1898,
he was resisted by a combination of the supporters of Amin
al-Sultan, merchants and (ulama ostensibly unhappy at a
possible foreign loan, but in Hardinge's view really intent on
- 2 3the return of Amin al-Sultan. Amin al-Daula's reform 
programme survived him to be tentatively pursued by his 
successor Amin al-Sultan and more vigorously by cAin al-Daula.
22. Gerard to Favereau, 3rd Dec. 1898, No. 296/94, 
Folio 2981 I to III, BMFA.
23. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 152, 17th Nov. 1897,
FO 539/77.
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The financial crisis deepened, and the government was 
able to find only two options to deal with it: to borrow
money or to carry out far reaching reforms in the fiscal 
system. The first would meet with criticism as making the 
country dependant on foreigners; the second, as Amin al-Sultan 
saw, would arouse opposition from powerful vested interests, 
and might well lead to rebellion.
Joseph Naus, the leader of the Belgian customs 
administration proposed a detailed programme of reform. The 
prevailing system had certain anomalies, the most significant 
of which was that trade in the hands of foreigners was 
subject to a 5% ad valorem duty, whilst that in Iranian hands 
paid duty at 2-4%. Trade in Iranian hands was also subject 
to many and various internal duties such as road tax. Naus 
proposed a uniform tax of 5% ad valorem on all exports and 
imports whatever the origin of the goods and nationality of 
the trader. He also requested suppression of transit dues 
in the interior. His plan was accepted and put into effect 
late in 1898. By September 1900 the new administration had 
raised the customs revenues from £200,000 per annum to 
£350,000-E400,000 per annum.^
The former system of customs collection had allowed some 
degree of flexibility. Although a tariff was supposed to be 
levied on goods entering and leaving the country, a present 
to the official in charge usually ensured freedom from 
taxation. Leading merchants came to agreements with the 
farmers of particular entry points, who would offer attractive
2 Rreductions to draw in trade by their routes. On condition 
a merchant guaranteed to bring in a given number of cases he
24. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No. 89, 18th Sept. 1900,
FO 60/618; Gerard to Favereau, 3rd Dec. 1898,
No. 246/94, Folio 2981 I to III, BMFA.
25. Independence, 5th Oct. 1904, in Folio 10.640, BMFA.
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could pay a relatively low fixed sum per case of goods.
Certain of the major merchants had acquired leases to farm 
the customs houses at a number of posts and Gilbar considers
  2 c
these major tujjar or wholesale dealers led the agitation.
Opposition to the customs reforms made itself felt. In
June 1900 Spring Rice reported disgruntlement on the grounds
of employment of foreign officials, but attributed the real
reason to the loss incurred by the most important officials,
Vho are unable to make favourable arrangements with the 
27Belgians.' De Groote, the Belgian Representative, believed
2 8former farmers and sub-farmers were involved. The opposition 
came into the open under the leadership of members of the 
4ulama using the pretext that there must be no foreign 
administration in the country. The government replied there 
v/as no foreign administration, only a few foreign servants of 
the Shah. During 1900 there were demonstrations against the 
new tariff in Shiraz, Tehran and Isfahan, and in November in 
most commercial centres. In early 1901 there were riots in 
Tabriz, Tehran and Kashan. Naus offered to resign in August 
but his resignation was not accepted.
The introduction of a new tariff in March 1903 brought 
serious agitation in Tabriz against the new chief Belgian 
customs official, Priem. Naus considered that it.was organised 
by the former employees of the customs with the possible 
complicity of those who stood to lose by the reform, including
O Q ^ ^
the Valiiahd. In July the lulama of the *Atabat, stimulated, 
the Belgians believed, by financial inducements, protested to
26. Gilbar, op. cit., pp. 293-4.
27. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No. 65, 26th June 1900,
FO 60/617.
28. De Groote to Favereau, 9th Sept. 1900, No. 114/78,
Folio 2981 IV-to-VII, BMFA.
29. De Villegas to Favereau, 5th June 1903, No. 136/58,
Folio 2981 IV to. VII, BMFA.
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30the Shah at the employment of foreigners. They sent a
letter to the leading mujtahid of Tabriz declaring the new
tariff impious and impure as it allowed duty on wine and 
3 1spirits. The campaign against Naus continued through 1904
and into 1905. There were protests in January in Mashhad,
in April in Tabriz, Kermanshah, and several other towns, and
3 2in January 1905 again in Tabriz. Naus, however, remained 
in office and by early 1904 the customs receipts had risen 
to £600,000.33
The customs receipts alone could not fund all domestic
expenditure. In January 1900, following a series of small
loans, Amin al-Sultan borrowed £2,000,000. Realising the loan
would only tide over immediate difficulties Amin al-Sultan
considered the possibility of reform, but was pessimistic as
he foresaw serious opposition. He told Spring Rice in
January 1901 that a careful survey of the finances had
revealed an annual deficit of £300,000, and he had considered
two possible solutions; one was an increase of the maliyat,
or internal taxes; the second was the reduction in unnecessary 
34expenditure. The problem with the first was that the 
landowners would hate him, and with the second that the 
pensioners would hate him. He also feared that Naus's 
customs scheme was provoking the opposition of the merchants 
and clergy, so that whichever way he turned he was met by 
irreconcilable opposition. Because of these difficulties 
reform could only come very slowly. In the meantime the 
proceeds of the first Russian loan were exhausted and in 
January 1902 a second loan agreement was concluded with the 
Russians for £1,000,000.
30. De Villegas to Favereau, 19th Aug. 1903, No. 195/87, 
Folio 2981 IV to VII, BMFA.
31. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 126, 17th Aug. 1903,
FO 60/666.
32. Gilbar, op. cit., p. 295.
33. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 19, 30th Jan. 1904,
FO 60/681.
34. Spring Rice to Salisbury, No. 7, 9th. Jan. 1901,
FO 60/636.
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Discontent was now affecting all classes, and in 1901
a plot involving diverse elements was uncovered. In August
a proclamation was posted in public places accusing the
government of selling the country to R u s s i a . I n  September
seventy persons were arrested including two senior officials,
— 3 6the Shah's son-in-law and some members of the lesser fulama.
One criticism of note in the leaflets circulated was that 
the government had failed to give proper account of the 
Russian loan, and that it had misappropriated funds. Hardinge 
reported that there was general discontent at the waste of 
public money, with complaints coming especially from merchants 
and shopkeepers. Indeed the government's proclamation after 
the plot gave a prolonged justification of the customs reforms, 
which it seemed to consider to be the most powerful cause of 
enmity.
The second loan brought signs of unease from the leading
*ulama, who had been largely quiescent since the return to
power of Amin al-Sultan. Although the ^ulama were reported
as representing misgivings on the part of some of the notables
and merchants, the strongest opposition in this matter seems
to have come from their own fear that the country was becoming
dangerously dependant on Russia. The government, anxious
that they should not incite a populace already discontented
at the dearness of provisions, attempted to buy them off one 
3 7by one. This was sufficient to divide them for a while, and 
stop open opposition, but when the Shah left for Europe in 
April 1902 only the Imam Jum4a appeared at his departure. 
According to Hardinge they were talking openly of 
excommunicating the Shah (presumably by issuing a takfir)
35. Hardinge to Lansdowne, 
FO 60/637.
No. 124, 18th Aug. 1901,
36. Hardinge to Lansdowne, 
FO 60/637.
No. 136, 6th Sept. 1901,
37. Hardinge to Lansdowne, 
FO 416/8 No. 125.
No. 23, 14th Feb. 1902,
I
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3 8unless he changed his policy. In August the opposition 
came into the open and achieved a brief moment of unity when 
the mujtahids of Tehran swore almost unanimously on the
Quran that they would renounce allegiance to the Shah if
- 39
A m m  al-Sultan returned to Iran with him as Prime Minister.
The sincerity of some participants may be doubted as Sayyid
^Abdallah Bihbihani, who was known for his association with
Amin al-Sultan, was said to have drawn up a long indictment
of him. The *ulama opposition was as usual entangled with
political intrigue as one of its mainsprings was the Governor
of Tehran, fAbd al-Majid Mirza, cAin al-Daula, who aspired
to be Prime Minister. The Shah, however, supported Amin
al-Sultan, and by November the culama were once more divided
into two camps, with one for and one against the Prime
Minister.
The culama of the ‘Atabat, who were now being incited by
the British, as well as by numerous complaints against the
40authorities from all over Iran, sent a remonstrance to the
Shah accusing the government officials of embezzling state
money, so that money had to be borrowed from Russia, which
was then not used for the general good. They also protested
at the employment of Europeans in the customs administration,
which they termed 'oppressive' and at the possible involvement
41of Europeans in the collection of the taxes. The proceeds 
of the second loan had now been spent, and since a third was 
likely to arouse intransigent opposition, Amin al-Sultan could 
find no more money, and was forced to resign. At the end of
38. Hardinge to Lansdowne, 
p. 155,
27th Aug . 1902, FO 800/177,
39. De Graz to Lansdowne, 
FO 60/651.
No. 107, 21st July 1902,
40. Newmarch to Hardinge, 
FO 248/802; See also 
p. 3 23.
No. 412, 
Hardinge,
18th July 1903, 
Diplomatist, op. cit
41. Hardinge to Lansdowne, 
FO 60/650.
No. 18, 4th Feb. 1902,
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1903 a takfir appeared against him purporting to emanate 
from the Shrine tulama. Although there v/as some doubt as 
to the validity of this document, the Shrine ^ulama never 
seriously denied it.
In the meantime the scheme for the reform of the maliyat 
had not been entirely forgotten. In 1902 Naus pointed out 
that despite the fall in the value of the toman the land tax 
had not been revised, and might be increased without injury 
to the taxpayer. In the spirit of Nasir al-Mulk's proposals 
of 1898 he added that the maliyat should be removed from the 
hands of the provincial governors, and made the responsibility 
of the Ministry of Finance. Amin al-Sultan agreed with him, 
but feared the unpopularity of the proposals. At the end of 
the year Naus again pressed his scheme, suggesting in addition 
that an assessment be made on all classes including government 
officials, the lulama and the. landowners. But in view of the 
opposition, particularly since, as Keddie has noted, the 
lulama of Mashhad were in touch with the Shrine ^ulama on 
this matter, Amin al-Sultan felt the proposals were too 
dangerous.
On the fall of Amin al-Sultan, cAbd al-Majid Mirza, 4Ain 
al-Daula, became Prime Minister. He determined to incur no 
further loans but pursue instead a vigorous policy of 
financial reform, retrenchment and increased taxation. He 
began by ordering that the maliyat from the Crown lands be paid 
in kind, or at its real value. In April 1904 Naus placed a 
further scheme for the reorganisation of the maliyat before 
a meeting of provincial governors. In Hardinge's words it 
was intended to:
'Strengthen the hold of the Central Government over 
the Provincial Administration, and assist in the 
gradual transformation of the Provincial Governors 
from Achaemenian Satraps to French Prefects.'
42. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 69, 22nd April 1904,
FO 60/681.
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The scheme proposed that the provincial authorities have 
fixed salaries. After these had been paid the surplus was 
to be sent to a central treasury in Tehran under Naus.
4Ain al-Daula had early enforced economies in the royal
household. In May 1904 he introduced a tax on salaries and
pensions of 10%. In addition arrangements were made for
recipients to discount their salaries on payment of 20% with 
4 3Naus. In actual fact the system was expected to benefit the 
recipients as salaries were to be paid regularly in quarterly 
instalments, and a discount of 20% on a government draft was 
in many cases less that what they might receive from the 
money changers in the bazaar. Hardinge was doubtful whether 
recipients would welcome the change in system:
'This new tax on salaries and pensions, from the 
uniform and systematic character of its incidence, 
is most distasteful to the Persian bureaucracy, as 
well as to the Princes, hereditary governors and 
aristocratic classes generally, who have hitherto 
milked the state whilst being milked from time to 
time by those immediately above them, and having 
grown up under this corrupt and gambling system, 
they have so adapted their methods to it, that any 
change in it confuses and alarms them.'
He reported that the discontent against 4Ain al-Daula's
policy of retrenchment was very great. LAin al-Daula also
attempted to revive a proposal of Amin al-Daula's to impose
a tax on sharila documents, but was obliged to give way on
t - 44the resistance of the culama. With his policy, *-Ain al- 
Daula managed briefly in 1904 to balance the budget, but the 
fall in the customs revenues in 1904, together with the Shah's 
insistence on a third trip to Europe, meant there was again a 
large deficit in 1905. By the end of the year the finances
43. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 87, 19th May 1904,
FO 60/682.
44. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 10, 6th Jan. 1905,
FO 60/698.
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were still in confusion and lAin al-Daula needed £800,000 
to balance his accounts. Grant Duff commented that no 
Prime Minister could reorganise the finances without offending 
the vested interests of the court, the 1ulama and the 
pensioners. If he did so the Shah would overthrow him, or 
there would be a popular outbreak he had neither the money 
nor the troops to deal with.
The different groups making up the population of Tehran 
were variously affected by the financial crisis and the 
government's various responses to it. The population may be 
roughly divided into officials of the court and state 
administration, culama, including tullab, merchants, members 
of the guilds, and servants and labourers, each of whom are 
discussed briefly below. Since this study is primarily 
concerned with the vulama, their position will be examined 
in greater detail.
45The population of Tehran in 1905 was about 250,000,
of which perhaps two thousand held official positions.
Certain of the senior officials, or notables, were landowners
and their consequent wealth brought them influence in addition
to their position. The proposals regarding the maliyat
would have affected them, but this particular attempt at
reform seems to have been greeted largely by passive 
46resistance. With regard to those more dependant on salaries,
Houtum Schindler considered the value of their earnings had
47fallen because of inflation. Those at court were discontented 
with uAin al-Daula*s retrenchments. Salaries, nearly always 
in arrears were further behind than usual. But the major 
grievance affecting both high and low seems to have been the
45. See Note 81 below.
4 6 . Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 69, 22nd April 1904,
F0 60/681.
4 7 . Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1902, Persia.
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4 810% stamp tax. In this general picture a strong division
existed as between the clients of the Prime Minister in
power, cAin al-Daula, and those of the one out of power,
Amin al-Sultan, many of whom had lost their positions with
his fall. Crossing this division was yet another between
those officials who favoured westernising liberal reforms,
such as those advocated by Malkum Khan, and those who were
either indifferent or opposed. Many, if not most, of the
readers of foreign based Persian language newspapers were
bureaucrats. Marling referred to those in the customs as
being 'of the partially or sometimes highly educated
reading class, which has been most influenced by the
49nationalist propoganda preached therein.' Amongst the 
higher bureaucracy was also a group, most of them educated 
abroad, who had clustered around Amin al-Daula during his 
brief period in office, and who had been largely out of
power since his fall. They included Murtaza Quli Khan,
-, 50 -Sani1, al-Daula, educated m  Berlin, and Nasir al-Mulk,
• •
educated in England, who drew up the original plan for
financial reform. Also of the group was Nasrallah Khan,
Mushir al-Daula. Of relatively humble origin he had risen
through the bureaucracy and sent one of his sons, Hasan
Khan, Mushir al-Mulk to be educated in Russia, and another,
Husain Khan, Muctamin al-Mulk to France.
♦
48. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 10, 6th Jan. 1905,
F0 416/22 No. 49.
49. Marling to Grey, No. 167, 14th July 1908,
FO 371/506 No. 26812, Incl. Cox to the Government of India
50. Biographical Notes of 1906, p. 77.(National Library of
T, . _ _ _ r n Scotland).51. Ibid., p. 58, p. 60.
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Of all groups the merchants, who probably numbered a 
52few hundred, seem to have been in the greatest state of 
discontent. Their major grievance, as already discussed, 
was the customs reforms. In April 1905 the leading merchants 
of Tehran closed their shops and went to the Shrine of Shah 
*-Abd al-LAzim in protest against the customs administration. 
The Shah, who was about to go to Europe, placated them with 
promises of Naus1s possible removal on his return. The 
merchants had also not been happy over the foreign loans and 
the connection between the loans and the customs reforms was 
not lost on them. As De Groote, the Belgian Representative 
reported:
'The one serious reform affected in Iran - the 
reorganisation of the customs, has only served to 
allow the Shah to conclude two loans, a large part 
of which has been squandered in Europe. ...The 
opposition points out that at least under the old 
system of farming the millions remained in I r a n . '54
It was not simply that the government had raised the taxes, 
they had failed to account for what they had done with the 
money. A quite different but also significant grievance
52. Strictly speaking the word tujjar, merchants, means the 
major wholesale merchants who dealt in the_import export 
trade. Persian sources, however, use tujjar to mean 
merchants generally, including bunakdars (retail dealers), 
dallals (agents) __and sarrafs (money changers) - see for 
example Daulatabadi, op. cit., p. 71 referring to 
bunakdars as tuj jar of the 'third rank'. Their functions 
were__also not rigidly divided as tujjar might also be 
sarrafs. Picot in the Biographical Notes of 1897,
FO 60/592 lists 28 important merchants, mainly wholesale 
dealers and money changers. Thomson in 1870 reckoned that 
there were about 250 'influential merchants' whom he 
distinguished from shopkeepers and artisans (Thomson to 
Clarendon, No. 2 Comm., 20th Jan. 1870, FO 60/327). The
possible estimate of 'a few hundred' is based on the
definition used in the Persian sources.
53. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 121, 12th May 1905,
FO 60/699.
54. De Groote to Favereau, 29th July 1902, No. 172/81,
Folio 2748, BMFA.
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of a section of the merchant class was that of the ?arrafs,
5 5who had 70,000 tomans owing to them from the treasury.
During 1905 they took bast in the house of the Imam Jum^a 
but left without making good their claim.
The merchants were reportedly unhappy over the prevalence 
of foreign goods, and the manner in which local industry had 
been destroyed. At the time of the establishment of the 
merchant councils, one of their complaints was that foreign
goods were so abundant that Iranian workshops had ceased to
56 —exist. According to Kabl al-Matin of Calcutta one of the
aims of the demonstration of April 1905 was to force the
government to encourage home industries and to protect them
57against competition from Russian goods. Contemporary
reports from Tehran itself do not mention such a request, and
stress the demonstration was intended to be against the customs
reforms. The question of the impact of foreign goods remains
unresolved with Gilbar contending that the wholesale merchants
5 8profited from the increased trade and Floor believing it
59pushed them into a position of dependancy they resented.
This was a long term problem and does not seem to be among the 
immediate causes of discontent in 1905.
It is uncertain how far the merchants were interested in 
reform. Their attempts to establish improved legal conditions 
in 1883 have already been discussed in Chapter II. Amin 
al-2arb, in his account of conditions in Iran at the time,
55. Kaj Shaikh Mahdi Sharif, op. cit., Vafrid No. 208 
1355/1977, p. 63,
56. Adamiyyat and Natiq, op. cit., p. 318.
57. Kabl al-Matin, Calcutta, 19th June 1905, quoted in
Gilbar, op. cit., p. 301.
58. Gilbar, op. cit.,
59. W.M. Floor, 'Merchants', op. cit., p. 124-5.
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6 0evinced discontent with the system of government. He
was exceptional in his wealth (about 2-3 million tomans), and
in having business connections in places as widespread as
61Paris, Cairo, Damascus, Warsaw, Moscow, and Bombay. But
another merchant involved in the Tehran council, Haj Muhammad
Ismael MaghaziJi corresponded for many years with Zain
al-Abidin MaraghJi author of the reformist book, 'The Travels 
— — — 62of Ibrahim Eig'. He was estimated to be worth about 30,000 
tomans in 1898, about average for a leading wholesale merchant
at that time, and carried out trade with Istanbul, Baghdad and
63 —Russia. Both he and another significant merchant, Mucin
al-Tujjar Bushihri, were active in the demonstrations against
64 - -Naus in April 1905. Mu^in al-Tujjar Bushihri was reckoned
one of the shrewdest merchants in the country, who whilst
continually augmenting his wealth,was also frequently engaged
in projects almost invariably stillborn, such as bridging the_ _ £ C
Karun at Shushtar. The motive behind his projects is not 
clear, but he may have been attempting to inaugurate 
developments of which the profits went neither to foreign 
concerns, nor to the Iranian government, but to an Iranian 
merchant. Of course Iranian merchants had neither the capital 
nor the legal or administrative support for such projects 
which is why they frequently failed. Amin al-2arb, with 
greater resources, had managed some small successes, including 
a short railway for the transport of goods in the Caspian.
60. Adamivyat and Natiq, op. cit., pp. 301, 305, 364,
61. Biographical Notes 1897, FO 60/592 , p. 206.
62. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 298.
63. Biographical Notes 1897, p. 210.
64. Kasravi, op. cit., p. 51 
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FO 60/698.
Lansdowne,
65. Marling to Grey, No. 228, 
FO 416/34 No.117.
10th Oct. 1907,
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Other merchants of note were the Zoroastrian sarraf, Arbab
Jamshid, and another sarraf, Haj Muhammad Hasan, who in 1898
  • * m
took bast in the British Legation because the government had
owed him, or rather a group of merchants for whom he was
6 6acting, 20,000 tomans for three years. One other way 
merchants evinced an interest in reform, was in subsidizing
the establishment of new schools, such as those of Haj Mirza
67 —  —  —  —
Hasan Rushdiyya in .Tabriz and Tehran. When Yahya Daulatabadi 
• •
founded the Madrasa-yi Sadat in 1899 the merchants, both of
6 8Tehran and abroad, sent donations. Indeed the merchant class
was amongst not only the wealthiest but also the most highly
69educated sections of the population.
Some of the merchant community were thus interested in 
modernising ideas and development, yet following Gilbar's 
point they were also desirous that more money should not pass 
into the hands of the government, and without government 
initiative it is difficult to see how major reforms could be 
undertaken. No real evidence has yet emerged that the merchants 
were working towards a constitutional government before 1906, 
so their position in 1905 was a conservative one - what they 
sought was the lifting of the customs dues.
If Thomson's estimates for Tehran in 1870 are correct, 
the guilds (asnaf) formed a substantial section (approximately 
5-^000)^ of the total male population, which Thomson put at 
about 29,000. The proportion in 1905 was presumably about
66. Durand to Salisbury, No. 118, 11th Nov. 1898,
FO 60/595.
67. F.R.C. Bagley, 'Religion and State in Iran',
Islamic Studies X 1971, p’ -10.
68. Daulatabadi, op. cit., I, pp. 249-50; Surayya 
No. 46, p. 6, 3rd Ja . I, 1317.
69. Rossiya, 19th May 1909, Browne papers.
70. Thomson to Clarendon, No. 2 Comm., FO 60/3 25.
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the same. Floor has defined a guild as a group of townspeople
engaged in the same trade or craft, who elect their own leaders
71and pay guilds tax. There was some overlap between the
guilds and the merchants in that the brokers dallal and the
moneychangers garraf paid guilds tax and were usually referred
to as tujjar, merchants. In addition to their corporate tax
the guilds were frequently called upon to give a pishkish
(present) to the governor at feasts. As mentioned above, the
guilds looked often to the lulama to represent their grievances.
They were also dependant on the wholesale merchants bunakdar
for their supplies, their consumer market, and their capital 
72on credit.
In the period just before the Revolution^Houtum Schindler
considered the guilds were less affected by inflation than
others as they were better able to keep up incomes in relation
73to increased prices. They seem, however, to have suffered to
some extent from the government's raising dues. In mid-1902
t,Ain al-Daula, as Governor of Tehran was said to have incurred
74their hostility owing to his 'extortions'. In 1905 there were
complaints that he was taking large sums in the name of
- 75tacaxuf (gifts) from the butchers and bakers of Tehran. But
they had had to contend with demanding governors before, as in
—  —  761899 when they repeatedly paid Na'1 ib al-Sultaneh 200,000 tomans.
71. W.M. Floor, The Guilds in Qajar Persia, unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, University of Leiden, 1971, pp. 16-17.
72. Ibid., p. 51.
73. Houtum Schindler, Encyclopaedia Britannica 1902, Persia.
74. Erskine to Lansdowne, No. 155, 8th Novv 1902,
FO 60/651.
75. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 254.
76. Floor, Thesis, op. cit., p. 56.
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One of the leading reformers, Sayyid Jamal al-Din
Isfahani, had a large following among the artisans and
77labourers of the bazaar. The substance of his speeches
seems to have amounted mainly to attacks on government
7 8officials and foreign enterprise. On the subject of law
he informed his audience they were ignorant of their rights,
and then spelling out the word 'ganun1 he got his audience
to repeat it after him. Reform was a new concept and
constitutionalism quite unknown. The main cause for
discontent among the guilds in general may be summed up as
high prices and government exactions on the butchers and
bakers in particular. These do not seem to have been
appreciably worse than during the 1890's. Unrest among the
guilds in 1905 seems to have been incited largely by the
merchants, who for example, obliged all the drapers to close
79their shops in April 1905, and later in the year by the 
agitation of some of the culama.
Of the specific problems of the lowest class, labourers
and servants, little is recorded except that they suffered
greatly from the high prices, as had been the case for many
years. According to Thomson in the 1870's, large numbers came
to Tehran annually from the countryside in search of work for 
8 0a season. They were usually poorly housed and fed, lodging 
fifteen to twenty to a room in caravanserais and stables on 
the outskirts of the town where they stayed for four to five 
months. A feature of the period is the growth in the 
population of Tehran from approximately 100,000 in 1870 to
77. Browne, Revolution, op. cit., p. 116.
•00r-' YaahmaJ i • - op. cit. , pp. 16-20.
79. Hardinge to Lansdowne , No. 101, 12th May 1905,
FO 60/699.
•o00 Thomson to Clarendon, No. 2 Comm., 20th Jan. 1870,
FO 60/327.
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81280,000 in 1908. As mentioned in Chapter II the districts 
of Chala Maidan on the east of the city and Sanglaj, an old 
mixed district in the centre, were particularly crowded, 
providing fertile ground for agitators and persons seeking 
mass support for a political cause.
As has been mentioned, the tulama had been unhappy for
some time at the increasing foreign presence in the country
and the Shah's failure to stem it. Gilbar has given three
main reasons why they were particularly discontented with
8 2the government in 1905. One was that they were engaged in
wholesale commercial activity and thus suffered from the
customs reforms like the major merchants. This may have been
true of the vulama of Isfahan, but it was not the case with
those of Tehran, who do not seem to have had commercial
interests of their own. The second was that those who owned
land or administered auqaf feared an increase in the land tax,
and its possible collection by foreigners. This point was
worrying the uulama of Mashhad, but it does not seem to have
preoccupied the Lulama of Tehran. The third point was that
salaries and pensions, on which many of the lulama and tullab
were dependant, were three years in arrears. This added to
the general discontent because it was a longer time than
normal, but it was not a new situation. What was new was
83the 10% tax and it did create considerable discontent.
The Lulama, however, were not united. There were 
rivalries amongst them, and differences of opinion. Amongst 
the mujtahids the accession to power of tAin al-Daula had
81. Thomson to Clarendon, No. 2 Comm., 20th Jan. 1870,
FO 60/327.
82. Gilbar, op. cit., p. 302.
83. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 10, 6th June 1905,
FO 60/698.
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accentuated the divisions. The early years of the century
had seen the passing of an older generation of mujtahids.
Mirza Hasan Ashtiyani died in 1901; his successor as senior
mujtahid of the capital, Sayyid cAli Akbar Tafrishi, in 1905;
the most liberal minded of the Hi 1ama, Shaikh Hadi Najmabadi
in 1902; and Zain al-lAbidin, Imam Jumca in 1903. In Najaf
Mirza Hasan Shirazi died in 1895, and there was no marja^i
taqlid. Sharabiyani and Mamaghani, who successively
followed him as most senior mujtahid, had died by 1905. Haji
Mirza Husain Haji Mirza Khalil, who at over ninety years of • *
age was the most venerable mujtahid, was held in the highest 
respect, but there was not either in Tehran or the *Atabat 
one overall leader of the Hi lama to repudiate government 
policies on their behalf as there had been at the time of 
the Tobacco Concession.
In the autumn of 1905 in Tehran there were four mujtahids
of outstanding importance, Sayyid lAbdallah Bihbihani, Sayyid
Muhammad Tabataba^i, Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri, and Mirza AbuJ1- 
• • •
Qasim, Imam Jumca. The first threeywho were to play a
significant role in the Constitutional Revolution^were about
sixty. The Imam Jum*a was a young man in his thirties. By
far the most politically active was Bihbihani, who has already
been referred to for his close links with Amin al-Sultan.
Through this connection he had charge of government business
in the shariLa courts which was very profitable both in
84material terms and in the patronage it brought him. He 
was likewise connected to the British and charges concerning
8 5British subjects and protected persons were referred to him.
In addition to his own mosque in Sar Pulak, Bihbihani also
84. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, pp. 210-11.
85. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 23, 14th Feb. 1902,
FO 60/650.
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preached in the important Mosque of Sipah Salar, which was
in the gift of the Shah. TabatabaJi came from a long line
• •
of religious figures, his father Sayyid Sadiq having been
approached by Malkum Khan in 1860 as a muj tahid likely to
favour reform (see Chapter IV). The most learned of the
iulama of Tehran was Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri who had spent
much of his life in the cAtabat and only returned to Tehran
in the late 1880's. He became involved in the Tobacco
protest with the other ^ulama, but otherwise appears to have
been only rarely active politically during the 1890's. In
1897 he was reported as leading a secluded life and being
8 6poor but much respected. Visitors usually found him
surrounded by s t u d e n t s . H e  joined Ashtiyani in 1898 in
opposing the policies of Amin al-Daula, who was trying to
—  88curtail the influence of the ^ulama. In 1902 he was one 
of those who worked for the removal of Amin al-Sultan. The 
Imam Jum^a came from a long line holding that office, and 
was very rich, having control of much vagf land. Having 
spent eighteen years in Najaf he succeeded his father in 
January 1904.
Shaikh Fazlallah and TabatabaJi had been amongst those
• •
who opposed the loan policy of Amin al-Sultan and actively 
sought to remove him. After meetings which also included 
Tafrishi and Zain al-^Abidin, Imam Jum^a, and cAin al-Daula, 
they wrote letters to the culama of the other cities of Iran
86. Biographical Notes 1897, p. 219, FO 60/592.
87. IUtimad_al-Saltana, Ruznama-yi Khafirat-i Ictimad
al-Saltana (The Diary of Ictimad al-Saltana), ed.
1^ Afshar, Tehran, 1345/1966-7, p. 1046;
Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 321.
•
88. Majd al-Islam Kirmani, Tarikh-i Inqilab-i 
Mashrutiyyat-i Iran (A History of the Iranian 
Constitutional Revolution), Tehran, 1351/1972-3, 
pp. 171-2.
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and to those of the cAtabat. Shaikh Fazlallah's cousin,
Mirza Muhammad Nuri, was especially active amongst the Shrine
_89  -  -  ~Hi lama. Amin al-Sultan silenced Tafri.shi and others by
bribery, but Tabataba<J i and Shaikh Fazlallah regarded his 
• •
policies as detrimental to the country, and continued to
9 0work with lAin al-Daula in opposition. When *-Ain al-Daula
came to power in 1903, TabatabaJi withdrew from association
• 0
with him, but Shaikh Fazlallah remained as his major 
supporter amongst the culama. In this he was joined by the 
new Imam Jumla.
*Ain al-Daula was anxious to reduce the influence of
Bihbihani as one of the leading partisans of Amin al-Sultan.
He removed from his care the responsibility for government
business in the sharica courts and gave it to Shaikh Fazlallah,
so that Bihbihani declined in influence whilst Shaikh 
- 91Fazlallah prospered. Association with the government gave
him and the Imam Jum^a extensive patronage, and their
following consequently grew. When Bihbihani protested at the
arrest and imprisonment of some brawling tullab, LAin al-Daula
seized the opportunity to make an example of him for
interfering in government affairs, and replied that the
- - 92government was not responsible to Mr. Bihbihani. From then 
onwards Bihbihani did his utmost to subvert the government.
The main body of the Uulama was now divided into three 
main groups. The first led by Shaikh Fazlallah and the Imam 
Jumia supported *Ain al-Daula. The second, of which Bihbihani 
was the leader, was working for the return of Amin al-Sultan,
89. Newmarch to Hardingej No. 387, 15th July 1903,
FO 248/802.
90. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 210-11.
91. Ibid., p. 210.
92 . Ibid., p. 213.
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in collaboration with the latter's following amongst the
bureaucracy. They were resentful of LAin al-Daula's efforts
to curtail the influence of the Lu1ama, and were joined by
others who were especially discontented over the tax on
salaries and pensions. The third group, led by Tabataba^i,
• •
considered cAin al-Daula no better than Amin al-Sultan, and 
desired not only his removal but a change in the whole 
apparatus of government.
Early in 1905 the group led by Bihbihani joined up with
the merchants discontented over the customs reforms.
Bihbihani had made no criticism of Naus during the regime of
Amin al-Sultan, but on LAshura, supported by students in a
state of great excitement, he made an impassioned address
against Naus, saying that the merchants' complaints about
93him to the Shah had been ignored. A photograph of Naus
dressed as a mullah was circulated at the religious
gatherings. Naus was accused by the followers of Bihbihani
of insulting Muslims and taking over the Muslim customs and
Post Office. uAin al-Daula sent heavy bribes to Bihbihani
and the Hlama of his faction. In addition the government
obtained a telegramme from the Uulama of the ‘‘Atabat in
94support of their policies, and the agitation subsided.
At about the same time Tabataba^i had also been preaching
• •
against the government, but for different reasons. He 
complained that the appalling state of the country was due 
to oppression and only regulation by proper laws could bring 
about improvement. At the same time he encouraged the 
reformist ^alim, Nazim al-Islam- Kirmani to start a secret
93. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 69, 24th March 1905,
FO 60/698.
94. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 76, 1st April 1905,
FO 60/699.
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9 5society to work towards constitutionalism. The society
began meeting on 19th March 1905. A decision was taken to
work on anyone with a grievance against the government, and
_  _  g r
to contact Bihbihani in particular. Seeing his campaign to
undermine 'Ain al-Daula was so far unsuccessful, and moreover
that he was in danger of losing yet more of his.influence
because he could not afford to pay his students, he welcomed
- - 97the idea of collaboration with TabatabaJi. He sent a
• •
message to TabatabaJi, who agreed on the condition Bihbihani 
gave up his limited aim of removing LAin al-Daula and worked 
for reform.
The society founded by Nazim al-Islam was not the only
one active at the time. Since the Tobacco Protest there had
been occasional reports of secret societies, but very little
is known about them. Nazim al-Islam's society or anjuman
seems to have consisted of about eight persons (from the names
recorded), belonging, as Lambton has remarked, to the middle
— 9 8 —ranks of the '•ulama. Malikzada records that his father helped
found a secret society in 1904, but his account is suspect,
especially as it enhances the role of his father Malik 
— 9 9al-Mutakallimin. The latter was, however, one of a number 
of middle ranking Uu1ama who knew each other and who favoured 
reform. They included Sayyid Jamal al-Din Isfahani, a 
preacher like Malik al-Mutakallimln, and Yahya Daulatabadi, 
who had been active in founding a new school. All these
95. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 243.
96. Ibid., p. 269.
97. Ibid., p. 271.
98. A.K.S. Lambton, 'Secret Societies and the Persian 
Revolution of 1905-6', St. Antony's Papers No. 4 1958, 
p:. 53.
99. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., II, p. 10-11.
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three held somewhat unorthodox religious opinions, Malik 
al-Mutakallirnin and Yahya Daulatabadi being almost certainly 
Azalis, and Sayyid Jamal al-Din, a freethinker. Another
Azali, Shaikh Mahdi Sharif, mentions that he founded a society 
of five persons to struggle against oppression, but says 
little more about it.
Nazim al-Islam's society is thus the only one which is 
reasonably reliably documented. Its members seem to have 
held a variety of opinions from strictly religious viewpoints 
to those such as Filsuf Shirazi's showing a fair knowledge of 
western political developments. Early meetings were largely 
spent reading newspapers whilst members ascertained each 
other's positions. Nazim al-Islam remarks on this point that 
most of those present had previously not read newspapers. In 
discussions on ganun (law) some seem to mean the shari La, and 
others not. Loyalty to either the religion or the fatherland 
vatan was permitted. These lulama seemed to have 
differentiated themselves from others more senior and 
possibly more orthodox as one of their aims was 'to limit the 
power of both ministers and mullahs'. It was not until the 
seventh meeting that Nazim al-Islam unveiled the true purpose 
of the society - to work for constitutionalism (jnashruta) 
through revolution. He said:
'Until you see a revolution (ingilab) in this
country you will not see reforms.'102
By the end of the year the society had acquired some cohesion 
in an agreed programme and was attempting to set up cells.
100. E.G. Browne, Materials for the Study of the Babi 
Religion (Cambridge 1918), p. 221; Keddie,
'Religion and Irreligion', op. cit., p.274.
101. Sharif, op. cit., Vahid 208, p. 42.
102. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 28; See also
pp! 289-90 for a discussion on constitutionalism.
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To the bureaucrats already referred to may thus be added 
the mujtahid TabatabaJi, a few of the middle ranking lulama 
and some tullab. As a whole they were probably no more than 
a small percentage of the Lulama.
The opposition movement did not get underway until
October 1905 mainly because the Shah was in Europe for the
spring and summer. In October 1905 the governor of Kerman
inflicted the bastinado on a prominent muj tahid for
instigating a riot. On 26th October Bihbihani came
secretly to TabatabaJi's house to discuss the matter and the 
• •
two mujtahids made a firm agreement to campaign against the
government. Some of the preachers, especially Sayyid Jamal
al-Din Isfahani and Malik al-Mutakallimin, who were associated
with TabatabaM began calling for freedom, justice and the law. 
• •
The collaboration of the two muj tahids produced a following
of several hundred persons, students, mullahs and artisans,
with connections with discontented bureaucrats, the clients
of Amin al-Sultan, and the major merchants. No detailed
programme had been given, and although Tabataba-* i was seeking
• •
reform, the main objective was most likely, as Browne has
103stated, the removal of Naus and uAin al-Daula.
Messengers were sent to other members of the lulama
to try and persuade them to join the opposition against
government 'oppression'. When TabatabaJi's emissaries
• •
approached Shaikh Fazlallah, they found his policy differed 
from theirs. He showed a concern for order which in the 
common interest took priority over the grievances of a 
particular group.
'The governor of each province must maintain order 
in the area. Anybody who disturbs the peace must 
be punished,^whether he be mullah or sayyid, or 
whatever. Haji Muhammad Ri£a (the mujtahid in Kerman)
103. Browne, Revolution, op. cit., p. Ill, p. 113.
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has been the cause of sedition and revolt.'
Shaikh Fazlallah showed a firm belief in the Shah and in the 
existing system of government, which must not be weakened:
'I have said the seditious must be punished. We, 
the people of Iran, need a Shah; we need an uAin 
al-Daula; we need the bastinado and the executioner. 
Whether mullah or sayyid we must submit to the 
government of the Shah.'
One of the reformers brought up the subject of mashrutn# and 
linked it with the term mashru *-a, 'according to the shari va' , 
to persuade Shaikh Fazlallah that it provided a legitimate 
alternative to the existing form of government.
The slogan mashruta«yi mashru^a was later to be turned 
against the constitutionalists by Shaikh Fazlallah. He was 
not now deceived by their attempt to make mashrut^a respectable 
by explaining it as the enforcement of the laws of Islam.
'Your argument is the same as that in the newspapers.
Far from being_in accordance with the sharica, to 
advocate mashrufa and jumhuriyyat (republicanism), 
especially in the newspapers, is seditious.'
Indeed Shaikh Fazlallah showed suspicion of any ideological 
innovation that might undermine faith in the existing system. 
Referring to recent attempts to found schools on modern lines, 
he said:
'Are these new schools not contrary to the shari ua?
Will entry to them not lead to the overthrow of Islam? 
Will lessons in foreign languages and the study of 
chemistry and physics not weaken the students' faith?'
The constitutionalist sources state that uAin al-Daula 
made Shaikh Fazlallah privy to the affairs of state and 
consulted him on matters of policy. There is no record,
104. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, pp. 321-4.
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however, of his intervening on a single political event of 
any importance. Yet he evidently believed the ‘•ulama should 
be consulted and should make an effort to keep abreast of 
the times. Asked by a reformer if a mullah of three hundred 
years ago would be useful to the people nowadays, he 
replied:
'Certainly not. A mullah nowadays must be aware of 
the exigency of the times and well-informed on 
international relations.'
Shaikh Fazlallah appears to have firmly supported the 
retrenchment and reforms of ‘'Ain al-Daula. The telegramme 
which came from Najaf in March 1905 was sent in reply to a 
letter from one of his associates, ‘•Ali Akbar Burujirdi, and 
was signrd by one of his connections, Muhammad Kazim 
TabatabaJi Yazdi, one of the most learned and respected of 
the Shrine lulama, as well as by Akhund Mulla Khurasani, 
another leading mujtahid. It stated that since the appointment 
of cAin al-Daula many beneficial reforms had taken place, 
particularly in the adjustment of revenues and expenditure,
so there should be no further financial obligations to
* . 105foreigners.
The constitutionalist writers vilified Shaikh Fazlallah 
as one of their most powerful opponents, and were at pains to 
show him as grasping and self-interested. Although he appears 
to have prospered through his connection with cAin al-Daula, 
acquiring a carriage and a garden, there is no evidence he 
was better off then most of the other mujtahids. Even in 
the constitutional sources there are traces of an earlier 
opinion from before his opposition to constitutionalism was 
fully realised. Nazim al-Islam wished that he would join the 
opposition, as of all the Uulama he was the most dignified in
105. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 76, 1st April 1905, 
FO 60/699,
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10 6 —his conduct. Malikzada said his word carried the greatest
. ,. . M . _ 107weight in Najaf.
The first major outburst of popular unrest came in 
December 1905 when a group of merchants were bastinadoed 
for having raised the price of sugar. The merchants had 
heard by telegram that prices had risen in Russia, and 
consequently in Rasht and Mashhad, so they moved to raise 
them in Tehran. The punishment was represented by the 
opposition as a great injustice on the part of lAlaJ al- 
Daula, Governor of Tehran. Merchants went in groups to 
the leading tulama to ask them to protest. The Imam Juraca 
called a meeting at the Masjid-i Shah at which Sayyid Jamal 
al-Din spoke. He began by saying the culama gathered in 
the Mosque were the deputies of the Imam of the Age (nuvvab-i 
imam-i zaman) and all were resolved to pluck out the roots 
of oppression and innovation. He then spoke of the duties 
of Muslim sultans in establishing justice and prohibiting 
injustice, saying:
'If the Shah were a true Muslim, he would cooperate 
with the ^ulama.1108
He was interrupted by the Imam Jum’-a whose followers set on
him and on Bihbihani. The opposition thus had their hand
forced, and Tabataba*1 i feared disorders leading to bloodshed 
• •
which he and Bihbihani were always anxious to avoid. He was
also aware that the ^ulama might be charged with supporting
merchants who put up the price of sugar, and discredited in
109the eyes of the common people. Evidently a sizeable
106. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 504.
107. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., II, p. 157.
108. Ibid, II, p. 42; Nazim al-Islam, op. cit.. I,
p. 333.
109. Ibid., I, p. 339; Taqizada, Maqalat, op. cit.,
I, p. 324.
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section of the populace was not in sympathy with the 
merchants, and the opposition Lulama feared being overwhelmed 
by a mob incited by ^Ain al-Daula and the Imam Jumla. On 
the other hand, TabatabaJi could not take the alternative 
course of deserting the merchants as they were subsidizing 
the opposition. So he decided to take sanctuary for a few 
days, as he anticipated, along with Bihbihani and their 
followers, in the Shrine of Shah LAbd al-Azim.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, as McDaniel has stated, the centralising 
policies of the government in the second half of the nineteenth 
century had already brought it into conflict with the Lulama. 
These policies had, on the whole, resulted in little progress. 
In the 1890's a serious financial crisis compelled the 
government to make a more persistent attempt than ever before 
at fiscal reform. The inaugurator of these reforms, Amin 
al-Daula, fell from power after a brief tenure. His 
successor, Amin al-Sultan, maintained the customs reforms but 
preferred a policy of borrowing from Russia to introducing 
other tax reforms to which he anticipated severe opposition.
His loan policy was defeated mainly by the culama. cAin 
al-Daula, who followed him, rejected the loan policy, 
persisted with the customs reforms, and began a reorganisation 
of the maliyat, with increased government control in the 
provinces, and laid a particular burden on Tehran with a tax 
on salaries, retrenchment at court, and increased taxes on 
the butchers and bakers at a time when prices had risen 
because of inflation, and when there was already discontent 
over the customs reforms. It may be said that the 
Constitutional Revolution began as a revolt against increased 
taxation.
Of the new taxes the greatest burden fell on the merchant 
class. From the introduction of the reforms in 1899 to 1905
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they agitated constantly, not only in Tehran, but in all 
the major commercial centres. Gilbar has drawn attention 
to the wholesale merchants in particular as the leaders 
of the discontent. The garrafs to whom the government 
owed money were also significant, and between them, with 
the assistance of the *-ulama they mobilised the bazaar. 
Together with the increase in taxation may be noted the 
beginnings of the idea that the government must account for 
its revenues. This was to be one of the most significant 
themes in the Constitutional Revolution.
Of the '-ulama in general in the period before the 
Revolution it may be said that any attempt at reform must 
cut across their considerable vested interests, and they 
were therefore an impediment to change. As Hardinge pointed 
out to one of them in 1902:
'The best hope of salvation for Persia lay in the 
reorganisation of her finances, and particularly 
the "maliat"...but the chief obstacle to any such 
reform was the fear entertained by a timid 
government that it would arouse such opposition 
amonost the privileged classes, and especially 
the clergy, as to cause the downfall of any minister 
attempting it.'1-^
The ^ulama of Tehran can be divided into particular 
groups. A considerable proportion of those who believed in 
revolutionary change were of heterodox opinion. Amongst the 
orthodox, a majority were aggrieved at the tax on salaries 
and pensions. A sizeable group, led by Bihbihani, were 
deprived of profitable contacts and lucrative business by 
the fall of Amin al-Sultan, and were working for his return. 
They joined up with merchants campaigning against the 
customs reforms, who wanted the removal of Naus. Keddie 
and Algar have seen the ^u1ama as the leading spirits in 
the protest movement, but the merchants were at least as
110. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 77, 5th May 1905,
FO 416/9, No. 164.
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important in view of their powerful sense of grievance 
and the funds they could provide in mobilising the bazaar. 
Another group of culama, led by TabatabaJi, and much smaller, 
were working for reforms in the whole spirit of government 
and the way power was wielded. The third group, led by 
Shaikh Fazlallah, comprising probably over a third of the 
culama, supported the reformist policies of cAin al-Daula.
The letter sent to Najaf suggests that some, at least, 
perceived the dilemma facing the government, and preferred 
the reforms to the loan policy. How far they would have 
countenanced Naus's centralising plans if they had been 
fully implemented is a mute point.
The position of Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri, as well as the 
motives of Bihbihani and his group, offers evidence in 
refutation of Algar's view that the Constitutional Revolution 
was the culmination of a long period of conflict between the 
uulama and a state they considered illegitimate. Indeed the 
single piece of evidence to support his argument from this 
period, is the speech made in December 1905 by Sayyid Jamal 
al-Din Isfahani, who was not a mujtahid, but a preacher of 
unorthodox views. The position of Shaikh Fazlallah's and 
Bihbihani*s groups, in other words of the majority of the 
Lulama, must also lead to questioning of Lambton's view 
that the movement was a demand for the restoration of just 
and righteous government. It may thus be argued that the 
protest of 1905 happened not because what had formerly 
existed had gone wrong but because something new and alien 
had appeared in Iranian political life, and that was 
European means of government that required higher taxation. 
Finally, it may be pointed out that there is as yet no 
evidence for a constitutional movement before 1906 apart from 
small groups of reformers who met for discussion.
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CHAPTER IV
TABATABAJI AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE COUNCIL OF JUSTICE
The constitutionalist writers set TabatabaJi apart from
• •
all the other leading culama, Malikzada, for example,
referring to him as the leader of the nation and the struggle
for the law. At the same time Malikzada distinguished him
from other reformers, sayir^ that although he was not
really one of the azadikhihan , (reformist group) he
encouraged their efforts. TabatabaJi took an interest in
• •
reformist ideas from an early age. His father, Sayyid Sadiq,
was reputed to have belonged to Malkum Khan's Faramushkhana,
the group founded in 1859 to make people familiar with
2
modern ideas and development. The effort made by Malkum to
recruit Sayyid Sadiq derived from his tactic of identifying
reform with religion. TabatabaJi himself was accused of
3 - * -being a freemason. Ra*in, however, in his study of
Freemasonry in Iran, shows there was no properly constituted
- 4lodge before that founded by Adib al-Mamalik in 1908.
Malkum Khan's Faramushkhana was loosely based on Freemasonry 
and as a result there has been confusion between the two 
organisations. As Algar has pointed out, the idea of 
Freemasonry, with its semi-secret bonds, fitted into the 
pattern of Iranian political life, with the difference that
5
it provided a greater degree of organisation. It is possible
that, with his father's links with the Faramushkhana, TabatabaJi
• •
as a young man entered into this milieu.
1. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit. , II, p. 20.
2. Adamiyyat, Taraqqi, op. cit., p. 67.
3. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit.. I, p. 27.
4. I. RaJ in^ Faramushkhana va Framasunari dar Iran 
(The Faramushkhana and Freemasonry in Iran), Tehran 
1347/1968-9, II, p. 27, p. 57.
5. H. Algar, 'An Introduction to the History of 
Freemasonry in Iran', Middle Eastern Studies, VI 
1970, pp. 276-296.
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Another idea which clung to his name was that of
republicanism (jumhuriyyat). Nazim al-Islam says he was
warned by a friend to avoid TabatabaJi as he wanted a
6republic and the country to be ruled by laws. The Shah
- - 7also believed that he was working for a 1jumhuri1. The
only time TabatabaJi is on record as raising the matter • •
was at a public sermon, during which he denied republican
3
sympathies and expressed support for the Shah. Yet these 
remarks were made in a public speech and it was still
9
dangerous to criticise the monarchy even in secret. In 
his memoir written in 1911, however, Tabataba'i went out 
of his way to exonerate both Sayyid Jamal al-Din Isfahani, 
and Sayyid Jamal al-Din Afjaii from the charge of making 
remarks prejudicial to the Shah."^ The root of the problem 
is that republicanism, constitutionalism, the limitation of 
royal power, and legal reform, were not always clearly 
distinguished from each other, as Algar has indicated.^ 
TabatabaJi certainly supported legal reform and the limitation 
of royal power, and was ultimately probably seeking a 
government by popular sovereignty, but there is no real 
evidence that he was a republican in the true sense of the 
word, that is one who positively seeks a government without 
a monarchy.
Another influence on TabatabaJi in his youth was the
• •
enlightened mujtahid. Shaikh Hadi Najmabadi, who held daily
6. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 63.
7. Ibid., p. 497.
8 . Ibid., p. 444.
9. Ibid., I, p. 247.
10. I. Kazimiyya, 'Yaddashtha-yi Sayyid Muhammad TabatabaJi' 
(The Notes of Sayyid Muhammad TabatabaJi), RAhnAma-yi 
Kitab, No. 8-9 1350/1971-2. p. 476-7.
11. Algar, Malkum Khan, op. cit., p. 48.
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discussions attended by people of all ranks. He was at
12heart a free-thinker,. and also used to inveigh against
the government, meaning the Shah, his family and his
courtiers, accusing them of oppression and extortion.
Tabataba'i attended his discussions, but later reportedly 
• •
denounced them as heretical. It may be that, whilst 
sharing Shaikh Hadi's reformist views, he found his freedom 
of thought on religious matters abhorrent.
From 1883 to 1895 Tabataba**i studied at Samarra, and
• •
whilst there corresponded with Afghani, who urged him to 
lead the struggle against oppressive government. This was 
part of Afghani's campaign to encourage the Hi lama to fight
14for the protection of the Islamic lands against the infidels.
Whether influenced by Afghani or not, one of Tabataba-* i' s
• •
major objectives was to save Shi‘ism from infidel agression.
Afghani does not seem to have urged on Tabataba^ i the Pan-
• •
Islamic idea of joining other Muslim countries in the
struggle against European incursions, or looking to the
Ottoman Sultan as the leader of all Muslims. Pan-Islamic
ideas were current in Iran at the turn of the century,
- 15touching even Shaikh Fazlallah. At the time of the 
Russian loans there was much talk amongst the *ulama of 
appealing to the Sultan against Amin al-Sultan, but it was 
probably more with the idea of frightening their own 
government, and discouraging European interference, than 
anything else.
12. Browne, Revolution, op. cit., p. 406.
13. Rabino to Browne, 20th March 1911, Browne Papers.
14. Keddie, Afghani, op. cit., p. 142, p. 336.
15. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 239, 31st Dec. 1904,
FO 60/683.
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On his return from Samarra, Tabataba*1 i became friends
• ♦
with the reformist minister, Amin al-Daula. He was involved
in the establishment of a new school, the Madrasa-yi Mubarak-
Islamiyya, which intended to strengthen Islam, and to show
both modernising and traditionalist ^ulama that the new
European style of education was in conformity with the Muslim
religion. At the beginning of 1905, TabatabaJi became
• •
seriously agitated about what he considered was the parlous
condition of the country. He complained from his pulpit of
government oppression, saying the only remedy was the
— — 16regulation of the affairs of state by laws (qanun). In
February 1905, he urged Nazim al-Islam to set up a secret
society to work for reform and for constitutionalism
(mashrufa). In his memoir written in 1911 TabatabaJi stated
• •
that he worked for constitutionalism (mashruta) and the
establishment of a national consultative assembly (majlis-i
shura-yi milli) from the time of his return to Tehran in
1895, and that Nasir al-Din Shah sent messages asking him
not to mention the matter in his sermons as Iran was not
17 - -ready for it. TabatabaJi's memoir, recorded when he was
• •
old and ill, gives a brief and not very coherent account of 
events up to 1906. A clearer exposition of his aims before
the Revolution comes in Nazim al-Islam's account of the
* 18 — _ _discussion between them in February 1905. TabatabaJi
• •
complained that he had been striving for progress in Iran for 
the past eight years. He had started discussions on the 
subject and educational projects to awaken the people, and 
had worked for the exile of Amin al-Sultan, who had quashed 
these endeavours. Now Amin al-Sultan had been replaced by 
uAin al-Daula, whom he considered ill-informed and oppressive
16. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 7.
17. Tabataba*i, 'Yaddashtha', op. cit., p. 474.
• •
18. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 243.
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Nazim al-Islam then raised the problem of who else could
govern the country. Tabatabaii replied that:
• •
'The problems of Iran cannot be solved_until it 
has a constitutional government (mashrufa) with 
a fundamental law (ganun-i asasi). Then despotism 
(istibdad) will be overthrown and reform (islab) 
and good order (intigam) will be introduced.'
But constitutionalism could not be introduced until people
were aware of their national rights (bugug-i milli). If
people understood their rights they would never again have
to live under oppression (zulm) and injustice (jaur). Both
Malkum Khan and Yusif Mustashar al-Daula, the author of
Yak Kalima, had spoken of the need to make people aware of
19their rights, and to awaken them from their ignorance.
Nazim al-Islam asked how and when Iran would have
constitutional government, to which TabatabaJi answered:
• •
'When people have knowledge and are awakened from 
their ignorance. Then they will comprehend not 
only their rights but understand the meaning of 
nationhood (mi 1liyyat) and nationality (gaumiyyat), 
and realise that what is to the advantage of the 
country affects all of its citizens.'
Knowledge and education were the key to the whole problem, 
but unfortunately time was short and the country was in 
grave peril. The people must be induced to unite and work 
together in the service and struggle (mujahida) of Islam and 
their homeland (va_tan) .
Tabataba'i then passed to Nazim al-Islam the 
• • •
'Siyafratnama-yi Ibrahim Big* (The Travels of Ibrahim Big), 
written c. 1890 by Zain al-*-Abidin Maragha> I,which he had 
just been reading and he strongly recommended the book. The
19. Mirza Yusif Khan, Mustashar al-Daula, Yak Kalima, 
edition published Tabriz 1327/1907-8, p. 4. It 
was read by Nazim al-Islam's secret society, see 
his book Vol.I,* p. 267.
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writer, who came of a merchant family, lived in Cairo and
Istanbul, and was influenced by the ideas of Malkum Khan.
Many of the ideas expressed in the book are similar to those
voiced by TabatabaJi. MaraghaJi also spoke of rights (buquq),
• •
which he defined as the protection of life, property and
20honour against oppression, both internal and external.
He commented on the disorder in Iran and the lack of laws
(gavanin) and advocated national unity to solve the country's
problems. The people should gather together in a
-  -  21consultative assembly (majlis-i shura). He also lamented
the extreme weakness of Iran and the consequent danger from
foreign interference. His loyalty, however, was distinctly
to the homeland (vatan) rather than to Islam. TabatabaJi's
• •
loyalty, as will be discussed below, was more towards Islam. 
Margha^i's ideas on rights were probably drawn ultimately 
from Rousseau and Montesquieu. The book, as Bakhash has 
remarked, is a rather confused mixture of medieval Islamic
i
I ideas on government with 18th and 19th century European
! . . , 22 j political theory.
!
i The discussion between TabatabaJi and Nazim al-Islam
| _ • _
I ended with TabatabaJi recommending that Nazim al-Islam begin
I • • •
I a campaign to educate people to understand their rights, to
be carried out by the setting up of associations and societies, 
at which those who were progressive (mutamaddin) could discuss 
the problems of the homeland. The most immediate practical 
problem with his objectives was that it would take time to 
achieve them because so few people understood their meaning.
20. Zain al-uAbidin MaraghaJiA Siyafratnama-yi Ibrahim Big 
(The Travels of Ibrahim Big), Tehran 1353/1974-5,
p. 81.
21. Ibid., p. 213.
22. Bakhash, op. cit., p. 353.
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It is not fully clear from this discussion how far 
Tabataba-1 i understood the working of constitutional 
government, or exactly what he meant by the terms mashruta 
and huquq-i milli. It is evident, however, that they 
were intended to uproot the oppression and misgovernment 
that were weakening the country.
Nazim al-Islam duly founded the society that TabatabaJi • • •
had advocated. He stressed the advantage of acting whilst
the society had the support of a mujtahid such as TabatabaJi
• •
as he was:
'So knowledgeable and aware; he reads foreign books, 
understands politics, and knows about international 
1aw.'23
Tabataba4i had studied French, and one of his vocabulary
24lists including the word patrie has come to light, but it
may be doubted that he read difficult works in that language.
He requested the British Legation to find out if a Persian
translation of La Civilisation Arabe by G. Le Bon existed,
and it is most probable that he read other works in 
25translation. There is no evidence that he knew Ottoman, but
as a mujtahid he was familiar with Arabic. It is almost
—  —  —  —  2 6certain that he had read Kawakabi's Taba'i1 al-Istibdad.
During 1905 Tabataba4i was chiefly concerned with • •
awakening the people to the need for reform, and he agreed to 
work with Bihbihani, providing that reform in the general
23. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 247.
24. H.M. Ardakani, 'Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba I1, Rahnama-vi 
Kitab, No. 21 Parts 1-2 1357/1978, pI 28.
25. Marling to TabatabaJi, 30th Dec. 1907, FO 248/920, 
No. 527.
26. See below. .. A number of translations of
foreign books were made at the turn of the century, 
for example Fenelon's Telemaque, presumably for its 
criticism_of absolutist government. See Adamiyyat, 
Idl-*uluzhi, op. cit., pp. 55-85.
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interest was the ultimate aim. At the time of the Mi lama1s
departure for Shah *Abd al-^Azim in December 1905,
according to his memoir, his purpose was a majlis-i ^adalat,
and the meeting in the Masjid-i Shah was, according to him,
27called partly for this purpose. No mention was made of 
mashruta at this point. The main aim of the body of the 
^ulama and of Bihbihani, was, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, most probably the dismissal of LAin al-Daula.
Those who accompanied Tabataba4 i and Bihbihani to the
• •
Shrine included members of their families and their students
as well as several other mujtahids; Mirza Muhammad Ri£a
Qummi, said to have come from the lAtabat at the same time as
Tabataba4i, and considered one of the most learned and 
* — 28and respected of the Mi lama of Tehran, who later withdrew
from even a slight involvement in politics and may be
considered an example of a learned but apolitical mujtahid;
Sayyid Jamal al-Din AfjaJi who scorned world power and spoke
29in a derogatory fashion of the Shah. Also amongst those 
who made an exodus were well known preachers and a number 
of lesser mullahs. They were joined by students from the 
theological schools including those under the control of the . 
Imam Jumca, as well as by Shaikh Mahdi, son of Shaikh 
Fazlallah, who professed support for the opposition movement 
and was on bad terms with his father. A limited number of 
merchants accompanied them, most preferring to keep a low 
profile, and they also had a following from the guilds. In 
all the bastis numbered about two thousand. After the
27. Tabataba^i, 'Yaddashtha', op. cit., p. 476.
28. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 345.
29. Ibid., p. 353.
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departure to the Shrine the Shah removed some of the vagf 
property from the charge of those mujtahids who had gone 
and gave it to those who remained.
Of the Hilama who remained in Tehran and continued to
support *“Ain al-Daula, Shaikh Fazlallah and the Imam Jum'-a were
by far the most important. Others included the mujtahid,
Shaikh Mirza Abu Talib Zanjani, a mujtahid who was
exceptionally well-informed on western ideas and in the
3 0 —confidence of ^Ain al-Daula. Saif al-Din, a descendent of♦ 9
Fath uAli Shah and ‘'Ain al-Daula’s chief confidant among the
• - 31 -
‘ulama; and Sayyid Raihanallah, a mujtahid who had been 
active in the movement to replace Amin al-Sultan by •’Ain 
al-Daula.
An organisation was set up to supply the bastis with
provisions. Funds were collected from bazaar sources by two
brothers, Haj Muhammad Taqi Bunakdar, and his brother Haj 
32Husain. Expenses for subsistence, such as food, tea,
tanbaku and cigarettes were disbursed from their fund. Of
the known contributors to the funding of this bast, the
highest contributions came from the notables, who may be
divided into three groups. These were aspirants to the
throne, including Salar al-Daula, who sent a large sum through
Malik al-Mutakallimin; the Vali^ahd who distrusted and
detested uAin al-Daula is also said to have sent a large
contribution in the belief that the bast was largely directed
against the Sadr-i Ac zam. The second group were the family and 
• •
clients of Amin al-Sultan. According to Browne, Amin al-Sultan
30. Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 40, 
FO 60/698.
28th Feb. 1905,
31. Grant Duff to Grey, No. 101, 
FO 371/109, No. 16412.
22nd April 1906,
32. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit.. I, p. 344.
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provided the very large sum of 30,000 tomans to subsidize 
33the bast. The third group, who according to Nazim al- 
Islam wanted a change in the form of government, included 
the Foreign MinisteryMushir al-Daula and his sons, Mushir 
al-Mulk and Mu^tamin al-Mulk. The encouragement from these 
political factions was to be more consistent than that of 
the bazaar. The support of the guilds flagged and when 
Malik al-Mutakallimln tried to raise more money in the 
latter part of the bast, the merchants would give him next 
to nothing. By that time it was fairly clear that they were 
not going to dislodge cAin al-Daula and Naus.
The manner in which the money was disbursed depended on 
the amount and source. All small amounts and contributions 
from the merchants were given to the two brothers. Large 
amounts from outside sources, such as the followers of Amin 
al-Sultan, were received directly by the leading **ulama, and
divided amonqst them. One of the lesser lulama told Nazim ^1-1 1 •
al-Islam that the only money he received was 60 tomans from
- - - 34Tabataba*1 i for daily expenses. A certain amount of the 
• •
cost was borne by the mujtahids and wealthier Lulama
themselves. TabatabaJi's brother complained that he had had 
• •
to pay out 1000 tomans in the first two weeks or so of the 
bast.
<*Ain al-Daula responded to the situation with the usual 
government policy of quelling Lu1ama opposition by means of 
threats and financial inducements. A week after the culama 
left, Amir Bahadur Jang, the Minister of Court was sent with 
a company of armed men to bring them back. A serious 
incident occurred when Sayyid Jamal al-Din Af ja**i referred
33. Browne, Revolution, op. cit., p. 113.
34. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 345.
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to the Shah as an ass. Fearing bloodshed, Tabataba^i
• •
agreed to return with Amir Bahadur, but certain of those
in sanctuary who feared for their lives prevented him from
doing so by dragging the leading muj tahids into the
sanctuary and surrounding them. The Sadr-i A^am also tried
to separate TabatabaJi from Bihbihani with a bribe, and 
• •
even succeeded in winning over the former's brother Ahmad, 
who, however, did not have sufficient influence to sway the 
^ulama. Accounts suggest that of all the cu 1ama Bihbihani 
was the most determined not to emerge without some advantage 
over 4Ain al-Daula.
Since threats and financial inducements had failed a
process of bargaining began. According to Nazim al-Islam
two lists were submitted through Ahmad TabatabaJi. The
• • •
first, made secretly with the agreement of only a few others, 
included the following conditions:
1. Dismissal of cAla al-Daula, Governor of Tehran.
(His punishment of merchants for putting up the 
price of sugar had started the agitation.)
2. Dismissal of Zafir al-Saltana, Governor of Kerman.9 •
(His bastinadoing of the mujtahid there was taken 
by the *u1ama as a primary example of 'oppression'.)
3. Removal of cAsgar Garichi, the conveyancer on the 
Qum road.
(He was annoying the uulama of Qum and the request 
was calculated to win their support.)
354. Compensation for the mujtahid punished in Kerman.
This list probably represents the wishes of a minority of the 
1ulama anxious to extricate themselves from the Shrine. The
35 . Ibid., p. 353 .
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second list, said to be more representative, was the same, 
except that it included one more condition:
3 65. Dismissal of cAin al-Daula, Sadr-i Auzam.
According to Nazim al-Islam this was the primary aim of the
*ulama, and, it may be added, of most of their supporters as
well. cAin al-Daula managed to prevent the fifth condition
from reaching the Shah and the uu1ama found it impossible to
circumvent him. It is to be noted that no request for
reform is included on the lists. It is fairly certain that
TabatabaJi and his small circle desired reforms but they were 
• •
very much in the minority. The culama1s requests were 
rejected and they declined to leave the Shrine.
At the same time Bihbihani was trying to find a way
round cAin al-Daula, to establish contact with the Shah, who
was less resolute and not antagonistic on account of personal
opposition. He sent a book and a note explaining the
position of the *»u 1ama to the Ottoman Ambassador, Shams al-Din
37Beg, asking him to see the Shah on their behalf. The
Ambassador had long been resident in Tehran and had many
connections among the notables. He was reputed to hold the
3 8Iranian government in profound contempt. However, he 
declined to intervene in the matter, but was persuaded to 
change his mind through the intervention of Yahya Daulatabadi 
and his brother, who were personal friends. According to 
Daulatabadi's own account he won the Ambassador over on the 
grounds that his intervention would help bring about reform. 
Daulatabadi further says he received from the lulama the 
following list to pass to the Ambassador:
36. Ibid., p. 357
37. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 19.
38. Spring Rice to Grey, No. 289, 4th Dec. 1906,
FO 416/29, No. 301.
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1. Dismissal of cAla al-Daula, Governor of Tehran.
2. Dismissal of Naus from the Customs and other offices.
3. Amnesty for the followers of the *-u 1 ama on their 
return to the city.
4. Return of the confiscated vaqf property.
5. Removal of cAsg.ar Garichi from the Qum road.
6. Compensation for the Kerman mujtahid.
397. Abolition of the 10% stamp tax.
Daulatabadi claims that he could not have given a list 
representative only of the interests of the cu1ama when he 
was supposed to be acting in the cause of reform. He himself, 
therefore, rewrote the list adding the deliberately ambiguous 
phrase:
'Qarardadi dar islah-i kulliyya-yi umur ba ruJayat-i
huquq-i 'u1ama.'
•
(Agreement to reform in all affairs with consideration 
to the rights of the ^ulama.)
The list was then passed from the Ottoman Ambassador to the 
Shah through Mushir al-Daula, and returned with agreement to 
all the first six conditions except for the dismissal of 
Naus. For the seventh condition an explanation was demanded. 
Daulatabadi and fellow reformers, such as Malik al-Mutakallimin, 
then held a meeting at which they redrafted the seventh 
condition as follows (or so Daulatabadi recounts):
'In order to carry out reforms in all affairs it__is 
necessary to establish a Council of Justice (divan-i 
cadalat) in conformity with the law of Islam as 
compiled in a book (kitab), and a national consultative 
assembly (majlis-i shura-yi milli) to ensure that the 
law be executed equally in all parts of Iran so that 
there can be no difference between high and low, and 
all may obtain redress of their grievances.'
39. Daulatabadi, op. cit., p. 22.
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The list with the newly drafted seventh condition and the 
Shah's comments was sent to the Lulama with the admonition 
that negotiations could go no further unless there was some 
general request for reform. The Lulama returned the revised 
list only slightly amended and it was once more passed to the 
Ottoman Ambassador.
According to Nazim al-Islam a final (and, in his version, 
third) list was submitted for the Shah's attention after 
consultations involving Daulatabadi and his brother, the
Ottoman Ambassador and the four leading younger hilama (Nazim1 ~ •
al-Islam is not precise as to who played what role). The list 
was submitted through the Ambassador and included the 
following conditions:
1. Removal of cAsgar Garichi from the Qum Road.
2. Compensation for the Kerman mujtahid.
3. Return of the vaqf property confiscated from some 
of the iulama who had gone into bast.
4. The establishment of an Ladalatkhana in every 
province which would redress the grievances of 
the subjects, and conduct itself in a just and 
suitable manner.
5. The execution of the law of Islam for each individual 
regardless of anyone (i.e. impartially).
6. The dismissal of Naus from his directorship of the 
customs and finance.
7. Dismissal of cAla al-Daula, Governor of Tehran.
8 . Abolition of the 10% stamp tax on government
40salaries and pensions.
40. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 358.
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The important question with regard to these lists is how the
term uadalatkhana found its way there and what it signified.
Tabataba-1 i1 s own account is brief and not very clear:
• •
'I wrote down whatever_anybody wanted, for example, 
that the Madrasa-yi Khan Marvi should_be taken back 
from the Imam JumLa, andtAsgar Garichi should be 
removed from the Qum road. The purpose, however, 
was a majlis-i ^adalat, to which they agreed. Then 
‘•Ain al-Daula obstructed our requests, and we went 
to Qum.'41
It should be noted that the term he used was majlis-i cadalat, 
and not cadalatkhana, which will be discussed further below.
On the other hand Daulatabadi's account must be 
questioned because it gives undue importance to his own role. 
It is improbable that the leaders of the lulama would have 
so passively accepted such a major change from a person of 
comparative insignificance, even on the grounds Daulatabadi 
gives. Nazim al-Islam and Haj Shaikh Mahdi Sharif both agree 
that Daulatabadi and his brother played an invaluable role 
in persuading the Ottoman Ambassador to act as intermediary. 
Nazim al-Islam, in a comment written in 1911, accepted the 
gist of Daulatabadi's account, but said he himself had
repeatedly mentioned the idea of an uadalatkhana to
- - - 42TabatabaJi before the departure to the Shrine. Elsewhere • •
he says the list the ♦’ulama gave the Shah was in the
handwriting of Murtaza Ashtiyani, with the word cadalatkhana
- - - 43added in the margin by TabatabaJi. This conflicts with
• •
TabatabaJi's account, and with Nazim al-Islam's own third 
• • •
list. Since Nazim al-Islam's 1911 comment suggests that he 
did not really know, the version just mentioned may have been 
contrived in response to an accusation that the request for 
reform did not really come from the ^ulama.
41. TabatabaJI, 'Yaddashtha', op. cit., p. 477.• • — ^ r r
42. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit.. I, p. 359.
43. Ibid., p. 377.
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Grant Duff reported on 28th December that the culama
44had asked for 'some form of representation of the people',
but he was being fed information by persons of reformist
sympathies and even translated as authentic a leaflet
distributed in the bazaar that purported to emanate from
the Hi lama and asked for a full constitutional government.
Some months later Saif al-Din told Churchill that:•
'Other and more far-seeing people have the clergy 
the idea of asking for a code of laws and other
liberal institutions.'45
The demand for an Cadalatkhana was not welcome to the 
government but the Hi lama had dropped their goal of 
removing fcAin al-Daula himself, and might also be persuaded 
to forego the dismissal of Naus. cAin al-Daula opened his 
own negotiations with them through his nephew, Amir Khan 
Sardar. It was agreed that the four younger Hilama, 
AbuJl-Qasim Tabataba*1 i, Mirza Mustafa Ashtiyani, Mirza Muhsin 
and I'-timad al-Islam, who were involved in the negotiations, 
should meet '•Ain al-Daula on 9th January. The following 
day a rescript was issued granting the requests of the Hi lama 
(except for the dismissal of Naus and cAin al-Daula) and 
promising:
'The_establishment of a_State House of Justice 
(uadalatkhana-yi daulati) to execute the laws of 
the shari ua and ensure the security of the subjects 
is our foremost objective. To carry out this sacred 
objective, the law of Islam, which consists of the 
establishment of the boundaries and the execution 
of the precepts of the shari ca, must be enforced 
immediately throughout the land.There shall be no 
difference in the treatment of the subjects, 
regardless of their status? nor shall considerations 
of personal interest play any part in the execution
44. Grant Duff to Grey, No. 277, 28th Dec. 1905, 
FO 416/26, No. 98.
45. Grant Duff to Grey, No. 101, 22nd April 1906, 
FO 371/109, No. 16412.
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of the law. Clarification of the law will be 
given in a code shortly to be issued, which 
will be in conformity with the shari La. Its ^
provisions will be enforced in all the provinces.
The body to be set up was thus an ‘•adalatkhana. The 
description of the law as the shari ca was probably convenient 
to most, and literally believed by many. The culama returned 
to Tehran on 12th January seated in honour in the royal 
carriages. Sayyid Jamal al-Din Afjaci, however, travelled 
back on a mule.
The term wadalatkhana occurred in previous Iranian
attempts at legal reform. As early as 1860 a member of
Malkum Khan's Council of Reform had proposed a divan-i ladalat
or divankhana-yi ^adliyya a court of justice to prevent the
governors and state officials from oppressing the people, and
47acting according to their own interests. In the same year
an Ladalatkhana or divankhana-yi ^adliyya was set up by cAbbas
- - - 48Ouli Khan, Muctamad al-Daula. It constituted part of a
reorganisation of the Ministry of Justice and aimed at 
prohibiting provincial governors from interfering in judicial 
affairs. It consisted of a high court in the capital and an 
independent presiding judge in each province who was responsible 
only to Tehran. The reform was obstructed by the provincial 
governors and proved fruitless. In the 1870's the Si]^ ah 
Salar tried to establish what he called 'bukumat-i ganun' 
which meant a reform and limitation of the absolutist system.
Law reforms were introduced with the aim of regulating 
personal and political rights along European lines. They 
included the reorganisation of the Ministry of Justice under
46. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit.. I, p. 366.
47. Adamiyyat and Natiq, AfkOr-i IjtimaVL, op. cit.,
p. 212.
48. Adamiyyat, Taraqqi, op. cit., p. 81.
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Yusif Khan, Mustashar al-Daula, who brought some of the
Code Napoleon to Iran for translation. In addition to the
Ministry of Justice (vizarat-icadliyya*-yi aczam) there were
also to be tribunals (cadalatkhanaha) in the provinces.
Each one was to have a supervisor nagir and seven courts
(mabkama). The nagir might summon the perpetrators of
illegal acts to the tadalatkhana and was particularly
responsible for counteracting the illegal actions of
government officials. The courts were intended primarily
to deal with criminal law, but it was the purpose of Sipah
Salar to reorder the curf courts in such a way that the ^ulama
remained in charge of religious affairs and personal law and
kept out of other matters. These reforms were part of his
overall aim to secure centralisation of government, and make
49the provincial authorities accountable.
There is strong evidence that the Sipah Salar was
influenced by the Ottoman reforms of the Tanzimat. He had
spent some time in Istanbul in the 1860's and many of his
ideas echo the Ottomans', particularly with regard to
centralisation and reorganisation. In the 1860's and 70's
the Ottomans were also in the process of reforming the legal
system. In the Ottoman Empire two main judicial bodies
existed. One was the Divan-i Ahkam-i Adliye (Council of
Judicial Ordinances), whose president was in effect the Minister
of Justice. By 1879 all non-religious courts came under its
control. The second body was the Shura-yl Devlet (Council of
State), which was modelled on the French Conseil de l'Etat.
It was a high court of appeal for administrative cases, with
50some consultative and guasi-legislativs responsibilities.
49. Ibid., p. 181.
50. See B. Lewis, op. cit., p. 179? S.K. and E.J. Shaw, 
History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey 
(C.U.P. 1977), pp. 80-1; E. Engelhardt, La Turquie 
et le Tanzimat (Paris 1882), II, p. 19.
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It was composed of a number of different councils with 
duties to examine and prepare all projects of law; judge 
government officials accused of misconduct; and one of its 
purposes was to increase the efficiency of administrative 
departments by subjecting them to close scrutiny. The 
Conseil de l'Etat of France, on which the Shura-yi Devlet 
was modelled, is the pinnacle of a system of special courts 
quite separate from the ordinary courts of law. Their 
purpose is to investigate and adjudicate complaints by the 
ordinary citizen against the government and its administration. 
It was also used following the French Revolution to formulate 
legislation and reorganise the administration completing the 
process of centralisation in France.
Sipah Salar's reorganised Ministry of Justice shows 
similarities with the Ottoman reform, itself influenced by 
the French administrative and judicial system. The most 
significant feature in all these bodies is that they had 
tribunals to which the government administration was 
accountable, and these tribunals were established throughout 
the provinces under a central body in the capital. All 
three also had certain quasi-legislative features in terms 
of drafting law. In the French and Ottoman systems the 
Conseil de l'Etat and the Shura-yi Devlet were separate from 
the judicial system. In Iran, however, the functions of 
supervising the executive tended to be combined and confused 
in the Ministry of Justice.
The reforms of the Sipah Salar lapsed after his fall, 
but an attempt to revive some of his ideas was made by Amin 
al-Daula in 1893. At this time an order was given to the 
Ministry of Commerce and Justice to set up an Cadalatkhana to
/
51. See L. Freedman The Conseil de l'Etat in Modern France 
(New York 1961), pp. 1-8
deal correctly and firmly with trials, and with the protection
of the rights of the subject. It was also to reorganise the
52government courts. It thus combined in a slightly 
confused way the functions of administering justice and 
watching over the executive.
Not long before 1890 Malkum Khan had called for a more
regular system of justice in the newspaper Qanun. He
demanded government according to the law and called for
security and protection from oppression by properly regulated
53tribunals of justice (cadalatkhanaha). In a later edition
the same year he pointed to the Ottoman law reforms and
compared the progress in the making of laws and the
organising of Vadalatkhanaha in the Ottoman Empire with the
54anarchic and oppressive system in Iran.
Thus up to 1905 the word uadalatkhana had two basic 
meanings: the first was a system of tribunals under the .
Ministry of Justice with the function of watching over the 
provincial authorities and obtaining redress of grievances 
against them; the word could also be used to refer to a 
single one of these tribunals. These functions, however, 
were to some extent confused with the ordinary administration 
of the law. In 1905-6 definition of the term was further 
complicated by confusion with other ideas such as representative 
government, consultation and sharing of power. It was seen 
primarily, though, as an institution whose purpose was to 
limit the arbitrary power of the state.
To return to the lists of the lulama enumerated above 
and the Shah's rescript, the ideas expressed in Daulatabadi's
52. Amin al-Daula, op. cit., p. 156.
53. Qanun, No.3, p. 4.
54. Qanun, No. 16, p. 3.
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and Nazim al-Islam's list, and the rescript though vague,
are in conformity with a reformed Ministry of Justice with
subsidiary tribunals with powers to supervise the conduct
of the executive. However, only Nazim al-Islam repeats the
word *-adalatkhana, Daulatabadi employing the term divan-i
cadalat. TabatabaJ i refers to a majlis-i ‘■adalat, and once 
" • •
used the term cadalatkhana in a speech when he asked for a
majlis-i mashru^a-yi cadalatkhana. As will be discussed
below, the majlis-i tadalat he sought was a different concept
to the uadalatkhana defined in the rescript. There was indeed
a great deal of confusion about what exactly the *»u 1 ama had
asked for, which is reflected in the reports of the foreign
legations. The British translation of the rescript refers to
the Cadalatkhana as 'courts of justice' but the accompanying
memorandum reports the concession as 'a representative
assembly' to be composed probably of government officials,
55mullahs and merchants. The Belgians reported the reform as 
intending:
'to create a Higher Tribunal in every important town 
as well as a kind of Council of the EmpirggWhich will 
be engaged in discussing legal projects.'
This grasps some points of the intended reform but not the 
fact that it aimed to watch over the administration.
The fact that Tabataba^i was not seeking the cadalatkhana 
• • ■ - - —
as defined in the rescript suggests that the initiative for 
the idea did not come from him. Apart from Daulatabadi's 
account there remains another possibility, although the 
evidence is as yet slight. According to Haj Shaikh Mahdi 
Sharif, some of the higher bureaucracy (unnamed) sent a 
message to Bihbihani in the spring of 1905 during the campaign 
against Naus, telling him to ask for an cadalatkhana to reform
55. Grant Duff to Grey, No. 23, 30th Jan. 1906,
FO 416/26, No. 155.
56. Sanservens, 15th June 1906, No. 23/13, in Doc. 1281, 
BMFA.
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57 - -the affairs of the country. Bihbihani, however, intent on
removing VAin al-Daula, did not take up the suggestion. As
previously mentioned the senior bureaucrats were active in
assisting the culama whilst they were in bast. The name of
Mushir al-Daula occurs as being of particular importance in
all accounts. Nazim al-Islam says he and his sons gave much
assistance to the lulama. According to TabatabaJ i he was— • •
assisted in passing his requests to the Shah by Mushir al-
Daula. Daulatabadi prints a letter to himself from the
Ottoman Ambassador in which the latter states that Mushir
al-Daula had promised full cooperation. Haj Shaikh Mahdi
Sharif reports that Mushir al-Daula encouraged Bihbihani to
persevere and sent him 500 tomans via Shaikh Mahdi Sharif 
58 —himself. Mushir al-Daula was the only one of the more 
progressive minded senior bureaucrats still in office, and 
he may have been encouraged and abetted by others who were 
not. Some sent letters to Bihbihani whilst he was in bast 
telling him not to be tricked into submission, and after the
59return of the cu1ama came to thank him for what he had done.
According to Grant Duff in February the cu1ama were receiving
moral and pecuniary support from high officials, one of whom
6 0he named as Sa*-d al-Daula.
With regard to Bihbihani himself, it may be noted that 
the question of the cadalatkhana was not raised until it 
became apparent that the ^ulama were not in a strong enough 
position to remove LAin al-Daula. Shaikh Mahdi reports that 
Bihbihani was determined to come out of the Shrine with some 
advantage.^ This was in the face of considerable difficulties
57. Mahdi Sharif, op. cit., Vahid No. 208, May 1977,
p. 62.
58. Ibid., Vahid 219-20, p. 47.
59. Ibid., Vahid 219-20, p. 47, and No. 238, p. 42.
60. Grant Duff to Grey, No. 60, 28th Feb. 1906, FO 371/107,
No. 9434; See also Grant Duff to Grey, No. 21,
Tel., 14th Jan. 1906, FO 416/26, No. 44.
61. Mahdi Sharif, op. cit., Vahid, 219-20, p. 46.
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6 2in financing the bast and controlling his following. The
request of the ^adalatkhana enabled him to emerge from the
bast without loss of prestige, and it may be that he was more
instrumental in putting the reform on the list than
TabatabaJ i.
• •
The question of exactly how the Ladalatkhana was
included in the lulama1s requests cannot be finally answered
on present evidence. With regard to Daulatabadi's account,
although it was not fully refuted by contemporaries, it must
be noted that it was published after two of the major
participants in events, Bihbihani and Mushir al-Daula, were
dead, and the Ottoman Ambassador was no longer in Tehran.
The situation was very confused and it may be that no one
person could be sure exactly what happened. It seems fairly
likely, though, that Bihbihani and TabatabaJi were instigated
• •
by either the reformers of the secret societies, or members 
of the highest bureaucracy, or both, to ask for an t adalatkhana 
but that the majority of Hilama, intent on removing those who 
imposed higher taxes, knew little about it and understood 
less.
The issuing of the rescript granting the Ladalatkhana 
was primarily a means whereby the Hi lama and the government 
could come to terms in a dangerous crisis. The government, 
whilst making concessions such as the removal of the stamp tax, 
refused to give way on the most important points, the 
dismissal of Naus and ‘•Ain al-Daula. The culama, however, 
had escaped from a difficult position with their prestige 
enhanced and the safety of their followers guaranteed. But 
the opposition factions seeking the exile of the Sadr-i A^zam,
• 9
the merchants discontented at the customs reforms, and the 
reformers working for a major change in government were not
62. Malikzada, Mashrutivvat op. cit.. Vol. II, p. 72, 
p. 82; DaulatSbSdT, op. cit., II, p. 25.
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likely to rest there. Events in Russia were being closely 
watched and discussed, particularly amongst the tullab, who, 
hearing that the Russian people were trying to obtain their 
'freedom', began openly to demand 'freedom* themselves. At 
the same time the difficulties of the Russian government
removed the fear of a Russian occupation of the north if there
. T 63 was an uprising m  Iran.
In the period following the return from bast the Mi lama 
took no further steps towards attaining reform, and the 
government consequently did nothing. The rumour had begun to 
spread that with the establishment of the cadalatkhana the 
Lulama would have to 'close shop', that is to say much of 
their legal business would be curtailed. Those seeking 
reform, therefore, started to pressurise the Hilama chiefly 
via leaflets distributed through the bazaar. fAin al-Daula, 
as before, played on the divisions amongst the Ml  ama and 
offered them financial inducements to desist. Some of the 
younger M  1ama, however, used the popular ferment to further 
their own ambitions. Sadr al-MJlama professed himself in
sympathy with the tullab and acquired the largest following
64 -amongst them. The younger Ml ama formed a faction known as
the Islamic Circle (Hauza-yi Islami) to press for the execution
of the Shah's rescript.
The Islamic Circle demanded a say in the compilation of 
the code of laws. The government recognised that judgement 
in shari ca affairs would have to be dealt with by the Ml ama 
but resisted their participating any further in the matter.
When vAin al-Daula passed the culama the section concerning 
the shari ua he hoped that it would create disagreements amongst
63. Grant Duff to Grey, No. 277, 28th Dec. 1905,
FO 416/26, No. 98.
64. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit.. I, p. 381.
- 152 -
them which they could not easily resolve, so responsibility
65for delay in the reform could be placed at their door.
A major part of the new code was to be a translation of the 
Ottoman law codes.
Prompted by the reformers, TabatabaJi wrote to °Ain
• •
al-Daula sometime in the spring of 1906, reminding him of
66 - his promise. In the letter the ideas expounded to Nazim
al-Islam at the beginning of 1905 are given further expression.
TabatabaJi pointed to the extreme weakness of the country and 
• •
the danger from foreign invasion:
'We wish to live under our own Shah and Sadr-i'A* zam 
under the Russians, the Ottomans or the British!''
Iran was so weak it was in danger of extinction. The only
solution to the country's problems was unity. This could
only be achieved by the establishment of a council (majlis)
in which the government (daulat) and the people (millat), the
notables of the government (rijal al-daulat) and the Lulama
were united. Finally, TabatabaJi urged VAin al-Daula to act
• •
for the same reason that he himself was acting:
'For this is a great work and will cause my name to 
be written in the pages of posterity.1
The majlis that TabatabaJI was now askinq for implied not a
• •
reformed Ministry of Justice, but a council uniting government 
and people to consult and obtain better government. How its 
members were to be chosen was not clear.
At about the end of May 1906 TabatabaJi wrote directly
67 * *to the Shah. Again he returned to the theme of Iran being
65. Ibid., p. 408.
66. Ibid., pp. 390-1.
67. Ibid., pp. 403-5.
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weak and endangered, but his identification of Iran with 
Shiism is much clearer:
'If Iran is thrown to the winds, Islam will become
weak and Muslims humiliated..... Iran is not only
their vatan but the place where their religious goals 
are fulfilled.'
This strong identification of Iran with Islam is not found in
more secular reformers such as MaraghaJi, and it must be
doubted that TabatabaJi had quite the same concept of 
• •
nationality, or understanding of nationalism as they did.
TabatabaJi identified the bane of Iran as oppression 
• •
(istibdad) by the governors and other state officials, 
describing it as follows:
'They (the governors) seize people's property whenever 
they have the opportunity. They vent their anger and 
greed on whomsoever they wish and beat and kill and 
mutilate.'
He added that:
'Thousands of Iranians have fled abroad from the 
oppression of the governors and state officials to 
become porters and labourers, and they die in an 
abject state.'
This view of Qajar government is close to that reflected in
the Siyabatnama-yi Ibrahim Big, which in parts it repeats
nearly word for word. MaraghaJi also wrote that many Iranians
had fled abroad from the oppression of the governors to work
as porters and labourers and that they had died in an abject 
68state. He too commented that there was no security. Of
course, both Mustashar al-Daula and Malkum Khan, especially 
in Oanun, had described the system of government in Iran as 
oppressive.
TabatabaJi again raised the matter of the mailis, calling 
• •
it a majlis-i cadalat, as a remedy for oppressive government.
68. MaraghaJi, op. cit., p. 24, p. 67.
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He described it as a council (anjUman) composed of all sections 
of the population (tamam-i agnaf-i mardum). In it all would 
be equal, the people could obtain public redress of their 
grievances, and through it the country would prosper. It is 
not clear whether the term 'all sections of the people' would 
include the guilds.
Early in June an agitator named Mahdi Gavkush was arrested 
for seditious activity and severely beaten. His family were 
also so badly treated that one of his children died.
Tabataba** i made this episode a pretext for a long speech from
69the pulpit on the state of the country and the need for reform.
He began his speech with a call for justice, presenting it as 
a legitimate Shiite demand:
'The Prophets and the saints have commanded justice
 Justice is emphasized in the Quran and the
message of the Prophet'.
He identified the main problems of Iran as being injustice, 
disunity and tyranny:
'Some say the disease is injustice and its cure is 
justice. Some say the disease is association (shirk) 
and the cure is oneness (taufrid)• Some say the 
disease is tyranny (zulm) and its cure is deliberation 
(shaur) and consultation (mashvarat)'.
This passage which would appear to have religious origins, in
fact comes from Kawakibi's TabaJic al-Istibdad, in which he
said that despotism meant shirk, that it is the sharing of
the despot in God's powers, and its remedy was tau^id, belief
70in God's oneness. The concept of disease and cure may also 
derive from Kawakibi, who spoke of the problems of eastern
69. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit.. I, pp. 444-53.
•
70. K.S. Al-Husry, Three Reformers (Beirut 1966), p. 63;
See also pp^ 26-29 of the Persian translation b^ cAbd
al-^usain Qajar, printed 1325/1907-8. Tabataba-* I 
must have read the Arabic, unless he saw a draft of 
this translation.
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71 -countries in those terms. Kawakibi's book, based very
largely on the Della Tirannide of V. Alfieri, comprised an
analysis of tyranny (zulm), how it grew and thrived, and how
72both oppressors and oppressed were subject to fear. In
his view the reason for the decay of Islam was the tyrannical
system of government, a view shared by Tabataba*i.
• •
TabatabaJi again brought up the subject of his majlis-i 
• •
^adalat as an institution that would unite people and
government in an effort to 'solve the country's problems'.
The theme of uniting people and government was to become one of
73the main goals of the Revolution, as Arjomand has pointed out.
It occurs also in MaraghaJi, who proposed the unity of people
- - 74
and government in a majlis-i shura. But the idea of 
bridging the gap between people and government had been 
considered by those with reformist ideas since the time of 
Malkum Khan's discussions in 1859. The concept implies a 
sharing of power producing a fairer, more efficient 
administration.
The guestion of constitutionalism was also raised in the
speech and Tabataba*i swore that other people had attributed • •
this aim to him. Indeed a long letter exists from Nasir al-
• 75
Mulk to him trying to dissuade him from this objective.
It may be that Nasir al-Mulk believed Tabataba*i was seeking
• m m
constitutionalism, or it may be that in a climate of intense 
debate on possible reform he wished to counterbalance those
71. uAbd al-Husain Qajar, op. cit., pp . 6-7.
72. S. Haim, 'Alfieri and al-KawSkibf, 
XXXIV 19 54 , pp. 321-334.
Orient* Moderno ,
73. Arjomand, 'The tUlama's Traditionalist Opposition', 
op. cit., p. 176.
74. MaraghaJi, op. cit., p. 213.
75. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit.. I, pp. 454-62.
- 156 -
who were trying to pressurise Tabataba*i towards it.
• •
Tabataba*i said again in his speech that the people of Iran 
• •
'have not yet reached the necessary level of education and
are not capable of constitutionalism', repeating what he
had told Nazim al-Islam. In his belief that constitutionalism
would only be arrived at gradually, he may have been at least
— — 7 6partially influenced by Kawakibi. This view is probably 
the reason he advocated a majlis-i **adalat rather than a 
majlis-i shura like MaraghaJi. It seems fairly clear, however, 
that government by popular sovereignty was his long term goal.
At the end of his speech Tabataba*i further defined his
• •
council as one in which Shah and beggar would be equal
according to the law. This latter phrase may have come from
Yak Kalima in which it also occurs. The idea, of equality
according to the law, borrowed from western constitutionalism,
was translated in Iranian terms as equal according to the
shari ca, thereby creating confusion on the nature of the law
codes that were to be introduced. Elsewhere Tabataba*i spoke
• •
on the need for gavanin, laws, and for the necessity of
executing the law of Islam. It is probable, however, that
he did not literally desire the execution of the sharica.
At that time it was dangerous to advocate ganun, law, for two
reasons. The first was that it implied another written law,
- 77which was regarded with suspicion by many of the Si lama.
Secondly, it implied a system of government where the
monarchy was limited by laws. It is unfortunately not
possible to conclude exactly what Tabataba*i's views on the
• •
law were at this stage. But from his reading of MaraghaJi, 
from the probability that he was familiar with some of Malkum 
Khan's ideas, from the fact that Yak Kalima was read in the
76. For Kawakibi's views see Husry, op. cit., pp. 67-9; 
Haim, op. cit., p. 331.
77. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit.. I, p. 300.
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secret society he instigated, and from his policy after the 
establishment of the constitutional regime, it is most likely 
that he envisaged a system similar to that proposed in Yak 
Kalima, that is a code of laws partly drawn from the sharil* a 
and at least not contrary to it, according to which the 
state administration could be regulated in secular affairs. 
Such a code had, after all, been drawn up in the Ottoman 
Empire, and was probably the one being translated in the 
spring of 1906.
Tabataba*i also considered the role of the Shah within 
• •
his altered system of government. At the beginning of his 
speech he emphasised that it was not true that he sought to 
depose the Shah. He stressed that the Shah was a Muslim and 
that if there were reforms whilst he reigned, it would prevent 
any further decline. However, he was less concerned with the 
position of the Shah than with the urgent need for change.
He argued that the reforms he advocated would not affect the 
Shah's place;
'Why shouldn't there be a Council of Justice in a 
country that has a Shah?'
Indeed, in view of the danger from abroad, reform would 
strengthen the position of the monarchy, for good government 
would produce a prosperous country and a full treasury.
At the end of the speech Tabataba* i stated that the one
• •
true Shah was the Imam of the Age, but in a brief analysis 
of the nature of human society, he showed that the Shah of 
the time had a valid function within the political system, 
and that he must be obeyed as long as he fulfilled it. He 
turned to the question of the meaning of saltanat and told 
his listeners:
'If you had studied in the new learning, if you knew 
about, history and law,, if you were educated, then you 
would understand the meaning of saltanat.'
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The emphasis on the need to have studied modern learning
(ulum-i jadid) to comprehend the meaning of saltanat shows
his interpretation of the word was drawn from European
thought. According to the theory which Tabataba*i propounded,
• •
God has given each creature certain qualities to enable it 
to survive. But unlike other creatures man is not simple 
in the things that he needs for his livelihood. For example, 
he needs bread, clothing and buildings. One person cannot 
supply all of these so communities have grown up to serve the 
needs of individuals. But these communities are in danger of 
destroying themselves because of the forces of rage and greed 
which lead men to destroy each other. Therefore, the wisest 
men decide to appoint one person to protect their community. 
The appointment is made on the understanding that members of 
the community devote their lives and property to the one 
person, on the condition that he protect them from oppression 
both from outsiders and from each other. This one person 
is is the Shah, and he has been provided with taxes to keep 
soldiery to enable him to carry out his duties. If the Shah 
does not fulfill his functions, but is idle and self- 
interested, his people may withdraw their allegience (life 
and property) and bestow it upon someone else.
It is not certain from where TabatabaJi derived these
• •
ideas which seem to combine the traditional Muslim view of
the role of the Shah as the protector of his people and the
keeper of good order, with the notion drawn from European
thought that the ruler is accountable to the people.
Tabataba^i1s pessimistic view of human nature recalls Hobbes,
• •
but there is no evidence he read Hobbes, whose theory hardly
fits in with TabatabaJi's other political ideas. The right of 
• •
people to choose a ruler and then remove him for dereliction 
of duty suggests the influence of contractual theories of 
government, particularly Locke and Rousseau. The idea may 
well have come to him though, through a contemporary thinker. 
Kawakabi, for example, argued that men could choose a
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government by their own reason and will, and remove it if
it failed their expectations. It might, on the other hand,
be argued that Tabataba*i was thinking of the Muslim bacya
• •
'the act by which a certain number of persons, acting
collectively or individually, recognise the authority of
78 _ _ _
another person.' But Tabataba*i stressed himself that
• •
his ideas were drawn from a new source. Further he stated
that the ruler had duties to the community, who had the
right to remove him if he failed them, but in Muslim theory,
the ruler is responsible to the shari *»a, the law of God, and
can only be removed if he violates the law, which Tabataba*i
• •
completely fails to mention in this context. He may have 
amalgamated these theories from general reading to form one 
of his own, or more likely, they were derived from a particular 
contemporary work, but so far investigations into possible 
European works, Farsi translations, Ottoman and Arab thinkers, 
have failed to bring an obvious source to light.
Tabataba*i ended his speech with an exhortation to 
• •
action couched in the traditional Shiite terms of a demand
for justice. Using what Fischer has termed 'the Kerbala
paradigm' he compared the oppression of the present regime to
that endured at the time of Husain. Like Husain he and his
• •
followers might be martyred in the cause of justice, but his 
children would carry on the struggle. Finally, he reminded 
the Shah of the tenuous basis of his authority:
'Our true Shah is the Imam of the Age, and we are 
his servants who fear no one.'
He did not, however, make any reference to the role of the 
culama as the na^ ib-i Lamm.
78. Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edition, BaLya.
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In this manner what was essentially a demand for a 
form of government based on ideas and values derived from 
Europe, was legitimised as a traditional Shiite protest 
against oppression and injustice.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Tabataba*i was influenced by ideas on 
• •
reform current since the 1860's at least, and found in the 
works of such writers as Malkum Khan and Kawakibi.
Tabataba*i legitimised his demands for reform by presenting
• 9
them as a traditional Shiite cry for justice against
oppression, but he himself stressed that his ideas came from
the 'new learning'. Tabataba*i was the leader of the reformist
• •
cu1ama of Tehran, Bihbihani being almost certainly concerned
with regaining his position of influence, and the body of
the other cu1ama seeking the removal of those who imposed
higher taxes. Only the members of Tabataba*i's family and
• •
a few others, mainly heterodox, thought as he did. There is 
therefore little indication that the Lu1ama led protest had 
much to do with Shi'ism or the return to rightful Shi'ite 
government. The government in 1905 was particularly weak 
because of lack of funds but was otherwise much as it had 
been for a very long time. What was new was the growing influx 
of political ideas, models of government and values from the 
West.
It is difficult to say for certain quite what Tabataba*i's
• •
aims were, partly because he had to obfuscate his intentions 
for fear of being labled seditious, and partly because he 
himself was perhaps not clear as to some of the concepts he 
had studied. With regard to constitutionalism (mashruta),
TabatabaJi perceived it as a system of government existing
• •
in Europe for which, conditions in Iran at that time were 
unsuitable. It was the ideal for which he worked, and for 
which he regarded education as the key. This education included
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understanding of the rights and limitations of both people 
and government. When he asked for rule according to laws, 
he almost certainly meant regulations in conformity with 
the shari*>a, applying largely to secular affairs already 
under the government sphere of authority. It is possible 
that he would have accepted a code based on the shari ^a 
of certain sections of civil, though probably not personal, 
law. It is unlikely, however, that he really understood the 
conflict that might arise under the constitutional system 
between a law based on the word of God and one based on the 
popular will.
In default of the immediate establishment of
constitutional government, TabatabaJi devised a majlis-i
• •
uadalat as an intermediate reform, better suited to Iranian
conditions. This majlis would have only sufficient powers
to make the government accountable, and remedy what
Tabataba^i termed oppression. Unfortunately he did not work 
• •
out how his majlis was to be chosen and what the limits of 
its authority were. For this reason his proposal fell before 
the pressure of constitutionalism in 1906, as the 
constitutionalists could at least borrow a fully worked out 
mode1.
Some attempt has been made to unravel the confusion that
surrounds the term cadalatkhana. It has been suggested that
the mailis-i wadalat which TabatabaJi sought was not the same
• •
as the uadalatkhana of the rescript, as the former seems to
have been a council with a representative element, whereas
the latter is in conformity with previous uses of the term
to denote a reformed Ministry of Justice with special powers
to supervise state officials. The origins of the ^adalatkhana
may be found in two ideas, a reformed Ministry of Justice in
charge of all secular courts of law, and the Ottoman Shura-yi
/
Devlet, derived from the French Conseil de l'Etat, with powers 
to investigate the executive, and certain quasi-legal functions.
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It must be noted that the confusion is exacerbated by the 
fact that other terms, such as divan-i *adalat, were used to 
describe the same institution, and, on the other hand, the 
word uadalatkhana came in 1905-6 to acquire connotations 
of representative government.
How the ^adalatkhana came to be included in the Hi lama1s
list of requests remains problematic. Daulatabadi's is still
the only detailed account, not properly refuted and yet not
probable, though it may well contain a gist of truth. The
other possibility is that the term was included at the
instigation of those progressive bureaucrats who had not
joined cAin al-Daula's government, and of whom Mushir al-Daula,
then still in power was in the most advantageous position. The
term was to some extent all things to all men, but the way it
was understood involved an important contradiction. The
fcadalatkhana granted to the Hi lama was seen by many as a
means of limiting the power of the state. The original Conseil
✓
de l'Etat, and the Shura-yi Devlet, were, however, instruments 
for centralising government and thereby strengthening the 
power of the state. Although purporting to regulate bureaucracy, 
the cadalatkhana was an idea that might be favoured by 
centralising bureaucrats.
On their return, the Hilama, as Adamiyyat has noted, showed 
little enthusiasm for the uadalatkhana, probably because they 
realised it might threaten their privileges in the administration 
of the law. They were obliged to pursue it because of pressure 
from their following, merchants and guildsmen discontented over 
the government's fiscal policies, tullab influenced partly by 
events in Russia, and secret societies such as Nazim al-Islam's, 
who were fuelling popular unrest. Also significant were the 
political cliques out of power who had largely financed the 
bast in December-January.
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CHAPTER V
THE 'ULAMA AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL 
CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY
Towards the middle of June 190 6 agitation against the
government mounted with TabatabaJi and Bihbihani, as well
as other Lu1ama, preaching to large congregations and
demanding an Ladalatkhana,^  On 10th July Grant Duff
received a message from Bihbihani saying the people were
prepared to overthrow the present government, and requesting
2
pecuniary assistance. He replied that the British 
government could not support opposition to the government 
of Iran. On 11th July lAin al-Daula ordered the arrest of 
Shaikh Muhammad Va*-iz, the leading preacher of Tehran, 
whose sermons were particularly incendiary. When a party 
of students attempted to rescue the prisoner, the officer 
commanding the guard shot one of them. His body was taken 
to a nearby mosque, and messages sent to the leading 
mujtahids. The body was carried in procession to the
Masjid-i JumLa. The government sent troops to prevent the
bazaar closing in protest, but with no success. The 
muj tahids tried to contain the situation, sending criers 
round the bazaar asking people not to loot, and the butchers 
and bakers to remain open.
The Imam Jumla was out of town, but the opposition was 
joined for the first time by Shaikh Fazlallah, who was 
obliged by a large crowd of persons who presented themselves
3
at his house, to come to the Masjid-i Jum^ -a. When the Imam
1. Grant Duff to Grey, No. 167, 21st June 1906,
FO 371/112, No. 23147.
2. Grant Duff to Grey, No. 178 Tel., 10th July 1906,
FO 371/112, No. 23516.
3. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 70.
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Jumta returned, he also joined the opposition. In this 
manner the leading Hi 1ama were induced into a semblance 
of unity.
After troops had been picketed throughout the bazaar,
the Shah issued a rescript to the Hilama expressing
disapproval of the agitation, and promising to redress
rightful grievances, but refusing to dismiss the Sadr-i AHam.
• »
On Thursday 12th July the situation remained unchanged, with
the shops closed, and a large crowd filling and surrounding
the Masjid-i Jumla. On the morning of the 13th a
procession parading the shirt of the dead sayyid formed in
the bazaar with a number of people wearing kafan, winding
sheets, and crying the names of Hasan and Husain. Bihbihani
• •
tried in vain to calm them. When the soldiers attempted to
stop the procession, the commanding officer gave the order
to fire and about a dozen people were killed. That evening
Bihbihani said from the pulpit that his demands for justice
had been met with bloodshed. However, he enjoined the
people to maintain order. For the whole of the 14th
negotiations took place between the government and the leading
Lulama who remained in the Masjid-i Jumla surrounded by
troops. Their demands were still the dismissal of the Sadr-i
- - 4A Lzam, and the institution of an tadalatkhana.
Negotiations continued throughout the 15th when the 
mujtahids also ordered the shops to open; however, the 
bazaar remained closed.
Sayyid cAli Yazdi, who had influence at court, spoke 
to the Shah on behalf of Shaikh Fazlallah and Bihbihani.
On the subject of the '-adalatkhana, the Shah commented:
4. Grant Duff to Grey, No. 193, 19th July 1906, 
FO 371/112, No. 26753.
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'You well know that Bihbihani and Shaikh 
Fazlallah do not want an *-adalatkhana, as it 
would be detrimental_to their interests. In 
fact if an '-adalatkhana were established, they 
would be the first to speak against it.'5
By the term ^-adalatkhana, the Shah probably understood the 
the institution envisaged in the rescript in January, 
similar to the Ottoman Shura-yi Devlet. TabatabaJi he 
considered desirous of a republic, and of political reforms 
impossible in Iran.
The *-ulama asked permission of the Shah to go to the 
LAtabat, and this being granted the great majority of them 
departed from Tehran on Sunday 15th July. The next day they 
changed their destination to Qum because to go to the 
LAtabat would be too costly. Shaikh Fazlallah delayed his 
departure by three days. *Ain al-Daula brought pressure 
on him either not to go, or to go and try to persuade the 
others to come back. Finally, probably realising that he 
would be stripped of all influence and prestige with the 
populace of Tehran if he stayed, he left on 18th July with a 
large following. tAin al-Daula was much weakened by the 
departure of Shaikh Fazlallah, whose support had prevented 
his regime from being discredited by the lulama as a body. 
With the great majority of the Hi 1ama absent little legal 
business could be carried on in the capital.
As he was leaving for Qum on 16th July, Bihbihani sent 
Grant Duff a second communication stating that discussions 
between himself and the Sadp-i Azam on the fulfilment of the 
Shah's rescript of January, and the institution of an 
^adalatkhana had only led to bloodshed. He ended with the 
ambiguous request that:
5. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit.. I, p. 496.
6. Ibid., p. 503.
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'In view of the friendship that exists between us, 
that you should on no account refrain from 
endeavouring to put an end to the oppression and 
transgression.'7
On 18th July, according to Grant Duff, two persons unknown to 
the Legation came to kAbbas Quli Khan, the Second Oriental 
Secretary, and said about 500 merchants proposed to take
g
bast there. According to Malikzada the major merchants
made preparations for the bast in the British Legation before
-  9
the 1ama left for Qum. This was done in cooperation with
leading reformers, and with the ultimate aim of using 
popular pressure to secure constitutional government. The 
merchants were said to have used their influence in the 
bazaar to win widespread support for the bast. The leading 
merchants had thousands of tradesmen in the bazaar in their 
debt, for they sold the merchandise they imported into Iran 
to the small tradesmen in instalments.^^ According to 
Malikzada, a merchant such as Haj Muhammad *-Ali Shalfurush 
gave the small tradesmen reductions on their debt to bring 
them into the opposition movement and force the closing of 
the bazaars. Malikzada also mentions the Zoroastrian 
Ardishirji as claiming to have acted as an intermediary 
between those in the Masjid-i Jumla and the British Legation 
on the possibility of a bast in the Legation grounds.^
He states the Legation obtained permission from London to 
shelter those whose lives were in danger. This account does 
not agree with the British documents where there is no
7. Grant Duff 
FO 371/112,
to Grey, No. 194, 
No. 26754.
19 th July 1906,
8 . Grant Duff 
FO 371/112,
to Grey, No. 193, 
No. 26753.
19 th July 1906,
9. Malikzada, 
Gilbar, op
Mashrutiyyat, op. 
. cit., p. 297.
cit. , Hf P* 168;
10. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit. , Hf P- 28.
11. Ibid., p. 168.
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-  -  12mention of Ardi shiir ji .
According to Daulatabadi, Bihbihani told some of his
following to take refuge in the Legation after the lulama 
13left for Qum. He adds that this unprecedented order had 
been agreed with certain notables of the government who 
were working with him secretly. The account in Nazim al- 
Islam is more detailed and agrees substantially with the 
British sources. Before the departure for Qum, Bihbihani 
told his merchant following that if harrassed by lAin al-Daula, 
they should take refuge in the British Legation. On 15th 
July a meeting of lesser merchants and sarrafs was held in
-  -  " 14
the house of Aqa Muhammad, the agent of the Russian Bank.
The two bunakdars, Haj Muhammad Taqi and Haj Muhammad--------- i* • * •
Husain, who had organised the provisioning of the bast in
December, came in and explained that they and others were in
danger from '-Ain al-Daula. A message was sent to Bihbihani,
then on his way to Qum, to ask what to do. He replied to do
as he had told them and take refuge in the British Legation.
The merchants were worried since they had no dealings with
or knowledge of the British Legation. Finally a merchant
named Aqa Mirza Mahmud Isfahani went to the Legation's
• •
summer quarters at Qulhak, where they spoke to one of the 
officials (evidently from Grant Duff's account, LAbbas Quli 
Khan). The official at first refused but in the end agreed
Ardi sh.irji is almost certainly the same as 
Ardershir Reporter, a Parsee from Bombay who 
sometimes acted as an intermediary between the 
Iranian government and the British Legation.
It may be he intervened in this case, and that 
his intervention is not mentioned as he was a 
confidential agent. However, his account given 
to Malikzada does not tally with the British 
correspondence or with Nazim al-Islam and must 
therefore be regarded as unreliable. (I am 
indebted for the information on Ardershir 
Reporter to Sir Denis Wright).
Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 71.
Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 510.
12.
13.
14.
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on condition that there should be no bankrupts or criminals. 
They then informed their friends and on 19th July some fifty 
merchants and mullahs (probably tullab and sayyids) took
15
bast in the Legation. Nazim al-Islam's account, like the
British sources makes no mention of Ardishirji, and agrees
that the first contact was made by two persons coming to
the Legation. It indicates no proper plan or organisation
before the bast, such as that described by Malikzada. The
bast was instigated by the lesser merchants prompted by
Bihbihani, not by the major merchants. This point is further
reinforced by the fact that when some days later the Shah
sent the major merchants to talk to those in bast, the
refugees at first rejected all discussion with them as being
16not of their number. The idea for the bast seems to have 
come from Bihbihani, and may, as Kasravi suggests, have been 
a ploy to use the Charge d'Affaires as an intermediary between 
himself and the Shah, as he had used the Ottoman Ambassador 
in the previous bast. It is nevertheless not impossible that, 
as Daulatabadi mentions, he had discussed the matter with 
notables sympathetic to reform, and as Gilbar believes, 
with the major merchants such as Amin al-2arb. It is possible 
too that once the bast began the major merchants used their 
influence in the bazaar to maintain it.
According to Nazim al-Islam, the tullab and sayyids
17joined the bast at the instigation of the merchants. He 
says, however, that two of the British Indian Officials 
(their names are given as Husain Quli Khan Navab and Mirza 
Yahya Munshi) suggested to the merchants that they invite
15. Grant Duff to Grey, No. 203, 13th Aug. 1906,
FO 371/112, No. 29707.
16. See page 176 below.
17. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 511.
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others to join them, as there was greater safety in larger
numbers. It is more probable that the merchants themselves
decided to bring the students in to create a larger pressure
group. The merchants initially invited the tullab from the
Madrasa-yi Sadr and Dar al-Shafa, some of whom they paid.
Certain payments were organised by Aqa Sayyid Muhammad Taqi
Simnani, one of the followers of Bihbihani, who had remained
in Tehran for this purpose, and were made through Aqa Mirza
Mahmud Isfahani. These two were the most active in 
• •
contacting sayyids and students.
The numbers in the Legation mounted rapidly. By 21st
June there were 7 00, with representatives of the guilds
having joined. The number had risen to 5000 by the 24th,
1810,000 by the 27th and 14,000 by 2nd August. Altogether
80-90 guilds or groups were represented ranging between
wealthy merchants and sayyids, and including nearly all the
19trade and craft guilds. Only a proportion of the guild
members were represented. They were so organised that each
guild had their own tent, and meals were prepared in a
common kitchen, and served in huge cauldrons to each guild
in turn. Grant Duff estimated that they cost £350 per day
at the height of the bast. According to one account a
meeting of 72 persons, including merchants and leaders of
the guilds, was held to discuss provisions as the students
and guild workers complained that they could not subsidize 
20themselves. The meeting decided that a large amount would
18. Grant Duff to Grey, No. 192 Tel., 21st July,
No. 197 Tel., 24th July, No. 200 Tel., 26th July,
1906, FO 371/112, Nos. 25173, 25310, 25684.
19. Grant Duff to Grey, No. 211, 15th Aug. 1906,
FO 371/112, No. 29712.
20. I. Safari, Panjah Nama-yi Tarikhi (Fifty Historical 
Documents), Tehran 1350/1971-2, p. 159.
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be sent by the guilds' leaders to the students. The
expenses of the bast were defrayed from the fund organised
- 2 1by Ha^ Muhammad Taqi. Browne heard that the fund amounted
to 30,000 tomans raised by subscription from merchants and. 
- 2 2^ulama . Malikzada, as stated above, believed the funding
came largely from the merchants. Daulatabadi attributed
the funding to merchants and officials working for the
- 2 3return of Amin al-Sultan. However, Vakil al“Daula, one
of the main correspondents of Amin al-Sultan, did not know
where the money came from, and like other officials believed
24the British had a hand in it. He considered most of the 
bastls were there for the free dinners. Another account
25reported that the merchants had contributed 100,000 tomans.
Nazim al-Islam states that the merchants subscribed to the
sum to be distributed by the heads of the guilds to the
students, and that this sum was also intended to support the
2 6students' families. He also says that after the bast was
over, Haj Muhammad Taqi and his brother raised the question
of expenses at a meeting of the merchants, saying that they
had spent 3 2,000 tomans. The merchants got an account for
18,000 tomans from the brothers and pointed out to them that
they had had other assistance. Finally, on the insistence of
Bihbihani and Tabataba-* i the major merchants divided the • • *
lesser sum between them, the most notable contributors
being Amin al-2arb, Haj MuLin al-Tujjar Bushihri, Haj
— — — — 27 *Muhammad Ismacil and Arbab Jamshid. The evidence would
21. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit.. I, p. 512.
22. Browne, Revolution, op. cit., p. 120.
23. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., II, p. 170.
24. Safari, Mashruta, op. cit., pp. 42-44.
25. Tafrishi Husaini, op. cit., p. 29.
26. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit.. I, p. 539.
27. Ibid., p. 590.
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suggest, therefore, that although the bastis, particularly 
the guilds' leaders and the lesser merchants, were to some 
extent self supporting, the major part of the expenses was 
defrayed by the leading merchants. The merchants also 
ensured the solidarity of the bast. When a small group, 
evidently bribed, left the British Legation for the Russian, 
the merchants sent roughs, who, after enticing them out, beat
4-u 28them up.
Most accounts indicate that the demand for a National 
Assembly evolved during the bast. Many persons were active 
in arousing the multitude.Dhu*1-Riyasatain Kirmani, a member 
of Nazim al-Islam's secret society, stood on a chair and 
addressed'the bastis on the subject of awakening. Fakhr 
al-Islam, another member, got out a book in French every 
day, read it, and translated it. Filsuf Shirazi and other
29members read out articles from the newspaper ffabl al-Matin.
According to Nazim al-Islam, the Legation became like a
'school' with people sitting in circles under tents, whilst
those 'with a knowledge of politics' taught them. Matters
which hitherto no one dared mention were brought to the
attention of the people. Daulatabadi also mentions that
those of reformist views mingled with the people and made
30 -good use of the occasion. Vakil al-Daula reported that:
'The people in the Legation are learning politics 
and law....for example, that the meaning of the 
word 'shah' is 'representative of the nation'.
And when the nation no longer wants a shah he is 
not recognised.'31
But not all the audience were receptive. Filsuf Shirazi was
chased from one tent when he suggested the bastis should
28. Smart to Browne, July 1906, Browne Papers, Cambridge Univ.
Library.
29. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit.. I, p. 512, p. 514.
30. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 74.
31. Safari, Mashruta, op. cit., p. 78.
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- - 32ask for a proper law (qanun). As Browne's correspondent
remarked, the vast majority of bastis were probably quite
33ignorant of the principles of democratic government.
On 23rd July Grant Duff conveyed the first demands of the 
bastis to the Shah. They included:
1. The removal of vAin al-Daula.
2. The establishment of 'law courts'.
3. The return of the cu1ama from Qum.
The 'law courts' - the English version of the Persian
*-adalatkhana-were further defined as having an administration
34not in the hands of venal officials.
The bastis refused to leave the Legation until their 
requests were granted, and claimed their lives and property 
were no longer secure. Muhtasham al-Saltana, the Head of the 
Foreign Ministry, was sent to deal with them but no one would
see him. He was told that all complaints would be submitted
35through the mediation of Grant Duff. On 26th July the 
leading merchants of Tehran, who had not gone to the 
Legation, were summoned before the Shah. They numbered about
nine persons and included Amin al-2arb, Haj Muhammad Isma^il
— — 3 6 * *and Mu1in al-Tujjar. The Shah demanded to know what
'this rabble' was doing in the British Legation. The merchants
remained silent, apart from professing loyalty to the Shah.
He sent the merchants to deal with the bastis, who, however,
32. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit.. I, p. 512.
33. Browne, Revolution, op. cit., p. 122.
34. Grant Duff to Grey, No. 206, 13th Aug. 1906,
FO 371/112, No. '29707. see also No. 193 Tel. of 
27th July 1906.
35. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 74.
36. Ibid., p. 75.
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refused to negotiate through them. VJhen they swore they
were in sympathy with the bastis, the latter told them that
the requests made so far were for the return of the lulama,
the establishment of an ^adalatkhana, and that the government
should honour its bills of credit (a particular grievance of
the garrafs). When the merchants returned to see LAin al-
Daula, MuLin al-Tujjar disassociated himself from the others,
who, he said, were in collusion with those in the Legation,
and had the same aim, the establishment of an assembly 
3 7(majlis). LAin al-Daula said he had promised an 
Ladalatkhana, to which Mu'-dn al-Tujjar replied that the 
bastis wanted an elected assembly. As Gilbar has pointed out,
the bastis had not asked for an elected assembly, but for
—  —  38an Ladalatkhana.
On the 27th *-Ain al-Daula replied to Grant Duff through
the Foreign Minister about the list of requests. The reply
stated that the government would offer sufficient protection;
that there vrere still Lulama in Tehran to transact business;
and that an ladalatkhana already existed. Such a body could
not be in the hands of any one other than government 
39officials. Evidently he interpreted the word to mean a 
reformed Ministry of Justice rather than some sort of council 
to make the administration accountable to law. This response 
was greeted with laughter by the bastis. That same day 
they submitted three petitions, one by the garrafs, one by 
the tullab and one general, to the Shah through Grant Duff 
detailing their grievances. The contents of the petitions 
are not clear, but Grant Duff does not say they included 
a request for an assembly (majlis).
37. This may have been a ruse as MuLin al Tujjar 
paid the main costs of the bast along with the 
other leading merchants.
38. Gilbar, op. cit., p. 299.
39. Grant Duff to Grey, No. 206, 13th Aug 1906, 
FO 371/112, No. 29707.
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On the 27th also the merchants were again summoned to
see '*Ain al-Daula, who, according to Daulatabadi, ostensibly
agreed to the request for a ma jlis, and stated that he
wished to cooperate with the merchants in order to
circumvent the ^ulama, whose growing intervention in affairs
40both he and the merchants mistrusted. This probably
represented an attempt to separate the lulama from their
following and save his own position. Daulatabadi considered
he was not sincere. It was agreed that Mushir al-Daula was
to go to Qum to inform the Lulama that a national
consultative assembly (majlis-i shura-yi milli) had been
granted. Grant Duff also reports that Mushir al-Daula was
to go with a rescript granting 'courts of justice' (the
British translation of the term ^adalatkhana) , a consultative
-  41assembly and the return of the lulama.
In the meantime the Vali’-ahd telegrammed the Shah in 
support of the *-ulama and what he believed was a movement to 
overthrow his enemy, the Sadr-i Ac^am who was reportedly 
opposed to the Vall^ahd's succession. lAin al-Daula's 
position was also seriously undermined when the soldiers 
and police made apparent their discontent over their lack of 
pay, and threatened to join the bast. His efforts to save 
his position having failed, he resigned on 29th, Mushir 
al-Daula being appointed Sadr-iAczam«
Among the bastis in the Legation a movement had begun 
to induce the participants to ask not only for the exile 
of lAin al-Daula, who wTould only return after a few months, 
but to demand fundamental changes in the system of government
40. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 76.
41. Grant Duff to Grey, No. 201 Tel., 30th July 1906,
FO 371/112, No. 25830.
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by the opening of a national assembly. Nazim al-Islam
says that the members of his secret society were
particularly active in this respect from about July 27th 
4 2onwards. According to what Taqizada told Browne a
commission was formed amongst the bastis, which was advised
43by the better educated Iranians. This last group seems
- 44 45to have included Sani'- al-Daula and Mukhbir al-Mulk.
When the bastis we re informed of the resignation of ’•Ain al-
Daula, some of them prepared to leave. The commission
persuaded them to remain, pointing out that his resignation
was no longer the issue, and that a more fundamental change
was needed. In this way the demand for an *-adalatkhana
developed into the demand for a majlis-i milli. It seems,
however, that the issue of the majlis was first raised by
the merchants in their interview with the Sadr-i A Lzam
the 26th and the list Mushir al-Daula was to take to Qum,
including a consultative assembly, was instigated by that
meeting. The merchants were most probably also in touch
with the commission in the Legation to ensure pressure in
favour of their requests from the bastis, but exactly how is
not clear. They may well also have been in contact with the
better educated Iranians, such as Sani*- al-Daula.
Mushir al-Daula, being appointed Sadr-i Aczam could not 
go to Qum himself, so uAzad al-Mulk, the head of the Qajar 
tribe, was designated to take the list of demands, and he 
left on 1st August. But the governments intentions over 
the majlis were evidently mistrusted. The Legation bastis 
sent word to the ^ulama in Qum not to leave until the Shah
42. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit.. I, p. 534.
43. Browne, Revolution, op. cit., p. 122.
44. Biographical Note of 1906.
45. Majlis, No. 16, 17th February 1907.
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had granted all requests. They further asked Grant Duff
that the majlis should be one in which merchants, lulama
4 6and other ranks of people should be represented.
Until the resignation of '■Ain al-Daula the telegraph lines
to Qum were cut, and contact with the Lulama was maintained
by messengers. Mirza Ibrahim lAttar, whose shop and house• •
were near that of Tabataba-*i, was the bearer of packets and
- - 47messages brought on foot from the '■ulama to the bastis.
The 1u1ama themselves were in touch with their colleagues in
Najaf and elsewhere in Iran by telegraph. TabatabaJi informed
• •
the 1u1ama of Hamadan that they had received a message not to
48leave Qum until the merchants in Tehran told them to.
Bihbihani sent Grant Duff a telegram asking him to tell the 
merchants and guilds in the Legation that the lulama would 
not leave until they had heard from the Legation bastis.
The Shah telegraphed the lulama asking them to return.
In reply they complained of oppression by the government and
- 49of the failure to execute the shariVa. The promise of an 
assembly of justice (majlis-i *-adalat) , to ensure justice in 
all affairs, and counter disorder and sedition had not been 
fulfilled, although it would strengthen the authority of Islam 
(saltanat-i islamiyyaj and protect the country against foreign
9 '
interference. They now asked for the establishment of a 
majlis to include:
46. Grant Duff to MuLtamin al-Mulk, No. 381, 3rd 
Aug. 1906, FO 248/889.
47. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 536.
48. Zahlr al-Daula, op. cit., p. 130.
49. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 546-8.
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'Ministers, senior government officials who will 
act in a disinterested fashion; merchants who are 
informed on subjects of economy and trade, and may 
be consulted on the well-being of the people and 
government (millat and daulat); representatives 
of the Lulama, and learned persons who have knowledge.
The assembly would, under the control of the Shah, 
oversee all the offices of government and introduce 
reform in all affairs'.
The constitution of the assembly would be written out in a 
set of articles; its character, however, would be Islamic, 
as it should:
'Aim to enforce the shari La, enjoin good and prohibit 
evil; and act as a check on agreements with 
foreigners according to the sharila.'
The assembly would also be the means of reforming the affairs 
of Muslims according to the law of Islam, defined as 'the
customary and sovereign law of the land' (ganun-i rasmi va
- 50saltanati-yi mamlikat). Evidently the assembly would be
composed of chosen representatives of the higher classes
51(the guilds are not mentioned). It was not, however, to
be a constitutional or national assembly. Its character
appears to be Islamic and its purpose a development of
Tabataba^i's earlier majlis-i '■adalat. Its legislative 
• •
functions are left vague, though possibly the passing of 
laws not contrary to the shariLa in the areas at present largely 
under the Hirf law was envisaged. The assembly is also 
subordinate to the Shah and no definition of his powers is 
suggested. It is also unequivocably Islamic, and different 
to the assembly the merchants and other bastis were in the 
process of demanding in Tehran.
50. The exact meaning of this phrase is uncertain but
it may have originated with one of the *»ulama who
had some familiarity with western thought, such as
Muhammad Sadiq TabatabaJi.
• .
51. This suggests the links of the leaders of the Uulama 
were closer to the merchants than the guilds. It 
may reflect the fact that they were largely funded 
by the merchants.
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On 3rd August a rescript was read to the people in the
Legation granting a majlis for Tehran only, and with
powers defined in such, a way that it was clearly subject to
the royal office, and that the Shah would not be obliged
52to execute the bills passed. It was to include 
representatives of the princes, landowners, lulama and 
merchants only. The merchants and guilds rejected it saying 
they wanted an independent majlis with authority throughout 
the country. The Shah must ratify its laws, whether he 
agreed with them or not. In fact what they appeared to be 
asking for was a national assembly with a limited monarchy.
On 6th August a rescript was posted on the walls of 
Tehran granting:
'The establishment of a majlis of elected 
representatives of the princes, lulama, notables, 
landowners, merchants and guilds to assemble in 
Tehran and give necessary assistance in consultation 
on affairs pertaining to the government, the country 
and the people, to the Shah's ministers. It will 
bring about reforms necessary for the prosperity of 
the country, which will be executed by the Shah and 
enforced in accordance with the shari ca.'53
It is to be noted that the guilds were for the first time to
54be included in the franchise. The rescript, however, was
torn down from the walls, the bazaars remained closed and
the bastis stayed in the Legation although some had wanted 
55to accept. They informed Grant Duff that they considered 
the wording ambiguous, and refused to accept the rescript.
52. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit.. I, p. 548.
53. Ibid., p. 551.
54. None of the sources report a struggle to include 
the guilds in the franchise, but there must have 
been a specific request, or else they would not 
have been included in the rescript of 3rd August.
55. TafrishI Husaini, op. cit., p. 40.
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There were two points at issue: the first the exact nature
of the maj lis - as Kasravi has pointed out the word 'miHi1
5 6was not included; the second was the limitation of the 
Shah's powers.
The ^u1ama had, in the meantime, sent Muhammad Sadiq
TabatabaJi and the two sons-in-law of Bihbihani to Tehran 
• •
with their requests and they arrived on 7th August. Their
main request was 'the establishment of a majlis in the correct 
57manner!. The leading conservative courtiers seem to have 
taken this opportunity to try and divide the merchants and 
guilds from the lulama, and the Shah issued an amendment to 
his rescript describing the assembly as 'an Islamic 
consultative assembly' (majlis-i shura-yi islami), which 
would execute the laws of the shari La. On 8th August Grant 
Duff took one part of the leading bastis for discussion with 
the Sadr-i Aczam whilst another, consisting of the major 
merchants, went to see the Shah. It was probably on this 
occasion, though possibly a day or so earlier, that the 
merchants spoke to the Shah on the drafting of the rescript. 
They informed him they should determine who the members of 
the majlis were, that is the Shah should have no say in who 
was chosen as a representative. Secondly the laws passed 
by the majlis must be executed, which was the major bone of 
contention. The Shah argued that he would only ratify a law 
if he considered it suitable, that is he retained final 
authority. The merchants replied that the situation would 
then remain unchanged.and added in a.manner which startled the 
court by its bluntness:
56. Kasravi, op. cit., p. 120.
57. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., p. 558.
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'The law must be what the majlis decides. We will 
not accept the Shah's order and signature in this 
matter, nor that of the Sadr-i A*zam nor that of the 
Lulama either. Nobody is’to interfere in the laws 
of the majlis. We have no business with the Sadr-i 
A^am nor the Lulama. . . .we do not want any orders 
except those of a just assembly. If the *u1ama want 
to come back, let them; they are as bad as you are. 
Whatever we save each year from thieves slips into 
the sands. Whatever we preserve from the depredations 
of the governors, the Sadr-i A(zam and the Shah, has to_ 
be given to the house of the shari *-a. When the Ma 1 ama 
return we are not going to accept any more orders from 
them either.'58
Following this interview, and the discussion with the Sadr-i
A'zam as well as consultation with the three culama who had
arrived from Qum, it was finally agreed that the assembly
should be described as the majlis-i shura-yi milli, and the
5 9Shah's rescript was issued with this amendment. In the
British version the major points of difference between the
final version and that of the 6th August were that the majlis
was described as a national assembly, and that the proposals
of the assembly would be submitted by the Sadr-i Aczam for the
60 'Shah's signature, and thus put into force. As the Shah's
rescript in the Persian as reproduced by Nazim al-Islam
changes only on the point of milli the second difference may
represent verbal agreement. The law to be enforced was still
described as the shariLa‘ though this probably meant that
— 61the laws passed would be in conformity with the sharica.
58. Malika-yi Iran to Zahir al-Daula^ in Zahir al-Daula 
op. cit., p. 136. Malika-yi Iran was his wife and a 
Qajar princess. She was educated, well-informed and 
close to the court. It is unlikely that she would 
have invented this speech so there is no reason to 
doubt that it is more or less correct.
59. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit.. I, p. 564.
60. Grant Duff to Grey, No. 210 Tel., 10th Auaust 1906,
FO 371/112, No. 27347.
61. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 562.
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The assembly, though national, in other words representative 
of the popular will, was still not constitutional, and the 
exact delineation of the Shah's authority was left vague.
The rescript was published on 10th August, and all but 
200 bastis, who had individual grievances, and the most 
significant of whom were the garrafs, left the Legation. The 
bazaars opened the next day. A telegram was sent to the 
Lulama in Qum telling them to leave, and the merchants sent
money to help pay their debts in Qum and defray the expenses
6 2 “ ~ “of the return. Amir Bahadur told Muhammad Sadiq
• •
TabatabaJi that the Lulama would never accept a majlis as
it was against the shari ’-a and their own interests. When
Muhammad Sadiq replied that the Prophet had enjoined 
• •
consultation, Amir Bahadur said Muslim consultation was
beneficial, but asked why they had agreed to 'national
consultation' (shura-yi milli). Muhammad Sadiq replied that
• •
religion could be used as a pretext to exile the opponents
of the government by designating them as irreligious, whereas
“ 63the word milli would .prevent such tactics. He also stated
that from now on the requisition and collection of taxes,
and the payment of salaries, would be the responsibility
of the majlis, and that government expenditure would be 
64controlled. This, of course, had not been defined in the 
rescript, and was to be another major point of conflict.
The court hoped that once the majlis was formed it would 
represent so many divergent opinions that the movement would 
come to nothing.
62. Ibid., p. 566.
63. Such tactics were in fact to be employed by Shaikh 
Fazlallah.
64. Vakil_al-Daula to Qavam al-Saltana, SafaJi,
Mashruta, op. cit., p. 68.
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The Lu1ama returned from Qum on 15th August, and a 
meeting of leading ^u1ama, government officials and members 
of the merchants and guilds was held on the 18th in the 
old military school to make arrangements for the establishment 
of the majlis. From 19th to 27th August the gathering was 
engaged in drawing up the electoral rules. Dabir al-Mulk 
wrote to Amin al-Sultan that everybody was busy writing the 
regulations they wanted and ignoring everybody else.
Mukhbir al-Saltana wrote to him that:
'A number of totally uninformed people are busy 
writing the electoral rules in the Military School.
About two thousand meet there about twice a week and 
ask for their 'rights'. The government is trying 
to avoid implementing the rescript, and there is 
likely to be a struggle between them and the people.
The members of the government suppose that they can 
deceive the people, and the people think that they 
can achieve these wonderful results free of cost.'66
According to Daulatabadi there were three main groups at work, 
those whom he calls the 'liberals' or reformers, together 
with notables educated abroad, Sani5- al-Daula and Mushir 
al-Mulk, and some of the merchants; certain of the *-ulama
led by the sons of Tabataba'i; and representatives of the
67 —  * *court. Malikzada adds that the court group had secret
—  68supporters amongst the Lulama.
The group led by SanIL al-Daula were the first to submit
a draft to the gathering for approval. The faction headed
by the sons of Tabataba-1 i objected to it, and withdrew to
• •
compose their own version, which would give religion more
69prominence and nation less. The draft was also altered by
65. SafaJI, Qajarivya, op. cit., p. 381.
66. Ibid., p. 384.
67. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, pp. 87-8.
68. Malikzada, op. cit., II, p. 188.
69. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 87.
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Amir Bahadur in such a way as to protect the powers of 
the Shah.^ The court urged the Shah to allow 
representatives from Tehran only, depriving the assembly of
its national character, and thus its main basis of
71 -legitimacy. The court camarilla led by Amir Bahadur then
tried to suborn Bihbihani, who was promised a piece of land.
He was invited to meet the Shah and given the altered
regulations to present to the people. The merchants
complained vehemently to TabatabaJi, who remonstrated with
- - 72 *Bihbihani. His students threatened to take his life, and
a large crowd gathered at his house so he was forced to
abandon the amended draft. It was a clear and prime example
of a mujtahid being dictated to by his following. On 30th
August two drafts, one written under the guidance of Sani^
al-Daula, and the other by the younger ^ulama, led by
TabatabaJi's sons, were read to the gathering at the military 
• •
school. After a few changes the former draft was accepted, 
again indicating that the influence of the merchants and 
bureaucrats was stronger than that of the 'u1ama. After 
some demur the Shah signed the electoral rules on 10th 
September.
The regulations provided for 200 members, 60 of whom came 
from Tehran. Mukhbir al-Saltana, who was one of those 
responsible for drawing up the regulations, wrote that 
preponderance was given to Tehran because it was anticipated 
that the provincial deputies would take time to arrive, and 
it was feared that unless some means was found for 
establishing the Majlis immediately the court camarilla would
70. Safari, Qajariyya, op. cit., p. 381.
71. Grant Duff to Grey, No. 226, 11th Sept. 1906,
FO 416/29.
72. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., I, p. 636.
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take advantage of the delay. Of the 60 Tehran deputies,
3 2 represented the guilds, 10 the merchants, 10 the 
landowners, 4 the '-ularna, and 4 the Qajar family. Despite 
their number, the guilds representatives were reported as 
being simple people, overawed by the proceedings and the 
more powerful members. Even later on only one or two took 
an active part in the debates.
The elections took place on 29th September, the total
number of electors being no more than a few hundred in each
of the five classes. One of those elected for the lulama
resigned and was replaced by Muhsin, brother of Sadr al-’*Ulama,
• •
and son-in-law of Bihbihani, without any further elections
73taking place. This indicated scant regard for the meaning
of representation, but Nazim al-Islam commented that anyway
few persons in Tehran understood the meaning of assembly,
deputy and elections, and that the provinces were no better.
The religious minorities wanted their own deputies, but the
members of Nazim al-Islam's secret society, realising that
this might cause a reaction amongst the *-u 1 ama, induced the
Armenians to let TabatabaJi represent them, and the Jews
• •
Bihbihani. The leading merchant Arbab Jamshid, however, won 
the right of representation for the Zoroastrians, reportedly 
by bribing Bihbihani. The reformers of all kinds were aware 
of the need to keep the good will of the *»ulama, as the 
'will of the people' was still a tenuous basis of legitimacy, 
and there was known to be powerful opposition amongst the 
notables. Therefore, though the deputies had general 
immunity from arrest, this did not apply if they said 
anything contrary to the laws of Islam. The formidable nature 
of the latent opposition was soon apparent when the Valicahd
73. Ibid., p. 644.
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forbade the publication of the Shah's rescript on the 
assembly in Azarbaijan and only yielded after disturbances 
in Tabriz.
The Maj1is opened as soon as the Tehran deputies were
elected, on 7th December. Its debates were somewhat
rambling, and though the President, Sanic al-Daula, maintained
a certain degree of order, there was no order of the day for
speakers. Bihbihani and TabatabaJi attended regularly and
• •
often interrupted the proceedings. They were not official
members, but seem to have had an undisputed right to attend
as mujtahids and leaders of the 'millat*. Their presence
gave the Assembly religious sanction. Their role indicates
how far the old order was still confused with the new. Of
the other Lulama, Haj Nasrallah Akhavi, one of the ~ * •
representatives of the 'ulama of Tehran, spoke regularly,
usually as a moderate, except in defense of religious
interests, when he was rigorous. Mirza Muhsin, another of
Tehran lulama, contributed only occasionally. Of the
provincial 'ulama, the Imam JumLa KhuJi, from Azarbaijan,
was to be the only significant contributor, again as a
moderate. There is no indication that the Lu1ama coalesced
as a group in the Majlis, or that at this stage they
perceived themselves as having a group interest. As before
the Assembly was founded, their concern was to represent the
views of their contacts among other groups, and in the
Majlis itself this role was chiefly carried out by Bihbihani
and TabatabaJi as the leading figures.
• •
The sons and relatives of the mujtahids found an outlet
for their ambitions in the establishment of the newspaper
Majlis which received,through the influence of Bihbihani,
the sole right to report the proceedings of the Assembly.
The original concession had been granted to Daulatabadi
74who first mooted the idea. The concession was, however,
74. Ibid., p. 650; Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 91.
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withdrawn from him and given to Muhsin, son-in-law of
Bihbihani, and Muhammad Sadiq TabatabaJi, partly because
• c • #
Daulatabadi' s views were suspect (he was believed to be 
an Azali Babi), and partly because the younger Hi 1ama 
desired control of such a potentially influential paper.
The paper's first editorial shows the Islamic preoccupations 
of its editors in stating its intention to work for knowledge 
and progress such as Islam had shown in the past, and in its 
perception of Iran less as a nation than as the home of 
Shi^a Muslims.
Shaikh Fazlallah rarely attended the Majlis and no
instance has come to light of his making a speech. V7hen
the ^ulama returned from Qum he found himself isolated and
much reduced in influence, partly through the exile of
tAin al-Daula, and partly through not having taken part in
the opposition movement early on. He seems to have tried
to disassociate himself from his former friends, so when
Sipahdar, who was responsible for firing on the crowd in the
Masjid-i Jum'-a, asked Shaikh Fazlallah to intercede on his
behalf, the latter replied that 'this is a personal matter
75and does not concern me'. He also seems to have tried to 
regain recognition by establishing contact with those 
involved in the reform movement. He wrote in September 
1906 to Zahir al-Daula, Governor of Hamadan, saying he had 
hitherto been excluded from 'these sacred intentions', and
asking to be kept informed of the reforms Zahir al-Daula
7 6 *was introducing. In a letter to Spring Rice on the occasion
of his arrival in Tehran he said:
'I am taking this opportunity to congratulate Your 
Excellency on behalf of myself and the other 
religious leaders of the people (millat), who have 
always considered themselves in accord with the
75. SafaJi, Mashruta, op. cit., pp. 141-2
76. Zahir al-Daula, op. cit., p. 157.
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77respected and progressive British.'
3ut Shaikh Fazlallah was well excluded from regaining his
former influence by Bihbihani who, in mid-October,
humiliated Fazlallah's son, Mahdi, in Fazlallah's presence
in the Majlis, just as Mahdi was about to protest over the
— 78irregularities in the elections of the Hi 1ama. Shaikh
Fazlallah felt obliged to withdraw, and thereafter hardly
attended. In any case it is doubtful that he ever really
sympathised with the Majlis. The frequent reports from
the autumn onwards that certain of the Hi 1 ama v/ere unhappy
over the effect the Majlis might have on their own
authority almost certainly referred to- him, arid Daulatabadi
considered him closely in touch with the court conservatives.
On 19th August 1906 he had a meeting with Mushir al-Daula,
TabatabaJi and HVzad al-Mulk at which the main subject
discussed was that the law of Islam must be executed, and
more particularly, that the law on taxation (maliyat) must
79be in conformity with the shari*-a.
By the beginning of December two bodies of opinion were 
discernible in the Majlis, the moderates led by Sani*" al- 
Daula and the radicals, consisting chiefly of the merchants 
and guilds, led by SaM al-Daula. In reality this 
distinction was somewhat arbitrary. The earlier division 
between government and people exemplified in court and 
Assembly was breaking down, but conflict between different 
groups in the Majlis had not yet clearly emerged and there 
were no party divisions. The Majlis seemed to have been
77. Shaikh Fazlallah to Spring Rice, received 6th Oct.
1906, FO 248/887, No. 363. The letter is written
in the fair hand of a scribe and is not signed
but it bears on the back a_square seal with the 
legend, !Dhalika fadlu Allahi yu^tih man yasha^u1 
(Such is the grace of God which He giveth unto whom
He will - Quran, Surah 5, No. 54). _This was well 
known as the seal of Shaikh Fazlallah (see Burhan, 
on. cit.f p. 876). The letter is therefore most 
probably genuine.
78. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit.. I, p. 640.
Ibid.. p. 577.
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composed of myriad constellations which formed and reformed
as their members cooperated over one particular immediate
interest, and then moved on to unite with someone else
over another interest. The Majlis was, for a while,
dominated by Saud al-Daula, a largely opportunist politician
who found a power base in representing some of the grievances
of the merchants and guilds, which he used to embarrass his
personal opponent, Sani*- al-Daula. The latter, as MacDaniel
has remarked, was in a difficult position as President
because he had to find compromises with the government which
8 0were not always popular with the Majlis. In this pattern 
TabatabaJi and Bihbihani seem to have oscillated between
9 9
collaborating with Saniu al-Daula and the merchants, and 
acting as conciliators as the need was recognised for 
compromise with the court conservatives.
During the autumn the constitution was under discussion, 
and in the contentious issue of the creation of the Senate, 
the mujtahids sided chiefly with the merchants and the 
guilds, who were led by Sa'-d al-Daula and Amin al-2arb. It 
was proposed that the Senate have a two thirds majority 
elected by the people and a third appointed by the government, 
but this idea met with stiff resistance from the court 
camarilla, who still hoped to use the Senate to check the 
lower house. The government was desperately short of money 
and the conservatives tried to bargain the Assembly into 
granting a foreign loan in return for ratification of the 
constitution. The Majlis responded by stipulating that an 
essential condition of their raising the money locally was 
the Shah's signature on the Constitution. On 25th December 
the government proposed a compromise whereby a small majority 
of the Senate would be chosen by the government. Sani*- al- 
Daula was inclined to accept, but SaLd al-Daula and the
80. McDaniel, op. cit., p. 63.
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merchants vehemently opposed it, in which they were
81 -supported by the muj tahids. Sani1 al-Daula resigned but 
was induced to reconsider by the muj tahids, and eventually 
on 29th December a compromise was reached whereby the 
government and people selected half the members of the 
Senate each. The Shah at first refused to sign, but when 
the muj tahids in response to popular pressure warned him 
that if he did not there would be trouble all over the 
country, he signed on 1st January 1907.
Battle between the Assembly and the new Shah, Muhammad
'■Ali, was soon joined over the issue of ministerial
responsibility. The Ministers attended irregularly, which
the Assembly interpreted as lack of cooperation, and a
letter of complaint on this point was sent to the Shah by
Bihbihani and TabatabaJi, probably at the instigation of 
• •
Sanic al-Daula. As a result eight Ministers appeared in the 
Majlis on 31st January.
From its inauguration the major problem facing the 
Majlis was that of finances. There was no prospect of 
revenues and salaries were well in arrears. Furthermore, it 
was impossible to implement reforms without funds. An 
attempt in November to raise a joint Anglo-Russian loan met 
with opposition from the culama, on the grounds that it 
threatened the country's independence (in which they appear 
to be expressing their own point of view) and from the 
mercantile deputies, who were mistrustful of what the 
government would do with the money. The Majlis continued 
to treat all loans with suspicion, taking the viewT that they 
would have no really effective guarantee that the money would 
be expended for the purposes shown unless they received it 
themselves. The government declined to sign any loan 
agreement unless they received the money, so the result 
was a deadlock.
81. Spring Rice to Grey, No. 5, 3rd Jan. 1907,
FO 371/301*., No. 2204.
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It was recognised that some order must be put in the
finances and a proper budget drawn up. Following suggestions
by Nasir al-Mulk, Minister of Finance, a committee was formed
to examine the government requirements, and discuss the
degree of control of the Assembly over the accounts. One
aim was to abolish madakhil, the old system of unregulated
gifts in the collection of revenue, and pishkish for the
bestowing of appointments. TabatabaJi spoke out against
• •
such 'bribery and corruption', and said the Majlis would be
8 2powerless until something had been done about it. Spring 
Rice preached (as he put it) for an hour on the subject of 
corruption to another mujtahid (almost certainly Bihbihani)'.
'He answered with a story about the Prophet. A man 
brought his son to him asking that he would warn him 
against eating dates. The Prophet said, "Bring him 
tomorrow". The father said, "Why not today?" The 
Prophet answered, "Because I have just breakfasted
off dates".'83
The finance committee, which consisted of Sanic al-Daula
and the major merchants, submitted its recommendations on
19th March. They comprised the beginnings of reorganisation
and centralisation along European lines. All provincial
revenues were to be paid into the treasury and the governors
were to receive salaries. The collection of the revenues
was to be undertaken not by the governors, but by the Agents
of the Ministry of Finance under the supervision of local 
8 4councils. A draft law dealing w’ith the regulations for
85provincial councils was already under discussion. In 
effect these reforms were similar to those of Naus, and in 
line with the centralising proposals set in motion by the 
higher bureaucracy in the 1890's under Amin al-Daula.
82. Spring Rice to Grey, No. 38, 27th Feb. 1907,
FO 371/301, No. 7801.
83. Spring Rice to Grey, 30th Jan. 1907, FO 800/70.
84. Spring Rice to Grey, No. 65, 28th March 1907,
FO 371/301, No. 11863.
85. Spring Rice to Grey, No. 38, 27th Feb. 1907,
FO 371/301, No. 11863.
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As an alternative to a foreign loan, the leading merchants
Amin al-2arb, MuLin al-Tujjar, Maj Muhammad IsmaVi.l and* •
Arbab Jamshid, proposed to set up a National Bank based on
subscriptions, which would then lend money to the government.
During the last week in November they circulated subscription
lists, but no large contributions were forthcoming. Nazim
al-Islam commented that the organisers had insufficient funds
8 6for such an enterprise and doubted their integrity.
Similar suspicions were voiced in the Majlis. There was an
additional problem that the amount of coin in the country
was limited and mostly in the hands of the Imperial Bank,
8 7which had the concession to issue bank notes. By March 
1907 the National Bank had still not been able to collect 
adequate funds to help the government. SaniL al-Daula 
proposed the Bank raise a foreign loan and then re-lend the 
money to the government, in return for the right to exploit 
concessions to be granted to the Bank by its Charter. 
Negotiations commenced for a German loan, and in return for 
a small advance the Government confirmed the concession of 
the National Bank. The chief features of the Charter were 
that all revenues from Tehran or the provinces were to be 
paid into the Bank, which would then pay the national 
expenses. It also had the right to undertake loans in 
accordance with the sharica, and to construct roads and 
railways and exploit mines.It is still not entirely clear 
what the major merchants intended by the National Bank, but 
it may be observed that the project itself, as well as items 
on its Charter, such as the development of mines, were 
amongst the proposals put forward by the merchant councils 
in 1883. It is possible the Bank represented an attempt by 
the merchants to raise capital to enable them to play a 
greater part in the economic development of the country.
86. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., II, p. 20; see 
also Majlis, No. 12, 31st Jan. 1907.
87. Spring Rice to Grey, No. 290, 4th Dec. 1907,
FO 416/29 No. 302.
88. Serstei/ens to Favereau, 19th March 1907. No. 112/53. 
Folio No. IV to VI, BMFA.
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Another aim it served was to assist in making the government 
finances accountable. The matter of the National Bank 
illustrates the powerful role played by the merchants in 
the Majlis at this stage.
With the assistance of SaLd al-Daula, the merchants also 
secured the dismissal of Naus, whom they held responsible for 
raising the money the government had, in their view, misspent, 
before the Revolution. Saud al-Daula had a personal grudge 
against Naus who had reported him for grossly overcharging
the government on the purchase of machinery for the new
. ' 89mint.
Beset on the one hand by a powerful court working outside 
it, the Majlis was also h^ r^ ras^ e<^  o^r^ ^h^ other by the radical 
and increasingly militant onlookers. Both these elements had 
some representation in the Majlis, but essentially they were 
not absorbed by the institution. From December 1906 there 
was a growing militancy amongst the populace of Tehran.
Secret societies proliferated, Nazim al-Islam joining a new
society where each member vowed to form an additional
90 -cell. An Anjuman-i Tullab was active distributing
91leaflets on the subject of the Vali'-ahd and the Majlis.
Members of these societies were amongst the onlookers who
were beginning not only to disrupt the Majlis but also to
intimidate its members. When the Majlis went into closed
session on one occasion there was very nearly a major
- - 92disturbance only just quelled by Bihbihani. In February
.00 H. Rabino to Browne, 
Papers.
31st Jan. 1911, Browne
90. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., II, pp. 73-4.
91. Ibid., p. 32.
92. Ibid., p. 81.
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1907 a society called the Anjuman-i Ittihadiyya, with
reportedly 4000 members, began drilling to form a sort of
national guard against the Shah's expected attack on the 
93Assembly. At the beginning of 1907 newspapers began to 
appear, and though most were moderate, a number contained 
articles of an inflamatory nature, which the government was 
not permitted by the Assembly to censor. Thus by the time
the Tabriz Deputies, who, according to Browne were
particularly radical, arrived in Tehran in early February, 
there was already a militant movement afoot.
As the situation polarised, Bihbihani and TabatabaJi did
• •
their utmost, with some success, to play a conciliatory role.
Bihbihani stressed the need for unity between government
and people, and attacked the authors of anonymous radical
pamphlets. In March the two mujtahids induced the so-called
94 - - -
National Guard, then drilling, to disband, and TabatabaJi• •
spoke against any society that was not properly constituted.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, with regard to the bast, the evidence of 
Nazim al-Islam and the British sources against that of 
Malikzada, suggests that there was no properly constituted 
plan. The bast was instigated by Bihbihani, whose initial 
aims appear to have been twofold: to secure a refuge for
some of the merchants from <-Ain al-Daula, and to use the 
British as intermediaries to bri ng pressure on the Iranian 
authorities. There was no talk of a national consultative 
assembly until the end of July. There is strong evidence that
93. Spring Rice to Grey, No. 43 Tel., 5th March 1907,
FO 371/308 No. 7334.
94. Spring Rice to Grey, No. 47 Tel., 8th March 1907,
FO 416/31 No. 166.
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the bulk of the financing came from the merchants, including 
major tuj jar, bunakdars, and sarrafs, with the highest 
contributions being made by four of the wealthiest tuj jar.
The reasons for their involvement await further research, 
but it may be said that their interests varied. The retail 
and wholesale dealers were angry at the customs dues, 
whereas the moneylenders were demanding payment of claims 
long overdue. There was, however, a common indignation at 
government misspending in the years before the Revolution, and 
a desire to make the government accountable. To some the 
Majlis may have represented a chance to achieve such goals 
as improvements in the law, as they indicated to the Shah, 
and participation in the economic development in the 
country. At this stage, and after the establishment of the 
Majlis, the guilds were largely under the guidance of the 
merchants and muj tahids.
Of the notables, most seemed anxious to maintain a low 
profile. Not all went so far as to advocate the 
establishment of a national assembly, both Nasir al-Mulk and 
Mukhbir al-Saltana being sceptical. The more progressive 
ones, such as the sons of Mushir al-Daula and SaniL al-Daula, 
were able to use their knowledge of European systems to give 
shape to the popular movement in the absence of any other 
clearly conceived ideology.
The telegrams of TabatabaJi and Bihbihani at the time of
• •
the bast indicate how far they were being guided by their 
merchant following, and the National Assembly that was 
established differed from the Islamic assembly the culama 
appear to have desired. However, on their return the '•ulama 
made no objection, perhaps because they did not yet 
understand the full implications of the difference. Once the 
Majlis was established the mujtahids were needed to help 
legitimise it. There is no indication that they initiated 
policies, their role being either to act as conciliators to
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keep the popular movement together in view of the conservative
opposition at court, and to mediate with the government. As
before the Revolution they represented the views of their
following, and were thus probably one of the impediments to
the formation of political parties. Bihbihani's loyalty to
reform was less noticeable than that of TabatabaJi, who
• •
commented on the Shah's coronation, that the Shah had been 
crowned with a constitutional crown, and that if he turned 
against the constitution, he would no longer be recognised 
as sovereign.
Shaikh Fazlallah said little to make his view apparent. 
Ostensibly he supported the Majlis in the autumn of 1906, 
most likely because of his isolation after the fall of Amin 
al-Daula, and his lack of attendance gives evidence of lack 
of enthusiasm.
By February the Majlis was having to contend with 
radical societies outside it and a powerful, but largely 
unrepresented, court faction led by Amir Bahadur. The 
impression is less of the Majlis changing political habits than 
being overwhelmed by traditional patterns, such as 
diffusion of authority and shifting allegiances, now made overt 
by the collapse of the Shah's coercive power.
- 196 -
CHAPTER VI
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE LAW OF ISLAM
In the course of the struggle over the responsibility 
of ministers in early 1907, Mushir al-Daula, the Sadr-i Aczam,
• j
pointed out that an assembly had been granted, but not
constitutional government. Indeed the royal rescripts had
so far avoided the word mashruta. The Majlis immediately
demanded a rescript from the Shah confirming that the
government of Iran was constitutional, a demand which the
Shah resisted. There was commotion in both Tehran and
Tabriz, which had received the news of the struggle from the
Tabriz deputies.'*' On the 10th February the Shah sent a
message that he would not grant an assembly that was
mashruta (constitutional) but that he would grant one that
-  2was mashru *-a (in accordance with the shari La) . On the 
following day Mukhbir al-Saltana told the Majlis on behalf 
of the government that:
'It is not advisable for the government of Iran to 
be constitutional, for in a constitutional government 
all things are free, and in this case there must also 
be freedom of religion. Certain persons will insist 
upon religious freedom, which is contrary to the 
interests of I s l a m . '3
This argument was resisted in both Tabriz and Tehran, where 
Tabataba-1 i and Bihbihani, under strong pressure from their
4following, who refused to let them go home, would not accept. 
That evening a rescript was issued conceding that Iran now 
had constitutional government. It is not clear where the 
government derived the idea of mashruLa and the point about 
freedom of religion, but it may have come from Shaikh 
Fazlallah.
1. Taqlzada, Khitaba, op. cit., p. 46.
2. Spring Rice to Grey, No. 38, 27th Feb. 1907,
FO 371/301, No. 8664.
3. Kasravi, op. cit., p. 222.
4. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., II, pp. 84-5.
Shortly afterwards, on February 19th, one of the
better known preachers of Tehran, Sayyid Akbar Shah,
preached a sermon against the assembly in which he said
that the laws of the Prophet were sufficient for Muslims,
and true believers should protest against the introduction
5 -of the laws of infidels. Sayyid Akbar Shah had been one
of the Lulama who had accompanied TabatabaJi and Bihbihani1-1 • •
to Shah LAbd al-*-Azim, but had lately fallen out with them
• g
over payments due to him in the Shrine and after. He was
joined by another preacher, Shaikh Muhammad VaLi2, who had
also been in the Shrine. He was, backed up by the Imam Jumca
and another mujtahid, Sayyid Muhammad Tafrishi, who had lost
control of a large amount of vaqf land to Bihbihani, as well
as by Zain al-LAbidin Zanjani, and complained that his
students were smitten with freedom and no longer showed him
any respect. On 23rd February Sayyid Akbar and his group,
together with a student following of about 70 persons, took
bast in Shah cAbd al-^Azim, where they were said to be 
" •
subsidized by the Vazir Makhsus, acting on behalf of the Shah.
• •
They continued to preach against the Majlis, but were largely
ignored by popular opinion, and eventually, through the
mediation of Tabataba'i and Bihbihani, they were allowed to 
• •
return to Tehran.
The Majlis, in the meantime, was considering how it
might save money, and a recommendation that tuyul be
abolished was added to the report of the Finance Committee.
Since fiefholders included many of the notables and Uulama,
opposition soon began to build up. Nazim al-Islam, whose
secret society was worried by the effect of such radical
measures, requested Tabataba-* i to try and restrain the Majlis
• •
5. Spring Rice to Grey, No. 38, 27th Feb. 1907,
FO 371/301, No. 8664.
6. Kasravi, op. cit., II, pp. 88-9.
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on this issue, and suggest that it could wait for another
year.^ TabatabaJi brought up the matter on 16th March,
• •
but was not given a chance to explain his case. The 
opposition, led by Taqizada, managed to carry the vote in 
favour of abolition by a small minority. A decision was 
also taken to examine and reduce pensions, a measure 
Daulatabadi considered ill-advised as it not only provoked 
opposition, but affected people of small means, as well as
g
the notables.
Consequently a reaction began against the Majlis, and, 
to the covert opposition of the Shah and the court factions, 
was added the discontent of other groups, who began to 
realise they stood to gain more under the old system. Spring 
Rice reported that:
'The priesthood are fully conscious that their turn 
will come, and that, when the court is dealt with, 
the mullahs will not have long to wait before they 
find their masters. The Shah had little difficulty 
in showing them that their interests are bound up 
with his. Their support of the popular cause is 
manifestly lukewarm, but they have to seem to lead 
for fear that it will be plain to everyone that they 
will be forced to f o l l o w . '9
He does not, however, indicate to which members of the Uulama 
this statement refers.
As part of the original constitution it had been stated 
that no oath of allegience would be sworn to the Shah and 
the 'nation' by the deputies, and the Shah requested that 
this should be accomplished in early March. On the 5th,
Sani*- al-Daula and about thirty deputies subscribed to the 
oath, but Sacd al-Daula refused because he said the
7. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., II, p. 118.
8 . Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 113.
9. Spring Rice to Grey, No. 81, 24th April 1907,
FO 416/32, No. 130.
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constitution required further modification. The 
spectators, with whom he was in league, rushed into the 
Majlis and tore up the draft of the oath, which was in the 
handwriting of Shaikh Fazlallah.^ Students and sayyids 
then began drilling outside the town in support of the 
Majlis. Bihbihani and TabatabaJi persuaded the students and 
sayyids, who were calling themselves the 'national guard' to 
disband, and on 7th March they administered the oath to the 
deputies. ^
Without assistance in men and money the Shah had no 
means of suppressing the Assembly. He had for some time 
been in contact with Amin al-Sultan concerning the possibility 
of the latter's return to office. Amin al-Sultan said that, 
although Iran was little suited to representative institutions,
the Majlis must be sustained, and, unless the Shah agreed, he
12 -  -would not take office. By mid-April Amin al-Sultan was on
his way home, and whilst some believed that he would use his 
statecraft to incapacitate the Majlis, others considered him 
the one person capable of reconciling the differences between 
the Assembly and the Shah. His supporters included Bihbihani
as well as the President of the Majlis, Sanit al-Daula, Mukhbir
- 13 - -al-Saltana and Amin al-2arb. On his arrival Amin al-Sultan 
• •
concerned himself with the pressing problem of the finance,
and the need to raise a loan. There were reports that the
Shah mistrusted him, and it was considered that any influence
Amin al-Sultan had at court was largely due to his being on
14good terms with the Russian Legation.
10. Safari, Asnad-i Nau, op. cit., p. 217.
11. Spring Rice to Grey, No. 43, 5th March and No. 47,
8th March 1907, FO 416/31.
12. Goschen to Grey, No. 35, 5th April 1907,
FO 416/36, No. 27.
13. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 127.
14. Spring Rice to Grey, No. 110, 21st May 1907,
FO 371/312, No. 18869.
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By April 1907 many of the ^ulama were evincing 
disquiet over the Majlis, and were particularly worried 
about the Commission on the Supplementary Law, which was 
completing its work. A series of meetings was arranged 
between deputies and leading lulama to examine the law 
article by article. Shaikh Fazlallah and his group came to 
the meetings determined to have the law drafted in conformity 
with the shari La. On 5th May he wrote to his son in Najaf 
that:
'My time is so taken up with all this business that 
there is no chance to read or write a letter. All 
the lands of Iran from Tabriz to Isfahan to Shiraz 
are in a state of chaos. A variety of people and 
societies have been stirring up events in a manner 
destructive to the community and the government of 
Islam (daulat va millat-i islam) in a way no one 
could have expected.'15
The most contentious point in the Law was Article 8 
which stated that all the people of Iran were equal before 
the law of the state (qanun-i daulati) irrespective of
their creed. As Mukhbir al-Saltana pointed out there was
_ _ —  16 *
no qanun-i daulati, but the radicals obviously intended
to rectify this. Some culama objected to Article 19 on the 
establishment of state schools and compulsory education, 
which they insisted was contrary to the sharica. A further 
point of controversy was Article 21 giving freedom of the 
press, although this was qualified by the prohibiting of 
books that might undermine Islam. The exact nature of such 
books was not defined.
To counter the constitutionalists, Shaikh Fazlallah 
composed an article to be included in the Supplementary 
Fundamental Law to the effect that no bill should pass the
15. Kasravi, op. cit., p. 293.
16. From_Mukhbir al-Saltana Guzarish-i Iran quoted in 
Rizvani Mashrutiyy&t, op. cit., p. 145.
- 201 -
Majlis without the consent of the lulama (see Appendix A).
The article did not clarify the important point of how the
Council would be chosen. Copies were circulated for about
a month, and in the meantime, the Shah proposed sending the
whole Law to the lulama of Najaf for approval, hoping
17thereby to create divisions and delay. On the other side
there were disturbances in Azarbaijan, following messages
18from the Tabriz deputies. In mid-May there were heated 
discussions in the Majlis on the Law. Sayyid Taqi Farati, 
one of the followers of Bihbihani, propounded the view that 
Islam was the religion of the country, and the Fundamental 
Law must be in accordance with it. The Law must therefore 
be meticulously studied by the lulama.
The Supplementary Fundamental Law was put to the Majlis
on 16th May in the presence of all the mujtahids. On the
subject of equality all the lulama except TabatabaJi
~~ • •
objected on the grounds that infidels and Muslims could not
be subjected to equal penalties or possess equal rights
according to the shari ua. The mujtahids were absent from the
next debate on the 19th, and there was strong criticism of
them, at which all the lulama deputies rose and left, an
unusual example of their demonstrating unity in defense of
their interests. Shaikh Fazlallah's amendment was to be
read to the Majlis on that day but Taqizada managed to have it
deferred, there being some possibility that it might be
ratified, owing to the influence of the Lulama over some of
the deputies. An attempt to cast aspersions on the motives
and loyalty of the Tabriz deputies was repulsed by
TabatabaJ i.^
• •
17. Spring Rice to Grey, No. 113, 23rd May 1907,
FO 371/301, No. 18872.
18. Kasravi, op. cit., p. 294.
19. Ibid., p. 324.
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In the meantime, Shaikh Fazlallah was reportedly
active in propogating his cause. Each day he was said to
summon about 80 students to his house, feed them, lecture
them on the evils of constitutionalism, give them two krans
20each and send them away. These activities were believed to be
assisted by donations from members of the court. He also
made common cause with Haj Mirza Hasan, the most prominent
• •
mujtahid of Tabriz who had recently been expelled by the
local anjuman, and with Haj Khummami, who had likewise been
compelled to leave Rasht. On May 3 0th students in the pay
of Shaikh Fazlallah entered the Majlis and abused the 
21members. The students thus mobilised formed a counterpoint 
to the radical anjumans, who had contacts with the 
constitutional leaders, and affrays began to develop between 
them.
Discussions on the Fundamental Law amendment resumed on
1st June, when Sanii al-Daula, probably trying in his
position as President to effect a compromise, suggested that
certain clauses be sent to the lulama of Najaf. On 11th
June Taqizada pointed out that Article 27 of the Fundamental
Law already stipulated that any laws passed must be in
conformity with the shari'•a, so the amendment was 
22superfluous. Pressing the advantage of the divisions 
amongst the lulama he added that they should all watch over 
the laws, not just a few of them. This argument was supported 
by the newspaper flabl al-Matin:
'The right of judging what is in conformity with 
the shariLa belongs to all the Lu1ama. The Council 
of lulama might well ratify a law which would be 
rejected by all the r e s t . ' 2 3
20. Ibid., p. 3 61.
21. Spring Rice to Grey, No 
FO 371/301, No. 22402.
. 137, 21st June 1907,
22. Kasravi, op. cit., p. 370.
23. Habl al-Matin, No. 30, 15th June 1907, p. 4.
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The amendment was again introduced on 12th June but with 
a significant alteration concerning the selection of the 
members of the Council, defined as follows:
'There shall at all times be a Council of not less 
than five persons who are muj tahids or jurists, well 
versed in the religious law, and aware of the 
exigencies of the age. They shall be chosen in the 
following manner: The leading Lulama and those who
are marajiL-/ i taqlid of the Shl‘a shall submit the 
names of twenty persons having the aforementioned 
qualities to the Majlis. Five or more of those,
according to the exigencies of the times, shall be
appointed by agreement or ballot of the National 
Consultative Assembly.'24
It is not clear where this compromise draft emanated from,
but it may have been Sani*- al-Daula in collaboration with
Bihbihani and Tabataba^i. The important point was, of 
• •
course, the participation of the Majlis in the selection 
of the members of the Council. Given the divisions amongst 
the lulama this would in effect permit the dominant
faction in the Majlis to choose those who acquiesced in
their views. There is little indication that such a faction 
would be in agreement with Shaikh Fazlallah.
On the 15th the matter was again debated, and TabatabaJ
• •
asserted angrily that the Majlis would not be allowed to 
exist unless the Council of HJlama was accepted. He added 
that the Council must have full authority to reject any 
bills passed by the Majlis if they were deemed contrary 
to the shari La. The article was carried by a large majority 
It is likely that, as Spring Rice observed, a number of 
deputies at least realised that they could not openly attack 
the Lulama at present. The article also had the advantage 
of cutting the ground from under Shaikh Fazlallah's feet.
The lulama who supported the Majlis had made some 
attempt to mollify Shaikh Fazlallah and induce him to
24. Kasravi, op. cit., p. 372.
- 204 -
compromise. On 11th June all the leading ^ulama signed 
a fatva which stated that the Majlis and all its laws must 
be in accordance with the sharica. Shaikh Fazlallah is 
said at this time to have made a promise not to oppose the 
constitution any further. But he was clearly not happy with 
the second draft of his article, and he and his group 
continued to preach against constitutionalism in the pulpits, 
and sent emissaries to the provinces to incite opposition 
there. It is possible, as Kasravi suggests, that his 
attitude may also have hardened because of links with members 
of the court.
On 19th June Shaikh Fazlallah's followers erected a
large tent, said to have been lent to them by the Shah,
ostensibly to hold a rauza khvan. When large numbers of
roughs gathered there it became evident the purpose was to
rally support for the anti-constitutionalist cause.
Supporters of the constitution attacked the tent and
succeeded in dismantling it. Next day a meeting of the
anjumans was held at the Sadr School, to which the leading
constitutionalist *-ulama were brought. The crowd was
threatening, and Tabataba-* i only succeeded in pacifying them
• •
by promising that if Shaikh Fazlallah continued to oppose 
mashruta, he himself would personally see him out of the 
city.
Shaikh Fazlallah and his group realised that things
were going against them, and the situation was growing
more dangerous. That evening they set out for the Shrine of
Shah uAbd al-LA3im, including in their number, Shaikh
Fazlallah himself, Shaikh Lu^fallah, Mulla Muhammad Amuli,
Sayyid Muhammad son of Muhammad Ka?im Tabataba^i Yazdi,
• • • •
and Sayyid Ahmad, the brother of TabatabaJi, and £aj Mirza 
• • •
Hasan, the mujtahid from Tabriz. They were joined by 
tu yuldars, many tullab, and some of the poorest classes
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- 25(aubash), amounting to about 500 persons. Unlike the
group who had taken bast in February, Shaikh Fazlallah and
his following enjoyed considerable prestige.
On 24th June Mu11a Muhammad Amull sent a telegram to
Najaf announcing their presence in the Shrine, and
explaining it as arising from 'a heretical rebellion' which
was to the revulsion of all the lulama, excepting two
persons (by whom he presumably meant Bihbihani and
Tabataba^i). They also wrote to the Shah saying that they 
• •
intended to go to Qum and win over the Lulama there, adding:
'This Majlis has nothing to do with out four 
principles - unity, prophecy, imamate, and 
resurrection.'
The bastis also sent a telegram to the Lulama of the main 
cities of Iran on 28th June, announcing their presence and 
explaining their intention as being to protect the laws of 
Islam.
In the Majlis deputies complained of the government's
failure to stop Shaikh Fazlallah, and said that if the
government did not soon intervene, the 'Nation' would. The
leading constitutionalist muj tahids went to see Shaikh
Fazlallah and try to persuade him to return to Tehran. He
reportedly refused to return unless about 25 deputies were 
26 — _ _
banished. TabatabaJi had considerable trouble restraining 
• •
the anjumans, with whom he was in contact through Sayyid
Jamal al-Din, from evicting the bastis from the Shrine by 
27force. The Majlis also urged restraint on the anjumans,
25. Ibid., p. 376. The Shah had signed the bill for 
the abolition of tu yul on 16th May, not, it was 
reported, without a certain satisfaction at the 
disagreements it would cause.
26. Spring Rice to Grey, No..137, 21st June 1907, FO 371/301 
No. 22402.
27. Yaghma'i, op. cit.. p. 285.
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fearing any major disturbance would give the Shah a pretext
2 8to ask for Russian intervention. In addition they urged
the bazaaris not to close shop, which they were presumably
29threatening to do for fear of disturbances. The Majlis 
further sent a telegram to the provinces accusing Shaikh 
Fazlallah of acting from motives of personal gain.
It was widely believed that the bast was subsidized by
the Shah, and indeed it would have been impossible to sustain
such an undertaking without a substantial and reliable source
of income. According to Malikzada, Shaikh Fazlallah was
financed by the notables whose pensions and salaries were to
be cut by the Majlis, and also the holders of tuyul.^
Kasravi considered that he was already receiving money from
31 -  -  -
the government early in June. Daulatabadi was of the same
opinion and stated that the money came from the Vazir Makhsus,
Governor of Tehran, from funds transferred by the Shah to
32the Russian Bank. A sufficient amount was reportedly paid
monthly to Shaikh Fazlallah's followers and each of their
families. Spring Rice reported that Shaikh Fazlallah had
received money from the Russian Bank which might have come
from the Shah's private account but was said to be paid with
33Russian consent. He estimated the cost of the bast as
£100 per day and said it was universally believed the money
28. Spring Rice to Grey, No. 164, 19th 
FO 371/304, No. 26051.
July 1907,
29. Kasravi, op. cit., p. 379.
30. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., III, p. 30
31. Kasravi, op. cit., p. 373.
32. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 129.
33. Spring Rice to Grey, 18th July 1907, FO 800/70.
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34came from the Shah. It v;as also the belief of Amin al-
Sultan that the Shah was subsidizing Shaikh Fazlallah. He
told Spring Rice that, when the Majlis pressed him on the
subject, had he denied it, they would probably have
3 5confronted him with proof.
On 7th July Spring Rice brought up the subject in an
interview with the Shah, and the latter replied that the
Majlis was filled with socialists and meddlesome Lu1ama and
3 6there was a need for new elections. According to the 
regulations of the Majlis this was not possible before the 
two year term was up. Spring Rice related the Shah's comments 
to Shaikh Fazlallah's demand that twenty five members be 
purged and observed that the Russians had put forward similar 
arguments before the recent dissolution of the Duma. In 
effect Shaikh Fazlallah and the Shah were arguing for a 
practical restoration of the old regime, according to his 
view. The Majlis would continue to exist because of popular 
support for such an institution but it would be purged and 
thus become an instrument of royal policy.
In the interim the controversy had spread to Najaf,
37whence the Majlis requested a telegram in its support.
Of the leading muj tahids there Akhund Mulla Khurasani and
Shaikh ’•Abdallah Mazandarani complied, but Sayyid Ka?im
Tabataba-1 i Yazdi refused, giving only a brief explanation 
• •
that the matter concerned the religion of Islam and the need 
to safeguard the souls and qualities of Muslims, which could
34 . Spring Rice to Grey, No. 143, 
FO 416/34, No. 136.
10th July 1907,
35. Spring Rice to Grey, No. 164, 
FO 371/304, No. 26051.
19th July 1907,
36. Spring Rice to Grey, No. 143, 
FO 416/ 33 , No. 136.
10th. July 1907,
37. Kasravi, op. cit., pp. 379-85 .
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not be accomplished except through the shari ca. Khurasani
and Mazandarani's telegram asserted that the Majlis would
counter tyranny and protect Islam and the shari La, but
Khurasani and Mazandarani saw the Majlis as the best means
of doing this, whereas TabatabaJi Yazdi did not. Shaikh
• «
Fazlallah claimed in a leaflet that the majlis he was 
seeking was precisely the one desired by Khurasani, and that 
the Majlis in existence was being taken over by Babis. 
Khurasani had supported Shaikh Fazlallah's amendment, and 
probably considered that measure adequate. It is difficult 
to escape the impression that Shaikh Fazlallah was to some 
extent right, and that Khurasani did not grasp the essence 
of the conflict in Tehran.
In about the middle of July the bastis in Shah LAbd
al-'-Azim set about propogating their cause in printed 
* 38leaflets. They are reported to have had difficulty 
persuading any of the printing houses in Tehran to publish 
their writings, so at first they wrote out their tracts very 
clearly and circulated them as photographs. Since this was 
an expensive method, they bought their own lithograph and
took it to the Shrine. Browne says there were nineteen
39 -leaflets in all but according to Kasravi there were more,
a first series of more than nineteen written in nastaliq
script, some of them dated, and a second series of nineteen
- 40 -written in naskhi script. Kasravi published three of the
leaflets in his history, and Rizvani has the largest
_  - 41
collection of them which he has published in Tarikh.
38. Ibid., p. 409.
39. E.G. Browne, The Press and Poetry, op. cit., 
p. 94.
40. Kasravi, op. cit., p. 411.
41. Ibid., p. 410, pp. 414-423, pp. 432-438;
Ri2vanl, op. cit., pp. 159-209.
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Altogether approximately fourteen have been published, 
each being about 2-4 pages long. In these two published 
sources there are four leaflets written in nastalig 
bearing the legend 'Published in the Shrine of Shah cAbd
alcAzim to Awaken the Brothers in Religion and Remedy their
- - 42Errors'. Two bear dates, 12th Jamadi II (23rd July) and
- - 4318th Jamadi II (29th July) but no numbers; and two bear
44 45numbers, No. 8 and No. 9 of which the latter is dated
23rd Jamadi II (3rd August). There are also two in naskhi
4 6 47script bearing the numbers 18 and 19, and the same layout,
but different titles, the first being called 'Awakening and
Admonition' and the second 'Against Doubt'. Neither are
dated, but the second refers to the bastis being in the
Shrine for two months, and must therefore date from about
20th August 1907. Other examples in the naskhi script are,
however, dated 26th Jamadi II (6th August), 2nd Rajab (11th
48August) and 4th Rajab (13th August). Thus Kasravi may be
right that there was an earlier series in nastalig and a
later one in naskhi. Of the leaflets published so far, the
earliest is dated 23rd July but those circulated as
photographs were probably sent out in mid-July; the latest
was printed about 20th August. The period of publishing
the leaflets seems thus to have been about six weeks. Of
the available leaflets only two are actually signed by 
_ 49
Shaikh Fazlallah. Most have no signature or are simply
to • Rizvani, op. cit., pp. 1 8 5 - 1 8 9 .
4 3 . Ibid., pp. 1 6 7 - 1 7 3 ; Kasravi, op.
4 4 . Rizvani, op. cit., pp. 1 9 1 - 1 9 4 .
4 5 . Ibid., pp. 1 9 5 - 7 .
4 6 . Ibid., pp. 2 0 2 - 3 .
4 7 . Ibid., pp. 2 0 4 - 6 .
00 • Ibid., p. 1 7 4 ,  p. 1 8 4 ,  p. 1 9 8 .
4 9 . Ibid., p. 1 8 7 ,  p. 1 7 8 .
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signed 'Written by the refugees in Shah uAbd alcAzim'. One 
gives the text of a long speech by Shaikh al-Hijji,~*^ whose 
name does not occur elsewhere, and who may have been a 
preacher designated to publicize the bastis1 arguments. 
Otherwise some leaflets reproduce letters and telegrams from
- - 51
the Lulama of Najaf to justify the bastis1 arguments.
As both Kasravi and Rizvani have remarked, their purpose is 
one of propoganda, making explicit the arguments of the 
bastis, rather than discussion or the conveying of news. The 
available evidence is not sufficient to distinguish marked 
differences of views between different groups in the Shrine, 
nor does it demonstrate any notable shift of opinion over 
the approximate six weeks that the leaflets were published.
Generally, the leaflets were known as the 'Ruznama-yi Shaikh
- - 52Fazlallah', 'Shaikh Fazlallah's Newspaper' and refutations
of their contents were directed against him personally. In
the following analysis they will therefore be taken as
representing a body of opinion, that of the bastis, amongst
whom Shaikh Fazlallah was the leading proponent.
The most powerful argument the bastis brought against
the constitutionalists was that of establishing an institution
that had no legitimate basis in shariLa law, and creating
thereby a conflict in sources of legal authority. They
accused the constitutionalists of working for a 'revolution
in the shari^a' and of trying to change it according to 'the
53works of the parliaments of Paris and England'. In trying 
to introduce the law of a European parliament the 
constitutionalists were omitting to take account of the fact
50. Kasravi, op. cit., p. 431.
51. E.g. Rizvani, op. cit., p. 190, pp. 177-8.
52. Browne, Press, op. cit., p.94*
53. Rizvani, op. cit., p. 187.
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that the people of Iran had the shari ua, of which they 
claimed:
'Its provisions cover all regulations of government, 
and specify all obligations and duties, so the needs 
of the people of Iran in matters of law are limited 
to the business of government, which, by reason of 
universal events, has become separated from the 
shariLa. ...Now the people have thrown out the law 
of the Prophet and set up their own law instead.'
The bastis accused the deputies of the Majlis of interfering
54in the revealed law, which they had no right to do. They 
strongly rejected the argument put forward by many 
constitutionalists, that the law of Islam could be altered 
according to the exigencies of the age. They explained why 
it was not possible to alter the revealed law:
'God has never left the world empty of proof (frujjat), 
and that proof is the Prophets. To each Prophet He 
sent the law in a Holy Book to regulate the affairs 
of this world and the next. To our Prophet, He 
revealed the law in the Quran, which is the perfection 
and completion of all previous laws, and will remain 
until the Day of Reckoning. Therefore there is no 
need to follow the example of the law of Europe and 
Germany. If the Law of the Seal of the Prophets 
were defective it would be necessary for God to send 
another Prophet and another law, so that his proof 
to the people be not defective.'55
In other words the only legitimate source of law is the
Divine Will made manifest from time to time in the Prophets
and their Holy Books. The bastis also questioned the basis
of the Majlis's legitimacy by demanding to know from what
5 6book or prophet the constitutionalists got their ideas. 
Without true basis for its power, i.e. the Divine Law, the 
Majlis did not belong to things that had to be obeyed. Those
54. Ibid., p. 209.
55. Kasravi, op. cit., p. 437.
56. Rifcvanl, op. cit., p. 198.
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were fixed in God, the Prophet, the Imams and those who 
derive their deputyship from them. The Majlis could not 
claim, therefore, to be the ultimate source of authority - 
ulu al-amr.
The second significant charge which the bastis brought 
against the constitutionalists was that they had perverted 
the original idea of the institution the Lulama had sought, 
and had created instead a European parliament:
' You must distinguish between the Great Communal 
Place of Consultation of the JaLfari ShiLa and 
foreign parliaments.'®®
They were particularly indignant that the word 'Islam!' had 
been dropped from the original description of the Majlis. 
Shaikh Fazlallah defined the majlis the lulama had sought as
'The Great Islamic House of Consultation established 
through the efforts of the Proofs of Islam and 
General Agents_of the Imam to serve and assist 
the Twelver Shila Government, and to protect the 
rights of the followers of the Jacfari faith.'59
They stressed the strictly Islamic basis of the Majlis the 
lulama had wanted. National Consultation (shura-yi milli) 
and constitutionalism (mashruta), they claimed, had not• 6Q
been heard of until the events of the British Legation.
The lulama had wanted an institution based on Islam, on the 
Quran, the sharica and on the principle of 'amr-i bi 
macruf va nahy az munkar', the command to enjoin good and 
prohibit evil. Instead, after the founding of the Majlis,
57. Ibid., p. 204.
58. Ibid., p. 197.
59. Ibid., p. 187.
60. Ibid., p. 200.
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Babis and other irreligious persons had come out into the
open, and had turned the Majlis into an institution based
61on the command to enjoin evil and prohibit good. The
heretics and infidels had introduced such concepts as
'national consultation', freedom, equality and a fundamental
constitutional law, all clothes made for a foreign figure,
6 2and outside the Divine Law and the Holy Book. Their 
influence was such that any majlis that was now set up, 
would have for every ten members, four materialists, one 
Babi, two foreign mimics (farangi ma^ab), and three ignorant
_ g ^ _
JaLfari Shiites. Whilst the bastis" assessment of the 
intentions of the more determined members of the Majlis 
was probably correct, their designation of their opponents 
as Babis, was not based on fact. It was indeed the common 
technique of slandering the opposition.
As an alternative to the existing scheme of affairs, the
bastis asked for mashruta-yi mashruLa. This phrase, borrowed
from the constitutionalists stated aims before the
revolution, was now used against them. In itself it has no
meaning, as 'constitutionalism according to the shari ua' does
not exist, and Shaikh Fazlallah otherwise used mashruta to
mean constitutionalism. Indeed he was really demanding the
64replacement of the word mashruta with the word mashruta.
In fact the word mashruta was very popular at that point 
so mashruta-yi mashruta made a convenient slogan. In the 
later leaflets the slogan emphasised was 1nizamnama-yi islami1,
61. Ibid., p. 192.
62. Ibid., p. 199.
63. Kasravi, op. cit., p. 434.
64. Ibid., p. 414; Rizvani, op. cit., p. 185.
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'an Islamic book of rules', which gives a more accurate 
summation of the bastis' aims:
'The meaning of 'nizamnama-yi islami* is precisely 
that law which has been amongst us for 1300 years 
or more.'65
In other words, the Divine Revelation was the only legitimate 
basis for law.
The bastis took up the point of Shaikh Fazlallah's
amendment on the Council of LUlama. They denied that the
Majlis had any right to interfere in the selection of the
6 6mujtahids on the Council. They demanded that there be 
twenty supervisors appointed by the lulama alone, and that 
the clause should be unalterable. They accused the 
deputies of assuming an authority to which they had no 
right, and of overstepping the bounds of their duties. They 
also demanded to know the duties of the Majlis and its 
deputies, their rights and the limits of their authority 
(bugug va budud), the implication being that they were 
infringing the rights, and duties of the lulama, and the 
prerogatives of the shariia. The authority of the lulama 
was strongly upheld:
'And the Prophet said, "An offence to an lalim 
is an insult to me, and an insult to me is an 
affront to God. And to contradict the lulama 
is to contradict me and to disobey God."'67
They complained of the current lack of respect for the Lulama 
and that their authority was ignored. They also complained 
of the denigration of the Shah:
'Every few days there is a bold attack on the 
exalted sultanate by groups of hired thugs.'68
65. Ibid., p. 180.
66. Kasravi, op. cit., p. 422.
67. Ibid., p. 437.
68. Rizvani, op. cit., p. 193.
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The aims of the Babis and materialists, the bastis asserted
69was to alter the sultanate. Presumably they were 
referring to the attempt to make the sovereign answerable 
to the will of the people, rather than the shari *»a. In 
asking why the existing system should be altered the bastis 
pointed out that:
'The land is the land of Islarn^  the Sultan is_the 
Sultan of Islam, and the lulama are the lulama of 
IslAm.'70
Shaikh Fazlallah also made an interesting distinction, upon 
which he unfortunately did not enlarge, between the Shila 
Muslim terms and the secular terms for oppressive government:
'The business of government (karha-yi saltanati)...
-is-called in the language of the fuqahS unjust 
government (daulat-i jaJira), and in the language 
of politicians, despotic government (daulat-i 
istibdad)'.71
Elsewhere the bastis stated that:
'The name of arbitrary government shall henceforth 
be known in the language as despotism (saltanat-i 
istibdad) and contractual government shall be called 
constitutional monarchy (saltanat-i mashruta).'72
The implication is that the constitutionalists have 
introduced a new vocabulary, with new values, into the 
language, and that it has been linked to Shiite concepts, 
but in reality the new ideas and those of Shi'ism belong in 
different contexts and serve different purposes, so the same 
inferences ; cannot be drawn from them. The impression 
remains that the bastig desired for the Shah the continuation 
of his role in the traditional, and in their view, Islamic 
system of government.
69. Kasravi , op. cit., p. 421.
70. Ibid., p. 438.
71. Ibid., p. 422.
72. Rizvani, op. cit., p. 167.
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The bastis also implied that the reformist cry for 
justice was delusive:
'The freedom seekers have deceived our brothers by 
the use of two enticing words, justice and 
consultation, into making common cause with atheists. 
... Islam, the most complete, the most perfect, took 
the world by justice and consultation. What has 
happened that we must bring our regulation of 
justice from Paris, and our plan of consultation 
from England.'73
They implied that the constitutionalist goal of justice was 
merely a deceptive means to another end, presumably a 
banner around which to rally support. According to them it 
was obvious that such a goal was not realistic:
'Absolute justice is limited to the time of the 
appearance of his Lordship the Proof, and you have 
always known this....so why have you become so 
weak in resolution that for the rumour of a ir.aj lis 
of justice you rebel against tyranny and 
oppression.'74
The constitutional measure that had most antagonised the 
Lulama and had driven Shaikh Fazlallah into open opposition 
to the Majlis was the article asserting the equality of 
all subjects regardless of their creed. It highlighted 
the differences between a law based on the will of the 
citizens of a nation state, and on one based on the Divine 
Will, in which believers have a privileged position 
distinct from that of unbelievers. As an example of the 
Majlis's alleged desire to prohibit good and enjoin evil, 
they stated:
'For example it gives the Zoroastrians the freedom
to propogate their faith. Now anyone who tries to
stop this is labelled a despot, and accused of 
trying to destroy the M a j l i s ' . 75
73. Kasravi, op. cit., p. 410.
74. Ibid., p. 433.
75. Rizvani, op. cit., p. 192.
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The bastig also took issue with the current call for 
liberty. In their view liberty was confined by the precepts 
of the shariia. Most particularly they attacked freedom of 
the press. They maintained it was causing sedition and 
permitting the spreading of anarchy. They demanded stricter 
control, and particularly that all articles and books 
published should be in conformity with the shari La. Since 
Shaikh Fazlallah had recently excommunicated Tali bov and 
banned his books, this term could be susceptible to fairly 
dogmatic interpretation.
Another point of contention was compulsory education,
which the constitutionalists were trying to introduce. The
bastis asserted it was contrary to the shari *»a, and that the
real intention was to create European schools and inculcate
7 6immature children with foreign habits, that is misteach 
impressionable persons who did not know better.
The bastis said little on the subject of the impending 
financial reforms. They took up the constitutionalist 
criticism of the present deployment of money:
'They say that the ignorant people of Iran spend 
twenty krore tomans a year on obtaining the waters 
of Zamzam and the ground for a tomb, and that if 
they were not wild and barbaric, they would not kill 
cows, sheep and camels at uId-i Qurban.'
and again:
'They argue that the funds for rauza-khvans and 
pilgrimages to the Holy Places should instead be 
used for the creation of factories, for the 
building of roads and thoroughfares and other 
novelties like railways, and to promote foreign
style industries.'77
76. Ibid., p. 434.
77. Ibid., pp. 416-8.
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Finally the bastis accused the constitutionalists of 
causing chaos and anarchy. Since the appearance of the 
Majlis, there had been a breakdown of security, and invasions 
and uprisings. This, they were careful to say, was not the 
result of the Majlis itself, but of the influence in it of 
those of seditious opinions. They fulminated particularly 
against the anjumans as a cause of anarchy and pointed out:
'In England there is only one Parliament, yet you 
are setting up an assembly in every corner of 
Tehran.'78
It was certainly true that the anjumans were impeding the 
work of the Majlis, and contributing to the growing disorder.
The constitutionalists set about refuting the bastis 
in the press, in the Majlis, and in the publication of tracts. 
On the question of law they brought a variety of arguments.
One of the Tabriz deputies, Mirza Fazl cAli Aqa, made a long 
and ingenious speech in the Majlis on 16th July 1907. He 
affirmed that the sharila would not be altered, and that 
the Majlis would legislate in conformity with it. This 
would be accomplished as follows: the laws the majlis
passed would be of two kinds. The first would define 
particulars of questions on which the shari *»a made general 
pronouncements - he gave examples including the whole area 
of government administration. The second would concern 
matters which are permissible, that is to say not obligatory 
by the shariia, but regarding which, for the preservation of 
order some form of agreement must be entered, though not 
in the name of the shari*-a. These laws will be a definition 
of the essential meaning of the sharila, made according to 
the exigencies of the age. If it were impossible because 
of treaties or other matters to execute the fundamental 
ordinances of the sharila, then on the principle that
78. Ibid., p. 438.
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necessity justifies avoidance, secondary regulations would
be put into effect. Thus in no case would the laws of the
Majlis be contrary to the shari *»a. Therefore a law voted
by the Majlis did not have to be referred to anybody for 
7 y
approval. This was an impressive argument, but posed 
practical problems, for example, there is not always 
agreement over what is permissible, and how was a situation 
to be judged as warranting the application of the principle 
that necessity justifies avoidance. Haj Sayyid Nasrallah 
objected that this example was correct on fixed precepts, 
but matters that were doubtful had to be referred to the 
lulama.
The newspaper Tamaddun came up with another argument
exploring the idea of essential and secondary principles,
and different areas of legislation* It maintained that the
law is divided into two parts, the roots and the branches.
The roots of the law were also divided into two sections,
that which pertains to politics, and that which pertains to
worship. The laws of the branches are laws which merely
channel and make explicit the laws of the roots, like
organising ministries and keeping account of taxes. These
laws may occasionally be changed according to the exigencies
of the age, but the laws of the roots which came from God
8 0may never be altered. The problem with this argument was 
that it presupposes a division between religion and politics 
that in theory does not exist in the shari *»a although in 
19th century Iran it was to some extent evident in practice; 
also it presupposes a more rigid distinction between what 
is primary and what is secondary law than in fact exists.
79. Habl al-Matin, No. 41, 15th June 1907, p. 4;
Spring Rice to Grey, No. 147, 16th July 1907,
FO 371/301, No. 26034.
80. Tam.addun, No. 4, p. 4.
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The newspaper Maj1is, in an article written by 
Muhammad Taqi, put forward the idea of the Majlis confining 
itself to legislation in a certain area. According to this 
argument the duty of the Majlis was to pass 'political' 
(siyasi) laws for the country as a whole, and regulations 
for the ordering of government departments. The paper then 
went on to define a law:
'A law is that which establishes the limits of the 
monarchy; which secures the basis of the constitution, 
and makes the ministers responsible. A_law is that 
which executes the precepts of the shari La, and sets 
the affairs of the country in order. ' 8'1
Majlis also argued that legislation on limitation of the 
actions of the government and making ministers responsible 
should take place in the area of Lurf law, and added that 
in this way taxes might be collected in a legal manner, 
without extortion or oppression.
An anonymous treatise written in about mid-August 1907 
in refutation of Shaikh Fazlallah, and published by Majlis 
newspaper took up this same point. The writer quoted the 
bastis' argument that the shari La had a precept on every 
matter and a duty for every situation, so the need for the 
enactment of laws was limited to government business, and 
pointed out that the argument was inconsistent, adding:
'What is meant by the enactment of laws? Is this 
a compromise? Is it a recognition of existing 
practice? Is it theoretically c o r r e c t ? . '
The writer then added this contention would take too long to 
answer.
In August 1907, 'gabl al-Matin* devoted space in at 
least three editions to the bastis' arguments. On the above
81. Majlis, No. 159, 18th August 1907, pp. 2-3.
82. Published by Majlis press, c. mid-August 1907.
(I am grateful to Dr. H. Modarressi for providing 
me with a copy).
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point on the limitation of law-making to the matters of 
government it said:
'From this it is clear that Shaikh Fazlallah wants 
the conduct of government officials to be limited 
by lav/, but that the government should not have a 
law. But in this he is mistaken because the deputies 
have been elected by the people and given rights to 
introduce laws which will give them peace and security. 
They want a lav/ that concerns the whole nation, a 
law that covers all g o v e r n m e n t .'83
However, this comment ignores Shaikh Fazlallah's contention 
that the deputies had no authority to do any such thing.
The paper also examined the slogan mashruta-yi mashruLa and 
asked what Shaikh Fazlallah intended:
'If by mashruta-yi mashrula the Shaikh means why_ 
wasn't the v/ord mashru*-a written alongside mashruta, 
the answer is because in all books of law, 
especially the Fundamental Law, it is repeatedly 
stated that legislation must be in accordance with 
the shari ia. If the Shaikh means that mashru ua 
should be written instead of mashruta, the answer 
is that the implication of the word mashruta relates 
to a political problem, for when constitutionalism 
becomes law in our country, and after it has borne 
fruit, we will be known to belong to the group of 
constitutionally governed countries. Then if 
tomorrow the ruler acts despotically, they may 
assist us to prevent it.'
The first point would be refuted by saying there was no 
guarantee that the Mailis would legislate in accordance 
with the sharila. The second argument may be less naive 
than an attempt to justify mashruta other than by saying 
the government be made responsible to the people. It would 
have been wholly repugnant to the bastis as it could invite 
infidel intervention.
The more radical newspapers such as $up-i.IsrafTl employed 
more sweeping arguments, such as saying that Islam should
83. gabl al-Matin, No. 86, 10th August 1907, p. 2; 
and No. 106, 2nd Sept. 1907, pp. 1-2.
- 222 -
conform to the exigencies of the age, and an Islam that 
was not in conformity with the exigencies of the age was
counterfeit Islam, invented by a number of opportunist
• . - 84lulama.
The constitutionalists were resourceful in their 
refutations of Shaikh Fazlallah's arguments on the sources 
of law and the area of legal jurisdiction, but they never 
really answered the fundamental point that there vjas a 
conflict between a law based upon the revealed will of God 
and one founded on the sovereign will of the people in 
parliament.
On the subject of equality the constitutionalist 
arguments were from the point of view of the shari ua of 
doubtful validity. Majlis brought forward the view that 
God bestowed rights on everybody according to what was
p C
suitable. Throughout the world and in every sect each
person has their rights and duties. The Fundamental Law 
concerned public rights (hugug-i lamma) which all prophets 
had recommended. On the possible conflict between 'public 
rights' and 'sharica rights' the paper made no comment.
More pertinently the paper queried why the Shaikh had not 
insisted upon the application of the shari ca rights under 
the former 'despotism'.
On the question of freedom of the press, the 
constitutionalists were on surer ground, as the Shaikh was 
not arguing that this was inherently contrary to the shari La, 
but rather that the press was denigrating religion and the 
culama. The 'Treatise in Refutation' pointed out that most
$4. Sur-i Israfll, n o . 5, p. 4.
85. Majlis, No. 162, 21st August 1907, p. 3.
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of what the bastis were complaining about was in the
anonymous leaflets shabnama , which had nothing to do with
the Majlis. The treatment of the 1 ama in the press bears
out some of Shaikh Fazlallah's complaints. More moderate
papers such as Ijabl al-Matin were circumspect, but the more
radical papers such as Taimadduo put forward some extreme
arguments; for example that the foundations of the Majlis
were based upon the Holy Law of the Prophet, and each of
its members was therefore a protector and guardian of the 
— 86sharila, which in effect meant usurpation of the authority 
of the lulama. It also accused the *»u 1ama of deliberately 
obscuring the principles of religion in language only they 
could understand in order to enhance their own authority, an 
argument which was also employed in Reformation Europe, and 
possibly comes from a European source.
The impression remains that much of what the bastis 
objected to could have been controlled by a law of libel and 
the judicious application of a limited censorship. Where, 
however, the press touched upon the conflict of authority 
between the sharila and constitutional government, the 
problem was much less tractable.
In discussing the complaint that the word islami had
been deliberately dropped from the title of the Majlis, the
'Treatise in Refutation' maintained that it was only the
87corrupt Islam of the past that had gone. It was stated 
firmly in the Fundamental Law that whatever takes place in 
the Majlis must be in accordance with the shari^a. In reply 
to Shaikh Fazlallah's complaint that the attempt to bind the
86. Tam~addur\ No. 5, p. 4.
87. Treatise in Refutation, op. cit., p. 12.
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Shah and government by contract was a transgression, the
Treatise expostulated that the aim was not only to limit
the powers of the government but of all classes and all
sects, so that each individual knew his rights and duties,
8 8and no one could then be oppressed and enslaved-. The 
writer was also insistent on the loyalty of all Muslims to 
the Shah.
The Treatise also attempted to define the nature of the
Majlis, affirming that it was not a foreign parliament
89 —introducing an alien law. In answer to Shaikh Fazlallah's
demand for a definition of its rights and duties, and the
limits of its authority, the Treatise specified it as being
a place of consultation which fixed the limits and
established the rights of the people, and enacted the
political laws of the kingdom. It was also the means of
executing the religious law. It was concerned with the
affairs of the country, and not with the religion. This
reflects the more moderate constitutional view, but still
presents unresolved problems on the possible conflict in
duties as between the Majlis and the government, and the
legal arrangements according to which these reforms would be
carried out.
The constitutionalist arguments against Shaikh Failallah 
and the bastis are, on the whole, weak. Because of the close 
dependancy of religion and state, to question the authority 
of Islam at that time was to lay oneself open to the charge 
of sedition, not only against religion, but against the 
state. Also the constitutionalists could not afford to
88. Ibid., pp. 4-5
89. Ibid., p. 27.
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dispense with the influence and legitimising presence of 
those lulama who, for whatever reason, still sided with 
them. Therefore they had to preserve the fiction that 
constitutionalism is inspired by and in conformity with 
Islam. This meant that they had to contend with Shaikh 
Fazlallah on his own ground, and on that ground he was very 
nearly irrefutable.
Shaikh Fazlallah and the bastis, had some success with
their propaganda. Daulatabadi reports that they gained
90influence over the more pious members of the guilds.
They are also said to have instigated closures in the bazaar
91as an expression of discontent with the Majlis. This was 
supposed to be achieved with money supplied by the court but 
in any case was not successful. The bastis1 activities 
produced bitter debates in the Majlis in August. When it 
was reported that Shaikh Fazlallah had been to see the Shah 
on 16th August, TabatabaJi remarked angrily on someone who
92had behaved so to the millat being received by the Shah.
A delegtation had been sent to see the Shah but only evasive 
replies were expected. Questions were asked on 19th August 
as to why the authorities did not take firmer action, and 
it was clear Fazlallah's propoganda was having sufficient 
effect to cause unease. In particular, the Majlis was 
vulnerable to the aspersions he cast on its legitimacy.
The situation over the summer of 1907 had not improved.
Amin al-Sultan had tried in vain to find the money to finance
reform, but all loan projects met with no success. Proposed
financial and administrative reforms had been drafted but
not yet put into effect. On 20th August when the regulations
of the Ministry of the Interior were discussed, TabatabaJi
• •
90. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 131.
91. Habl al-Matin, No. 94, 27th August 1907, p. 3.
92. Majlis, No. 159, 18th August 1907, p. 2.
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strongly protested at a clause stating that the government
had the right to supervise the administration of vagf land,
* 93and left the Majlis.
In the meantime the disorder complained of by Shaikh
Fazlallah increased. At the end of May, Spring Rice reported
that the resistance to all authority was spreading and was
94strongest in Azarbaijan and Tehran. By 24th August the
situation had worsened, and TabatabaJi made disturbances in
• •
Rasht a pretext to deliver a speech against the anjumans:
'We went to much trouble to establish this Majlis 
and make it fruitful , but these numerous anjumans 
and certain deputies, the soundness of whose credit 
is not known, are creating so much disorder that 
the country is nearly lost. There are 70 anjumans 
in Tehran alone. These should unite and work for 
the country, not interfere in its political affairs.
We must work against the sedition and anarchy 
being caused by the anjumans.195
During the same debate TabatabaJ i suggested that the
• •
Supplementary Fundamental Law be sent to the lulama of
Najaf for approval, a proposal formerly put forward by the
Shah. It was reported that at this time the Russian Legation
was in communication with both Bihbihani and TabatabaJi, and
• •
that the latter had paid a secret visit to the Russian
96Minister on 15th August. On the 22nd August, before the
above mentioned debates, the Russian Oriental Secretary was
said to have called on both TabatabaJi and Bihbihani and this
• •
visit was linked to the opinion on the anjumans expressed by 
TabatabaJi in the debates.
93. Majlis, No. 161, 20th August 1907, P. 2.
94. Spring Rice 
FO 371/301,
to Grey, No. 113, 
No. 18872.
23rd May 1907,
95. Majlis, No. 164, 24th August 1907, p. 4.
96. Spring Rice 
FO 371/304,
to Grey, No. 205, 
No. 32480.
13 th Sept . 1907,
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These events may, however, be connected to the activities 
of Amin al-Sultan, who from his return seems to have set 
about creating a moderate party in the Majlis as a means of 
reconciling that institution with the Shah and the more 
moderate notables and members of the court. Those who appear 
to have been won over included Sani*-al-Daula and his 
brother, as well as the leading merchants Haj Muhammad 
IsmaLil, Amin al-2arb and Mu^in al-Tujjar, and some of the
representatives of the guilds, as well as Bihbihani and his
97 — —group. At the same time Amin al-Sultan managed to have
removed from the cabinet the more hardline conservatives, 
such as Vazir Humayun, and most particularly the Shah's uncle 
and father-in-law, NaJib-i Saltana.
The strongest opposition to Amin al-Sultan came from 
Taqizada and the Tabrizis, who lost influence as that of the 
Sadr-i Aczam grew, to the point where they sometimes had 
difficulties in speaking in the debates. The anjumans, 
especially that of Azarbaijan, in which Taqizada was 
prominent, were deeply suspicious of Amin al-Sultan's tactics, 
which they considered to be aimed at sapping the Majlis to 
the point where it proved ineffective and lost respect and 
support. This was probably an extreme view of a policy that 
may have been aimed at achieving a compromise between the 
Majlis and the Shah over their respective powers, and a 
degree of collaboration in resolving the country's problems.
On 31st August the situation changed completely with 
the assassination of Amin al-Sultan. This led in turn to 
the resignation of SaniL al-Daula, President of the Majlis, 
in the belief the deed was the result of a court intrigue, 
and that he was next on the list; it also led to the
97. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 125.
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resignation of Vazir-i Makhsus, Governor of Tehran, who
• •
was convinced it was the work of a radical secret society
98who would shortly attack him. Many deputies were deeply 
disturbed, and a telegram of condolence was sent to the 
Shah as well as one to the provinces informing them of the 
loss. The anjumans, on the other hand, received the news 
with joy and held lamp lighting ceremonies in celebration.
On 16th September Shaikh Fazlallah emerged from bast.
Kasravi linked the timing to the death of Amin al-Sultan,
whom he considered was supporting him, although no evidence
for this has yet come to light. Daulatabadi considered
the reason to be that the supply of money from the court 
99had dried up. He also stated that the implication of the 
assassination, that the Revolution had entered a more violent 
phase, created fear in certain quarters, and that Shaikh 
Fazlallah was affected by it. Spring Rice reported on 13th 
September that his propoganda was having little effect.
This may be a reason why his source of funds dried up. 
Certainly he does not seem to have shaken the control of 
the anjumans over a large part of the populace of the capital. 
Another possible reason for the Shaikh's emergence at this 
time, although nowhere stated or implied, was that the 
Shah was supporting him not only to give ideological 
justification to his own position, but also to bring pressure 
upon Amin al-Sultan just as the latter was building up a 
party in the Majlis and the government to induce him to 
cooperate.
Shaikh Fazlallah was able to emerge with some honour
through the good offices of TabatabaJi and Bihbihani. A
• •
98. There may, as Ettehadieh Nezam Mafi suggests, have 
been two plots to assassinate Amin al-Sultan;
see her thesis, op. cit., p. 219.
99. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 146.
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question he drafted was put to the Majlis by Sadr al-'-Ulama 
asking what the limits of its authority were. In a written 
answer the Majlis affirmed that it would not interfere in 
the affairs of the sharica, and that its responsibility lay 
in matters covered by the Lurf law, and concerned reform of
 ^ 100the country.
CONCLUSION
Although Shaikh Fazlallah did not come out in open 
opposition to the Majlis till May 1907, there is some 
evidence that he was disquieted with the course of events, 
and collaborating with the new Shah, who also opposed the . 
Majlis, soon after the latter's accession in January. By 
May 1907 unease, not only among members of the court but 
among others such as the holders of tuyuls and pensions, 
gave Shaikh FaSlallah sufficient support to manifest his 
discontent. The article on equality, pressed by the 
Tabrizis and the religious minorities, provided him with a 
clear pretext on which the designate constitutionalism as 
contrary to the shari La.
Shaikh Fazlallah's most powerful argument was that the 
constitutionalists wished to replace the shariLa with a law 
of foreign origin, which had no legitimate basis in the 
shari*-a since it did not derive from the s h a r sources of 
authority. The constitutionalists struggled to refute this 
argument either by dividing the shari *»a precepts into 
essential and non-essential, or by attempting to define 
an area of law, formerly in practice under government 
administration, in which the Majlis might legislate without 
contravening the shari La. Both these divisions are 
nebulous, and in effect the constitutionalists were not able 
to refute Shaikh Failallah.
100. RiSvani, op. cit., p. 208.
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It must be asked how far the bastis really wanted a 
mailis. As Spring Rice commented, at that time it was 
virtually useless to advocate a return to the old system.
In this context the call for mashruta-yi mashruLa may be 
taken as a slogan to win support for what was in effect to 
be a constitution framed from the shari La. Remarks in the 
leaflets, such as having a majlis for a period, the need to 
purge certain members, and the functions being to help and 
advise the government, suggest that any majlis the bastis 
accepted would not only be based on the shari *»a but also be 
compliant with the royal wishes. The main sources of 
difference with the constitutionalist mujtahids were firstly 
that they desired a limitation of the Shah's authority, and 
secondly that they perceived a sphere of jurisprudence 
where the Majlis might legislate without interfering with 
the shari *»a.
Shaikh Fazlallah's propaganda seems to have had a slight 
effect in the bazaar, particularly amongst the pious 
members of the guilds. How far this was due to the respect 
in which he was held, and how far . to . discontent with the 
Majlis is difficult to assess. Otherwise, his adherents 
were those with an interest in the old order, and those the 
constitutionalist writers termed aubash . Again it is 
difficult to know if the latter were mostly poorer persons 
who profited little from constitutionalism, or roughs in 
the pay of the Shah. The Majlis was most worried about 
Shaikh Fazlallah's opposition because it undermined the 
legitimacy of the assembly, and created a serious division 
in the original unity of the people against the Shah and 
court.
In the spring TabatabaJi appears to have had frequent 
• •
contacts with the anjumans, but by August he was expressing 
strong disapproval of their activities, and seems to have 
identified with the factions clustered rounf Amin al-Sultan
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rather than with the Tabrizis and the anjumans. His 
vehement objection to the idea of government administration 
of vagf land reveals the ambivalence of his position in 
supporting a western style of government whilst defending 
the privileges of the religious estate.
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CHAPTER VII
REFORM AND REACTION - SEPTEMBER .1907 TO JUNE 19 08
The Supplementary Fundamental Law came before the Majlis 
for debate in late September and early October 1907. The 
Uulama, led by both chief mujtahids, but particularly 
Bihbihani, objected to many points which threatened their 
privileges and authority. The most serious dispute was over 
judicial authority (qazavat) . The *~ulama demanded that the 
articles relating to this matter be drafted in such a way 
that their judicial powers be in no way impaired. The 
radical constitutionalists, led by Taqizada, wanted all cases 
referred initially to the Ministry of Justice, which would 
then decide whether they should go before a civil or a 
shari La court. This would give the state the authority to 
decide what went before the shari La courts, and thereby 
remove judicial control from the ^ulama. The problem of 
what types of cases came within the purview of the shari *»a 
and of the secular courts was for the present avoided. 
Bihbihani, however, firstly disputed the right of the 
Ministry of Justice to decide, and secondly contended that 
judgement in the important areas of property, petitions and 
life (amval, alraz va rufus) should be referred to the 
shari*-a courts, and customary law matters (umur-i uurfiyya) 
should go before the tribunals at the Ministry of Justice.
He did not get as far as explaining what he meant by 
umur-i Uurfiyya, but from the beginning the lulama seem to 
have been seeking reform in the area of government 
administration and not that which pertained to their own 
jurisdiction. It cannot be said, however, that they appear 
to have given much thought to the practical workings of any 
new system. Bihbihani's speech was greeted by an uproar in 
the Majlis, and members of the anjumans appeared, adding to
1. Marling to Grey, No. 231, 10th Oct. 1907, 
FO 416/34 No. 116.
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the commotion, so that Bihbihani felt it unsafe to leave 
2
the building. To achieve a compromise the article under 
discussion (No. 27) was drafted ambiguously: the matter of
who should decide to which courts a case was to be referred 
was not mentioned, nor was the question of which cases came 
under what jurisdiction. It was simply stated that 
shari La cases were to be tried in the shari La courts and 
Lurf cases in the government tribunals. Article 71 dealing 
with the powers of the Tribunals of Justice was drafted with 
similar obfuscation. Likewise Article 86, setting up a 
court of appeal in every provincial capital, did not state 
whether it would consider appeal against a shari ua decision, 
but merely defined the court as dealing with judicial matters 
in accordance with the regulations concerning the 
administration of justice (not yet drafted). A further 
proposal that the Lulama be compelled to try their cases 
in the courts of the Ministry of Justice, and not in informal
3
tribunals in their own homes or elsewhere, also appears to 
have been dropped.
The power of making laws was vested in the Shah, the
Majlis and the Senate, with the proviso that they could
only become operative if deemed not contrary to the laws of
Islam. In Article 2 the Lulama ostensibly reserved the
right to decide what constituted infraction of the shari La,
but their lack of organisation, the divisions amongst them
and the method of selecting the committee of supervision
made it unlikely that this negative power could be used to
much effect. On 5th October the constitutionalists also
proposed an article ending the right of bast in a mujtahid's 
4
house. The Majlis showed determination to pass the 
measure, but it was vehemently opposed by the Lu1ama and 
did not become law.
2. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 150.
3. Marling to Grey, No. 242, 7th Nov. 1907,
FO 371/313, No. 38673.
4. Marling to Grey, No. 231, 10th Oct. 1907,
FO 371/303, No. 35499.
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On other points the '-ulama do not seem to have again 
contested the article on equal rights. Freedom of the press 
was allowed, with the provision that nothing be published 
detrimental to Islam, (Article 20). There was no mention, 
however, of any mechanism for determining which publications 
were contrary to Islam. The acquisition of scientific 
knowledge was also permitted except what was forbidden by 
Islam (Article 18). Details of what scientific knowledge 
might be contrary to Islam do not seem to have been discussed. 
The lu1ama are not recorded as objecting to Article 19, that 
all primary and secondary schools must be under the direction 
and surveillance of the Ministry of Education, and perhaps 
considered it as applying to secular schools only. Since 
there were very few of these schools,the full import of this 
article was possibly not yet apparent.
With regard to other matters, the powers of the Shah, 
by contrast with the Law of December 31st 1906, were severely 
curtailed. Sovereignty was defined as a trust which is 
bestowed by the nation on the sovereign (Article 35). The 
t-ulama did not contest this, most probably because they took 
the word mi11at (nation) to mean the community as led by 
themselves and not, as the radical constitutionalists 
intended, the popular will. Responsibility rested not with 
the sovereign but with his ministers (Article 440) who were 
responsible to the Assembly (Article 58), though the Shah 
retained the right to appoint them (Article 4 6). Most 
significant, there was to be strict control of the state 
revenue by a State Accounts Department (Article 102).
The articles of the Fundamental Law relating to the 
judiciary are fairly evenly balanced between the interests 
of a modern nation state with a centralised administration, 
and the traditional Islamic legal system. Many articles 
are deliberately ambiguous, and the intention, though 
possible to deduce, is left in obscurity. The
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constitutionalists could not afford a breach with those of 
the cu 1 ama who supported the Majlis, in view of the 
antagonism of the Shah and many powerful wealthy notables.
Also in a country still profoundly influenced by traditional 
concepts, the 'will of the people', imperfectly understood, 
was still not sufficient legitimate basis for the Majlis.
The approval of the mujtahids was also needed to legitimise 
it. Pressure to complete the Fundamental Law was brought 
on the Majlis by representatives of the anjumans, who took 
up positions in the House, and it was signed by the Shah in 
October 1907.
The Majlis, however, remained in difficulty for other 
reasons as well. Marling reported on 10th October:
'The treasury is empty; there is no public force to 
maintain order an<j enforce it; the moral authority 
of the old regime has been destroyed by the local 
Anjuman and the Assembly is powerless to create any 
respect for itself; there appear to be no statesmen 
of constructive ability; taxes are being paid with 
the greatest irregularity and even the framework of 
such elementary administration as once existed has 
well nigh disappeared.'^
As McDaniel has remarked, the forces of the central government 
were neutralised by the internal conflict and fear, with 
ministers fearing to take any action not popular with the 
Assembly.^ The Majlis was thus little more than the local 
government of Tehran, its power resting on the strength and 
support of the anjumans. Any opposition was immediately 
interpreted as support for the Shah.
The major problem facing the Majlis remained finance.
The National Bank continued to be discussed as a panacea for 
all ills, and about 320,000 tomans were said to have been
5. Marling to Grey, No. 230, 10th Oct. 1907,
FO 416/34, No. 119.
6. McDaniel, op. cit., p. 74.
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collected, but only 12,500 was in cash, the remainder being
in Treasury receipts. In an attempt to balance the budget
cuts were made in the amount allowed to the Shah so that
he informed the royal household that their salaries would
7
be reduced and some members dismissed. It was also known 
by mid-October that the salaries of princes and notables were 
to be cut by 50% and only those wholly dependant on their 
salaries were to receive them in full. Their dissatisfaction 
was therefore added to that of the tuyuldars and the 
numerous dependants of the royal household.
Tension between the Majlis and the Shah began to build 
up again towards the end of October in the frequently uneasy 
month of Ramazan. The Shah made urgent pleas to the Russians 
for money. Rumours of a movement to depose the Shah were
meanwhile gaining ground, particularly of a largish faction
—  8supporting the claims of Zill al-Sultan, the Shah*s uncle. Some
• •
anjumans were reported to have sent messages to Zill al-Sultan
9asking him if he would be a 'constitutional monarch'. The 
cabinet of reformist ministers led by Nasir al-Mulk was 
virtually powerless.
The anti-constitutionalist lulama had once again become 
active. Shaikh Fazlallah was reported to be one of those 
influencing the Shah against the Majlis,^ and Sayyid LAli 
Yazdi began preaching against the Majlis in early November, 
the students of his madrasa gathering round the pulpit so that 
no one could interrupt him. He was believed to have support 
from members of the court. Another preacher, Shaikh Muhammad 
Valiz, who had been a prominent member of the opposition
7. Kasravi, op. cit., p. 488.
8 . Marling to Grey, No. 326 Tel., 
FO 371/313, No. 36529.
4 th Nov. 1907,
9. Marling to Grey, No. 248, 8th 
FO 371/313, No. 38679.
Nov. 1907,
•
o
 
*—1 Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 161 •
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movement in 1906, attacked TabatabaJi and Bihbihani, as well
• •
as Sayyid Jamal al-Din. His message was similar to the one
propounded by Shaikh Fazlallah during the summer. 'This
is not the mashruta we wanted - it has been perverted by
Babis and materialists'. As Kasravi remarks, Shaikh
Muhammad was always one of those who understood mashruta
11as literally implementation of the shari ^ a.
On 19th November the anjumans wrote a letter jointly
12to the Majlis requesting the formation of a National Army.
This proposal seems to have represented an attempt by the
anjumans to create a legal force of their own to protect
the Majlis. The proposal was opposed by the leading merchant,
Mu,*in al-Tujjar, who said such a force was needed on the
frontier and not in Tehran. The matter was, however, again
taken up by Bihbihani and TabatabaJ i on 29th November when
• •
they put forward a plan which they stressed was intended to
strengthen the government, not weaken it, for a volunteer
force which would receive money and arms from the government.
Though they were evidently worried about the lack of order,
the pressure for this proposal appears to have come from the
anjumans for Tabataba^i and Bihbihani stated the 'millat*
• •
had a strong desire for such a force. The Majlis was 
reluctant to agree, and discussion on the proposal was 
deferred by putting it to a committee.
By early December both the Shah and the anjumans were
mustering their forces, and the Shah was said to be trying
to organise an armed force composed of his own bodyguard and
13his father's guard under Amir Bahadur, as well as bringing
11. Kasravi, op. cit., p. 482.
12. Majlis, No. 212, 20th Nov. 1907, p. 2.
13. Marling to Grey, No. 263, 5th Dec. 1907,
FO 416/34, No. 441.
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14tribal elements to Tehran from Azarbaijan. Certain 
courtiers were believed to be organising anjumans in support 
of the Shah, for example the Anjuman of the family of 
Muhammad, consisting of savyids who held meetings under the 
slogan 'The Family of Muhammad does not want constitutionalism'. 
Shaikh Fazlallah was held to be ready with a takfir against 
certain members of the Majlis, should the anjumans be 
dispersed.
The radical anjumans, receiving rumours of activity on 
the Shah's part, blamed him and his hardline advisors for 
the country's problems. They particularly castigated SaLd 
al-Daula, Amir Bahadur, Shapshal (the Shah's former tutor), 
Shaikh Fazlallah and Sayyid uAli Yazdi. At a meeting of the 
anjumans on 13th December speeches were made by Sayyid Jamal 
al-Din and Malik al-Mutakallimin demanding the removal of 
Saud al-Daula. The Shah retorted by claiming liberty of 
person under the constitution and on 14th summoned the 
cabinet, which being unable to deal with the crisis, resigned.
At sunrise on the following day, groups of roughs
numbering about 6-700, from the Sanglaj and Chala Maidan
quarters occupied one of the courtyards of the Sipah Salar
Mosque, the main meeting place of the anjumans. Bihbihani,
having been summoned, sent a message to one of their leaders
16to ask what they were doing. He replied that they had 
been sent to defend the Majlis, but shortly afterwards the 
mob attacked the Majlis building itself, and shots were fired 
at the door. Those in the Majlis itself were unarmed but 
members of the anjumans fired a few shots from the walls of 
the mosque, and the mob retreated. When the Majlis requested
14. Hartwig to Izvolsky, 7 Dek./20th Dec. 1907,
Sbornik, p. 57.
15. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 160.
16. Kasravi, op. cit., p. 506.
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that the Cossack Brigade be sent to maintain order the
17Russian Colonel, Liakhoff, refused. The Brigade, indeed, 
played no part in the attempted coup.
The mob departed to Maidan-i Tupkhana where they were
joined by camel drivers, muleteers, canonkeepers, servants
of the guard house and soldiers of the Silarkhur regiment 
_ _
of Amir Bahadur. The President of the Majlis sent his 
brothers to intercede with the Shah, who promptly arrested 
them. In the afternoon the Prime Minister, Nasir al-Mulk, 
was also seized and had to be rescued by the British 
Minister. On his arrest the Majlis dispersed. It seemed 
briefly that the Shah had won, as the Majlis and the anjumans 
had been thrown off their guard and offered no resistance.
The Shah, however, did not press his advantage - according 
to some because of his lack of resolution, but probably,
19as Browne suggests, because he could not rely on his 'troops'. 
Kasravi considered his main objective was to create a 
disturbance to show that the people did not support the 
Constitution. This view is borne out by a telegram from 
Hartwig in which the crowd in the Tupkhana is represented as 
a vast throng of different sections of the community expressing 
support for the Shah and antipathy to the Constitution and
4 - u  M  • ■, • 2 0the Majlis.
The following day the Majlis regained the advantage.
The anjumans gathered round it, with about 3000 men with 
21rifles. The opposition was largely organised by the Tabriz 
deputies, and the Anjuman-i Adharbayjan who sent messages to
17. Marling to Grey, No. 380 Tel., 15th Dec. 1907,
FO 416/34, No. 378.
18. Kasravi, op. cit., p. 505.
19. Browne, Revolution, op. cit., p. 163.
20. Hartwig to Izvolsky, 11 Dek./24th Dec. 1907,
Sbornik, pp. 61-2.
21. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 167, p. 170.
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the provinces. When the Shah requested the Majlis adjourn
«
whilst he restore order, meaning disperse the anjumans^ his 
message was rejected.
The crowd in the Maidan-i Tupkhana was now joined by 
mullahs, including the preachers Sayyid *-Ali Yazdi, and 
Akbar Shah, as well as well-known opponents of
constitutionalism such as lAli Akbar Burujirdi, Mulla Muhammad
Amuli, and the mujtahids, Abu Talib Zanjani, Muhammad Tafrishi
and Shaikh Fazlallah. Kasravi maintains that Shaikh Fazlallah
was party to the whole plan^but from a letter from one of
Fazlallah's retainers to his son in Najaf, it is clear that
he was brought from his house reluctantly by the Shah's roughs,
22who had been sent to fetch him. The crowd was also joined 
by students and sayyids, and more armed roughs appeared from 
Varamin led by a mullah. The crowd was provided with some 
protection by Cossacks with guns. Two partisans of the Majlis 
who went to survey the scene were set upon and killed.
By 17th December the fact that the Majlis had stood firm
for two days helped to rally support. More arms appeared as
well as workers on the telegraphs, the railway to Shah uA.bd
al-LAzim and the tramways, who were sent back to work by the
President. According to Daulatabadi, the Anjuman of the Guilds
provided victuals for the other anjumans, and the costs were
23borne by a special commission set up for the purpose.
Contributions came secretly from wealthy notables, such as
Zill al-Sultan, who were against the Shah. Zill al-Sultan 
• • • •
had previously withdrawn £50,000 in Consols invested in 
London.^ He was also said to have provided guns.^
22. Kasravi, op. cit., p. 511.
23. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 168.
24. Marling to Grey, No. 391 Tel., 18th Dec. 1907,
FO 416/34, No. 399.
25. Mustashar al-Daula, op. cit., p. 47.
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Anjumans arrived from the outlying districts such as 
— 26Shimiran. According to one of Browne's correspondents
those around the Majlis included young men in white collars,
mullahs and sayvids, kulah namadis (labourers) and 
27tradesfolk, indicating the variety of support for the 
Majlisland the many hopes held of it.
The Majlis now took the initiative and demanded the 
removal of Amir Bahadur and Sa’**d al-Daula; that the Cossack 
Brigade and other forces should come under the Ministry of 
War and that a National Guard of 200 persons be established 
to protect the Majlis; and that the exiled notables be 
allowed to return. The Shah in turn demanded the expulsion 
of 4 or 5 deputies. Whilst the idea of putting pressure on the Shah 
to restore order by removing his myrmidons was resisted by 
the Russians, the demand for the expulsion of the deputies 
was opposed by the British. On the evening of the 17th the
crowd round the Majlis was estimated by the British at
— — — 28 6-7,000 and that in the Maidan-i Tupkhana at 1,500.
On the 17th, indicating that it felt more secure, as its
supporters were evidently more numerous, the Majlis dismissed
some of them, though a core remained in the Mosque. The same
day telegrams began arriving from the provinces in support of
the Majlis. That from the Tabriz anjuman advocated the Shah's
deposition. On the 19th the Shah ordered the crowd in the
Maidan-i Tupkhana to leave, and a number of them took refuge
in the Arg (citadel). The Russians considered the Shah
indecisive but also believed he had not sufficient support to
deter the anjumans. They believed he would have been
26. Kasravi, op. cit., p. 515.
27. Browne, Revolution, op. cit., p. 165.
28. Marling to Grey, No. 283, 31st Dec. 1907,
FO 416/35, No. 75.
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victorious if he only had some military force to take
29advantage of the initiative he at first won.
By the 22nd the Majlis was getting the upper hand,
largely through the efforts of the Tabriz anjuman, which
sent telegrams calling for the Shah's deposition to all
other cities^with the result that telegrams poured in from
the provinces. On the evening of the 23rd the Shah yielded
to all the Majlis's conditions, requesting only that Amir
Bahadur be retained. When on the 24th the militants seemed
poised to press their advantage further, the Russians and
British agreed it was important to keep the Shah on the
30throne to prevent the country falling into anarchy. As
McDaniel has pointed out this attempt to maintain stability
31meant preventing either side from overwhelming the other. 
Finally, the Shah agreed to swear an oath in support of the 
Constitution, and the deputies in turn were to swear loyalty 
to him. The Majlis conditions relating to military forces 
appear to have been dropped, but the notables were to return 
and the Shah's roughs to be punished. By the 26th the 
situation was sufficiently secure for the bazaar to reopen.
The mullahs and roughs sheltering in the citadel were 
given 5 tomans each by the Shah's henchmen and escorted out. 
Whilst the Shah tried to put off punishing them, they took 
refuge in the Madrasa-yi Khan Marvi on the east side of the 
palace, dislodging the tullab from their quarters. Food 
was supplied from the court. Sayyid uAli Yazdi made a 
speech from the pulpit demanding mashruta-yi mashruLa. To 
secure this he proposed that articles in the constitution
29. Hartwig to Izvolsky, 7 Dek./20th Dec. 1907,
Sbornik, p. 58.
30. Marling to Grey, No. 283, 31st Dec. 1907,
FO 416/35, No. 75.
31. McDaniel, op. cit., p. 75.
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(nizamnama) which were contrary to the shari'-a should be 
3 2changed. Emissaries sent to the bazaar collected a
miscellaneous following under the cry of 'Islam in danger'.
On 28th Shaikh Fazlallah sent a telegram to the *-ulama of
all the provinces in the name of the shari La and requesting
assistance for himself and his following as they were
oppressed (ma?lum). The following day some of the Ministers
went to see Shaikh Fazlallah and request him to disperse his
supporters. On 30th a telegram came from the three
constitutional *-ulama of Najaf in response to one from
TabatabaJi and Bihbihani. It declared Shaikh FaSlallah was
the cause of sedition and his participation in affairs was 
33forbidden. The Shah reportedly sent a message to Shaikh
Fazlallah saying the time for further resistance was not
propitious and requesting that he disperse his following,
so on 1st January they left the Madrasa. This following,
about 500 in number, was evidently not paid for by the Shah.
The Russians referred to it as the 'reactionary party', and
considered it to be composed of the adherents of Shaikh
Fazlallah who were in the pay of the more hardline members 
34of the court. In the next few days the newspapers 'Habl 
al-Matin' and 'Majlis1 published telegrams from the lulama 
of the provinces accusing Shaikh Fazlallah of leading the 
people astray and trying to reinstate the 'despotism'.
Though Shaikh Fazlallah seems initially to have been brought 
to open criticism of the Majlis on the Shah's initiative 
to give justification for the attempted coup, he himself, 
apparently then took a leading part in encouraging opposition 
to the constitution, using a number of the arguments he had 
employed in the summer.
32. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, pp. 183-4.
33. Majlis, Year 2 No. 12, 31st Dec. 1907, p. 1.
34. Hartwig to Izvolsky, 14 Dek. /27th Dec. 1907,
Sbornik, pp. 72-3.
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It was generally recognised that the agreement between
the Shah and the Majlis in December was only a truce. In
an effort to convert this into a more lasting peace
Bihbihani asked Hartwig to use his influence with the Shah
to give up his more hardline advisors and to show more trust
35in experienced men of moderate opinions. Hartwig, who 
had considerable respect for Bihbihani 'since he is possessed 
of a keen mind unlike his colleague Sayyid Muhammad 
promised to induce the Shah to compromise, but although he 
made an effort in this direction he met with no success.
The problems of government were exacerbated by divisions
within the Majlis itself. Ettehadieh Nezam Mafi has
identified two parties in the Majlis, the Azadikhahan and
MuLtadil. The former may be translated variously as the
Liberals, Democrats or Radicals (Daulatabadi called the same
groups the Tundravan - Radicals), and the latter as the
Moderates. As Ettehadieh Nezam Mafi has shown, the
Azadikhahan formed a more cohesive group with an agreed
programme of social and economic reform, the division of the
secular and religious spheres, strict curtailment of the
powers of the Shah, and such liberal-democratic tenets as
3 6freedom of the press. The Moderates were concerned to 
limit government and make it accountable to laws and in 
finance. The Azadikhahan were dominated by the Tabriz 
Deputies, led by Taqizada, and had a powerful organisation 
outside the Majlis in the Anjuman-i Adharbayjan^of which 
Taqizada was also the head. The Moderates were, in reality, 
composed of amorphous groups which formed and reformed 
according to what they perceived to be their immediate 
interest, and whose members at times allied themselves with
35. Hartwig to Izvolsky, 5 Ian./18th Jan. 1908,
Sbornik, pp. 82-3.
36. M. Ettehadieh Nezam Mafi, op. cit., pp. 234-7.
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the Azadikhahan, if it suited them. The Moderates included
the ^ulama and some of the leading merchants who had been
linked to each other from the time of the opposition movement
to 'Ain al-Daula. They looked upon the Azarbaijan contingent
as a group of unknown persons who had played little part in
the establishment of the Majlis, and should not be allowed to
take it over. They included Bihbihani and TabatabaJi, Amin
• •
al-Zarb, Haj Muhammad Isma'-il, Mu^in al-Tujjar, and Haj 
• •
Muhammad Taqi Bunakdar, and according to Malikzada, they 
considered themselves 'the pillars of the mashruta', and had 
great influence among the lesser deputies. They had hoped, 
with the return of A-min al-Sultan, to overwhelm the most 
radical deputies and purge them from the Majlis, with the 
help of the government. They also had links with the 
anjumans, for example the Anjumans of the Guilds and Merchants. 
These factions within the Majlis, whilst being suspicious of 
each other, had a common bond in opposition to the Shah.
A somewhat isolated figure was the President, who was,
from the autumn of 1907, Ihtisham al-Saltana. Like Sanit al-
• •
Daula before him, he was placed in a weak position because, 
by virtue of his office, he had to struggle to achieve some 
form of compromise with the Shah. He was, moreover, faced 
with the problem that when he became President he had only 
recently returned from abroad and had no time to build up a 
base of his own. Partly because the President sympathised with 
many of the reforms desired by the Azadikhahan, and partly 
because one of his chief aims, as indeed of many of the higher 
bureaucracy, was to curb the influence of the Lulama, 
particularly Bihbihani, since the President considered their 
rigorous defense of their privileges was interfering with 
the reform of the administration and the regular running of
37. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., Ill, p. 68.
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government, he decided for the present to ally with the 
3 8Tabrizis. To win them over he kept them informed on all
discussions, and allowed them a say which added to their
influence. Bihbihani and the leading merchants perceived
that their position was being undermined and responded each
in their own way. Amin al-2arb and Mu’-in al-Tujjar made a
rapprochement with Ihtisham al-Saltana, who, although advised
• •
by Taqizada to ignore Amin al-2arb, had to respond since he
was in charge of the Majlis accounts. The other merchants,
Haj Muhammad Isma'-il and Sayyid Murtazavi, disliking the
influence of both the Tabrizis and the Uulama, formed some
links with the Shah, but on the whole remained in a neutral
position. Bihbihani, in danger of being isolated, knew that
the Shah did not trust him, and that in any case to effect
a reconciliation would mean losing all the prestige he had
gained for his part in the opposition movement. His only
alternative was to ally with the Tabrizis and detach them
from Ihtisham al-Saltana. This he achieved by increasingly 
• •
voicing the opinions of the anjumans, even the most radical,
in the Majlis. At the same time the alliance between
Ihtisham al-Saltana and the Tabrizis was shaken by the 
• •
President's habit of arrogating a greater measure of 
executive powers to himself than his predecessor had done, 
and adopting a premptory tone in discussion - usually to 
try and see business carried through. The constellations, 
thus reformed, with Bihbihani and the Tabrizis allied against 
the President. One effect was to increase the representation 
of the radical section of the anjumans in the Majlis. Another 
was to exacerbate the difficulty of the President's task of 
reconciling the Majlis and the Shah, and to lay him open to 
charges of conniving with the Shah whenever he tried to 
represent the latter's point of view.
38. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 181, p. 193.
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Following the failure of the coup of December 1907,
the Shah became resigned to the existing state of affairs,
and ceased, for a time, to actively oppose the Majlis.
Perhaps partly as a result of his abstention, the divisions
within the Majlis itself were now exacerbated. Whilst
Ihtisham al-Saltana had the support of many deputies his 
• •
base was not strong enough for him to resist Bihbihani and
the Tabrizis. His necessary private audiences with the Shah,
and his efforts to placate him by such measures as restriction
of freedom of the press, led to rumours that he was betraying
the popular cause. He was accused of having joined the
Shah's faction and of planning to drive Taqizada from the 
39house. In January Ihtisham al-Saltana openly attacked
• •
Bihbihani and accused him of taking bribes and trampling
4 0on the people's rights. Although a number of deputies 
agreed with him there was a furore in the Majlis. In 
Marling's summation:
'The popular view interpreted this action as a sign 
of treason to the_popular cause. It has long been 
known that Bihbihani is swayed by dishonest motives, 
but the present moment is not thought opportune for 
a breach. Bihbihani, with TabatabaJi, is intimately 
connected with the popular movement. Ihtisham al- 
Saltana is therefore thought to be acting in the 
interests of the Shah. The attack was a grave 
tactical error which has laid him open to the 
accusation of attempting to split the constitutionalist 
ranks.'41
The legitimising presence of a compliant mujtahid together 
with the influence he could exert on the pious, and with 
his multifarious connections, was of much greater value to 
the constitutionalist cause at this time than the influence 
of a reformist notable. The constitutionalists also 
recognised that as long as the Shah distrusted Bihbihani,
39. .Ibid., p. 194.
40. Ibid., pp. 192-3.
41. Marling to Grey, No. 18, 30th Jan. 1908,
FO 416/35 No. 206.
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the latter had no alternative but to support the Majlis 
whatever his real views and interests. They believed that 
if they could be assured the Shah would support the Majlis 
they could dislodge Bihbihani and the other cu1ama.
Ihtisham al-Saltana was obliged to apologise publicly 
• •
to Bihbihani. At the end of March Ihtisham openly criticised
the leader of one of the more radical anjumans over a
- - 42disagreement he had had with the merchant, Mucin al-Tujjar.
This gave the anjumans an opportunity to bring about his 
resignation, which he had in any case been seriously 
contemplating. In his place the Majlis elected Mumtaz al- 
Daula, who was compliant to the wishes of the Tabriz deputies, 
once again the dominant faction.
Most of February 1908 (Muharram) passed without disturbance. 
The British found it difficult to renew the minting contract of 
the Imperial Bank, which should have been automatic, because
of the opposition of the Finance Committee of the Majlis,
- 43 - -of which Amin al-2arb was a member. He and MuHLn al-Tujjar
were the most active in blocking renewal of the contract, of 
which they sought to gain control. On February 26th two 
bombs we re thrown at the Shah's car, but the Shah, who was 
travelling in a carriage behind, was unharmed. The apathy 
shown by the Majlis in finding the culprit, and the manner 
in which the anjumans obtained the release of persons 
ultimately arrested in April, caused bitterness to the Shah.
The battle over the authority of the Hi lama and the 
Ministry of Justice in the administration of judicial affairs 
came to a head again in March 1908. The Hi lama, led as 
usual by Bihbihani, considered the Ministry of Justice to be
42. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 218.
43. Marling to Grey, No. 24, 14th Feb. 1908,
FO 371/497, No. 6677.
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- 4 4'the servant of the shari La', the reformers, particularly
members of the higher bureaucracy such as Mukhbir al-Saltana
with their centralising objectives, aimed for state
administration of the judiciary, as well as for greater
consistency and efficiency. The officials of the Ministry
of Justice, in which the lulama had no position, complained
of the constant interference of the Lulama, and also that
their contradictory judgements (ahkam-i naskh va mansukh)
were causing chaos in the administration of justice. The
*-u1ama still exerted the greater influence, and therefore
authority, which enabled them to ignore the regulations
issued by the Ministry of Justice when they chose. In the
autumn of 1907, Mukhbir al-Saltana, an assertive Minister,
had attempted to ignore the shariLa afrkam when incompatible
with the workings of the Ministry, and to curtail Bihbihani's
45influence in judicial matters. But after the Cabinet of 
Nasir al-Mulk resigned, the Lulama once more gained the 
upper hand.
The result was paralysis in the work of the Ministry,
which consequently made no improvement in the administration
of justice. The primary aim of the first stage of the
movement for reform had been judicial reform, and the
Anjuman of the Guilds began to complain that all their efforts
to confirm their rights and set up a proper Ministry of
Justice (ihgag-ihaqq va dashtan-i ^adlivva) had come to 
46 * *nothing. A meeting was called on 11th March 1908, of 
lulama. Ministry officials and representatives of the 
anjumans to discuss the affairs of the Ministry of Justice.
An indictment on the part of the Anjuman of the Guilds was
44. Majlis, Year 2, No. Ill, 2nd May 1908, p. 2.
45. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 205.
46. Ibid., p. 213.
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read complaining of the Ministry officials and of the lack
of reform. The officials, after pointing out that the
Ministry still had no suitable location, insufficient
educated personnel, no civil law in accordance with the
necessities of the times and no money, took the opportunity
to launch an attack against the Hi lama for creating anarchy
in the legal system by their contradictory pronouncements.
Mukhbir al-Saltana^. who had attended, although no longer
Minister, suggested that the Lulama should collaborate to
examine all ordinances (ahkam), burn those they considered
null and establish what was correct. Everyone agreed to
this suggestion except the Lulama, who included Bihbihani,
Sadr al-HJlama and Muhammad Riza Qummi. They demanded to 
• •
know what sort of meeting would suggest burning the 
ordinances of the shari *-a, and left in high dudgeon.
The members of the guilds were distressed by their 
departure, firstly because, according to Daulatabadi, they 
were pious and simple people, secondly perhaps because the 
cu1ama represented their grievances in powerful quarters, 
and there was still no other means of obtaining a hearing 
or redress. The reformers Malik al-Mutakallimin and Sayyid 
Jamal al-Din perceived that a dangerous rift was developing 
amongst the supporters of the Majlis, and decided that it 
was unwise to antagonise the Hi ama. They therefore arranged 
a reconciliation between the guilds and the leading lulama. 
The situation remained, however, that there could be no 
judicial reform without encroaching on the authority of the 
shari La. There was still an inherent clash of interests 
between the Hi 1ama and their following amongst the guilds, 
which was for the time being buried because of the need to 
maintain a united front against the Shah.
According to Daulatabadi there was also a division 
amongst the members of the guilds themselves as between the 
the more important members (rish sifldan) and the lesser
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and younger ones who were particularly active in the
4 7Anjuman of the Guilds. The former had links with certain 
government officials to whom they made representations on 
behalf of lesser members, which brought them both influence 
and pecuniary advantage. They were suspicious of change, 
of the younger members of the guilds and of the influence 
exerted amongst them by reformers such as Daulatabadi.
The lulama continued to stall on the regulations of the
Ministry of Justice. When, on 30th April, the President of
the Majlis announced that the ' bill was ready for completion,
Bihbihani complained because it had not been given to a
48committee of hilama to examine and expurgate. Mustashar 
al-Daula (Tabriz) tried to persuade him that the regulations 
were in two parts, one of which was purely concerned with 
administration, and the other with the shari *-a. It was not 
necessary for the Hi lama to occupy themselves with the 
administrative arrangements. Bihbihani retorted that all 
the regulations concerned the shari ua, especially since it 
was rumoured that the Majlis desired to limit the power of 
the shari La courts, which in effect meant limiting the shari La. 
Aqa Shaikh Husain, representing the guilds of Tehran, 
complained that the purpose of the Majlis was to give equal 
rights to rich and poor, and this was impossible as long as 
the Uulama issued contradictory ordinances. The more radical 
anjumans also tried to bring pressure on the ^ulama by 
threatening to occupy their houses unless they at once began 
discussing the regulations. In the end, Bihbihani, as 
previously, held his ground against any curtailment of the 
influence of the lulama in the judiciary. A decision was 
taken to form a committee to include other deputies as well 
as the Hi lama, but to examine the regulations article by 
article, whether they concerned the sharii*a or administrative
47. Ibid., p. 216.
48. Majlis, Year 2 No. Ill, 2nd May 1908, p. 2.
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regulations. By the time of the June coup the committee 
had still reached no agreement.
The Majlis was becoming increasingly dominated by the 
radical and somewhat lawless element in the anjumans, which 
were by now very numerous. From the autumn of 1906 they 
had been playing an important role in political life. As 
shown in the events of 1907 the Majlis depended on the 
anjumans to act as its 'strong arm' against the Shah. On the 
other hand many members were worried by the growth of 
lawlessness, for whilst some anjumans had a serious political 
aim, others had no purpose but agitation. As Malikzada 
commented:
'Many members belonged to the oppressed poor. They 
had little understanding of the rights and duties of 
members of a constitutional government, and constantly 
interfered in the work of government. Thus if a 
telegram arrived from the provinces complaining of the 
government officials, they at once organised a meeting, 
contacted other anjumans and went to the Majlis to lay 
a charge of transgression of rights or oppression, and 
also sent messengers to badger the relevant Ministry.
The Shah complained that he was the protector of the 
rights of the people, not this collection of roughs.'^ 9
Yet whilst the anjumans formed pressure groups with
radical aims and interests of their own, a number also took
their leadership from deputies, notables or members of the
Hi lama. The most powerful and best organised of the anjumans
was the Anjuman-i Adharbay jan which had 2,962 members, headed 
- - 50
by Taqizada. It was used to bring pressure to uphold the
policies of the Azadikhahan, giving them influence out of
proportion to their numbers in the Majlis. Another radical
anjuman was that of the Baradaran-i Darvaza-yi Qazvin (the
Brothers of the Qazvin Gate) led by Mirza Sulaiman Khan
51Maikada, the Quartermaster General. This anjuman appears
49. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., Ill, p. 82.
50. Marling to Grey, No. 39, 28th Feb. 1908,
FO 416/35, No. 356.
51. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., III, p. 277.
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to have been in the nature of a gang of retainers, since it
collapsed at Sulaiman Khan's arrest in June 1908. Also
militant was the Anjuman-i Muzaffari, led by the Tabriz
Deputy, Haj Mirza Ibrahim 7-i.qa^ and including amongst its
members officers in the regiment of riflemen of Muzaffar al- 
- - 52Din Shah. They may have joined through discontent at being 
unemployed. As was customary, Muhammad cAli Shah had instated 
his own bodyguard of Adharblay janTs on his accession to the throne, 
dismissing his father's. Particularly radical was the 
Anjuman-i Mujahidin, which included among its members LAbd 
al-Husain Taimur Tash, who had studied military science in
• # _  _  5 3
Russia, and was later Minister of Court under Riza Shah.
The anjuman was led largely by Malik al-Mutakallimin, and its
rank and file seem to have consisted of lesser tradesfolk
54and poorer persons. About 70 anjumans were formed amongst
55the guilds of Tehran, but with various purposes. Some 
reportedly held discussions reflecting modernist views, 
whilst others called for the reinstatement of Islam and many 
considered that the purpose of the Majlis was to lower or 
fix prices. Unfortunately not very much is known about them, 
but the police reports on the activities of Sayyid Jamal 
al-Din Isfahani reveal that they were numerous. Sayyid Jamal 
had for several years had a following amongst the artisans, 
and in 1907 particularly was inciting them to press for a 
'national militia' and to attack the bastis in Shah VAbd 
al-cAzim. His contacts included the Anjumans of the Grocers, 
Potters, Bricklayers, Cobblers, Goldsmiths, Patchers and 
Secondhand Dealers.^ Sayyid Jamal was the link between these 
organisations and their particular leaders in the Majlis,
52. Ibid., IV, p. 58.
53. Ibid., p. 57.
54. Ibid., p. 271.
55. Floor, Guilds (Thesis), op. cit.,
56. Yaghml'I, op. cit., pp. 281-3.
- 254 -
Bihbihani and TabatabaJi. The two mujtahids, whilst 
• •
using their following as did the Tabrizis, to enhance their
influence in the Majlis, also took pains to dampen its more
extreme manifestations, a policy which required finely
balanced manoeuvres. TabatabaJi did not actively express
• #
disapproval of the militia, but his remarks in the Majlis 
at this time reveal his anxiety over the extremist activities 
of the anjumans. They may also reflect the views of his 
other 'constituents' the leading merchants. Bihbihani 
similarly calmed a meeting that proposed to send a militia 
force to fight the Ottoman encroachment on the frontier, and 
when a member of the audience objected, those present told
_  ^g
him to be silent and obey Sayyid uAbdallah. On the other 
hand Bihbihani took up the demands for a militia to win 
popularity and prestige when his position in the Majlis was 
slipping in the autumn of 1907.
There is no sign of the merchants being involved in these 
activities, though they were occasionally present at meetings 
between leaders of the anjumans and the culama. They had 
their own anjuman reportedly held in respect, but it rarely 
featured in events.
The guilds also organised their own central anjuman,
largely at the instigation of the reformer, Yahya Daulatabadi,
59who wrote its regulations, and ran its newspaper. Each 
guild elected one member, from whom twelve were chosen, with 
Daulatabadi, to form a central committee. Members of the 
guilds from the provinces also assisted in forming anjumans 
which looked to the Tehran anjuman as their head. It might 
be thought that this organisation had links with the guild 
members in the Majlis, but evidence of connections has yet
57. This point was first made_by Charles Davis in a
talk on Sayyid Jamal al-Din given at St. Antony's,
Oxford, May 1982.
58. Yaghma>i op. cit., p. 286.
59. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, pp. 116-7.
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to emerge. The true representatives of most of the guild 
interests in the Majlis remained the mujtahids.
The tullab as a group are rarely mentioned in 1908.
There was reportedly an Anjuman-i Tullab headed by Bihbihani, 
and having slight conservative tendencies. In June 1907,
Bihbihani's tullab tried to persuade him to stop Sayyid
“ 60 —Jamal preaching. Shaikh Fazlallah retained a following of
tullab, and some are mentioned as being with the conservative
opposition. If it is remembered how few tu11ab could claim
to be serious students of theology, it may be surmised that
many donned secular garb, and became mujahidin or members of
the anjumans.
The conservative opposition also established anjumans, 
for example, the Anjuman-i 'Ilmiyya reportedly set up at the 
instigation of Na^ib al-Saltana through the mullah Sayyid
Husain Shushtari and including sayyids, mullahs, pishnamazes,
• —  61
rauza khvans, and others dependant on religious offices.
Each member was given a subsistence and encouraged to attack
the Uulama who supported the Majlis. When a special anjuman
for Isfahani members of the guilds who were residents of
Tehran was established, certain merchants with connections
6 2with the conservative courtiers got control of it.
According to Daulatabadi, the Shah and his uncles had infiltrated
a number of the anjumans with their own followers, and were
much better informed oh the activities of the anjumans and
6 3their strengths and weaknesses than in December. An
Anjuman-i Futuvvat, led by Zafar al-Saltana, met in the house
• •
of the Imam Jumla Khu'i, its purpose being reportedly to 
undermine the Anjuman-i Adharbayjan, particularly by 
organising demonstrations against cuts in salaries.^
60. YaghmaJI^  op. cit., p. 250.
61. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 271.
62. Ibid., p. 217.
63. Ibid., pp. 271-2.
64. Ibid., p. 161.
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Arshad al-Daula organised an Anjuman-i Markazi, with the
6 5purpose of discrediting the Majlis and the Shah. Members 
were encouraged to come to the Majlis and demand deposition 
of the Shah. According to Malikzada^180 anjumans in all
6 6declared themselves ready to support the Majlis in 1908. 
Beyond the fact that some of the guilds' anjumans seem to 
have paid for themselves, and other anjumans were, as 
mentioned above, funded by particular notables,,little is 
known of their financing. Malikzada says that many were 
unemployed and so poor that they ate dried bread and slept 
on a mattress out of doors.
Accounts vary as to how many of the anjumans were armed
but it was probably no more than two or three hundred, and
most of these lacked ammunition. Some members took out loans
6 7and bought guns themselves. Others were provided with
guns by the anjuman to which they belonged. Thus Mirza
Sulaiman Khan was accused of supplying arms to his own and
other anjumans from both the arsenal and the tribes near
Tehran with whom he had contact. The Zoroastrian merchant,
Arbab Jamshid was also said to have supplied money for arms
for the popular cause in December. Another source was said
to be Zill al-Sultan. But though there was talk of thousands
of armed men, when the Majlis actually came under threat in
June, Malik al-Mutakallimin tried in vain to get arms from
—  68a supplier named 2iya al-Mulk. He finally gave Malik 
al-Mutakallimin and his companion 'two guns and some bullets, 
for which they were grateful'.
65. Mustashar al-Daula, op. cit., p. 31.
66. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit.. Ill, p. 271.
67. Yaghma*!, op. cit., p. 284.
68. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., IV, p. 66.
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By the end of April mutual suspicion between the 
Shah and the radical anjumans had grown again. The authority 
of the Majlis, financially broke and increasingly 
intimidated by the anjumans, was at a minimum. At this 
point, reportedly at the behest of the Shah, the anti­
constitutionalist religious party became active again.
Sayyid Muhammad Yazdi, a relative of Sayyid *"Ali Yazdi, was 
implicated in posting leaflets in the bazaar in the name of
the mujahidin of Tabriz, implying they were self-confessed 
- - 69Babis. When Sayyid Muhammad was caught and sentenced to
long imprisonment even the culama who supported the constitution
70objected because he was a sayyid, but to no avail.
The Qajar family were now very anxious over the situation
and a series of meetings took place for several days at the
house of LAzad al-Mulk, the chief of the Oajar tribe. The
meetings were organised by three of the Qajar princes,
particularly Jalal al-Daula, son of Zill al-Sultan, and
• •
included Lu1ama, notables, deputies and representatives of 
71the anjumans. The Russians considered they were part of a
plot to bring Zill al-Sultan to the throne, and reported a 
• •
telegram had been sent requesting him to act as Regent.
Hartwig believed that Zill al-Sultan had been cooperating with
• •
the anjumans since December 1907, and that the Ministers
and Majlis were now totally intimidated by the
72revolutionaries.
As a result of the meetings the Shah was told he must 
either cooperate with the Majlis, or the Qajar family would
69. Kasravi, op. cit., pp. 559-560.
70. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 232.
71. Zahlr al-Daula, op. cit., p. 324.
72. Hartwig to Izvolsky, 21 Maia/3rd June and 25 Maia/
7th June 1908, Sbornik, p. 174, p. 180.
- 258 -
depose him. 1-Ie was to prove his sincerity by removing his
more hardline advisors, particularly Amir Bahadur. The Shah
felt obliged to agree and on 3rd June Amir Bahadur took bast
in the Russian Legation. Hartwig considered the Shah had
thus been deprived of his most trustworthy support and
protection, and that the revolutionary anjumans would take
advantage of the general disorder to make an attack on his 
73life. The Ministers and Majlis he believed too intimidated
to defend the Shah. In Hartwig's view, if the Shah, regarded
as pro-Russian, were removed, Zill al-Sultan, who was
• •
considered pro-British, would take advantage of the anarchy to 
seize the throne. The threat gave Hartwig and the Shah the 
pretext they had long been waiting for to disperse the 
anjumans and purge the Majlis.
On 4th June, the Shah with a strong escort, left his
palace for Bagh-i Shah, a residence just outside the west of
the city, where Hartwig considered he would be safe under the
74protection of the Cossack Brigade. On Saturday 6th June
Jalal al-Daula and two other Q a j a r  princes were arrested and
exiled. Amir Bahadur joined the Shah in Bagh-i Shah and the
telegraph lines were cut. Hartwig considered conditions now
favoured the Shah more than in December because many in the
75Majlis were alienated from the anjumans.
The Majlis looked on the arrest of the princes as 
contravention of the Fundamental Law. On 8th June Bihbihani
and TabatabaJi sent a note to all the provinces saying an
* * 7 6attack on the Majlis was feared. The anjumans had meanwhile
73. Hartwig to Izvolsky
Sbornik, p. 174.
74. Hartwig to Izvolsky
Sbornik, p. 176.
75. Hartwig to Izvolsky
Sbornik, p. 181.
76. Kasravi, op. cit.,
21 Maia/3rd June 1908,
22 Maia/4th June 1908, 
26 Maia/8th June 1908,
p. 587.
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rallied in the Sipah Salar Mosque and the Shah demanded
their dispersal. The Majlis realised that whereas the
Russians would support the Shah, the British would not
support them. Further, there was not the same enthusiasm
for the Majlis in the provinces as there had been in 
77December. It was decided to disperse the anjumans, though
the move was resisted by Bihbihani as a sign of weakness.
The leading merchants were meanwhile active. At the
instigation of Haj Muhammad I s m a ^ i i  and several others,
Malik al-Mutakallimin and Sayyid Jamal were ordered not to
speak. Amin al-Zarb and three other leading merchants
78seized what arms they could find and hid them.
The Shah, who had been moving arms and ammunition to 
Bagh-i Shah demanded that eight persons be either exiled 
or handed over to him. Nearly all of them were either 
militant preachers or members of the radical press. Some 
deputies were anxious to comply but Bihbihani resisted the 
move on the grounds that the Shah would then demand something 
else.
The British and Russian Ministers meanwhile fell into
disagreement over what their joint policy should be. Whilst
the British continued to pursue a policy of non-interference,
the Russians argued that this would enable Zill al-Sultan to• •
seize the throne. Hartwig represented this as a grave danger 
to Izvolsky, who, whilst anxious to maintain the Anglo- 
Russian Agreement, realised that the Agreement would be 
jeopardised in Russia itself if it resulted in a Shah of 
Persia known for his British sympathies.
77. Hartwig to Izvolsky, 7 Iiun. /20th June 1908, 
Sbornik, p. 191.
78. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., IV, p. 25.
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On 14th June the Shah's soldiers were given guns and
ammunition. The bazaars closed, partly because of
79intimidation by the revolutionary anjumans. The Majlis 
petitioned the Shah on the 15th complaining of his failure 
to enforce the constitution. In return the Shah demanded 
more authority than granted in the Fundamental Law, sole 
control over the army, and the right to suppress any 
'national' forces.
The Majlis and the anjumans realised that an attack
was imminent. The radicals slept in the Majlis for safety,
but the organisation of their provisions, mainly from the
Anjumans of the Guilds and Merchants, was haphazard because
80 _ _
of lack of funds. Bihbihani proposed that the people and
^ulama should congregate in the Masjid-i Shah, and present
themselves as the oppressed seeking their rights. In the
event, on the 23rd Sadr al-<-Ulama, other mullahs and members
of the guilds put on winding sheets, and went to the Masjid,
81but were unable to gather popular support.
On 22nd a demand from the Shah that the 8 radicals be
handed over was rejected. At 6 a.m. the following morning
20 Cossacks were sent to arrest them. Being fired on from
the Sipah Salar Mosque, they withdrew. Reinforcements were
brought in under Russian officers. Bihbihani and Tabataba^i
• •
arrived with their following, but when the firing started 
again they fled to a nearby house where they were later 
arrested. Only the Anjuman-i Adharbayjan and some members 
of the Anjuman-i Muzaffari put up a fight. ;The mosque was 
forcibly cleared, and the Majlis building bombarded.
79. Hartwig to Izvolsky:, 1 Iiiin, ./30 th June 1908, 
Sbornik, p. 216.
80. Daulatabadi, op. cit., II, p. 308.
81. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., IV, p. 84.
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Bihbihani and Tabataba^i, seized in the garden where they 
• «
had taken refuge, were seriously manhandled by the Shah's
soldiers and servants, but later rescued by an Iranian
Cossack officer and taken to Bagh-i Shah. Shortly afterwards
Bihbihani was despatched to Iraq, later changed to Kurdestan,
and Tabataba*i to Mashhad.
• •
The circumstances and participants in the events of
December 1907 and June 1908 were outwardly similar, yet the
outcome was entirely different. One reason was the employment
of the Cossack Brigade, which as a fighting force was much
superior to the cohorts of muleteers, roughs and tribal
levies the Shah had assembled in December. But probably of
greater significance than the Russian decision to give the
Shah firmer support in June than in December was that popular
enthusiasm for the Majlis was ebbing away, a point not lost
on the Russians. Already in December there were signs of
disillusionment with the Majlis, and TabatabaJi complained
• •
that:
'We heard much praise of a constitutional form of 
government. If this is the result there is no
advantage in it. Is it not the duty of the Sovereign
to preyent disorders? Under present conditions, life
in this city is i m p o s s i b l e . ' ^
By January accusations of corruption were being made.
Marling reported that about £50,000 extorted from certain 
notables (presumably for the National Bank) had been lodged 
with one of the Vice Presidents (probably Amin al-Zarb, who 
kept the Majlis books). No account had been given and the money 
was said to have been quietly absorbed by the Assembly and 
the anjumans. In late January there was a violent 
disagreement in the Majlis with deputies accusing each other
82. Marling to Grey, No. 261, 4th Dec. 1907,
FO 416/34 No. 439.
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8 3of pecculation and self-interest. The Majlis was reported
weaker than before, in February, and to be unpopular because of
84prevalence of the committee system. . it also incurred
odium by paying its own members arrears of salary, which
were denied to others. In March the Majlis continued to
lose ground in popular esteem on account of its inefficiency
8 5and the committee system. Marling commented that the Shah 
was doing nothing against the Majlis, possibly because he 
thought it was becoming 'so disordered and unpopular that 
it would die a natural death'.
Daulatabadi, in enumerating the reasons why the Majlis
failed to defend itself in June 1908, gives lack of support
as a major factor. He says that in December financial
support came in for the Majlis and the anjumans, but that
8 6it was seriously short of money in June. A major factor
was the loss of enthusiasm on the part of the wealthy 
merchants. When in mid-June Bihbihani sought funds to
instigate a demonstration in the bazaar in support of the
— * — — 87Majlis, both Amin al-Zarb and Mucin al-Tujjar refused.
The merchants were critical of the militants and the radical 
anjumans and inclining towards the Shah. Arbab Jamshid, who 
was said to have provided money for guns in December, was 
worried by the murder of a Zoroastrian merchant, andx seeing 
that the Majlis was too weak to provide proper protection, 
was secretly in touch with members of the court. Amin
83. Marling to Grey, No. 
FO 416/35, No. 204.
14, 29th Jan 1908,
84. Marling to Grey, No. 
FO 416/35 No. 357.
41. 26th Feb. 1908,
85. Marling to Grey, No. 
FO 416/36, No. 65.
77, 27th March 1908,
86. Daulatabadi, op. cit. / II, p. 271.
87. Ibid., p. 303.
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al-Zarb had disapproved of the militants, but for reasons
unspecified was not on good terms with the Shah. Some of
the provincial deputies sent telegrams home to the effect
that the Shah was wronged and the anjumans and the
88extremists were the oppressors. Many resented the
interference of the Lulama in affairs, whilst others opposed
the dominance of the Tabrizis. Also some of the Qajar clan,
who had been able to influence the Majlis through Ihtisham
al-Saltana as long as he was President, were less enthusiastic
when he was replaced by Mumtaz al-Daula, who was known to be
89close to the Tabrizis. As a result, the Majlis lost their 
patronage.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the progress of reform from September 1907 
to June 1908 and the reaction to it amongst the uulama 
highlighted the divergence between the interests of the 
Lulama and those of many of their following and collaborators 
in the initial opposition movement. Resistance to the reforms 
in the judiciary brought them into conflict with 
westernising modernisers such as Taqizada and the 
Azadikhahan, and reformist bureaucrats wanting centralised 
government, such as Mukhbir al-Saltana. The chief impediment 
to an efficient and impartial Ministry of Justice as desired 
by the merchants and guilds was that such an institution 
would encroach upon the authority of the Lulama over the 
administration of the shari*>a.
Yet the reformers in the Majlis, realising that they 
already had formidable opposition in the Shah and the
88. Ibid., p. 275.
89. Ibid., p. 273.
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conservative courtiers, sustained by the Russians, 
perceived that it was as well for the present not to bring 
out their differences with the lulama, especially as the 
support of the latter was still needed to legitimise the 
Majlis. Therefore the interests of Islam were placed on 
a level with those of Iran in the Fundamental Law, and 
the lulama were able to hold their ground against the 
encroachments of reform.
The dependance of the mujtahid on his relations with
other members of the community meant that leading Lulama,
and particularly Bihbihani, continued to represent the views
and interests of those they were linked to. In the case of
Bihbihani and TabatabaJi these were the merchants, guilds 
• •
and tullab, and the anjumans in which certain of these groups
were involved. The opinion of the pro-Majlis uulama was to
some extent conditioned by that of their following, as for
example in the matter of the 'national militia'. Bihbihani's
rise to a position of considerable power was due to his
ability to remain constantly in touch with popular opinion
and represent it in the Majlis. It seems, however, that
the dedication of the two mujtahids to the Majlis was greater
than that of many of their following, as is witnessed by
their firm defence of it at the end. On TabatabaJi's part
• •
this was mainly ideological - whatever the faults of the 
Majlis he never ceased to prefer it to the Shah. Bihbihani 
had probably gone too far along the path of opposition to 
be reconciled with the Shah, and to desert the Majlis would 
mean the loss of his power and prestige.
Of the following of the two mujtahids, the leading 
merchants seem to have separated from them during 1908, 
largely because of the growth in lawlessness and the 
predominance of the radical anjumans over which they had no 
influence. The majority of the lesser merchants and the 
guilds appear to have either continued in their support or
- 265 -
else to have remained neutral in the battle with the Shah.
The tullab, though on the conservative side, do not appear 
to have opposed the Majlis as a group. l\To doubt many still 
followed the mujtahid who paid them, whilst others may have 
been absorbed by the anjumans.
Shaikh Fazlallah continued to provide the Shah, and 
those whose interests were vested in the traditional system, 
with an ideology for opposition - that the Majlis had been 
taken over by 'heretics' and that the Fundamental Law was 
not 'mashrula', suggesting justification for a purging of 
the Majlis and a redrafting of the Constitution. In the 
latter part of December 1908 Shaikh Fazlallah seems to have 
been campaigning on his own account with probable financial 
support from members of the court even less conciliatory 
than the Shah'.
In the political manoeuvering within the Majlis 
Bihbihani, leading the Lu1ama, behaved much as any politician 
bent on maintaining his power. Thus he joined up with the 
Tabriz deputies, with whom he had little in common, when 
both groups found their position threatened by Ihtisham 
al-Saltana.
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CHAPTER VIII
SHAIKH FAZLALLAH AND THE ABSOLUTIST CAUSE
In the immediate aftermath of the coup, with the
attitude of the British in particular and the situation
in the country in general still uncertain, the Shah and
Shaikh Fazlallah felt it expedient to express themselves
with caution on the subject of constitutionalism. Shaikh
Fazlallah said that constitutionalism must be in conformity
with the shari ua, and the Majlis limited. By mid-August
he was feeling sufficiently confident to excommunicate the
constitutionalist Lulama of Najaf, and say openly that
2constitutionalism was contrary to Islam.
Nazim al-Islam's account reveals many people in Tehran,
and his associates among the lesser 'mlama in particular, as
disillusioned with constitutionalism. On some points Nazim
al-Islam had moved closer to Shaikh Fafclallah's view, saying
that the previous constitutionalism had not been in conformity
with the shariua, that freedom of the press had been abused,
and that if the Shah had not acted against the seditious nothing
3
would be left of Iran and Islam. He also opined that the 
three mujtahids of Najaf were ignorant of the conditions 
constitutionalism had created, and would not have supported 
it otherwise.
Amongst other sections of the populace, constitutionalism 
had become unpopular because their financial lot had 
deteriorated still further under its regime. Many existed
1. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., II, p. 169.
2. Ibid., p. 183.
3. Ibid., pp. 236-7.
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on salaries and emoluments provided by the government, and 
blamed the Majlis for their employer's lack of funds. 
According to Nazim al-Islam many merchants and guildsmen 
felt that matters had worked better under the despotism 
(istibdad - which word now acquired quite positive 
connotations). ^
In contrast to many of his following, Tabataba-1 i retained• •
his faith in constitutionalism, commenting that:
'In the next few months the people will be busy 
thinking of their own affairs, but then they will 
wake up and realise what a blessing they have 
lost. Then they will once again seek their rights 
and be "pulling at our skirts"'.5
On the whole the Shah seems to have had a fair amount 
of support amongst the people of Tehran, and for a few 
months the game was in his hands. Marling estimated that 
if he gave any proof of a capacity to govern, the bulk of 
the population would acquiesce 'for a time' to absolutism.
In reality many regarded the question as a matter of choosing 
the lesser of two evils. Marling's view of the alternatives 
available was not optimistic:
'If the Shah is able to secure the return of 
subservient Deputies, the new Parliament will 
only serve to sanction the restoration of the
old state of affairs which originally led to
the constitutional movement; while, on the other 
hand, if the elections are free, they are likely
to result in the return of a House as hostile to
His Majesty as the last, but without the support 
of the Anjumans to make its opposition effective.
In neither case would the cause of reform be 
forwarded.
4. Ibid., p. 364.
5. Ibid., pp. 363-4.
6. Marling to Grey, No. 213, 13th Aug. 1908,
FO 416/37, No. 404.
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To this may be added that a Majlis with the support of the 
anjumans would only produce the disorder and paralysis of 
government evident in early 1908.
The main thrust for the reintroduction of the Majlis 
came from the constitutionalists of Tabriz, but it was 
strongly pressed by the British and Russians. The British 
in particular believed the Majlis held the best prospect 
for introducing a proper system of financial control, and 
this view was to some extent endorsed by the Russians. Both 
realised that unless the turmoil in Tabriz was settled the 
Russians might become embroiled there, thus endangering the 
1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement. On 8th September the two 
powers therefore made representations to the Shah to restore 
the Majlis. In his reply the Shah stated that it was his 
intention to form a Majlis which would 'suit the nature of 
the country, be in conformity with the religious laws and not
7
again cause anarchy.' It would not, however, be established 
before the restoration of order in Azarbaijan, which condition 
really meant the Shah would be able to summon the Majlis he 
wanted, or indeed, no Majlis at all.
Throughout September and October a struggle took place 
between the Shah and the court camarilla on the one hand, 
and the British and Russians on the other, over the 
summoning of some sort of assembly. At about the end of 
October the Shah was openly joined by the anti-constitutional 
*ulama, led by Shaikh Fazlallah, who sent messages to the 
lulama of the provinces requesting the despatch of telegrams 
signed by themselves, merchants, guilds and any others 
stating that constitutionalism had.been tried in Iran and
7. Marling to Grey, No. 309 Tel., 19th Sept. 1908, 
FO 416/37, No. 540.
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had failed. The present order of affairs was quite adequate
g
and there was no need to alter it. In another missive the 
Shaikh announced that he was despatching an emissary to the 
lulama of every district to explain his policies.
The lulama of Najaf also took up the propaganda battle
and sent the Shah a telegram implying he was a tyrant and
saying his conduct in failing to grant representative
9government was an offence against the Absent Imam. These
events caused commotion in Mashhad where Tabataba7 i was
• •
accused of inciting agitation and had to write protesting his 
innocence to the Sadr-i Aczam.^ The 'ulama of Mashhad wavered 
as between the two parties until a telegram from Shaikh 
Fazlallah recalled them to their anti-constitutionalist 
duties.
Shaikh Fazlallah's vigorous propoganda campaign produced 
a flurry of telegrams from the provinces. On 7th November a 
demonstration against the reintroduction of constitutionalsm 
organised by the Shah's entourage took place in Bagh-i Shah. 
Some hundreds of persons attended including lesser merchants 
and guildsmen, notables and princes and Shaikh Fazlallah 
and his lulama following. Court officials read out telegrams 
from the provinces requesting the abandonment of 
constitutionalism, and those present signed a petition in 
the same sense.
The British and Russian representatives, for whose 
benefit this had largely been staged, were not taken in.
8 . Zahir al-Daula, op. cit., p. 401.
9. Barclay to Grey, No. 287, 
FO 416/38, No. 231.
4th Nov. 1908,
10. Franklin to Barclay, Nos. 
FO 248/939, Nos. 232, 236
48 & 49,
•
28th Nov. 1908,
11. Franklin to Barclay, No. 
FO 248/939, No. 225.
47, 21st Nov. 1908,
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Informed by one Minister that he had only signed for fear
of the consequences, Barclay considered that most of those
12present had done the same. Accused of staging the 
demonstration the Shah denied that it was artificial and 
claimed a large section of the population regarded 
constitutionalism as contrary to their religion. Barclay 
countered that most people supported constitutionalism. In 
fact most people at this stage were probably either undecided 
or indifferent, but the Shah was using the objections of the 
^ulama to justify his own opposition to the Majlis, and 
Barclay was using the chimera of popular support to press 
for a Majlis which the British hoped would introduce order 
into the finances.
At about this point the constitutionalists began to
take heart, and a petition signed by SaniL al-Daula, several
ex-deputies, members of the lulama led by Sadr al-'Ulama, and
merchants, numbering 3 2 in all, was presented to the legations
13on 15th November. There was also a note by a muitahid
(Sadr al-uUlama?) stating that constitutionalism was in
conformity with Islam. At about the same time a group of
culama, led by Sayyid uAli Yazdi, who had switched sides,
reportedly because the Shah had failed to compensate him
adequately for previous services, held meetings at which
14the Shah was enjoined to open a Majlis.
In response to the protests of the legations and the 
constitutionalist activity, further demonstration was 
organised in Bagh-i Shah on 19th November, in which Shaikh
12. Barclay to Grey, No. 366 Tel., 8th Nov. 1908,
FO 416/38 No. 162.
13. FO 248/947, No. 322, Received 15th Nov. 1908.
14. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., V, p. 67.
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Fazlallah was more openly active. A petition was presented
15to the Shah which had been prepared under his auspices.
It stated that a meeting of all classes had agreed that a 
national consultative assembly was inconsistent with the 
precepts of Islam, but that no rescript had been issued 
confirming this. Therefore:
'Since by the firm order of the Creator of the World, 
the foundation of Islam throughout the centuries has 
been in the trust of the Sultan of the Age and the 
lulamat the issue of a rescript is requested.'16
In addition, a petition was read on behalf of the merchants
and guilds stating they did not want constitutionalism as it
created disorder. According to Malikzada, considerable
pressure had been brought to bear on most of them by Mufakhkhar
17al-Mulk, Vice-Governor of Tehran. In response to 'the
request of the 1ulama' the Shah granted a rescript banning
constitutionalism and an elected assembly. In it he stated
that he had ever been ready to protect Islam, and now that
the ordinances of the lu1ama of the capital and the provinces
had expressly stated that the institution of a majlis was
18contrary to Islam, he would abandon the idea.
The British and Russians responded immediately with a
strongly worded joint note on 22nd November. The rescript,
which had been printed and promulgated to the Lu1ama of the
provinces, but not yet posted in Tehran, was withdrawn on
the 23rd. Barclay saw the Foreign Minister, '•Ala al-Saltana
• *
15. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., II, p. 234.
•
16. The wording of the request reflects the_theory
of a partnership between Shah and *>u 1 ama mentioned 
in Chapter I.
17. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., IV, p. 200;
see also Tafrishi Husaini, op. cit., p. 279.
•
18. Barclay to Grey, No. 302, 25th Nov. 1908,
FO 416/38, No. 386.
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on 24th to demand a properly constituted Majlis, which 
would ensure the restoration of order in Azarbaijan. LAla 
al-Saltana riposted with some truth that the trouble in 
Azarbaijan had nothing to do with constitutionalism, that 
Iran was not ready for constitutionalism, and that the majority 
of people were against it. Barclay responded that the 
'educated classes' of the capital were in favour of it as 
a way of subjecting the Shah's advisors to some control. The 
Foreign Minister then produced an Egyptian newspaper, and 
asked Barclay why, if Britain thought constitutional 
government was such a benefit, she did not confer it upon 
Egypt. To this Barclay had no adequate response.
The rescript banning a constitutional maj1is was posted
all over Tehran on 1st December. Its publication was
followed by an urgent message from the Shah to the British
and Russian Ministers denying responsibility. An explanation
of the incident may be provided by a letter from Shaikh
Fazlallah to the Sadr-i Aczam saying that since the printing
• *
of the notice had been delayed he himself had had it printed
19and distributed.
In an attempt to placate the two powers, the Shah
appointed a new body called the majlis-i shura-yi kubra-yi
daulati or High Consultative Council of State. The members
of this assembly were all of absolutist sympathies and
measures were instigated by the government and ratified by
the Shah. The two powers protested that this was not an
elected assembly. AbuJ1 Qasim TabatabaJi, who was a member
• •
of the Council, received a letter from his father in Mashhad 
saying constitutionalism and a correct Majlis were needed,
19. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., V, p. 270.
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20not this counterfeit assembly attended by false persons.
By December 1908 there appears to have been a shift
in popular opinion in Tehran. Nazim al-Islam reported that
members of his anjuman were despairing of the Shah and
repenting of supporting him as there was no improvement in
the country's condition. The Shah had been no more able to
solve the country's problems than the Majlis. As in the
summer, salaries remained unpaid, trade could not function
because of disorders, and there was a shortage of money. The
merchants were also reportedly discontented because they had
once again no protection from extortion at the hands of the
21Shah's advisers.
On 20th December forty persons took bast in the Ottoman
Legation. Amongst their leaders was Sadr al-HJlama, who had
evidently assumed the mantle of TabatabaJi and Bihbihani as
• •
the leading mujtahid of the constitutionalist cause. On
22nd the numbers in the Ottoman Legation had risen to 270,
and a petition demanding the restoration of the constitution
and stating it was in accordance with the laws of Islam,
signed by 650 persons, including Sanlu al-Daula, was presented
22to the Austrian Legation. The British and Russians now
fearing that the Germans and Austrians would capitalise
on popular discontent, again pressed the Shah to issue an 
23electoral lav/.
Shaikh Fazlallah resumed the pressure from the other
side. He and Sayyid Ahmad TabatabaJi organised meetings of
• • •
20. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., II, p. 273
21. Barclay to Grey, No. 297, 15th Nov. 1908,
FO 416/38 No. 329.
22. P.L.P. II, No. 375/139, 22nd Dec. 1908, BMFA.
23. Barclay to Grey, No. 446 Tel., 22nd Dec. 1908,
FO 416/38 No. 417.
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several hundred people which sent the Shah a request to
the effect that constitutionalism was contrary to Islam and 
24forbidden. They were encouraged by the conservative
notables, such as MaJib al-Saltana. Thus when the British
and Russians saw the Sadr-i A^ zam on 24th December, he proved• *
unexpectedly stubborn, and argued that elections by the
25people w7ere contrary to Islam, a point, no doubt, derived 
from Shaikh Fazlallah.
On 28th December the bazaars closed, but were forcibly
reopened. The bast in the Ottoman Legation now included
merchants, guildsmen, and officials, who, having received no
2 6salary, saw7 no point in supporting the existing regime.
On 29th December Sayyid lAli Yazdi, acting from a sense of 
grievance over payments, and Sayyid Jamal al-Din Afja^i, who 
had always supported constitutionalism^ took bast in Shah cAbd 
al-Azim, together with their tullab. They were later joined 
by Mlrza Mustafa Ashtiyani, who had been quiescent since the
• • n
early days of the opposition movement.
Shortly afterwards, on the 8th January, an attempt was
made on Shaikh Fazlallah's life* in which he was slightly
wounded. His assailant, Karim Davatsaz, who had a shop in
the tinsmiths' bazaar, refused to divulge the identity of
his associates, but according to Malikzada, he had been put
up to it by a secret organisation called the Jahangir
Committee, set up by some of the constitutionalists resident
27in Qulhak, with links with Tabriz and Gilan.
•
CM Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., II, p. 270.
25. Barclay to Grey, No. 451 
FO 416/38 No. 423.
Tel. , 25th Dec. 1908,
26. Zahir al-Daula, op. cit., P* 414.
•
CM Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., V, p. 109.
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The committee was not the only group inimical to the
Shaikh, as Barclay, who had for some time been advocating
the removal of the Sadr-i A^am and Amir Bahadur, now added
the name of Shaikh Fazlallah. On 21st.February he
telegrammed to Grey that the Shaikh should be removed from
Tehran, for though he was not a minister he had a most
2 8baneful influence. The Russians, however, considered the 
measure imprudent on the grounds that:
'This mujtahid enjoys great influence not only in 
conservative circles but also amongst moderate 
elements with whom it is indispensable to collaborate 
for the success of the reform project. Any steps 
which the two governments undertook against this 
Shaikh could provoke the discontent of the masses, 
especially in Tehran, where he has many adherents 
amongst the tullab.' ^ 9
That Shaikh Fazlallah had influence amongst conservatives 
such as court notables, fief and pension holders, and a 
large section of the *»ulama, is almost certainly true, but 
it is difficult to find evidence of support amongst the 
'moderates', presumably meaning those who would support a 
majlis with a limited franchise. Although he does not 
appear to have controlled vagf property of any substance, 
he does seem to have been held in respect amongst the tullab 
as a teacher, so he may have had a following amongst them.
Of course, this influence may have been augmented by 
provision for their stipends. With regard to the poorer 
classes, he was identified in December 1907 with those of 
them who derived their income ultimately from the Shah, 
what Abrahamian calls 'the palace economy', and demonstrations 
by these persons were probably due less to Shaikh Fazlallah's 
influence than the organisation and inducements provided
28. Barclay to Grey, No. Ill Tel., 21st Feb. 1909,
FO 416/39, No. 327.
29. Nicholson to Grey, No. 172, 18th March 1909,
FO 416/39, No. 470.
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by the Shah's roughs. Nevertheless, the Russians were 
probably correct in estimating that it would be unwise to 
interfere with such an eminent religious figure.
In the bazaars a struggle was taking place over whether
to support the bast, with both the constitutionalists and
the Shah using coercive tactics. The bast was evidently
30funded from the bazaar with support from discontented
notables such as Farman Farma. Possibly each group or
individual funded themselves with the lesser merchants
contributing more than others. Of the merchants who did
support it at least two were money lenders, who were no doubt
still owed large sums by the government. One notable feature
is the absence of the influence of the major merchants. Amin
al-Zarb was bankrupt at this point. Haj Muhammad Isma^ -il had
* •
joined the absolutists, and was making a profit from the mint,
31where he was twice reprimanded for issuing false coin.
Arbab Jamshid had grown cool on the idea of constitutionalism 
since the murder of the Zoroastrian merchant. Mu‘in al- 
Tujjar continued to prosper, but though he did come with 
Sani^ al-Daula to see the Shah in December 1908, he is not 
reported as actively sustaining the bast.
It appears some guilds were supporting the bast and some
were not. The cobblers guild declared they had no business
32with either mashruta or istibdad. When the bazaars finally
closed in mid-February, the tobacco sellers, hat makers, shoe
makers and sellers of second-hand items tried on several
33occasions to reopen. No doubt they were influenced by the 
fact that their businesses were hard hit.
30. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., H H p. 268.
31. Marling to Grey, No. 239, 
FO 416/37 No. 575.
3rd Sept. 1908,
32. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., II, p. 270.
33. Ibid., p. 314.
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In addition, pro-constitutionalists used coercive 
tactics to induce the bazaar to close. When some of the 
guilds tried to stay open in February, they were threatened 
with a bomb, and on 20th a bomb actually exploded in the
34quarters of the second-hand dealers, who promptly closed.
A leaflet was posted through the door of an ammunition
35
seller who was told his duty was to stay open, not to close.
A similar leaflet was delivered to the house of a leading 
member of the -^ulama who had not gone to bast in the shrine. 
Messages were passed round the bazaar that the guilds should
stay closed and references made to an order of the *-ulama
* ^ • * 36 of Najaf.
Various measures were also taken to force the bazaars
to open. Haj Muhammad Isma^il managed to prevent some of the
37guilds closing in January. The Russian Legation prompted
the Russian Bank to reclaim immediately debts owed to them
by the merchants in the Ottoman Legation. The government
sent cossacks, soldiers and gendarmes to oblige the bazaars
to open, but without success. Government ministers eventually
tried to persuade some of the merchants, whom they seem to
have regarded as the prime movers in the closures, to reopen
the bazaar with promises that constitutional government
3 8would be reinstated, but to no avail.
The numbers in ShahkAbd al-cAzim had grown by March to
1000.persons. They were joined in mid-March by the aged
mujtahid Raihanallah, who had cooperated with Shaikh Fazlallah
39in the autumn, but now seemed to have changed with the wind.
34. Ibid., p. 314
35. Ibid., p. 335
36. Ibid., p. 295
37. Ibid., p. 272
38. Ibid., p. 311
39. Ibid., p. 326
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The Shah had earlier been urged by Shaikh Fazlallah to
take firm action against the bastis in Shah '■Abd al-*-Azim 
40in particular, and soldiers were sent on 14th March to
stop Sayyid LAli Yazdi from preaching. On 23rd March
Mustafa Ashtiyani and three others were assassinated in a 
• •
house near the Shrine by the Shah's roughs led by Sani1- 
Hazrat. It was widely believed that Mufakhir al-Mulk.
was involved, though the incident seems to have been set up
— 41by ffiujallal al-Sultan the Shah's Chamberlain and henchman.
According to Sanic Hazrat at his trial some months later, the
original orders were to assassinate Sayyid lAli Yazdi, but
since they could not find him and did not want to go back
empty-handed, they entered a house by the Shrine and shot
the inhabitants, who happened to be Mustafa Ashtiyani and
• •
his associates. Evidently the purpose of the attack was to 
frighten the bastis into leaving the Shrine.
At the end of March Saud al-Daula, probably at the
instigation of the Russians, proposed a meeting of all classes
to give their view on the reinstitution of constitutional
government. A letter from Shaikh Fazlallah published by
Malikzada may be a response to an invitation to attend the
meeting. The letter was written not long, after he was shot,
42as he refers to his joy at being able to stand up and walk.
In it he was most scornful about a gathering to which he had 
been invited. There was no need for it especially as there 
had recently been large gatherings participated in by people 
of all kinds in support of the Shah. 'Last time the 
ambassadors complained we nevertheless got rid of the idea 
of an assembly, and things worked out well.'
40. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., V, p. 279.
41. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., II, p. 530.
• —
42. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., V, p. 279.
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A second letter from Shaikh Fazlallah to the Sadr.-i
43A Lzam also probably dates from this time. It mentions 
that Sakd al-Daula is in contact with the ambassadors who 
are also making representations. It also says that Tabriz
is nearly taken so must date from the time when vAin al-
Daula was threatening the city, but before the Russians 
entered on 20th April. He exorts the government not to weaken 
as the disorders will grow worse. He shows only a limited 
understanding of the British and Russian policies and power.
In his view the European powers are pressing the Shah now 
because they fear that if Tabriz falls there will be no 
further chance of constitutionalism. He goes on to say:
'I am an old worshipper with one foot in the grave.
I have no desire for life, and that which I had to 
see of this world I have seen, but as long as I 
live I will never cease to struggle for Islam, and 
what life I have left I will sacrifice for it.1
The meeting proposed by Savd al-Daula took place on
26th March, notables and ‘•ulama being invited. When
constitutionalism was brought up, AbuJ1-Qasim Tabataba^i,
• •
who envisaged a division between religious affairs and those
of the running of the state, propounded the view that where
there was no law the wise men of the land had to enact 
44laws. In Iran there was the law of Islam, which had to be 
followed. However, the law of Islam did not cover certain 
matters not in existence in the early years of Islam, such 
as administration of the army or the running of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. For these matters, which concerned 
state affairs, the people had to collect laws in a code, 
which would be in conformity with the shariua. His opponents
43. Ibid., pp. 261-4.
44. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., II, p. 339.
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led by *-Ali Akbar Burujirdi representing Shaikh Fazlallah, 
retorted that the lav/s of Islam covered all affairs, and 
the Prophet had dictated what was permitted and what was 
forbidden. Evidently in the face of this new attack 
Shaikh Fazlallah was being at his most fundamental. The 
meeting appears to have ended inconclusively.
The Shah, still under pressure from the two powers,
summoned a further meeting to discuss the matter, and Shaikh
Fazlallah again organised agitation against it. Large
gatherings were held under the banner, 'We do not want
45constitutionalism, we are subject to the Quran'. At the 
subseguent meeting, the debate grew acrimonious, with LAli 
Akbar Burujirdi voicing Shaikh Fazlallah's views that 
elections were against the sharila, and that any majlis must 
be endorsed and participated in by the Hi 1 ama, and SaHl al- 
Daula presenting the usual view of the higher bureaucracy 
that the Hi 1ama should not intervene in government. The 
anti-constitutionalist Hi lama lost and the gathering agreed 
to petition the Shah to grant a majlis in accordance with 
the wishes of the two representatives.
On 5th May the Shah issued a rescript restoring 
constitutional government, and on 9th May another ordering 
'learned constitutionalists' to draft a new electoral law. 
The latter rescript also explained that it had been the 
Shah's intention to grant a Majlis in November, but that the 
' Hicrala' had beseeched him not to do so as it would be a 
cause of sedition. The Shah thus laid the blame for the 
failure to restore the constitution on the anti­
constitutionalist Hi 1ama, whom he was now evidently 
jettisoning as being of no further use to him. Possibly he 
held the meetings on restoring constitutionalism partly to 
disembarrass himself of their arguments. The Shah finally 
signed the new electoral law in mid-June.
45. Ibid., p. 543.
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In May 1909 Shaikh Fazlallah published a 'pamphlet' 
which set forth all his arguments against constitutional 
government. The 'pamphlet' is mentioned in the Russian 
newspaper Rossiya of 1st June which says it was published
4
a few days before and freely distributed amongst the people. 
This 'pamphlet' may be either of two works by Shaikh 
Fazlallah; the first is a treatise entitled Tadhkirat al- 
Ghafil wa irshad al-jahil, dated 1326 but written after the
fall of the Majlis, that is between July 1908 - January
47 -1909; the second is a fatva written after the fall of the
Majlis, but otherwise undated, and published by Malikzada 
- 48in his Mashrutiyyat. As the arguments expressed in the 
treatise and the fatva are similar, the two will be treated 
together, and any difference or development from 1907 
indicated.
The most fundamental new concept that Shaikh Fazlallah 
introduced into his arguments against constitutionalism was 
that it interfered not only with the workings of the shari *»a 
but with its basic purposes. First he emphasised that the 
two systems, Islam and what he called infidelity (kufr) were
46. Rossiya, 19 Maia /1st June 1909, Browne Papers.
47. (A Reminder to the Negligent and a Guide to the 
Ignorant). The work bears no name, and Hairi 
originally believed it to be_by Shaikh uAbd al- 
Nabl Nuri (see Hairi, Shiv ism, op. cit., p. 209, 
p. 260)._ Hairi_has since referred me to M.A. 
Mudarrisi, Raifraria al-Adab, Tehran n.d. VI,
p. 264, who lists the Tadhkirat as one of the 
works of Shaikh Fazlallah. The arguments are 
similar to those in the fatva (see below), and 
on p. 36 is found the legend inscribed on Shaikh 
Fazlallah's seal (Dhalika fadlu Allah### see Ch# V),
48. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., IV, pp. 211-221
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different and each possessed of a logic complete in itself. 
Thus he said:
'They (that is the constitutionalists) maintain that 
the law can be changed. Does this mean change from 
Islam to infidelity, or from infidelity to Islam?
It is obvious either of these is f a l s e . '49
He goes on to say:
'If such a change would be from Islam to Islam it 
is conceivable. But it is an error (qhalat) to make 
a law (which by its nature must be enforced) 
concerning an action which the_Founder of Islam has 
designated as permissible (mubah, i.e. that need not 
be obeyed or enforced), and as a consequence to 
punish (a Muslim) for non-compliance with a law 
which (according to the shari*-a) he need not obey. '
The argument devolves on the significance of the words mubah
and vajib. These terms are two of the five qualifications
(al-Ahkam al-Khamsa), namely: wajib, obligatory; mandub,
recommended; mubah, permissible; makruh, reprehensible; and
haram, forbidden. Every act of a Muslim is subsumed in
Islamic law under one of these five qualifications. They
provide a scale of moral evaluation by which all acts and
50 -relationships are measured. The shari*»a thus comprises an
infallible doctrine of ethics covering the whole religious,
political, social, and domestic lives of those who profess 
51Islam. Problems, which in other legal systems belong to
the moral or religious sphere only, come within the competence
of the shariva jurist, and he is obliged to give a value
52judgement on all human actions. Certain actions are 
neither recommended or condemned, but regarded with 
indifference (mubah). But in reality the fuqaha still retain
49. Ibid., p. 215.
50. N. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh 
1974), p. 83.
51. Encyclopaedia of Islam, First Edition, Shariua
s
52. Y. Linant de Bellefonds, Traite de Droit Musulman 
Compare* (Paris 1965), I, p. 78.
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ultimate authority over these actions because only they 
are empowered by their knowledge of figh to designate 
whether an action is permissible. The ultimate purpose of 
categorising every action by one of the five qualifications 
is to secure divine favour both on earth and in the 
hereafter. The Muslim community is intended to be so 
ordered by the shari ^a that its individual members may 
secure favourable judgement on the day of resurrection.
Thus, when Shaikh Fazlallah accused his opponents of 
interfering with the shariva, and the five qualifications, 
by, for example, declaring obligatory what was permissible, 
he was in effect saying they were obstructing the basic 
purpose of Islam.
A process which in particular undermined the shari *-a 
was the drafting of a constitutional law. In Shaikh 
Fazlallah's eyes this was contrary to Islam because it 
involved legislation, which he designated an innovation.
Islam has no shortcomings so that it needs someone to
53 "* -complete it. Shaikh Fazlallah was clearer and more
emphatic on this point than he had been in 1907. He also
reiterated that the emergence of new situations was no
justification for legislation. In the case of such
situations reference must be made to the Gates of the
54Provisions, that is the Deputies of the Imam. This was 
a further clarification of his arguments of the previous year.
The Shaikh's fundamentalist arguments were disputed
by Mirza Muhammad Husain Na^ini (1860-1936) in his Tanbih 
• •
al-Umma wa Tanzih al-Milla (The Admonition and Refinement
55of the People) written in Najaf in the spring of 1909.
53. Malikzada, Mashrut-iyyat, op. cit., IV, p. 219.
54. Ibid,., p. 219.
55. Hairi, ShiHsm, op. cit., p. 210.
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NaJini claimed that where there were already specified
Islamic provisions covering existing judicial and political
problems, then there was no need for legislation.^ But
a number of problems had arisen which were not predicted
by the shari ca, and in this matter it was the duty of the
authorised ruler to make an appropriate law. This argument
was employed by some of the following of Tabataba-* i and
• •
expressly stated by his son AbuJ 1 Qasim. On the matter of
objection to change in the law, NaJ ini claimed that as the law
emerged from expediency, it was logically bound to alter to
57suit new circumstances. As Hairi has pointed out, Shaikh
Fazlallah's argument on this point stands, there can be no
legislation in Islam, only logical deduction by a mujtahid
of new provisions from the shari "-a. With regard to Shaikh
Fazlallah's point that a constitutional law might enforce
what was not compulsory, NaJini gave an example of the same
process taking place after a contract or on the basis of a 
5 8vow. Thus the performance of certain non-compulsory 
actions may become obligatory because they may be part of 
the performance of a compulsory action. This argument did 
not grapple with Shaikh Fazlallah's real point that 
interference with the five qualifications governing every 
action, by a power having no true knowledge of the sharica . 
constituted interference with the fulfilment of the moral 
and religious purpose of Islam.
Another point taken up by Shaikh Fazlallah was that 
of areas of authority in law. The matter is deeply 
confused and no one at this period ever really clarified 
it. This failure is perhaps because, as stated above, the 
shari*-a covers every aspect of a Muslim's existence, but
56. Ibid., p. 210.
57. Ibid., p. 211.
58. Ibid., p. 200.
- 285 -
in reality such a rigid doctrine is not practicable and 
the concept had long existed of umur-i Lurfiyya with which 
the *-ulama did not concern themselves in practice, leaving 
such matters to the state officials. Shaikh Fazlallah's 
position on this subject was ambivalent. At one point he 
stated:
'All matters, including the political (giyasat) 
fall within the scope of the shari La. 1 ^
To the constitutionalist argument that they were working in 
the area of government law (ganun-i daulati), which was 
outside the shari La, Shaikh Fazlallah contended that no 
government could consider itself outside the divine law, and 
make and execute laws. At another point, however, he admits 
that in practice:
'There have always been government affairs and 
regulations (dasturat) to cover them, but it 
is certain that these stipulations were outside 
the religion (kharij az din).'60
Thus they had a de facto existence but were not legitimate 
according to the sharica. From the phrase 'khari.j az din' 
it would seem they are not permissible, simply extraneous. 
Fazlallah appears to see a division between the affairs of 
the government umur-i daulati and those of the religious 
community umur-i '-amma:
'If their intention was to draw up a law especially 
to control the actions of government officials 
then it has no connection with the affairs of the^, 
community, on which the shari^a alone may speak.'
In effect there are two spheres of authority in the state, 
one ordered by the government, in which the lulama play 
little part and the other under the authority of the Jjjlama,
59. Tadhkirat, op. cit., p. 2.
60. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., IV, p. 214.
61. Tadhkirat, op. cit., p. 8 .
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in which no one else may intervene. The problem with 
constitutional government seems to be that, unlike the 
existing regime, it fails to recognise this division 
and attempts, for example, to enforce legislation in the 
umur-i uamma, which it has no legitimate right by the 
shariLa to do. Thus he states that by contrast with the 
past when government regulations were generally recognised 
as outside religion, under the Majlis adherence to the
regulations of the assembly were considered an obligatory
, , 62 duty.
The Majlis had claimed to be acting in accordance with
the shari *-a, and Shaikh Fazlallah refuted this claim on a
number of points. But first he pointed out that if the
constitutionalist intention really was to conform to the
shari'-a, how were they to judge whether their actions were
6 3consistent with it or not. In other words he considered 
the Majlis had attempted to subsume the authority of the 
vulama and interfere in the affairs of the community in a 
way that previous governments had not.
In 1908-9 Shaikh Fazlallah also took up another argument
against the constitutionalists' supposed source of authority,
that is representation of the will of the people followed
by decision according to the wishes of the majority. In
his challenge the Shaikh discussed representation in the
sense it is used in figh, that is of one person appointing
another to perform certain duties on his behalf. As Hairi
has pointed out this arrangement involves individual matters
64and is not a communal concern. The term used then and now
62. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., IV, p. 215.
63. Tadhkirat, op. cit., p. 8 .
64. Hairi, ShiH-sm, op. cit., pp. 204-5.
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for a representative at the assembly is vakil and his 
function is vikalat, but the Shaikh did not acknowledge 
this secular usage. Asking what was meant by vikalat, he 
said:
'What is the meaning of representation, who is 
represented and for what is the representative 
elected? ...If the matter concerns Lurf affairs, 
then this religious practice (tartibat-i dini) is 
not necessary.
Thus maintaining the idea of a division between the affairs 
of the community and those of the government, he said 
there was no need to introduce a concept drawn from shari La 
jurisprudence into customary administration. He continued:
'If it is intended (to introduce representation into) 
the shari ua affairs of the community, then what is 
meant is not vikalat (representation) but vilayat 
(deputyship).'
The basis for this point is that the representative of the 
people has no authority in shari *-a affairs, responsibility 
for which devolves on the deputies of the Imam, as Shaikh 
Fazlallah explains:
'Vilayat ^deputyship) in the time__of the absence 
of the Imam devolves on the fugaha and the 
mujtahids, not on just any grocer or draper depending 
(for his authority) on the will of the majority.
Such a concept is erroneous in the Imami religion.1
In other words the will of the majority is not a basis for
any claim to authority in Imami Shiite law, and hence has no
role in the affairs of the community. Further:
'Participation in the affairs of the community 
by anyone other than the Imam amounts to denigrating
the authority of the Prophet and the Imam....
If anyone else sits in his (the Imam's) place it is 
obligatory to oppose such an attempt and forbidden 
to support it. Do you not know t;hat this work is 
outside the General Agency and usurpation of the 
right of Muhammad and his descendentsT'66
65 Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., IV, p. 211.
66. Tadhkirat,- op. cit., pp. 27-8.
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There is no more place for the representatives of the 
people in the chain of authority derived from the revealed 
will of God, than there is for a monarch, and if they lay 
claim to such a place then they, like him, are usurpers.
The constitutionalist Lulama had declared that support 
for the Majlis was part of the Islamic duty of amr-i bi 
maLruf va nahy az munkar (to enjoin good and prohibit evil). 
In refuting this point Shaikh Fazlallah was obliged to 
admit the judgement of a mujtahid may be fallible. Having 
shown that support of the constitution was contrary to the 
shari <-a and the Quran, he declared the duty of tag lid 
(following the practice of a chosen mujtahid) was null in 
this matter if the mujtahid supported the constitution.
'If a thousand mujtahids write that this Majlis is 
founded on the command to do good and prohibit 
evil,....then you are a witness that this is not 
the case and they have erred...(exactly as if they 
were to say) this animal is a sheep, and you know
it is a dog, you have to say "You are mistaken, it
is unclean".'67
Shaikh Fazlallah did not attempt to reconcile this appeal to 
individual judgement with the argument that a defective 
intelligence could not gauge what was in conformity with the 
sharica,
Na*ini took up Shaikh Fazlallah's contention that only 
the Deputies of the Imam could have authority in the umur-i 
tamma. He stated that it was not necessary or even possible
that a mujtahid should handle all the problems in the affairs
of the community, and so he might authorise another person 
to do so on his behalf. Further, if the Agents of the Imam 
could not perform all necessary functions then responsibility
67. Ibid., pp. 24-6.
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for them devolved on the just faithful (Hidul-i muJminin)
In his view, if the Hi 1ama themselves could not take 
power, the best alternative was the creation of a 
constitutional regime, which was much preferable to tyranny. 
Any aberration in the legislation would be rectified by the 
mujtahids under Article II of the constitution. This was a 
pragmatic point of view but it raised problems in practice 
for the authority of the Hi lama and the religious estate.
To begin with a member of the assembly was a representative 
vakil of the people and not a deputy 'naJ ib of the Lulama. 
According to Fazlallah's understanding and experience.,, this 
contention created a new authority which threatened that of 
the Hi 1ama. He also realised that Article II might sound 
promising in theory but in practice it left the culama 
with very weak control over the legislation of the assembly.
NaJini also argued that vikalat does not have to be 
religious representation to be rightful, in which he was 
correct, but Shaikh Fazlallah was arguing that if the 
representation was not religious representation then it 
belonged in *-urf affairs, and had no rightful place in the 
sphere of the shari La. On the subject of the majority 
Na^ini contended that the payment of taxes by the people in 
the public interests gave them a right to a voice, which is 
not a principle recognised by the sharica. He also believed 
Islamic rulership was based on consultation, mashyarat, 
implying the superiority of the majority of the wise men 
over the minority. In this he was confusing a general 
principle with a precise element in a chain of authority.
To Shaikh Fazlallah the best alternative in the absence 
of the Imam, was the Shah and as such he had to be supported.
68. Hairi, Shiuism, op. cit., pp. 205-7.
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It was at this point he produced the argument mentioned in 
Chapter I that Islam is based upon two supplementary 
authorities, deputyship in the affairs of the prophesy and 
kingship, defined as the power that executes the Islamic 
provisions. If justice is to spread it was necessary to 
strengthen these two groups, that is those who know the 
provisions and those who possess power among Muslims. The 
Shah maintained that he derived his authority from God,
Shaikh Fazlallah, as already mentioned, does not raise the 
question, but maintains the Shah's authority is justified 
by the exercise of power in the interests of Islam. In the 
Tadhkirat Shaikh Fazlallah attacked the constitutionalists
for undermining the government of Islam, composed of the Shah
- 69 - - - -and the ^ulama. To Na^ini, as to many other *»ulama,
kingship was usurped authority and liable to become
tyrannical, for which reason constitutionalism, for all its
shortcomings, was preferable. To Shaikh Fazlallah, kingship
fell short of the original ideal government where both power
and knowledge were invested in one person, the Imam, but
provided the ruler acknowledged the superior authority of
the shari*-a, kingship was preferable to constitutionalism
because it reinforced Islam, instead of standing over and
against the shariLa and thereby weakening the faith.
In the fatva, Shaikh Fazlallah goes into greater detail
about his objections to the notion of equality. The most
serious differences he mentioned were undoubtedly those
between Muslims and non-Muslims, especially apostates, into
which category Babis fell. He reminded his readers that if
equality were introduced, Muslims would lose their special
70status under the shari <-a. Using his argument that only
the culama have the authority in the umur-i lamma he asked
71why different sects were to have a voice in its affairs.
69. Tadhkirat, op. cit., p. 31.
70. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., IV, p. 215.
71. Tadhkirat, op. cit., p. 8.
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NaJini, in hi£ attempted refutation, reveals himself, as
Hairi comments, as confused by a vague interpretation of
72the constitutional notion of equality. He took the view 
that all should be equally summoned to court for an offence, 
b\it that they should be tried respectively according to the 
precepts which governed Muslims and non-Muslims. He did not 
appreciate, as Shaikh Fazlallah did, that in a modern nation 
state all citizens are equal before the law, and all law can 
only be valid if it is passed or condoned by Parliament.
This was quite distinct from the system of communities 
(millets) regulating their own affairs under a distant or 
minimal government, as happened in Ottoman Iraq, where NaJini 
resided.
Shaikh Fazlallah perceived that constitutionalism would 
mean greater government control, and greater taxation, with 
a consequent diversion of funds from the: religious estate.
He enlarged upon this point in the Tadhkirat, though with 
some exaggeration:
'Under constitutionalism the people of this country 
will pay taxes at the rate of 90%. Money will 
be extracted little by little on a thousand different 
pretexts. For example the municipality will take 
money from you every year by a hundred means.
And every governor will have the right to take two 
contributions each year under the Fundamental Law.
Also the new Ministry of Justice will exact more 
money from you.'^3
A new sort of oppression was about to exert itself:
'In brief the subjects must toil so the coffers of 
the National Bank will fill up, and they can 
organise the affairs of commerce.'
In his assessment of the economy under constitutionalism, 
he seemed only able to conceive of wealth as a fixed sum, 
and had no idea of economic development to a much greater 
wealth.
72. Hairi, Shi Lism, op. cit., pp. 223-4, p. 234.
73. Tadhkirat, op. cit., pp. 30-1.
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Interestingly, Shaikh Fazlallah, rare among 
contemporary commentators, identified some of the problems, 
other than lack of education, of establishing a nation 
state in Iran in particular:
'Parliament is not possible in Iran because of 
three characteristics: lack of an army; religious
differences; and large tribal groups. These do not 
exist in other countries.
Shaikh Fazlallah gives an account in the fatva of how
he became involved in the early stages of the constitutional
movement. He states that like many people he was beguiled
by the constitutionalists' presentation of their cause,
75particularly the offer of justice. This is not strictly 
true as he only joined the movement at the last possible 
moment, and then most likely because he would have been 
isolated if he had not. As he himself admits he initially 
acquiesced to the notion of representation, but tried to 
make it conform to Islam (he does not say how).
The Shah had yielded on the subject of constitutionalism
because of pressure from the two powers, and financial
embarrassment, and also because he was threatened on two
sides by constitutionalist forces. The first of these,
coming from the north, was an army led by Sipahdar-i Aczam,*
Governor of Rasht, and including members of the Rasht 
anjuman, and Caucasian revolutionaries from Russia. The 
second was a force ofBakhtiyaris led by discontented Khans, 
and allied with the constitutionalists of Isfahan. In late 
April the Russians intervened in Tabriz where the populace 
was starving under seige by the Shah's forces. This 
impelled Sipahdar and his army to move towards Tehran, partly
74. Ibid., pp. 39-40.
75. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., IV, p. 211.
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to escape the Russians and partly to compel the Shah to 
grant a constitution. The Bakhtiyaris then also advanced 
on the capital.
In July, after an attempted compromise with the Shah 
had broken down, the two forces entered Tehran. Following 
their arrival, the Shah, who had taken refuge in the Russian 
Legation, was deposed by an 'Extraordinary General Council', 
consisting of notables, deputies, culama, merchants and 
guildsmen. Once it became clear that the 'Nationalist' 
forces were reasonably well disciplined, the return of 
constitutionalism was largely welcomed by the people of Tehran.
The Shah was joined in the Russian Legation by the
conservative notables and by his henchmen, such as Mujallal
al-Sultan. Saud al-Daula, who was in the British Legation, is
said to have warned Shaikh Fazlallah that he was in danger of
his life, to which the Shaikh is said to have replied that
his religious calling made it impossible to take refuge in
a foreign legation. In a letter to NaJib al-Saltana written
just before the Nationalists entered Tehran, he says friends
had sent messages that it would be better if he went to the
north, but his own inclination was to stay in town, as it was
7 6quiet and the people would be agitated if he left. He was 
determined to maintain the struggle and encouraged Sani** Hazrat,
f
with a large group of roughs armed by the Shah, to resist the
advance of the Nationalist forces into the Sanglaj district,
— 77where Fazlallah lived. On 25th July their defenses were 
broken, and on 10th August, Shaikh Fazlallah was arrested.
The newspaper accounts of his trial give only the long
78indictments against him. They do not give any record of
76. Ibid., V, p. 265.
77. Ibid., VI, p. 50.
78. See Majlis, Year 3, No. 8, 7th Aug. 1909.
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an interrogation, or say if there was one. Both Malikzada
and Kasravi searched for a transcript of the trial or any
79written account, but without success. Malikzada, who
knew some members of the mixed tribunal who tried him, 
obtained verbal accounts, but as he himself says, these
accounts must be treated with caution. Nazim al-Islam claims
—  * 80 Shaikh Fazlallah denied he was against constitutionalism.
In a letter to the new Regent, cAzud al-Mulk, Shaikh
Fazlallah expressed his sense of injustice at the idea of a
81trial, and hoped the judges chosen would be fair. In
another letter to the same person, he attempted to defend
himself, pointing out that he had not run away because he
8 2believed only in protection from God. He also disclaimed
any fault, mentioning that as one of the founders of the 
Majlis he had spent 4000 tomans on it. If he had felt 
compelled to criticise it, it was because strangers had 
gained control of it, so it needed purging. He also mentioned 
that he was 3 5,000 tomans in debt, as the local money lenders 
would testify. It would seem that Nazim al-Islam's 
assertion that he denied being against constitutionalism 
is correct, but in view of his policy after June 1908, hardly 
true. The mention of his debts is interesting as it 
suggests he spent large sums on the demonstrations against 
constitutionalism, as well as receiving money from the Shah 
and the notables.
79. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., _VI, p. 128;
A. Kasravi, Tarikh-i Hijdah Sala-yi Adharbayjan 
(An Eighteen Year History of Azarbaijan), Tehran 
2537/1978, I, p. 661.
80. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., II, p. 536.
81. Majd al-tAli, MajmuVy'rKhatirat, No. 3, 1359/1978-S 
p. 89.
82. Ibid., p. 90.
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The indictment against Shaikh Fazlallah was nearly all 
based on the assumption that to wage a sustained campaign 
against constitutionalism was tantamount to a crime. That 
he had consistently opposed constitutionalism is, as 
Malikzada remarks, not much in doubt. It is the accusations 
concerning the methods he used that are disputable.
The first point raised against him was that, after the
initial establishment of constitutionalism, he first
8 3supported it then turned against it. He was also accused
of first accepting the Fundamental Law and then rejecting
it. This ignores the fact that his original wording of
Article II was changed. He was, in addition, castigated for
declaring mashruta forbidden, when the lulama of the
^Atabat had enjoined it as obligatory. He was, however,
legally entitled to give his opinion as a mujtahid of eminence,
and moreover he had the support of one leading mujtahid in
the kAtabat, TabatabaJi Yazdi.
• •
One charge that is amply substantiated by Shaikh 
Fazlallah's leaflets is that he accused his opponents of 
being Babis and atheists, an accusation which amounts to the 
calumny with which he frequently charged his enemies, as 
there is no evidence that the majority of the constitutionalists 
were other than ordinary Muslims.
Shaikh Fazlallah was bitterly criticised for his part 
in the events of December 1907 and for his support of the 
Shah's unconstitutional policies after June 1908. It was 
a cause of some bitterness to the constitutionalists that in 
December 1907 he had organised demonstrations by poorer 
persons shouting, 'We don't want constitutionalism^ we want 
tea and rice'.
83. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., VI, pp. 128-131.
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The Shaikh was also charged with involvement in 
certain incidents of a violent nature. These included 
fortifying his house in June 1909 and surrounding it with 
armed roughs, who fired against the 'nation1. The Shaikh 
is reported to have answered this accusation at his trial 
by saying: 'According to the basic rules of Islam any
Muslim is bound to defend himself. I took steps to protect 
myself and my adherents'. In addition he was said to have 
planned the murders in Shah ^Abd al-LAzim in March 1909.
As mentioned earlier, Fazlallah encouraged the Shah to take 
action against the bastis, but there is no evidence that 
he instigated their murder.
Contrary to expectation Shaikh Fazlallah was reported not 
to have defended himself at the trial, but concerning his 
prop ganda campaign, the treatise, leaflets, fatva, letters 
and telegrams that he wrote, he is said to have commented:
'I am a muj tahid and in conformity with what was 
revealed to me through my power of ij tihad, and in 
the light of my knowledge of jurisprudence, I 
distinguished the way that was consistent with the 
shari^a and followed it.'84
The existing accounts of Shaikh Fazlallah's execution
8 5vary but an important point is raised in Browne's account.
On the scaffold he is reported to have said:
'Neither was I a reactionary nor were Sayyid 
'•Abdallah and Sayyid Muhammad constitutionalists.
It is merely that they wished to exceed me and I 
them, and there was no question of reactionary or 
constitutional principles.'
84. Ibid., p. 129.
85. Browne, Revolution, op. cit., p. 330.
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In addition to this a number of points are mentioned 
in the account in Browne. His son Shaikh Mahdi is said to 
have stood under the scaffold and cursed him. Fazlallah 
is said to have quoted the verse:
'If we were a heavy burden we are gone,
If we were unkind we are gone.'
After telling the executioner to do his work he was hanged in
his turban and cloak. According to Malikzada, the square
was very full and noisy. No mention is made of his speaking
but Malikzada says the story about Shaikh Mahdi is quite 
8 6unfounded. An account published recently in a magazine 
in Qum in which Shaikh Fazlallah discarded his stick, his 
turban and his cloak as he proceeded up the scaffold, and
waited till his servant had swallowed his seals, may be
87 — —discounted. In Nazim al-Islam's version, derived shortly
afterwards from merchants who were present, two mujahidin
8 8removed his turban. On the scaffold all he had a chance to 
say was: 'What good, what ill, I am gone.' A picture
of the occasion shows an excited crowd, and the Shaikh with
89 -his cloak, but without his turban. The account in Nazim
al-Islam, therefore, probably comes closest to the truth, and
the speech recorded in Browne, which has been taken as fact,
was almost certainly apocryphal, and belongs to the
constitutionalist historiographical tradition, which sought
to attribute the Shaikh's political stance to personal
motives alone.
The execution caused consternation amongst the other
culama, Khurasarii sending a telegram to try and save his
90 ' ■life. It is difficult t?o know why he was executed but most
86. Malikzada, Mashrutiyyat, op. cit., VI, p. 132.
87. Majalla-yi Kausar No, 3 1359/1978-*}.
88. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., II, p. 535.
89. 'LAksha-yi Tarikhi', Vafrid, No. 200 2535/
1976-7, p. 240.
90. Hairi, Shi uism, op. cit., p. 114.
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probably it was because his arguments threatened to 
undermine the legitimacy of the constitutional assembly, 
and it was felt necessary to make an example of him.
Both Tabataba4i and Bihbihani were back in Tehran by
the beginning of November, when the oath to the constitution
was administered in their presence. Bihbihani had been released
from his prison near Kermanshah in the spring and had gone
to Kerbala where he had forged stronger connections with the
lulama of the ^Atabat. TabatabaJi, on hearing of the
overthrow of the absolutist regime had sent a telegram
offering congratulations on "this moment which is one of the
91most blessed celebrations of Muslims". On his return,
however, he withdrew from politics. He became unhappy
with the course events were to take, writing in his notes:
'The mashruta and majlis have once more been set up, but not
92in the way I wanted.' It is not clear what he meant by this, 
but perhaps he was referring to his original wish to establish 
a majlis-i Ladalat,
Bihbihani tried to regain his old position, but now that 
the Shah had been overcome he was no longer useful to the 
constitutionalists, who told him that as he was not an
93elected member of the Majlis he had no right to participate. 
However, he retained a following amongst the guilds, who were 
instructed that the ideas of the radicals, led by Taqizada, 
especially on the division of religion and state, were 
contrary to Islam. Members of the guilds still brought their 
grievances to him in the traditional way. By means of this 
following, by his links with the ^Atabat, and by joining up 
with the more conservative faction led by Sipahdar, he was 
able to intervene in politics to some extent.
91. Nazim al-Islam, op. cit., II, p. 521.
92. TabatabaJi, 'Yaddashtha', op. cit., p. 473,
• •
93. Daulatabadi, op. cit., III, p. 126.
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At the end of June 1910, Khurasani telegraphed to the
government urging the removal of Taqizada from the Majlis on
the grounds that he was irreligious and his activities were
94 -harmful to the country's interests. The *-ulama of Najaf
were said to have received information from various sources
- - 95on Taqizada's line of conduct of which they disapproved.
Taqizada asked for, and obtained, three months leave, which
was granted with practically the unanimous approval of the
Majlis. The expulsion was also sought of the foreign fidajVis
on whom Taqizada and the militants mainly relied to maintain
their influence. Bihbihani was believed to be implicated in
the denunciation of Taqizada by the Hi lama of Najaf, and on
16th July he was shot by four fidaJ is whose motives were
96said to be revenge. The bazaars closed and a demonstration 
of merchants and lulama demanded the arrest of the murderers, 
the expulsion of foreign fida*is , and the dissolution of 
the existing Majlis. They also protested at the chaos brought 
about by the militants and their following.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, to Shaikh Fazlallah the best form of 
government in the absence of the Imam was not constitutionalism 
but absolutism, that is government by the Shah in the 
traditional manner. It was at this point that he produced 
the argument mentioned in Chapter I that Islam is based upon 
two supplementary authorities, deputyship in the affairs of 
the Prophet and kingship, defined as the power that executes
94. Marling to Grey, No. 129, 15th July 1910,_
FO 416/45 No. 181? see also Afshar, Auraq,
op. cit., p^ 207 and p. 209, for Khurasani's telegram 
and Mazandarani's letter of explanation published in 
Habl al-Matin No. 28, Ramazan 1328.
95. Marling to Grey, No. 297-Tel., 22nd July 1910,
FO 416/4.5 No. 125.
96. Marling to Grey, No. 292 Tel., 18th July 1910;
FO 416/45 No. 102.
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the Islamic provisions. This division in authority is 
reflected in the umur-i ~amraa, the affairs of the religious 
community, covered by the shari ca, and the umur-i daulati, 
government affairs, of which the umur-i Lurfiyya, customary 
affairs, formed a part. As was mentioned in Chapter I, 
these two spheres of authority were recognised in practice 
by both the Shah and the Hlama. The Shah's authority was 
justified by his services as the Protector of Islam.
Constitutionalism in the eyes of Shaikh Fazlallah, 
presented a much more dangerous threat to the authority of 
the shari *-a than did the Shah. To begin with the Shah's 
claims to legitimacy were weak, but constitutionalism had a 
more solid and attractive legitimising doctrine in the 
enactment of the will of the people by their elected 
representatives in Parliament. This stood over and against 
the Shi'ite chain of Divine Will, Prophet, Imam, Hi lama. 
Shaikh Fazlallah perceived that the will of the people as 
a source of authority was dangerous, not only because it 
was outside the Shi'ite chain, but also because it was the 
product of alien European thought. It was for this reason 
that he was at pains to attack representation as a basis 
of authority for legislation.
The pro-constitutionalist mujtahids, such as NaJini and
Bihbihani and Tabataba^i, hoped that the constitutionalist 
• •
government would confine itself to the sphere of umur-i 
daulati and umur-i ^urfiyya but Shaikh Fazlallah saw that in 
practice this would not be possible, and that sooner or later 
constitutionalist government would impinge upon the shari La 
and undermine the authority of the lulama. An example arose 
in the matter of equality. The will of the people meant the 
will of the individual members of the nation regardless of 
creed. Such a theory was not possible according to the 
sharica. Further, by interfering with the five 
qualifications, for example, rendering obligatory what the
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shari '•a judges permissible, constitutionalism interfered 
with one of the fundamental goals of the shari *>a.
Therefore, in the battle between the Shah and the 
Constitutionalists, Shaikh Fazlallah supported the Shah, 
providing him with ideological ammunition against 
constitutionalism, and against the remonstrations of Britain 
and Russia. The Shah used Shaikh Fazlallah's arguments most 
notably in November 1908, and generally seems to have 
preferred them to his other defence that constitutionalism 
did not suit the conditions of the country.
It may be said that Shaikh Fazlallah identified the 
interests of the religious estate, and examined in detail the 
implications for Shi^ ism of introducing constitutionalism 
into Iran, in a way that his contemporaries amongst the 
lulama did not. Many of them gradually came round to 
producing arguments similar to his and indeed, found themselves 
in a position he had held, though they were on the whole 
reluctant to take the final step back towards positive 
endorsement of the royal authority.
Public opinion in general seems to have wavered between
the constitutionalist and absolutist causes, but to have
been on the whole, after the spring of 1908, either lukewarm or
indifferent to either. Nazim al-Islam's account shows that
there was a certain amount of support for the Shah after the
coup, but as the Shah was unable to solve the country's
economic difficulties, public feeling swung back towards
constitutionalism. On present scanty evidence, the%
constitutionalist cause in Tehran seems to have been 
maintained by some of the bureaucrats, and by the lesser 
bazaar merchants, partly because of the Shah's failure to 
pay his debts, and partly because the government was resorting 
to its old tactics of extracting money from the populace and 
deploying it without account.
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CONCLUSION
The cu1ama of Tehran and particularly the mujtahids 
played an important role in the Constitutional Revolution 
of 1905-9, and yet it was not a united role. Ostensibly they 
divided into pro- and anti-constitutionalists, but as 
Arjomand has pointed out, the division was in fact superficial, 
and many Hi 1 ama did not maintain one position throughout the 
course of the Revolution.
Before examining the pro- and anti-constitutionalist 
division, however, it is necessary to consider the deeper 
divisions within the Hi lama of Tehran as a group. It has 
already been stated that this study is concerned with the 
orthodox Hi lama, so religious doctrine was not a dividing 
factor amongst this group. The main differences to be noted 
were financial. The chief economic sources of the tulama, 
as discussed in Chapter II, were vagf foundations, 
contributions from the faithful, fees for judicial services, 
and salaries and pensions. These sources of income, however, 
were not under the secure control of the lulama, and the 
membership of the religious estate being large, there was 
fierce competition for the money available. Vagf income 
might be in the hands of the Shah, or another layman, who 
could appoint or remove the mutavalli at will. The faithful, 
if dissatisfied with the representations made by a particular 
mujtahid on their behalf, or his political stance, might 
take their contributions elsewhere. They could also bring 
their shariva business to any number of different mullahs. 
Salaries and pensions were in the gift of the state, most 
notably the Sadr-i Acgam, who would expect support in return 
for any grants bestowed.
On the other hand, a mujtahid1s influence and prestige 
depended a great deal on his financial resources. Ideally 
a mujtahid attained his position of eminence by his knowledge 
of the sacred texts, by the judgements he gave, and by
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conduct worthy of emulation. In practice, it was extremely
hard to fund the long years of study which such an ideal
required. Most mujtahids inherited their positions, as
happened with Ashtiyani, Bihbihani, TabatabaJi and Sadr
• • •
al^Ulama. Others, like Shaikh Fazlallah, were assisted by 
an eminent relative. Those muj tahids who inherited their 
office might also expect a certain amount of inherited 
wealth, particularly in the form of endowments made by their 
ancestors to their own family in perpetuity. Such inherited 
wealth alone, however, was rarely sufficient for an heir to 
assume his father's position, as the case of Sayyid Muhammad 
Tafrishi shows, so the mujtahid had to struggle with rival 
muj tahids for the other sources of funds available to attain 
a prominent position. To do so he needed to be attuned to 
popular goals and discontent, or to the goals of those with 
means to contribute, so that the laity would bring him their 
canonical contributions. As Mutaharri has pointed out, this 
made the mujtahid vulnerable to popular pressure and obliged 
him to pursue ends with which he might not at heart be in 
accord.^ The muj tahid also needed wealth for patronage, as in 
Qajar Iran influence without patronage in one's gift was 
virtually impossible. In particular he needed money to pay 
his tullab, who were a symbol of his prestige and his strong 
arm against his enemies.
Unfortunately not a great deal is known as yet about the
background of the mujtahids who participated in the
Constitutional Revolution, but certain tentative conclusions
are possible. It is notable that Bihbihani, TabatabaJi, and
• •
Sadr al- MJlama came from long-established Tehran families.
•
In addition they had close connections with the bazaar, and 
this may well have been a result not only of their influence 
in the quarter in which they lived, but of their families'
1. A.K.S. Lambton, 'Marjat', op. cit., pp. 133-4.
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long residence in the capital. Shaikh Fazlallah, by
contrast, does not appear to have come from an old Tehran
family, his most notable relative being a muj tahid in the
^Atabat. He does not seem to have earned much from v/agf property
or bazaar connections, but lived rather on the fees of his
shariwa duties. He also seems to have developed links at
court and risen to prominence largely through his
cooperation with 'Ain al-Daula when the latter became Sadr-i
A zam.•
The influence of the mujtahid1s following and connections
upon him is most striking in the case of Bihbihani. In the
years before the Revolution he derived great influence from
his link with Amin al-Sultan. The fall of the latter and
the consequent cutting of remuneration meant Bihbihani lost
influence. He strove to regain his previous position by
working for the return of Amin al-Sultan, and using popular
grievances, he represented the complaints of the merchants
against Naus. After the initial failure of this campaign,
he found himself without money to pay his students. This
was the factor which persuaded him to join with TabatabaJi in
• •
an attempt to remove wAin al-Daula. It was near defeat at 
the hands of tAin al-Daula that induced him to press for an 
vadalatkhana. After this institution had been granted, 
there are signs that Bihbihani changed his mind about the 
merits of such a body, but pressure from his following of 
merchants, guildsmen and tullab induced him to pursue the 
matter. After the establishment of the Assembly he was again 
prevented from coming to terms with the conservatives by his 
following, this time with threats upon his life. In the 
succeeding two years most sources, Persian, British and 
Russian, agree that Bihbihani was indifferent to 
constitutionalism, Hartwig commenting that if it ever became 
advantageous for him to join the anti-constitutionalists, he 
would not hesitate to do so. It never did become advantageous. 
His constituency lay with the merchants, guildsmen and anjumans, 
conservative views being well represented by Shaikh Fazlallah.
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If Bihbihani was a pro-constitutionalist muj tahid, it was 
because his following dictated that he must be - deprived 
of his following he would have been without influence or 
prestige. Thus if Bihbihani - and to some extent Tabataba*1 i 
- appeared to lead the constitutional movement, in reality 
it may be said they were quite as much pushed from behind.
A number of muj tahids who were ostensibly pro- or anti- 
constitutional were really probably governed by a variety of 
motives. This was true for a brief period of Shaikh Fazlallah 
himself, for he is known as one of the three muj tahids who 
founded the Majlis. Examination of his recorded actions 
reveals, however, that he was a firm supporter of vAin al-Daula, 
until that minister proved powerless. As soon as constitutional 
doctrine, as such, was introduced, he began to manifest 
signs of discontent, coming into open opposition in 1907.
By that time he had once again a strong ally in the new Shah.
It is true that what he initially supported was an elected 
Majlis not a constitutional one, but subsequently he was to 
argue against representation, and it is difficult to conclude 
his conduct in 1906 was dictated by anything other than 
expediency. Other mujtahids seem to have changed their view 
at least partly for ideological reasons as the implications 
of constitutional government became clearer. Sayyid Murtaza 
Ashtiyani and Muhammad Riza Qummi appear to have responded to 
these implications by withdrawing from political activity. 
Ashtiyani was, however, drawTn back onto the constitutionalist 
side for personal reasons, that is the murder of his brother. 
Pecuniary motives were also significant in dictating conduct, 
influencing the initial antagonism of Sayyid Akbar Shah, and 
Sayyid lAli Yazdi's final support of the constitutionalist 
cause. A number of mujtahids preferred quite simply to be on 
the winning side. Chief among these 'Vicars of Bray' was 
the Imam Jum^a, who changed sides no less than three times.
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Rivalry was probably not a very significant factor in 
establishing the position of the muj tahid vis a vis the 
constitution. It has been argued by constitutionalist 
historians that the rivalry of Bihbihani and Shaikh Fazlallah 
induced the latter to become an anti-constitutionalist since 
no place was allowed him on the constitutional side. However, 
Shaikh Fazlallah's opposition to constitutionalism went 
deeper than mere rivalry, as is shown by its very consistency, 
ending in his death. The constitutionalist historians have 
perhaps sought to obscure the gravity of the questions that 
he raised by attributing to him a trivial motive.
There is some evidence that kinship was a dividing factor
among members of the ^ulama. During the course of the
Revolution members of one family tended to stay together.
This was most noticeable at the initial stages at the time of
the departure to Shah cAbd al-cAzim. The qroup who took bast
included both Ashtiyanls, Bihbihani and his two sons-in-law,
and the brother of one of them, Sadr al-wUlama. Tabataba^i's
• • •
brother and three sons joined him. One of Shaikh Fazlallah*s
sons was an active opponent of the constitution in Najaf.
Shaikh Mahdi Nuri's espousal of the side opposing his father
is perhaps the exception. Some of the initial family
cohesion was broken in the course of the revolution for reasons
both financial and ideological, as both Ahmad and AbuJ1 Qasim
Tabataba*i,’for example, joined the opposition,
• •
Another division was one of age. The younger members of
the *»ulama (agazadigan) were denied much chance of power or
prestige whilst their fathers lived. In 1906 in particular
the reform movement was perceived by this group as a chance
to make a name for themselves and acquire status. Notable
among them were Sadiq Tabataba*! and Muhsin, the brother of
• • • •
Sadr al-cUlama, who gained control of the newspaper Mailis.
• «
Both continued to be active after 1909, Sayyid Jadiq ultimately
becoming one of the Presidents of the Majlis.
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It would seem, therefore, that Arjomand is correct 
in assuming that the attitude of the u 1 ama towards 
constitutionalism was not the defining feature in their 
behaviour. But Arjomand has taken the matter further and 
argued that:
'The divergent attitudes within the clerical estate 
are best looked at as relatively superficial 
differentia resting on a common outlook'.2
It cannot be denied that the mu j tahids and the lesser *»ulama
had a great deal in common as members of the religious estate.
This is reflected in the manner in which they defended their
privileges, as for example, over the punishment of sayyids;
It is shown in Bihbihani's defense of the shari ^a in the
debates on the Supplementary Fundamental Law in 1907, in
which he showed much in common with Shaikh Fazlallah; it is
revealed also in his refusal to countenance a proposed tax
on the shari'•a. All the muj tahids except TabatabaJ i agreed
• •
that equality was not compatible with Islam; after 1909 
Bihbihani and Khurlisani found themselves at odds with the 
radicals, especially Taqizada, as Shaikh Fazlallah had been 
previously. As Arjomand has pointed out all were influenced 
not by nationalism, but by religious nationalism, that is the 
consideration of what might strengthen Islam.
Yet the fact is that the Hi 1ama, even the mujtahids, did
not work as a group, despite their common ground. There
are perhaps two reasons for their divergences. One is that
most of them simply did not understand constitutionalism,
and the threat it presented to the interests of the religious
estate. The debates even of Nazim al-Islam's secret society
reveal their confusion, or failure to grasp many points.
Although TabatabaJi realised that education was fundamental 
• •
to the successful establishment of constitutionalism, he does
2. S.A. Arjomand, 'HJlama's Traditionalist Opposition', 
op. cit., p. 184.
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not seem to have comprehended that constitutionalism would 
create a centralised nation state that would seek to impose 
taxation on vagf land, and to severely curtail the authority 
of the shari^a. There is some evidence that Bihbihani was 
doubtful about the benefits of the Majlis and constitutionalism, 
especially during 1906, but the only muj tahid who appears to 
have thought through all the implications of constitutionalism, 
particularly in terms of its conflict with the shari^a, was 
Shaikh Fazlallah.
More significant in the Culama1s lack of unity, however,
were the divisions caused by the differences in their
financial position already mentioned, and their links with
other groups within the community. Bihbihani and TabatabaJ i
• •
had a different kind of following to that of Shaikh Fazlallah. 
The pressures imposed by his following led Bihbihani in 
particular to pursue a course that was apparently not in his 
interests as a shari*»a jurist. His policy seems to have been 
that he would deal with the long term disadvantages of 
constitutionalism in the long term. His immediate concern 
was to retain his position of power and influence, and this 
was best achieved for the present by identifying with 
constitutionalism. There was a good deal which members of 
the Hi lama did not have in common. For example, a mullah 
such as Sayyid *-&li Yazdi, who depended for his income on the 
court, had perhaps less in common with a mullah who subsisted 
on contributions from his bazaari congregation, than he had 
with another dependant of the court. Members of the Hi lama 
whose salaries and pensions were cut were likely to identify 
with notables in the same situation. Higher taxes on bazaar 
merchants no doubt made themselves felt in lower canonical 
contributions. Further, as mentioned in Chapter II, many of 
the lesser Hi lama were linked to, or dependant on, a particular 
mujtahid, and their interests would, to a great extent, be 
identified with his, so they would most likely follow his lead. 
These significant divisions undermined the potential unity
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identified by Arjomand, and lead the Hi lama to follow 
different policies during the Revolution.
There was also an important ideological point which
divided the pro- and anti-constitutional Hi lama, and this
concerned the role of the Shah. The anti-constitutionalists
considered that in the absence of the Imam, the absolutist
system best served the interests of Islam, as long as the
Shah respected the shari*»a and defended the religion. In
the absolutist system the Shah was dependant on his service
to Islam to justify his rule. The pro-constitutionalist
Hiiama, or at least a few of them led by Tabataba^i, believed 
” • •
that Islam would best be strengthened by the inauguration of 
an elected assembly. Such an assembly would render the 
government accountable, introduce new laws in the government 
sphere and thus make the administration and the army more 
efficient. These improvements would ultimately serve Shi’ite 
Islam by regenerating Iran, its homeland.
Tehran society at large was also divided into pro- and 
anti-constitutionalists, with equal lack of consistent 
conviction. The Shah and certain members of the court, 
notably Amir Bahadur, opposed it from the first. They were 
joined, as time went on, by those whose interests were 
threatened, holders of tu yul and of salaries and pensions, 
dependants of the palace who found themselves without pay 
after the Majlis had made economies. These persons, as both 
Hairi and Arjomand have remarked, found their ideological 
protagonist in Shaikh Fazlallah.
The opposing side was composed largely of merchants, 
guildsmen and tullab. The initial opposition of the merchants 
was motivated largely by their desire to remove those who 
imposed higher taxes, notably ^Ain al-Daula and Naus. By 
19 06 the merchants, as Gilbar has noted, were among the prime 
movers in the movement for an elective assembly, and the major
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financiers of the bast. Their motives varied but appear 
to have included above all a desire to render the 
government accountable for its finances. Other possible 
goals were improvements in the law, and a chance to 
participate to a greater extent in the country's economic 
development. The major merchants were very active in the 
Majlis, sitting on important committees, such as that on the 
finances. Together with the mujtahids they, for a while, 
formed a moderate body of opinion in association with Amin 
al-Sultan. By 1908, however, they appear to have become 
disillusioned, largely because of the breakdown in law and 
order with the rise of the anjumans. The role of the lesser 
merchants is less clear and awaits a more detailed study with 
close attention to their different functions. However, the 
evidence shows that the sarrafs were active on the reformist 
side throughout the Revolution, one of their main reasons 
apparently being the failure of the government to repay its 
debts to them.
The guilds were also significant for their support of 
the Majlis. As with the merchants, this support appears to 
have begun as an objection to higher taxes, in part possibly 
instigated by the merchants. Opinion on constitutionalism 
seems to have varied amongst them, from those, who as the 
Revolution developed, made some attempt to understand and 
believe in it, to those particularly amongst the elders, who 
felt the old system served them well enough, to those to 
whom it remained a means to oblige the government to fix or 
lower prices. There is some indication that certain guildsmen 
perceived in the Majlis an opportunity for law reform, but 
not at the price of conflict with their mentors among the 
Lulama. On the whole the guildsmen appear to have taken their 
leadership from the Hi lama and the merchants, making few 
significant contributions, for example, to the debates in the 
Majlis.
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The tullab may tentatively be divided into two groups.
Those with a serious calling in theological studies, and 
those who clung to the madrasas as a means of subsistence.
The fullab were active particularly in 1906, and were 
reportedly influenced by events in Russia. After the 
establishment of the Majlis, they are mentioned less as a 
large group. This is perhaps because the ones with a desire 
to make a career in theological affairs still followed the 
muj tahid who paid them. The less dedicated ones may have 
swelled the ranks of the poor folk who made up the anjumans.
The **u 1 ama, notably the mu j tahids , played a significant 
role in organisation on both the pro- and anti-constitutionalist 
sides. Shaikh Fazlallah organised demonstrations in the summer 
of 1907, including the bast in Shah ^Abd al-A^im, and also the 
continued protests after the events of the Maidan Tupkhana.
He was also active in the demonstrations of the autumn of 
1908 and the spring of 1909. The fact that he was in debt at 
the time he died suggests that he spent some of his own money 
on the absolutist cause. However, his role in that respect 
was equalled, if not surpassed, by that of the conservative 
courtiers. They are reported to have funded the Shaikh's 
activities at nearly every point, as well as founding anti­
constitutionalist anjumans. Most important, however, was the 
Shah himself, and the trial of his roughs reveals that the 
major demonstrations were organised from the Palace through 
his special henchman for such purposes, the chamberlain,
Mujallal al-Sultan.
The role of the mujtahids in organisation on the
constitutional side was perhaps most important. Bihbihani in
particular had connections with the leading roughs of Tehran
including Sanic Hazrat Muqtadir-i. Nizam Haj Ma^sum and Mihdi 
• • • *
Gavkush. His links with the lesser merchants and his long 
standing relations with the British enabled him to instigate 
the bast of 1906. His connections with members of the higher
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bureaucracy were possibly an important factor in bringing the 
bast of December 1905 to a successful conclusion. The two 
mujtahids were the point of connection between the rank and 
file of the opposition movement in 1906, the merchants who 
financed it, and the bureaucrats who gave it ideological 
direction. Through lesser Hi 1 ama such as Sayyid Jamal al-Din 
Isfahani they had contacts amongst the anjumans, though these 
do not appear to have been anything like as close or well 
organised as those of Taqizada and the Azadikhahan with the 
Anjuman-i Adharbayjan.
Only two of the muj tahids of Tehran contributed 
significantly to the ideological debate on constitutionalism. 
These were Tabataba*1 i and Shaikh Fazlallah. It would appear
that TabatabaJi was not desirous of establishing constitutional
• •
government in 1905-6, as he considered that conditions in Iran 
were not yet suitable, especially wTith the lack of education. 
Instead he advocated a majlis-i ^adalat, which would render 
the government accountable and remedy the ills of an arbitrary 
administration. He did not, however, work out in detail how 
his majlis would be organised, and the idea was thus overtaken 
by constitutionalism, which could call on a fully worked out 
system.
TabatabaJi1s views on legal reform are not entirely clear,
• •
but most probably, like many of the pro-constitutional Hi lama, 
he hoped for reform in the area of government administration, 
but in conformity with the sharica. His defense, alone among 
the Hi 1ama, of the principle of equality regardless of religion, 
and his remark that the establishment of the Majlis would mean 
the end of much business for the Hi lama, suggest that he was 
willing to see a more extensive legal reform than his fellows.
It is unlikely, however, that he really understood the 
inherent conflict between a legal system based on the revealed 
word of God, and one based on the will of the people represented 
in Parliament.
- 313 -
It has been maintained by some writers that the Hi lama
opposition in 1905-6 was a characteristic Shi'ite campaign
against injustice. Algar in particular holds this view and
sees the Hi 1ama as leading the opposition in the role of
naJib-i lamm. Lambton views the aim of the opposition
movement as the restoration of just and righteous, i.e., Shi'ite
government. In response to this view it must be stressed that
TabatabaJi was the ideologue amongst the Hi 1ama of the
movement against the absolutist government. The sources of
his ideas, as indicated in Chapter IV, were primarily western,
as he himself stated. There is no mention in any of his
speeches of any major Shi'ite source, nor did he place any
emphasis on the juLama's role as naJ ib-i *»amm. It is true
that the protests followed traditional patterns, with cries
for justice, and crowds turning up in winding sheets declaring
themselves ready for martyrdom. It must, however, be asked
when there had ever been righteous Shiite government, and
whether the justice envisaged was an ideal concept drawn from
the past, or merely the restoration of the 10% deducted from
one's salary or pension. Indeed, the mechanisms of protest
must not be confused with the nature of what was demanded:
in the case of the majority of the ^ulama the restitution of
personal grievances for themselves and some of their
following, and in that of TabatabaJi and a few others, the
• •
implementation of new values, ideas and institutions drawn 
from western thought.
Shaikh Fazlallah was the ideologue of the absolutist 
cause. Hairi has discussed Shaikh Fazlallah's arguments on 
the drafting of a constitution, representation, legislation, 
liberty and equality. This study has sought to stress Shaikh 
Fazlallah's essential point, that constitutionalism and the 
shari*»a are based on different sources of law. The one
derives its authority ultimately from the revealed will of
God. The other is based on the will of the people in 
Parliament. The Majlis therefore did not belong to the
category of things that had to be obeyed, and could not claim
- 314 -
to be the ultimate source of authority. Shaikh Fazlallah 
perceived that constitutionalism threatened the shari La more 
than absolutism because it had a dangerously attractive 
legitimising doctrine, which absolutism lacked. That is 
why he was at pains to attack representation and to make 
the point that vikalat used in the constitutionalist sense 
is different to vikalat as used in fiqh. The constitutionalists 
were employing vikalat where the fuqaha would use vilayat, 
that is for authority over the affairs of the community.
As Hairi has pointed out, Shaikh Fazlallah sought to 
disqualify anyone, including a muj tahid, from legislation.
The muj tahid can only elicit the provisions of the shari Hi 
from the sacred texts. To this point it may be added that 
the constitutionalists argued that the laws may be changed 
according to the exigencies of the age. Shaikh Fazlallah 
responded that the shari *a may never be changed - it was 
complete and perfect and appropriate to all ages. It has 
been noted further in Chapter VIII that Shaikh Fazlallah 
believed that legislation would interfere with the 
fundamental purpose of the shari*»a and the system which had 
been carefully constructed to achieve that purpose. In 
arguing that constitutionalism might, for example, make 
obligatory actions which the shariua declared merely 
permissable, Shaikh Fazlallah was accusing the 
constitutionalists of interfering with the five qualifications 
which define every action of a Muslim. The purpose of these 
qualifications is to guide the Muslim to good conduct in this 
world and to salvation in the next.
The constitutionalist Hiama believed that the Majlis 
would only legislate in what they termed the umur-i ^urfryya.
By this they appear to have meant matters dealt with in 
practice by the state and customary courts. Shaikh Fazlallah 
also recognised that there existed in practice affairs that 
were under the authority of the secular power, and even 
conceded that there was a need for reform in such affairs.
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These matters had fallen by a series of accidents outside 
the scope of the sharifca. Affairs which still remained 
within the scope of the sharica he termed umur-i <»amma 
(of course in practice under the traditional system the 
two spheres of authority, umur-i ^amma and umur-i Hrfiyya 
had overlapped and been confused). The constitutionalist 
<»ulama believed that the powers of the Majlis^  would be 
limited to the umur-i Hirfiyya. Shaikh Fazla 1lah,with 
his clearer understanding of the sources of law, realised 
that in practice constitutionalism would make no such 
distinction, which is why he demanded to know the boundaries 
(budud) of the Majlis. Constitutionalism was more likely to 
encroach upon the shari H  than absolutism because of its 
national basis and its powerful legitimising doctrine. The 
points of potential conflict between parliamentary law and 
the shari *»a were not clear to the constitutionalist Hlama 
partly because the lay constitutionalists tended deliberately 
to obscure them, because of their need for the Hi lama1s 
support. One major example arose in the matter of equality. 
Constitutionalism based on the community of the nation state 
recognised the wishes of individuals regardless of creed.
The shari ^ a based on the community of believers, could not 
accord to non-believers the same privileges as to Muslims.
It was Shaikh Fazlallah who drafted Article II of the 
Fundamental Law which provided for the supervision of 
legislation by a council of Hi 1ama. This article had the 
support of two other leading mujtahids, but their attitude 
differed from that of Shaikh Fazlallah. To the constitutionalist 
mujtahids the Article was a satisfactory means of ensuring 
that legislation would be in conformity with the shari^a.
To Shaikh Fazlallah it was a last resort to protect the 
shari *»a against a system he regarded as a dangerous threat 
and would really rather not have accepted at all. Shaikh 
Fazlallah was criticised for drafting the Article and then 
reneging on his promise not to oppose the Majlis if it were
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carried. This criticism did not take account of the fact 
that the Article as ratified differed from his initial draft 
most particularly on the point that in the final version 
selection of members of the council lay with the Majlis, not 
with the leading JHlama. As Shaikh Fazlallah foresaw the 
Article was rendered virtually nugatory.
Shaikh Fazlallah used the term mashruta to mean that
form of constitutionalist government that the westernisers 
were trying to impose on Iran. One of his demands in 1907 
was for mashruta-yi mashruH, constitutional government in 
accordance with the sharica. There is, however, no such 
thing, as Shaikh Fazlallah well knew, for the whole force of 
his arguments in his various pamphlets went to prove it. 
Mashruta-yi mashrijca is best understood as a slogan used at an 
expeditious moment. It was originally devised by the 
constitutionalists in an attempt to win support amongst the 
culama. In the summer of 1907, when,as Spring Rice pointed 
out, constitutionalism was the universal cry, and it would 
have been fruitless to argue against the existence of a majlis, 
Shaikh Fazlallah turned the constitutionalists' own slogan 
against them. If, however, he had to have a majlis, then it
must be based on the shari *»a - a goal better summed up by his
other slogan nigamnama-yi islami.
The constitutionalists offered various arguments in 
their attempts to refute Shaikh Fazlallah. As already shown 
they tried to establish the existence of a division in 
authority between the umur-i ^urfryya and the affairs covered 
by the shari*»a. But they could work out no clear dividing 
line, and did not confront the problem of having two 
conflicting legal systems existing side by side. They tried 
to differentiate between the roots and the branches of the 
sharica, between essential and secondary principles, but in 
fact no such divisions exist. They also tried to argue that 
the Majlis would execute the s h a r i but this brought them 
into conflict with the fact that law had first to be deduced
- 317 -
by the Hi 1ama before it could be executed by anyone else.
The constitutionalists never really answered Shaikh 
Fazlallah's fundamental points on the sources of the 
authority of the Majlis and the limitation of its powers.
As Hairi has shown, not even an lalim as eminent and gifted 
as NaJini was able to find adequate refutations.
In addition to providing ideological arguments on both
sides the muj tahids had an important part to play in
legitimising the view they supported. Shaikh Fazlallah, by
attacking the roots of constitutionalism and showing them to
be contrary to Islam, as well as establishing the Shah as one
of the executive authorities of the religion, served the
absolutist cause. On the opposing side, although
constitutionalism itself does not, of course, need religious
sanction to legitimise it, in Iran at that time representation
of the will of the people was little recognised and imperfectly
understood. The authority of TabatabaJi and Bihbihani was
• •
thus needed as further proof of the legitimacy of the Majlis 
in a still very traditional society, particularly in the 
face of the attacks of Shaikh Fazlallah.
The muj tahids' role in the Revolution was significant
only from 1905-1909, that is for a relatively short period.
The influence of the anti-constitutionalist Hlama began to
wane with the collapse of the absolutist cause. In the spring
of 1909 the bankruptcy of the government, the opposition
forming at Isfahan and Rasht, and the continued pressure from
the British and the Russians led the Shah to seek a compromise
with the constitutionalists. From this point an estrangement
grew between him and the anti-constitutionalist Hilama.
Their complete defeat in the summer of 1909 indicates how
closely their cause had been identified with his. After the
absolutist opposition crumbled, the constitutionalists likewise
no longer needed Bihbihani and TabatabaJi to legitimise the
• •
Majlis in terms of Islam. Tabatabaai, in any case, withdrew
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from politics. Bihbihani, with his political acumen, 
experience and contacts, continued to represent the views 
of some of his former largely bazaar constituency, the 
idea of the services of a parliamentary representation 
being still imperfectly understood, and the old and new 
arrangements existing side by side.
It has been argued by Algar that the 19th century in 
Iran was a period of conflict between the Hi lama and the 
state, and that this conflict arose from the failure of 
Shi'ite Islam to accord legitimacy to the Shah. The 
irreconcilable differences between the Hi lama and the state 
culminated in the Constitutional Revolution. In Chapter I 
of this thesis it has been contended that this was not the 
case. True, in fundamental jurisprudence the Shah had no 
legitimate place. But fundamental jurisprudence was not 
carried into practice by all the Hiama. Realising that 
they themselves had no adequate machinery to control political 
affairs, and recognising that a Shi'ite ruler was much 
preferable to the alternatives of Sunni, or infidel rule, 
or anarchy, many Hi lama sought accommodation with the state. 
Correspondingly they sought means to justify the Shah's 
authority and found them through God, the Imam, and through 
the proper execution of a legitimate function, the protection 
of Islam. There is evidence to suggest that by the latter 
part of the century a tacit agreement on the division of 
powers existed between Shah and Hi lama■ This agreement was 
to some extent shaken before the Constitutional Revolution 
by the centralising policies of the central government.
Although recognising that they had the authority to
accord validity to a political institution, the muj tahids
of Tehran do not seem to have seen themselves as Deputies
of the Imam acting against an oppressive government.
TabatabaJI made a vague reference to the Imam as the one 
• •
true ruler, but he was, as has been discussed, primarily
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influenced by ideas of western origin. The only 
reference to the ^ulama as naJib-i lamm, with aspersions 
cast upon the Shah, came from Sayyid Jamal al-Din Isfahani, 
who was not a mujtahid, and was a free thinker. The most 
powerful defendant of Islam, the one who argued most closely 
from the essentials of Shi'ite doctrine, Shaikh Fazlallah Nuri, 
was at pains to justify the royal authority. Indeed he 
highlighted the position of the ^ulama as na-J ib-i Hmm against 
the encroachments of constitutionalism, not against the royal 
power.
In 1905-6 the Ha lama led a movement for reform, yet it 
is questionable whether with a few exceptions, they really 
understood or desired change. Under the traditional system 
they enjoyed a position of power and privilege, paying 
little or no taxes on substantial income, having superior 
control of the judiciary, and being invested with peculiar 
advantages in such matters as sanctuary and punishment.
All these factors were obstacles to the creation of a uniform, 
national administrative and legal system. During the 
Revolution some of the discrepancies of the interests of 
the Hiama and their merchant and westernising associates 
became apparent. This was shown particularly in their 
resistance to legal reforms and to the taxation of vagf 
property.
It is a remarkable paradox of the Constitutional 
Revolution that what began largely as a revolt against a 
policy of centralisation of government turned into an 
important stage in that very process. The chief reason is 
perhaps that the bureaucrats who had revived the policy in 
the 1890's took a leading part in the Majlis and the first 
constitutional cabinets. They were joined in 1907 by militant 
westernising reformers like Taqizada. In 1905-6, when there 
were so many groups with different goals and understanding of 
what was happening, members of the higher bureaucracy, such
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as Saniu al-Daula, with their study and experience of the 
West, were alone in having clear objectives and the concept 
of a political ideology and organisation to carry them out.
In the confusion of the situation they were able to implement 
some of their policies, assisted by those, like the merchants, 
who saw advantages in them for their own reasons. These 
policies included the reorganisation of local government with 
the provincial governors rendered accountable, the reordering 
of the finances with the introduction of the notion of a 
budget, of departmental accountability, and of something 
approaching a civil list for the Shah. As mentioned, at the 
Ministry of Justice, Mukhbir al-Saltana worked for legal 
reforms which gave greater power to the state. In all 
departments the notion of accountability desired by reformist 
bureaucrats, leading merchants and others before the 
Revolution was introduced. Because of the financial crisis 
and the disordered state of the country, these reforms, 
though ratified by the Majlisyremained in abeyance. However, 
they were not removed from the statute books, and were taken 
up and implemented under the Pahlavi regime. Considering 
the implications of the policy of westernisation and 
centralisation for the Hjlama, Smart's comment in 1906 may 
be recalled:
'One remarkable feature of this revolution here - 
for it is surely worthy to be called a revolution - 
is that the priesthood have found themselves on the 
side of progress and freedom. This, I should think 
is almost unexampled in the world's history. If 
the reforms which the people, with their help, have 
fought for become a reality, all their power will 
be gone.'3
This is precisely what happened. The uu1ama assisted in that 
process which they had so long resisted and which under the
3. E.G. Browne, Revolution, op. cit., p. 123: original
letter in Browne Collection of Letters, Cambridge 
University Library.
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Pahlavi regime was to create a nev; social, political and 
economic order, which reduced proportionally the numbers 
and influence of the religious estate, subjected them to 
taxation and control by state bodies (e.g. the Ministry of 
Auqaf) and took over many of their legal functions as well 
as curtailing the jurisdiction of the shari*»a.
Yet since the majority of Iranians remained loyal to
Shi'ism, they retained an important residue of their former
power as leaders of the Shi'ite community, which they were
able to exploit when Mohammad Riza Shah's westernising and
economic policies created social dislocation and widespread
discontent. If Algar's view of the Revolution of 1905 as
a culmination of conflict between religion and state was
correct, it would be considered a Shi'ite revolution. In
fact those who shaped its course, including TabatabcJi, were
• •
influenced by ideas drawn from the west, and it was therefore 
a constitutional revolution. The events of 1978 onwards 
might be more truly termed a Shi‘ite revolution in that the 
doctrine that prevailed was, with some modifications, in 
the tradition of fundamental Shi'ite juristic thought.
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APPENDIX A
Shaikh Fazlallah1s original draft of Article II 
of the Supplementary Fundamental Law
The Sacred National Consultative Assembly, which has 
been established through the care of the Imam of the Age, 
may God hasten his coming, and the favour of His Majesty 
the Shahanshah of Islam, may God prolong his reign, and the 
diligence of the Proofs of Islam, and the whole community 
of Iran, may at no time pass a law that is not in 
accordance with the sacred precepts of Islam and the laws 
of His Excellency, the best of men, may prayers and peace 
be upon him. It is specified that it is the responsibility 
of the exalted lulama, may the blessings of God be upon them, 
to distinguish whether the laws proposed by the National 
Consultative Assembly, have been and are in accordance with 
the shariLa . Therefore it is laid down that at all times 
a Council of muj tahids and jurists of the first rank should 
be in session, so that before laws are passed they may be 
first examined and discussed in that learned Council. If 
the proposal is contrary to the sharica, it shall not be 
accorded the title of law. The judgement of the learned 
Council in this matter is final and must be obeyed. This 
article cannot ever be altered, 7th Rabila I (20th 
April 1907).1
1. Kasravi, op. cit., pp. 316-7.
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